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In July 1981, the last sections of the state-owned Bilston steelworks were 
unceremoniously shut, thus ending two centuries of hot metal production in the Black 
Country, the onetime workshop of the world.  The devastating closure of this profitable 
facility occurred despite a decade-long grassroots defence campaign spearheaded by 
local rank and file workers.  Using previously unexplored primary source material and 
oral testimony, this thesis provides a detailed analysis of the battle to save Bilston 
works.   
 
It explores how, in the midst of the 1970s steel crisis, an exceptionally diligent type of 
worker activist adapted traditional production practices to ensure the survival of the 
plant.  With Bilston’s steelmen maintaining their uniquely profitable record, bungling 
industry officials conspired to marginalise their plant in order to justify a deeply flawed 
state-sponsored rationalisation programme.  At the heart of this process were the 
activities of a senior and divisional management team who systematically rationalised 
the Bilston facility, whilst seeking to cynically undermine shop-floor solidarity.  The 
thesis, therefore, highlights the ways in which management prerogative impacted the 
lives of steelworkers and their families.   
 
The work critically examines the actions of a small band of shop stewards who 
mobilised into a multi-union local action committee tasked with saving 2,300 jobs.  A 
key focus here is their chosen strategic framework.  As experienced activists, they 
initially recruited a cross-party coalition of political figures to convince sympathetic 
policymakers to absorb the facility into a medium-term operating plan.  With the 
`3 
 
unfolding crisis prompting a less forgiving political landscape, Bilston’s enterprising 
shop stewards made a tactical transition, engaging in concerted collective direct action 
to persuade conservative union leaders to petition decisionmakers on their behalf.   
 
The thesis offers a critique of institutional behaviour, revealing how both the state and 
moderate steel unions undermined Bilston by repeatedly acquiescing to management 
prerogative.  Abandoned by union and Government bureaucrats, the campaign 
eventually crumbled from within.  The research identifies the ways in which ambivalent 
officials merely sat idly by as management undermined a profitable state concern 
before insidiously harassing its conscientious employees.  The thesis concludes with 
an account of the legacy of the battle for Bilston works, demonstrating how redundant 
steelmen, politicised by their experiences, played essential roles in the post-industrial 
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As part of an ambitious industrial renewal policy intended to reinvigorate Britain’s post-
war manufacturing base, Harold Wilson’s Labour Government nationalised the UK iron 
and steel trade in July 1967.  On vesting day, a newly formed British Steel Corporation 
(BSC) became the second largest industrial enterprise in the western world, employing 
a staggering 270,000 employees across 21 fully-integrated facilities producing a 
theoretical capacity of 29m t/p/a.  State control prompted an unprecedented wave of 
optimism to flow through a strategically vital manufacturing sector that, under private 
ownership, had been badly mismanaged.  Nationalisation, on the other hand, was 
expected to provide a platform from which planners and Whitehall officials could 
expand and reconstruct the industry in an organised and socially responsible manner.  
Whilst all major production units were initially safeguarded during the Corporation’s 
formative years, this would change over the course of the 1970s as the industry, 
saddled with a defective long-term development programme and suffering from 
commercial and operational mismanagement, was hit by an unprecedented crisis.       
 
Following a series of expedited rationalisation initiatives that culminated in a plant 
closure stampede in the second half of the decade, the industry entered the 1980s 
with only eight major sites having survived the cull.  Of the tens of thousands of 
steelworkers falling victim to this exceptional process of deindustrialisation, 
approximately 3,000 were once employed at Bilston, a site in a region of the West 
Midlands known as the Black Country.1   
 
1 It was Elihu Burritt who originally popularised the term ‘Black Country’.  Writing in 1868, the US Consul 




This thesis chronicles the so-called battle for Bilston steelworks from the perspective 
of unionised employees who orchestrated a decade-long grassroots campaign of 
shop-floor resistance.2  By shining a spotlight on their personal experiences, it 
represents a valuable addition to the study of the history of work, workers’ organisation 
and trade unionism.  Although the thesis is primarily an exploration of the workplace 
and the extra-workplace activities of the rank and file, it does not disregard national 
political developments.  It therefore provides an analysis of how the state, senior 
industry officials, trade unions and other stakeholders interacted with Bilston’s 
steelmen.3  Through this institutional framework, the experiences of local workers are 
positioned within the wider political, economic, and social contexts of 1970s Britain.4 
 
As an investigation into workplace organisation, accommodation and resistance, the 
bulk of the thesis focuses on reconstructing the activities of an informal workers’ group 
created to block closure and persuade policymakers to extend the lifespan of their 
plant.  Over a period of ten years, the so-called BJUAC coordinated a multi-faceted 
and determined campaign of resistance.  As an inquiry into their activities, the thesis 
 
cloud of industrial communities” between Wolverhampton and Birmingham.  See E. Burritt, Walks in the 
Black Country and its Green Borderland (London, 1868), p. 344. 
2 This includes all manual and supervisory grades, middle and departmental managers, the vast 
majority of which supported the fight against closure. 
3 Adopting a broad-church approach, the work places the experiences of Bilston’s workers and their 
unions in their local and national contexts. 
4 Between 1973 and 1979, the year iron and steel production permanently ceased at Bilston, the UK 
experienced the lowest growth rate in the western world.  Unemployment levels rose more or less 
continuously throughout the period, with larger organisations rationalising production and reducing 
manning levels accordingly. 
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addresses questions relating to how and why workers adapt, organise and, ultimately, 
fight to survive during an extended period of industrial decline.   
 
A core research theme is to identify and scrutinise the tactical framework adopted by 
the BJUAC, a multi-union body led by a cohort of politically conscious and community-
minded shop stewards.  Critically examining several distinctive strategic phases of the 
campaign, the thesis demonstrates how they originally based their defence on the 
plant’s impressive financial record, responding to the onset of the crisis by introducing 
a whole raft of cost-cutting and marketing initiatives.  Early chapters, therefore, seek 
to identify ways in which diligent and highly skilled production workers adapted 
traditional workplace practices in order to survive and flourish in recessionary 
conditions.  
 
With the actions of senior industry officials deliberately undermining profitability, the 
thesis outlines how the Bilston men recalibrated their position by calling for the 
retention of steelmaking on commercial and industrial lines.  Underpinning this tactical 
transition was a decision to work within the parameters of the industry’s consultatory 
apparatus.  The move saw shop stewards join forces with management to produce 
two detailed survival plans that convincingly called for investment.  The research, 
therefore, seeks to extend our understanding of how rank and file workers engaged in 
acts of shop-floor accommodation.  Likewise, it determines why a workforce with little 
history of self-organisation was compelled to participate in collective action.  Despite 
occasionally engaging in militant acts of industrial protest, instances of radicalism were 
nonetheless extremely rare.  As such, the thesis represents a detailed study into the 
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behaviour of a moderate rank and file compelled into participating in orthodox and 
sometimes unorthodox activities in a desperate bid to protect their livelihoods.  
 
An early strategy adopted by the Bilston men was to employ a powerful cross-party 
lobby of civic leaders, community stakeholders and sympathetic politicians to petition 
policymakers on their behalf.  Later, when faced with the prospect of a much less 
accommodating political and economic environment, pragmatic campaign leaders 
directed a more extensive and sophisticated process of outreach, enlisting the support 
of domestic and foreign experts, sympathetic media correspondents, respected 
academics and even the opposition Conservative Party.  The Bilston men engaged in 
peaceful direct action by taking their campaign of resistance onto the streets of Britain, 
organising huge public rallies whilst also occupying Fleet Street with a sit-down protest 
vigil.  The research, therefore, places the battle for steelmaking in its extra-workplace 
context, examining ways in which local workers sought to manipulate national political, 
industrial and trade union elites into supporting their cause. 
 
These actions, it is established, were also used to galvanise an under-siege workforce 
that, at various stages of campaign, displayed signs of battle-weariness.  The thesis 
considers what methods Bilston’s shop stewards used to mobilise internal support and 
sustain shop-floor solidarity, with more conventional measures such as mass meetings 
or branch communiques combined with the aforementioned instances of industrial or 
public protest.  Despite the BJUAC preserving a united front through solidaristic 
collective action, the defence would eventually disintegrate from within, as financial 
self-interest and sectionalism took hold.  The relationship between the action 
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committee leadership and the plant’s rank and file is a principal topic of the study, with 
accusations of undemocratic behaviour and coercion probed in some detail.   
 
The post-industrial period, beginning in May 1979, is explored, with the thesis 
determining how the BJUAC, having reformed as a workers’ welfare cooperative, 
dominated Bilston’s social, cultural and political landscapes until their retirement in 
May 2008.  Housed in an abandoned works facility, they attended the needs of a 
community devastated by the loss of their primary industry.  Politicised by defeat and 
then the policies of the Margaret Thatcher Governments, the Bilston men spearheaded 
several grassroots ‘right to work’ protests.  This process would culminate in June 1987 
with the election of their Chairman, Dennis Turner, to Parliament.  Whilst in 
Westminster he would seek to use his past experiences as the head of both the 
BJUAC and the workers’ cooperative to reduce poverty by encouraging the self-
advancement of unemployed workers through the provision of open access tertiary 
education.  The final section, therefore, examines how the decade long anti-closure 
campaign directly impacted the BJUAC’s post-industrial behaviour.  In this context, the 
thesis delves into the social, political and cultural legacy of the battle for Bilston 
steelworks.    
 
Another key overall aim of the thesis is to place the men’s activities in their full 
industrial context, thereby uncovering how the policies of employers and management 
directly impacted on working lives.  It is suggested that, in order to fully understand the 
men’s fight for steelmaking, we must explore managerial activity and prerogative.  The 
experiences of local steelmen are, therefore, situated in the background of the various 
personnel, commercial and development policies adopted by successive BSC 
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regimes.  At the centre of this appraisal is a modernisation programme espousing an 
inflexible ‘bigger is better’ approach to industrial renewal.  The thesis critically 
evaluates a flawed strategy that, in the case of Bilston, wantonly rundown and 
eventually sacrificed a consistently profitable facility.  It is revealed how a process of 
managed decline was coordinated at plant-level, with management decision-making 
negatively impacting on workplace practices and, crucially, profitability.   
 
Coordinating this process were divisional officials, who exploited management 
prerogative to introduce a series of discriminatory policies designed to shield 
production units already incorporated into their headquarters’ long-term development 
proposals.  After forcibly engineering a lossmaking situation at Bilston, an explicitly 
biased management oversaw a more formal rundown process.  The thesis establishes 
how industry officials coordinated a campaign of misinformation that, in a successful 
attempt to legitimise the expedited closure of traditional plants, blamed their own many 
failings on employees.  Foiled in their attempts to shut Bilston by conventional means, 
a cynical senior management team oversaw an insidious shop-floor assault designed 
to undermine rank and file resistance.  The impact this and other questionable tactics 
had on the mindset of steelworkers underpins the penultimate sections of the thesis. 
 
As a study into public sector steelmen, a further line of enquiry is to investigate the 
wider political environment and how the state impacted on the experiences of rank 
and file workers.  Having survived a doctrinaire assault on the industry coordinated by 
the 1970/74 Edward Heath Government, Bilston’s steelmen skilfully persuaded the re-
elected Harold Wilson Government to absorb their plant into the industry’s medium-
term operating plan.  It is argued, however, that Labour’s steel policy was little more 
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than a political compromise which handed only a temporary stay of execution to Black 
Country steelworkers.  Although the appointment of James Callaghan as Prime 
Minister in April 1976 brought an ideological recommitment to traditional steelmaking 
communities, a severe drop in world demand prompted a shift in the political 
landscape.   
 
The thesis examines how a March 1978 White Paper saw the withdrawal of Labour’s 
erstwhile manifesto pledge.  The Bilston men, who had previously relied on their ability 
to manipulate sympathetic Whitehall officials, forlornly sought to exploit a loophole in 
Government policy.  However, not only did the new industrial strategy permanently 
end any prospect of Bilston receiving vital investment, it also permitted the use of 
tempting state-sponsored compensation packages to induce local workers to 
surrender their livelihoods.  Substantive elements of this study, therefore, define how 
the industrial policies of successive Governments not only drove the BJUAC’s overall 
strategic framework, but ultimately contributed to the plant’s demise.   
 
The influence of state policy on Bilston’s post-industrial social, political and economic 
environs is also examined.  It is asserted that the domestic policies pursued by the 
Conservative Government, elected only weeks after the permanent cessation of iron 
and steelmaking in April 1979, prompted the BJUAC’s decision to reform as a workers’ 
cooperative.  Moreover, the thesis demonstrates how Thatcherism not only 
determined the nature of their unique brand of community activism, but also their 




The response of the steel unions to the threat of industrial decline is another key 
aspect of the research, with the thesis measuring patterns of resistance and 
accommodation at executive level and, how these impacted on the fortunes of rank 
and file members.  Offering a broader narrative of late twentieth century trade 
unionism, it presents a study into institutional conduct in a period of industrial decline.  
It is argued that, when confronted with recessionary and structural de-manning, the 
unions were regularly found wanting.  The thesis establishes how inter-organisational 
disputes, resulting from a disorderly and fragmented institutional landscape, prohibited 
effective collective resistance from the TUCSICC, an official umbrella body consisting 
of the industry’s major workers organisations.5  It is revealed how the steel unions, led 
by the moderate ISTC, too readily accepted the rationale behind management’s 
‘bigger is better’ philosophy, thereby sacrificing thousands of members on the altar of 
technological advancement.  In a failed bid to pacify the concerns of fraternal brothers 
employed at doomed facilities, the unions adopted a ‘no redundancies before re-
employment’ posture.  The adequacy of this compromise plan is scrutinised, with the 
thesis uncovering how ideologically conservative organisations, acquiescing to 
managerial privilege over commercial and development policymaking, undermined the 
prospects of their rank and file members. 
 
The thesis also examines how those policies pursued by steel union hierarchies at the 
centre shaped the strategies adopted by campaigning members at plant-level.  The 
BJUAC’s founding fathers, frustrated by the perceived ambivalence of their leaders, 
at first turned their backs on union headquarters.  This position would change later in 
 
5 The TUCSICC, formed immediately after nationalisation, consisted of ISTC, NUB, TGWU, GMWU, 
UCATT and the NCCC; an organisation representing fourteen different craft unions. 
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the campaign, particularly after the appointment of a seemingly more combative 
General Secretary.  It is determined that despite his arrival at first appearing to herald 
a newfound organisational resilience, a policy vacuum promptly reappeared at 
executive level.  Bereft of ideas, the steel unions again accepted management 
prerogative over policymaking by signing a productivity deal that legitimised the inbuilt 
overmanning myth propagated by BSC headquarters.  Moreover, by acknowledging 
the need for structural streamlining measures whilst encouraging record breaking 
redundancy cheques in exchange for members’ jobs, the steel unions merely opened 
the door to the aforementioned wave of closures.  As the battle for Bilston reached its 
climax, their leaders’ haphazard, firefighting approach to defending individual plants 
completely undermined the defence campaign.  Ignoring these institutional 
shortcomings, the BJUAC, chaired and co-chaired by fraternal loyalists, continued to 
pin their colours to the union mast.  This, the thesis asserts, would be to their own 
disadvantage. 
 
In summary, this thesis recounts a little-known campaign to save a Black Country iron 
and steel plant from the standpoint of its rank and file steelmen.  Focusing on their 
personal experiences during a decade-long economic crisis, it represents a vital 
contribution to research into the post-war history of workers and the workplace.  The 
study, nevertheless, places the battle for Bilston in the industrial, political, economic 
and labour relations contexts of 1970s Britain; providing a detailed investigation into 
how the actions of the state, management and the labour movement directly impacted 







This analysis of the battle for Bilston works makes use of a rich body of pre-existing, 
yet largely unexplored documentary evidence.  The survey of institutional behaviour 
benefits from collections housed at established archives.  In the case of BSC, WCA’s 
‘Bilston Steel works Collection’ contains all administrative, financial and technical 
records for Bilston, permitting a close study of workplace practices, performance and 
management prerogative.6  Additional primary source material relating to the conduct 
of steel union bureaucrats has been consulted at Warwick University’s MRC.  The 
facility’s authorised ISTC collection includes monthly editions of the steel union’s 
journals, Man and Metal and The Banner; transcribed minutes of Executive meetings; 
quarterly reports; correspondence produced by full-time officials and transcriptions of 
all national resolutions passed by its leadership.7  Likewise, the Centre’s TUC 
collection contains detailed reports and minute books for the Steel Committee, which 
are supplemented with a voluminous assortment of ancillary statements produced by 
trade union, Government and industry officials.8  These collections shed light on state 
 
6 See ‘Bilston Steelworks collection (1693 – c.1990s), WCA, DB-31’.   
7 The ‘ISTC, the BISAKTA and predecessors collection (1865-2004), MRC, MSS.36’, sheds light on the 
union’s official response to the changing economic and political landscape, and proposals for 
developing and rationalising the industry.  The collection includes microfilm copies of all 
correspondence passed between individual works branches and union headquarters.  These items help 
extend our awareness of the relationship that developed between the Confederation leadership and its 
lay members.  Meanwhile, the ‘SIMA collection, MRC, 755/4/4/4-5’ reveals the activities the 
management union undertook on behalf of their Bilston members; and ‘BSC and predecessor bodies, 
1896 – 1981, MRC, MSS.365/BSC/56’, includes material relating to management’s systematic rundown 
of the works. 
8 See ‘Steel: Trade Union Consultative Committee, 1967-1975, MRC.292D/611.41/6 – 36’; and ‘Steel 
Committee: Signed Minutes, 1972-1990, MRC, MSS.292D/611.41/6 – 27’.  The MRC’s TUCSICC 
collection lays bare the collective actions of the steel unions during the crisis, granting the reader a 
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and organisational responses to the constantly changing economic, political, and 
industrial landscapes of 1970s Britain.  Not only do they widen our understanding of 
the relationship the various steel union Executive Councils developed with rank and 
file members, but also each other – two key lines of enquiry within this study.   
 
Notwithstanding their value in scrutinising institutional behaviour, the various WCA and 
MRC collections reveal very little about rank and file behaviour.9  In order to establish 
an alternative perspective, the thesis exploits extra-institutional primary source 
material previously housed in personal collections.  Beginning in 2014, the author 
delivered an 18-month HLF sponsored community project surveying the industrial 
heritage of the works.  The initiative led to the creation of the ‘ITSOE collection’, an 
incredibly diverse archive comprising of newspaper cuttings, personal 
correspondence, diaries, flyers and minute books for Bilston’s Works Council and 
union branches.  One particularly valuable cache of files includes reports and official 
communiqués sent between Bilston’s protesting steelmen and local and central 
Government, industry and trade union officials.10  Not only does the ITSOE collection 
help expand our understanding of everyday life on the shop-floor, it also shines a 
spotlight on the overall strategic framework adopted by local shop stewards in their 
fight for jobs.  
 
 
wider understanding of the body’s inner dynamics and how internal conflict often prohibited any kind of 
effective collective response to structural de-manning. 
9 Although a small folder of WCA files does relate to the local defence campaign, it only provides a 
partial picture of the activities of steelworkers at plant-level.  See ‘The Closure of British Steel at Bilston 
1972-1979, WCA, DW-173’. 
10 See ‘ITSOE Collection, BCA1/1 – 1/6’. 
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Whereas the ITSOE documentary collection provides a much-needed antidote to the 
one-dimensional, top down interpretation offered by traditional collections, it amounts 
to only a partial record of local activities.11  In an attempt to fill the empirical void, this 
thesis makes use of interview material collected from a group of ex-steelworkers by 
trained ITSOE volunteers.12   
 
Infamously maligned by A.J.P. Taylor as “old men drooling about their youth”, the 
credibility of oral history was questioned by scholars contesting its legitimacy as an 
academic data collection tool.13  This would all change in the 1970s and 1980s when, 
in the words of Michael Frisch, the method was embraced by historians seeking to 
produce, “a new kind of history from bottom up and the outside in to challenge the 
established organisation of knowledge and power”.14  For some, oral history is 
employed as part of a reconstructive agenda, which Ron Grele describes as, “the 
interviewing of eye-witness participants in the events of the past for the purpose of 
 
11 As an informal, un-constituted voluntary organisation spearheaded by fulltime workers, the BJUAC 
failed to keep a complete record of their activities.   
12 A small cohort of volunteers, many of whom had ancestral ties to the plant, received intensive 
interview training from the Oral History Society.  Following an extensive outreach and screening 
process, they interviewed approximately twenty former steelworkers whom had either participated in or 
witnessed key events covered by this thesis.  These men and women were loosely divided into four 
subgroups: 1) the sole surviving action committee leader; 2) ex-senior shop stewards who acted as a 
secondary support network for the action committee; 3) active rank and file trade union branch and 
Works Council members and 4) members of the wider community including political activists, 
community leaders and the wives of ex-steelmen.  See ITSOE collection, BCA1/0.  The thesis also 
benefits from the Documenting the Workshop of the World oral history project, which included interviews 
with action committee Chairman Dennis Turner and former works convenors.  See Documenting the 
Workshop of the World, WCA, LS/LB6/2. 
13 R. Gildea, ‘The Long March of Oral History: Around 1968 in France’, Oral History, 38 (2010), p. 68. 
14 M. Frisch, A Shared Authority: Essays on the Craft and Meaning of Oral and Public History, (New 
York: 1989), p. xviii. 
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historical reconstruction”.15  In the case of In the Shadow of Elisabeth, the ITSOE 
interview material has been deployed in what Lynn Abrams has labelled the “evidential 
model of usage”, encompassing, “the application of oral history for evidence gathering, 
the use of oral testimony as data, providing information to support an argument and 
illustrative material”.16  Any concerns over the validity of the interview material were – 
in part – assuaged by the use of reminiscence sessions.  Adopting a roundtable 
approach, these private events provided an opportunity to authenticate and 
corroborate personal testimonies, and to capture memory narratives and personal 
reflections in a group setting.  Meanwhile, the author of this thesis, in his capacity as 
a community historian, spent countless man-hours in the former works social centre 
speaking to ex-steelmen in an informal capacity.  The results of these conversations, 
alongside the oral history interviews, underpin key sections of the research. 
 
Notwithstanding the capacity of these techniques to verify the material collected at the 
interview stage, there is evidence that ITSOE’s oral testimonies, as personal 
recollections, contain what Anna Bryson and Sean McConville refer to as “false 
memories”.17  Indeed, the issue of subjectivity has long been debated by oral historians 




15 For a summary of the use of interviews for the purposes of historical reconstruction, see R. Grele, 
‘Directions for Oral History in the United States’, in D.K. Dunaway and W.K. Baum (eds), Oral History: 
An Interdisciplinary Anthology (Plymouth, 1996), pp. 62-84.   
16 L. Abrams, Oral History Theory, (London, 2010), p. 15. 
17 A. Bryson and S. McConville, The Routledge Guide to Interviewing: Oral History, Social Enquiry and 
Investigation, (London, 2014). 
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Subjectivity then, at least in this sense, is not unique to oral history, but subjectivity 
– defined as the quality of defining or interpreting something through the medium 
of one’s mind – is what oral history is … accessing it, even celebrating it – is the 
bread and butter of oral history.18 
 
This thesis fully acknowledges the mismemories and distortions that may appear in 
the interview data; accepting that, in the words of Alessandro Portelli, “subjectivity is 
as much the business of history as are the more visible ‘facts’”.19 
 
The ITSOE collection, when combined with those items sourced from formal settings, 
has facilitated a comprehensive analysis that places Bilston’s rank and file experience 
in the wider institutional context.  The thesis adopts a traditional linear chronological 
narrative, permitting a progressive and methodological analytical framework that 
traces the pattern of events as and when they occurred.  Pragmatic and empirical, 
rather than abstract and overly theoretical, it provides an intimate, blow-by-blow 




The first chapter presents a critical reading of the historiography of steel and the Black 
Country.  Part one examines the development of labour history from the early 
institution studies through to the more analytical and reflective historiography of the 
 
18 Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 22. 
19 A. Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History, (New 
York, 1991), p. 50. 
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1960s and 1970s pioneered by scholars such as Thompson and Hobsbawm.  It then 
highlights the limited place that steel holds in the landscape of both ‘traditional’ and 
‘new’ labour history.  The final part explores the problems with the existing 
historiography of the Black Country and the ways in which the study of work, and steel 
in particular, has been relatively neglected. 
 
Divided into two distinct parts, chapter two places the public sector steel industry and 
the ensuing fight to save Bilston in historical context.  The scope is deliberately broad, 
with the first half providing a general account of the industrial and commercial heritage 
of the trade prior to nationalisation in July 1967.  By concentrating on the overall 
performance of Bilston works under two dynamic family firms, it offers an insight into 
how the facility survived the collapse of the pig iron trade in the late nineteenth century 
before becoming one of the most successful special steel plants of its kind.  The 
chapter assesses how the basis of Bilston’s business model was the advanced 
technical expertise, commercial nous and frugality of a class of steelworker who, 
decades later, would repeatedly post a profit even during the world crisis of the mid-
1970s.  It also exposes how an ill-fated capitally intensive post-war reconstruction 
programme would sow the seeds of its demise under the Corporation.  By surveying 
the nascent trade union landscape of the industry, the chapter sheds light on the 
origins, ideological underpinnings, structure and internal dynamics of the ISTC.  A key 
area of interest here is the union’s traditional readiness to sacrifice large swathes of 
members in the name of modernisation.  Another theme explored is the historically 
fractured relationship the ISTC developed with rival unions; an issue that generated a 
fragmented labour relations climate which also prevailed into nationalisation.  The 
remainder of the chapter focuses exclusively on the unique industrial relations of the 
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Black Country works.  It is contended that, by adopting a uniquely progressive 
approach to management, the plant’s paternalistic owners established an espirit de 
corps with a wider workforce that habitually displayed an aversion to combination, self-
organisation and radical industrial action.  Meanwhile, outside the works, local shop 
stewards played an active role in political and community life.  These longstanding 
traditions, later chapters reveal, had an explicit impact on the strategic framework 
adopted by subsequent generations of workers during the battle for Bilston works.20   
 
Chapter three documents the fortunes of local workers during the early years of state 
ownership.  Nationalisation originally generated a new sense of hope as steelworkers 
were buoyed by a wide range of progressive personnel policies introduced by 
enlightened Corporation officials and a supportive Labour Government.  Attention is 
drawn to how these social functions were extended to its fledgling rationalisation 
programme by establishing safeguards that initially cushioned the effect of 
restructuring.  Although some minor closures did occur in this early period, they were 
carried out at a measured pace and with the full compliance of affected workers.  The 
chapter provides an insight into how this relatively peaceful coexistence would end 
when, from April 1971 onwards, the Conservative Government exploited a downturn 
in the traditional trade cycle to unilaterally expedite closures.  It investigates the main 
political events surrounding Edward Heath’s dogmatic approach to state steel and how 
it influenced the trajectory of the February 1973 Ten Year Strategy White Paper, which 
set out BSC’s long-term development plans.  The chapter dissects a ‘bigger is better’ 
 
20 Against a backdrop of low union consciousness amongst the wider workforce, Bilston’s senior shop 
stewards traditionally participated in the civic life of the town.  This, the thesis will demonstrate, had a 
significant impact on the strategic direction of the campaign.   
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approach to modernisation that was both ill-conceived and badly delivered.  One of 
the core findings of this critical appraisal is that management left the industry ill-
prepared for the coming crisis by overlooking the commercial benefits of flexible mini-
works such as Bilston.  Presenting an overview of the actions of the first generation of 
so-called WACs or action committees, the chapter concludes with a detailed 
investigation into the earliest instances of industrial resistance at Bilston.  Whilst 
identifying the origins of the BJUAC, a primary objective here is to establish its initial 
tactical approach.  Providing an account of local events, the chapter establishes how 
shop stewards, frustrated by the apathy displayed amongst their national leaders, 
adopted a strategic framework that centred on recruiting a regional political lobby to 
successfully petition decisionmakers on their behalf.  
 
Chapter four examines the manner in which Bilston’s steelmen reacted to the arrival 
of the slump at the midway point of the decade.  It begins with an evaluation of the 
Labour Government’s interventionist approach to steel by reviewing the impact of a 
1975 state-sponsored tripartite review of management’s closure programme.  It is 
argued that the inquiry failed to address the fundamental flaws of the Ten Year 
Strategy.  As a relieved workforce celebrated a political pardon secured with the 
assistance of their lobby, they were suddenly hit by the crisis.  The chapter suggests 
BSC, now led by a more combative top brass, looked to unilaterally expedite mass 
redundancies previously postponed by the Government review.  The adequacy of the 
trade union response to this move is scrutinised, with the TUCSICC temporarily 
blocking BSC’s advances by negotiating a national cost-cutting deal.  The chapter 
chronicles how Bilston’s dutiful labour force reacted to the changing economic 
landscape of the mid-1970s, establishing the methods in which they adapted working 
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practices to maintain their proud tradition of profitability.  A short-lived mini-boom was 
bolstered by the early industrial strategies of new Prime Minister James Callaghan, 
persuading management to enthusiastically extend Bilston’s life expectancy by half a 
decade.  The chapter, however, demonstrates how the plant’s performance continued 
to be diluted by failings elsewhere, prompting senior industry officials to cynically falsify 
labour costs and productivity statistics in a bid to force through the rundown of older 
facilities.  Placed under immense pressure, steel union leaders signed a deal which – 
in acknowledging the existence of overmanning – facilitated the transfer of orders from 
traditional sites to more modern, lossmaking facilities safeguarded under the Ten Year 
Strategy.  The chapter concludes by detailing events surrounding the subsequent 
cessation of ironmaking at Bilston which, it is alleged, management secured by 
abusing existing consultation machinery.   
 
Chapter five is principally concerned with responses to a March 1978 decision by the 
Labour Government to partially disengage from state steel.  Having witnessed their 
prized blast furnace mothballed, a revamped BJUAC acted on the advice of 
policymakers by revising their earlier approach.  In a display of solidarity that was 
typical of a tightknit group of industrial workers, they worked alongside local middle-
management to produce a sophisticated report advocating redevelopment on 
commercial grounds.  The chapter explores how the situation on the ground was 
quickly overtaken by wider political events at the centre.  A beleaguered Labour 
Government, deceived by BSC’s vague and perfidious overcapacity/overmanning 
narrative, made an epoch-making decision to abandon its pre-election pledge to 
safeguard older steelmaking communities.  With Whitehall officials retreating into the 
shadows, emboldened management expedited the closure of previously pardoned 
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sites before turning their attentions towards the Black Country.  The men’s tactical 
flexibility is highlighted, with the BJUAC realigning their thinking by seeking to establish 
a closer working relationship with their unions.  Following an examination of the inner 
dynamics of the action committee’s streamlined new leadership team, the chapter 
considers how shop stewards pursued their leaders and galvanised an increasingly 
disenfranchised shop-floor.   
 
Chapter six begins with an appraisal of the trade union landscape in the wake of a 
national strike threat made on behalf of Bilston.  With the men’s actions forcing 
management into a temporary retreat, the TUCSICC was handed one final opportunity 
to formulate a collective anti-closure campaign from the centre.  The chapter exposes 
how inter-organisational conflict at executive level resulted in yet another policy 
vacuum.  As their leaders wavered, Bilston’s enterprising shop stewards sought to 
take matters into their own hands.  The men’s relationship with their union leaders in 
London is examined, with the chapter highlighting how the latter finally threw their hat 
into the ring after a further round of lobbying from the Bilston men.  The chapter 
concludes by outlining the management’s stubborn refusal to answer further calls for 
investment. 
 
Chapter seven provides a comprehensive account of what would be a turbulent final 
phase of the fight to save Bilston’s heavy-end.21  It begins by exploring how 
management, having been frustrated in their efforts to negotiate closure by legitimate 
 
21 The heavy-end of a fully-integrated steelworks consists of a blast furnace for producing iron, and a 
melting shop for steel.  A rolling mill and finishing end subsequently transform crude steel into a variety 
of semi-finished or finished products. 
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means, deliberately sought to weaken local resistance.  Adopting a range of 
unscrupulous tactics, the primary objective was to offer lucrative compensation 
packages in an attempt to encourage voluntary mass redundancies.  The methods 
adopted to counter these illicit overtures are assessed, with a seemingly more militant 
BJUAC overseeing a historic plant takeover and work-in that secured another stay of 
execution.  But with the Corporation determined to have their way, it is revealed how 
the campaign became badly exposed.  With no one left to turn to, Bilston’s desperate 
shop stewards made one final approach to an ISTC leadership who belatedly launched 
a three-pronged defence of their fraternal brothers in the Black Country.  The 
effectiveness of this final flurry of activity is measured, as is the mindset of a battle-
weary workforce.  The chapter concludes by suggesting that the ideologically 
conservative steel unions’ refusal to call a national stoppage led to an irrevocable 
malaise taking hold of the shop-floor.  With the men dividing into two opposing camps, 
it is demonstrated how the campaign would eventually disintegrate from within.   
 
Chapter eight begins by highlighting the treatment of the nation’s public sector 
steelworkers at the hands of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Government.  Part one 
concerns itself with the 1980 steel strike, a tumultuous event that is placed in the 
context of both past and present rationalisation measures.  The post-strike climate is 
explored, with yet another new industry chief announcing his arrival by launching 
further job cuts.  The chapter draws attention to trade union responses to an 
unprecedented threat to commercial steelmaking, highlighting the positive effect the 
stoppage had on a TUCSICC leadership that finally relinquished longstanding rivalries 
to launch a sophisticated pan-organisation executive campaign.  Politicised by the 92-
day strike, which they organised at regional level, the BJUAC briefly reformed in a vain 
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attempt to defend what remained of their facility.  Although shop stewards prepared a 
radical new defence strategy, their colleagues were unwilling to participate in yet 
another protracted struggle.  The second half of the chapter is devoted to surveying 
life in post-industrial Bilston.  Identifying the reasons for the failed economic 
regeneration of the town, it recognises the role the BJUAC played in attending the 
needs of a community struggling with the harsh realities of de-industrialisation.  By 
forming a welfare cooperative on abandoned works property, the men established a 
forum from which they delivered a range of frontline services and innovative re-training 
schemes to unemployed industrial workers.  The chapter concludes by demonstrating 
how these experiences enhanced a collective social and political consciousness 
already heightened by the campaign and the aforementioned steel strike.  Having 
spearheaded a region-wide protest movement, Dennis Turner entered Parliament 
where he devoted his twenty-five-year political career to championing the cause of 
traditional working-class communities. 
 
The conclusion summarises the role the principal actors played in the battle for Bilston 
iron and steelworks.  After critically assessing the actions of successive Governments, 
senior industry officials and trade union leaders, it appraises the behaviour of the 
BJUAC leadership throughout the battle for Bilston.  Some of the more controversial 
elements of the campaign are addressed, particularly retrospective complaints 
levelled at action committee leader Dennis Turner.  Did he overly rely on political and 
trade union elites to save the plant?  As an institutional loyalist, did he allow his esteem 
for his union leadership cloud his judgement?  Did he cynically exploit the anti-closure 
campaign to enhance his own political career?  Were charges of autocratic behaviour 
at all reasonable?  The thesis concludes by examining the legacy of Turner and his 
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colleagues, taking a brief look at how they continue to influence the social and political 
landscapes of Bilston today. 








The early pioneers of labour history, adopting a strict institutional approach, focused 
their attentions on documenting the activities of formal organisations such as political 
parties, trade unions and employers’ associations.  The likes of Sidney and Beatrice 
Webb, Barbara Hammond and G.D.H. Cole placed trade union bureaucrats and 
national political leaders at the very centre of their protracted accounts.1  Although 
working men and their communities occasionally featured in their voluminous texts, 
they were invariably depicted as the malleable playthings of a powerful capitalist or 
managerial elite.  Following WWII, practitioners continued to advocate these so-called 
Webbian histories, limiting labour history to the study of organisations and their 
bureaucratic officials:2 
 
1 See G.D.H. Cole, An Introduction to Trade Unionism (London, 1918) and A Short History of the British 
Working Class Movement 1789-1947 (London, 1948); B.L. Hammond, The Town Labourer 1760-1832: 
The New Civilisation (London, 1917); and S. and B. Webb, The History of Trade Unionism, revised ed. 
(London, 1926). 
2 For examples of general trade union or labour movement histories published in the immediate post-
war era, see H.A. Clegg, A. Fox and A.F. Thompson, History of British Trade Unions since 1889: 1889-
1910 (Oxford, 1964); A. Flanders, Trade Unions (London, 1952); A. Hutt, British Trade Unionism: An 
Outline History, revised ed. (London, 1975); L. Morton and G. Tate, The British Labour Movement, 
1770–1920, revised ed. (London, 1956); and H. Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism (London, 
1963).  Single or comparative institutional histories also continued to flourish in this period.  There are 
too many to list in this short review, but some more noteworthy examples include H.A. Clegg, General 
Union: A Study of the National Union of General and Municipal Workers (Oxford, 1954); A.I. Marsh, 
Industrial Relations in Engineering (Oxford, 1965); A. Spoor, White-Collar Union: Sixty Years of NALGO 
(London, 1967); and H.A. Turner, Trade Union Growth, Structure and Policy: A Comparative Study of 
the Cotton Unions (London, 1962).  For a review of trade union historiography during the period in 
question, see E.J. Hobsbawm, ‘Trade Union Historiography’, Bulletin of the Society for the Study of 




They were studying the organised workers’ movement, its leaders, actions and 
ideas.  They knew which research methods they were supposed to use and 
had little doubt about the appropriate framework for interpretation.  True, 
dominant approaches varied from one country to the next, but almost everyone 
seemed to have his or her own ‘synthesis’.  They all had one thing in common: 
they focused on the institutional aspects of labour history, such as 
organisational structure, congresses, leaders, debates, strikes and elections.3 
 
John Harrison, in his review of the Asa Briggs and John Saville edited Essays in 
Labour History, bemoaned the antiquated nature of this traditional approach, 
declaring: 
 
But the central question with which one is left after reading the Essays is, what 
is Labour History all about?; or, more precisely, what should be the methods 
and content of this field of study? … The weakness of much Labour History is 
that it has not yet emancipated itself from approaches and methods derived 
from economic history and biography …4 
 
Answering this critique was E.P. Thompson who, by publishing his momentous The 
Making of the Working Class, sought to, “rescue the poor stockinger, the ‘obsolete’ 
hand-loom weaver, the ‘utopian’ artisan, and even the deluded follower of Joanna 
 
3 M. van der Linden, Transnational Labour History (Aldershot, 2003), p. 1. 
4 J.F.C. Harrison, Reviews: Asa Briggs and John Saville, New Left Review (NLR), 3 (1960). 
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Southcott, from the enormous condescension of posterity”.5  Similarly, in a deliberately 
provocative journal article reviewing the state of the literature, Eric Hobsbawm 
criticised labour history for its banality: 
 
A few works of scholarship, like R.W. Postgate’s Builders’ History (1929) and 
the 1934 TUC Martyrs of Tolpuddle stand out among a mass of jubilee or 
souvenir volumes or pamphlets, mainly written by elderly officials or 
sympathetic publicists with a very much greater sense of union piety and 
retrospective self-satisfaction than scholarly competence or critical sense.6 
 
When advocating the abandonment of the existing status quo, these radical thinkers 
actively encouraged the adoption of a social approach to the study of labour history in 
order to record the lives and experiences of ordinary working-class communities.  
Assuming the moniker of ‘new history’, this burgeoning school championed a move 
away from formal institutions and their national leaderships, promoting innovative 
investigations into what Thompson had labelled “history from below”.7  To some 
disciples, these calls to arms sparked an interest in life away from the shop-floor, whilst 
others cast their scholarly gaze towards documenting everyday experiences within the 
workplace.8  A member of the latter camp, James Cronin – author of Industrial Conflict 
 
5 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London, 1963), p. 12. 
6 Hobsbawm, Trade Union Historiography, p. 31. 
7 E.P. Thompson, ‘History from Below’, The Times Literary Supplement, 7 April 1966. 
8 Those who sought to investigate everyday experiences away from the workplace busied themselves 
documenting various aspects of working-class culture, family and domestic life, housing and leisure 
time, social mobility, race and gender.  Others, retaining an explicit interest in workers, investigated 
forms of industrial and collective action away from trade union headquarters.  The vast majority had a 




in Great Britain – summarised the contribution this new generation of writers had made 
to a field that had become frustratingly prosaic: 
 
Yet another important cluster of researchers felt that, despite the orientation of 
previous labor history towards workers’ economic interests and collective 
organization, very little was in fact known about workers’ lives at work … I would 
suggest that in broad terms it would be agreed that ‘rank and filists’ have 
enormously enriched our understanding of the daily life of workers, of the 
problems they face in the labour market and at work, of the strategies and 
attitudes of employers, and of the opportunities different working environments 
and economic conjunctures have presented for organization and collective 
action.9 
 
Cronin and his contemporaries, many of whom were disciples of the ‘New Left’, looked 
to record working-class experiences by surveying radical acts of resistance, or what 
Allan Flanders termed the “challenge from below”.10  This new framework, however, 
proved highly controversial, with those exponents studying trade union activity in the 
workplace instinctively drawn to more militant breeds of industrial workers.  A definitive 
pattern emerged, with researchers instinctively and brazenly attacking trade union 
leaders for their perceived conservatism which, it was asserted, subverted their rank 
and file members.  Cronin pinpointed its core assumptions: 
 
 
9 J.E. Cronin, ‘The Rank and File and the Social History of the Working Class’, International Review of 
Social History (IRSH), 34.1 (1989), pp. 85-86. 
10 A.D. Flanders, Management and Unions: Theory and reform of industrial relations, (London, 1970). 
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The [first] assumption [is] that unions have an interest in, and a propensity 
toward, accommodation with management whereas ordinary workers do not.  
Unions are thus seen as institutions that constrain workers' inherent militancy 
and that help tie them to capitalism.  The second assumption underlying ‘rank 
and filism’ is that the working class is ‘endowed with a vast reservoir of latent 
power which is contained by the institutions which represent them’.11 
 
An inevitable scholarly row ensued.12  Alistair Reid, himself an advocate of old-school 
institutionalism, was concerned by the predilection of some labour historians to 
unjustly attack the trade union elite.  In one essay, he targeted his counterparts for 
unfairly discrediting moderate leaders.13  Jonathan Zeitlin went a step further, calling 
for rank and filism to be “abandoned outright”.14  In one controversial critique, he 
argued that, by discarding the traditional framework, his rivals had overemphasised 
the informal actions of the ordinary worker, advocating a renewed interest in the work 
of national union officials.  In his much-debated article, From Labour History to the 
 
11 Cronin, The Rank and File, p. 81. 
12 Despite being maligned by their critics, advocates of institutional approach to labour history continued 
to publish in the second half of the twentieth and early twenty first centuries.  A. Hutt produced his 
British Trade Unionism: A Short History (London, 1975), whilst H. Pelling penned a fifth edition of his 
standard text, A History of British Trade Unionism (London, 1992).  These two stalwarts were joined by 
a younger generation of labour historians.  Some of the more noteworthy examples include W.H. Fraser, 
A History of British Trade Unionism, 1700-1998 (London, 1999); and K. Laybourn, A History of British 
Trade Unionism, 1770-1990 (Stroud, 1992).  Meanwhile, union specific histories also flourished.  See 
V. Bailey, Forged in Fire: The History of the Fire Brigades Union (London, 1992); M. Carpenter, Working 
for Health: The History of the Confederation of Health Service Employees (London, 1988); and B. Wynn, 
Skilled at All Trades: The History of the Farmworkers’ Union, 1947-1984 (London, 1993). 
13 A. Reid, ‘Marxism and Revisionism in British Labour History’, BSSLH, 52.3 (1987), p. 46. 
14 J. Zeitlin, ‘Rank and Filism in British Labour History: A Critique’, International Review of Social History, 
34.1 (April 1989), p. 60. 
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History of Industrial Relations, Zeitlin proceeded to advance an alternative mode of 
study: 
 
Taking stock of recent research on late nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
Britain, it argues that relationships between workers and employers at the 
workplace were shaped less by informal groups or spontaneous social and 
economic processes than by institutional forces:  by organisations such as trade 
unions, shop stewards’ committees, business enterprises, employers’ 
associations and the state; and by the rules and procedures governing their 
interaction, such as collective agreements, conciliation and arbitration boards, 
wages councils and legislation.15 
 
Zeitlin had, quite rightly, drawn attention to the manner in which a new generation of 
scholars either diluted or completely overlooked the impact capital, trade unions and 
the state had had on the development of British industrial relations.   
 
Reviewing the debate, John McIlroy highlighted the contradictory nature of the 
framework being advocated by this new generation of institutionalists: 
 
If we leave things there, there is a risk of regressing to a simplistic, unitary 
model of trade unionism which eliminates, minimizes or overlooks, certainly 
fails to categorize, the internal differentiation and internal conflict that has 
 
15 J. Zeitlin, ‘From Labour History to the History of Industry Relations’, Economic History Review, 40.2 
(1987), pp. 159-160. 
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existed, analysis of which is necessary to a proper comprehension of collective 
organization.16 
 
In what was another timely contribution, American sociologist, Howard Kimeldorf, 
called for a hybrid approach to the study of trade unionism: 
 
If the old consensus is ever to be effectively challenged it will mean returning 
unions to the center of labor studies, not in some mechanical fashion that 
merely reproduces the former institutionalism, but rather by viewing the 
relationship between unions and their members through the experiential lens of 
the new history. The thought of analyzing unions from ‘the ground up’ will no 
doubt offend the sensibilities of many labor historians, making both ‘hard line’ 
institutionalists and ‘new wave’ culturalists more than a little uncomfortable.  But 
there is no reason, apart from intellectual tradition, why the two approaches 
should not be brought together as part of a new synthesis that reintegrates the 
union, as a critical component of the proletarian experience, into workers' 
everyday lives.17 
 
Kimeldorf’s intervention was, however, seemingly ignored by British labour historians.  
As many distracted themselves with the study of clandestine acts of radicalism 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century, there has remained a conspicuous 
 
16 J. McIlroy, ‘The Society for the Study of Labour History, 1956-1985: Its Origins and its Heyday’, 
Labour History Review (LHR), 75.1 (2010), p. 110. 
17 H. Kimeldorf, ‘Bringing the unions back in (or why we need a new old labour history)’, Labor History, 
32.1 (1991), p. 102. 
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neglect of the post-war activities of trade unionists.  Concerned by this trend, John 
Saville lamented history from below for neglecting the modern era:   
 
But it has to be noted that the majority of radically minded or Marxist historians 
who work in the modern period concentrate largely upon nineteenth century, 
working-class history, with a special convergence on the radicalism of the pre-
1850 decades, and little upon the dominant themes of twentieth-century society 
… it cannot but be remarked that some, at least, of this interest in the working-
class past has a feeling of rather cosy antiquarianism about it.18 
 
With labour historians distracted elsewhere, the contemporary period has been tackled 
by industrial relations experts and political scientists.  However, despite constituting 
the “heartland for the study of trade unionism”, they have, according to McIlroy et al., 
singularly failed to investigate crucial areas of interest: 
 
It [industrial relations] has proved unable to come to terms with central 
questions: the role of the state; the political alignments of trade unions; power, 




18 J. Saville, The Labour Movement in Britain: a commentary (London, 1988), pp. 137-138. 
19 J. McIlroy, N. Fishman and A. Campbell (eds), British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics: The high 
tide of trade unionism, 1964-79, (Aldershot, 1999), p. 3. 
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When reviewing the literature, it is apparent that both the activities of the steel unions 
and the experiences of their lay members have been generally ignored by domestic 
labour historians.    
 
The Historiography of Steel 
 
The study of iron and, latterly, steel instead became the domain of economic and 
business historians focusing on the growth, decline and adjustment of the trade 
between the Victorian and post-war eras.20  Interest was driven by the everchanging 
political landscape, with the industry experiencing some form of state intervention from 
the Great Depression onwards.  Further uncertainty over proprietorship, initially 
prompted by the first nationalisation in 1951, precipitated a multitude of regional, 
company-specific or plant histories, many of which were commissioned by the boards 
 
20 There is a huge reserve of work looking at the industrial, commercial and technical heritage of iron 
and steel; helping to widen our expanding of the trade’s complex record of growth, decline and 
adjustment throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  For general, industry-wide studies, 
see T.S. Ashton, Iron and Steel in the Industrial Revolution (Manchester, 1951); A. Birch, The Economic 
History of the British Iron and Steel Industry, 1784-1879 (London, 1967); D. Burn, The Economic History 
of Steelmaking, 1867-1939: A Study in Competition (Cambridge, 1961); J.C. Carr and W. Taplin, A 
History of the British Steel Industry (Cambridge, 1962); D.N. McCloskey, Economic Maturity and 
Entrepreneurial Decline: British Iron and Steel, 1870-1913 (Cambridge, 1973); S. Tolliday, Business, 
Banking, and politics: The Case of British Steel, 1918-1939 (Cambridge, 1987); and J. Vaizey, The 
History of British Steel (London, 1974).  The final four chapters of Vaizey’s tour de force provides a 
detailed overview of the trade’s troubled post-war history, as does B.S. Keeling and A.E.G. Wright’s, 
The Development of the Modern British Steel Industry (London, 1964).  However, as works that were 
sponsored by industry officials, they both adopt a largely favourable view of the steel firms.  For a more 
critical appraisal, see D. Burn, The Steel Industry, 1939-1959: A Study on Competition and Planning 
(Cambridge, 1961) and D.W. Heal, The Steel Industry in Post-war Britain (London, 1974). 
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of steel firms themselves.21  The continuous ideological struggle for steel between 
1951 and 1967 provoked additional interest from economists, political scientists and 
experts in the field of public policy and planning.22  Investigating the relative merits of 
state versus private ownership, these scholars involved themselves in a national 
 
21 For company specific studies, see P. Payne, Colvilles and the Scottish Steel Industry (Oxford, 1979); 
A. Reid (1948) Continuous Venture (Shotton, 1948); G.R. Walshaw and C.A.J. Behrendt, The History 
of Appleby-Frodingham (Lincolnshire, 1950); and W.G. Willis, South Durham Steel and Iron Co. Ltd 
(London, 1969).  There are several regional studies, the vast majority of which tend to focus on the 
larger steel producing areas.  A survey of the historiography reveals some interest in the rise and fall of 
the Black Country’s pig iron industry.  For a general overview of the trade’s origins, structure, technical 
and commercial development, and fall of the nineteenth century trade, see G.C. Allen, Industrial 
Development of Birmingham and the Black Country (London, 1966); J. Baker, History of the Nut and 
Bolt Industry in the West Midlands’ (University of Birmingham MA dissertation, 1965); W.K.V. Gale, The 
Black Country Iron Industry: A Technical History (1979, London); G.R. Morton and M. Le Guillou, ‘The 
Rise and Fall of the South Staffordshire Pig Iron Industry’, The British Foundryman (July 1967); and R. 
Shill, South Staffordshire Ironmasters (Gloucestershire, 2008).  Works on the area’s steel industry are 
woefully short in number.  In the case of Bilston, G.R. Morton and M. Le Guillou, ‘Alfred Hickman Ltd, 
1866-1932’, West Midlands Studies 3 (1969), pp. 1-30; and M. Le Guillou, ‘Developments in the South 
Staffordshire Iron and Steel Industry, 1850-1913, in the Light of Home and Foreign Competition’ 
(University of Keele Ph.D. thesis, 1972) detail the transition from a crumbling industrial mausoleum to 
a state-of-the-art iron and steelmaking facility under Alfred Hickman.  Although these two works touch 
on the industrialist’s celebrated altruism, there is very little on the close working relationship he 
developed with his employees.  Moreover, none of the aforementioned studies investigate the plant’s 
industrial and commercial experience under Stewart and Lloyd’s Ltd.  Although F. Scopes, The 
Development of Corby Works (Portsmouth, 1968) does provide a brief pre-WWII commercial and 
technical history of Bilston, it completely ignores local industrial relations. 
22  For an analysis of the impact of public ownership during the interwar years, see S. Tolliday, Business, 
Banking, and Politics: The Case of British Steel, 1918-1939 (Cambridge, 1987).  The internal and 
external debate surrounding the ill-fated first nationalisation is covered by a wide range of works 
including D. Edgerton, ‘War, Reconstruction, and the Nationalization of Britain, 1939-1951’, Past & 
Present, 210; W. Fienbergh and R. Eveley, Steel is Power: The Case for Nationalisation (London, 
1948); D. McEachern, A Class Against Itself:  Power in the Nationalisation of the British Steel Industry 
(Cambridge, 1980); and A.A. Rogow, The Labour Government and British Industry, 1945-1951 (Oxford, 
1955).  Denationalisation is ably covered by K. Burk, The First Privatisation: The Politicians, the City, 
and the Denationalisation of Steel (London, 1988), whilst the political debate surrounding 
renationalisation is explored by H. Abromeit, British Steel: An Industry between the State and the Private 
Sector (Leamington Spa, 1986); and R. Kelf-Cohen, British Nationalisation 1945-1973 (London, 1973).   
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conversation over commercial operations, labour productivity, development and the 
spatial arrangement of an industry that was in constant turmoil.23 
 
The labour historiography of the post-war steel, on the other hand, is meagre, with 
scholars instead turning their attentions to the origins of the iron and steel unions in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Existing literature tends to focus on the 
sometimes chaotic journey from sectional, regionally based organisations into 
collectivist industrial unions.24  Adopting a primarily conventional, top down approach, 
labour historians have depicted how, after prolonged and damaging bouts of industrial 
disorder in the second half of the nineteenth century, trade union leaders and 
employers successfully nullified rank and file discord vis-à-vis formal negotiation and 
 
23 The overall commercial and financial performance of BSC, particularly during the world steel crisis, 
is tackled by a number of economic historians or specialists in accountancy and business studies.  For 
highly critical appraisals of management performance, see R.A. Bryer, T.J. Brignall and A.R. Maunders, 
Accounting for British Steel: A Financial Analysis of the Failure of the British Steel Corporation, and 
Who was to Blame (Aldershot, 1982); E. Cottrell, The Giant with Feet of Clay: the British Steel Industry, 
1945-1981 (Cambridge, 1981); R. Pryke, Public Enterprise in Practice: The British Experience of 
Nationalisation over Two Decades (London, 1971); and M. Upham, ‘British Steel: Retrospect and 
Prospect’, Industrial Relations Journal (IRJ) 11.3 (1980), pp. 5-21.  Another well-furnished area of study 
is that of Government economic policy and industrial strategy, with political scientists devoting a great 
deal of attention to the design and implementation of the failed Ten Year Strategy in particular.  See K. 
Ovenden, The Politics of Steel (London, 1978); J. Redwood, Public Enterprise in Crisis: The Future of 
Nationalised Industries (London, 1980); A. Silbertson, ‘Nationalised Industries: Government 
Intervention and Industrial Efficiency’, in Butler and Halsey (eds), Policy and Politics, Essays in honour 
of Norman Chester (London, 1978), pp. 140-151; and S. Young, Intervention in the Mixed Economy: 
The Evolution of British Industrial Policy 1964-72 (London, 1974).  In focusing on the actions of 
Government officials and industry planners, none of these studies investigate the local impact these 
policy decisions had on individual works and their employees.  
24 Much of this work focuses on combinations in North England, where workers displayed a propensity 
towards formal organisation.  See N.P. Howard, ‘The Strikes and Lockouts in the Iron Industry and the 
Formation of the Ironworkers’ Unions 1862-1869’, IRSH, 18.3 (1973), pp. 396-427; and A. Pugh, Men 
of Steel, by One of Them: A Chronicle of Eighty-eight Years of Trade Unionism (London, 1951). 
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conciliation apparatus or wages boards.25  Such a portrayal has, in turn, stifled wider 
academic interest.  Notwithstanding scholarly works on the embryonic industrial 
relations history of steel, there is still a marked absence of studies exploring its post-
WWI development.   
 
With a discernible academic void, the only comprehensive accounts of trade union 
activity in the twentieth century were penned by national leaders themselves.  This 
pattern of insider history first emerged when John Hodge, inaugural President of the 
ISTC, published his autobiography, Workman’s Cottage to Windsor Castle, which 
included an account of the role he played in the professionalisation of the steel unions 
and his experiences as a Government Minister.26  The floodgates were now firmly ajar, 
with former NUB leader Jack Owen providing his own history of combination amongst 
Britain’s blast furnace workers in Ironmen.27  The most detailed contribution to the 
early literature, however, was penned by the Confederation’s first General Secretary, 
Arthur Pugh.  Coinciding with the Clement Attlee Government’s controversial decision 
to nationalise the industry, Men of Steel, by One of Them presents a complete record 
of collective action up to and including WWII.28  Although the extensive text, like those 
of his peers, is an explicitly self-serving organisational and biographical account of the 
journey towards formalisation, it still provides a valuable insight into the political and 
 
25  The very first negotiation and arbitration apparatus in iron and steel was established in the Black 
Country.  However, the Midland Iron and Steel Wages Board had a troubled pre-WWI history, with local 
iron and steelmen repeatedly turning their backs on labour leaders in order to make their own 
agreements with masters.  For a history of the board, see E. Taylor, The Better Temper: A 
Commemorative History of the Midland Iron and Steel Wages Board, 1876-1976 (London, 1976). 
26 J. Hodge, Workman’s Cottage to Windsor Castle (London, 1931). 
27 J. Owen, Ironmen: National Union of Blastfurnacemen, Ore Miners, Coke Workers and Kindred 
Trades, 1878-1935, 2nd ed. (Middlesbrough, 1953). 
28 Pugh, Men of Steel.  
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ideological outlook of the modern day steel unions’ founding fathers.  The book also 
highlights a series of episodes whereby these traditionally authoritative institutions 
sided with management in disputes over pay, working conditions and even 
rationalisation.  Pugh and his colleagues’ pro-establishment agenda, crystallised 
during the interwar years, provides a valuable context to explaining the behaviour of 
their successors approximately half a century later. 
 
A limited post-war labour historiography of steel continued to be dominated by 
institutional accounts penned by trade union bureaucrats.  Hard Labour, for example, 
is the official autobiography of Bill Sirs who, as head of the ISTC and the TUCSICC 
during the world steel crisis, was an instrumental figure in driving trade union strategy 
throughout the period covered by this thesis.29  A patently self-indulgent text that seeks 
to divert readers’ attentions towards what the author deems to be the more successful 
chapters of his period in office, it often brushes over an unprecedented restructuring 
process that took place in the second half of the 1970s.  When Sirs does, albeit briefly, 
discuss what ultimately prompted the closure stampede, he lambasts the use of 
mouth-watering redundancy cheques, conveniently disregarding his own role in 
encouraging management to adopt this cynical tool.  Another reoccurring theme within 
Hard Labour is the problematic relationship ISTC bureaucrats developed with their 
fellow union leaders; an issue which, as this thesis repeatedly asserts, prevented any 
genuine attempt at organising a coordinated, pan-union defence strategy at executive 
level.   
 
 
29 B. Sirs, Hard Labour (London, 1985). 
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The same can also be said of the only other comprehensive account of trade union 
activity under state ownership, Martin Upham’s Tempered Not Quenched.30  As an 
authoritative, sanctioned history of the Confederation’s post-war activity, the study 
looks to redirect responsibility for the failure to block plant closures on rival Executives.  
In doing so, Upham provides a valuable commentary on the inaction of the TUCSICC, 
an umbrella organisation that was often rendered impotent by prolonged bouts of 
infighting.  Another key aspect of Tempered is its exploration into the cosy relationship 
which developed between the pro-establishment union and state officials: a factor that 
helped determine the fate of Bilston.  However, as is the case with Sirs’ contribution, 
this account consciously dilutes the role rank and file members played in defending 
their livelihoods.  Although, Upham at least acknowledges the existence of the WACs, 
they are too often depicted as a superfluous subplot to the supposedly more vital 
struggle taking place at national level.  
  
With the unions providing their own historical accounts, the story of steel and steelmen 
under state ownership has suffered the further indignity of being completely 
marginalised by contemporary labour historians who, in search of an authentic rank 
and file experience, have distracted themselves elsewhere.  The new forms of 
workplace mobilisation throughout the 1970s have attracted some degree of academic 
interest.  Earlier, more general accounts of worker co-operatives, plant takeovers and 
sit-ins by Ken Coates and John Greenwood have recently been supplemented with 
additions from Michael Gold and Dave Sherry.31  Meanwhile, the literature on specific, 
 
30 M. Upham, Tempered Not Quenched: The History of the ISTC, 1951-1997 (London, 1997). 
31 See K. Coates (ed.), Essays on Industrial Democracy (Nottingham, 1971); The New Worker Co-
Operatives (London, 1976); and Work-ins, Sit-ins and Industrial Democracy: The Implications of Factory 
Occupations in Great Britain in the Early ‘Seventies (Nottingham, 1981);  M. Gold, ‘Worker Mobilization 
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plant-level anti-closure campaigns was, for a long time at least, dominated by non-
historical social scientists investigating the epoch-making Upper Clyde Shipbuilders 
occupation and work-in of 1971/2.32  Scotland is in fact well represented in the 
historiography of workplace protest, with a series of local case studies into campaigns 
established by rank and file employees at the Scottish Daily News, the Uddingston 
Caterpillar plant and Inverclyde’s Lee Jeans factory.33  Another region that has caught 
the imagination of scholars exploring workers’ mobilisation is the North West, with 
studies on the Gardner Engines occupation in Manchester, as well as protests at 
Cammell Laird Shipbuilders, Fisher-Bendix and Kirkby Manufacturing in Merseyside.34  
 
With these and other industrial workers canonised in the literature, the humble 
steelman, known for his passivity and close ties to management and capital, has failed 
to capture the imagination of labour historians.  Explaining the trend, Peter Bowen et 
al. concluded: 
 
in the 1970s: Revisiting Work-ins, Co-operatives and Alternative Corporate Plans’, Historical Studies in 
Industrial Relations (HSIR), 18.2 (2004), pp. 65-106; J. Greenwood, Worker Sit-ins and Job Protection 
(London, 1977); and D. Sherry, Occupy! A Short History of Workers’ Occupation (London, 2010). 
32 A. Buchan, The Right to Work: The Story of the Upper Clyde Confrontation (London, 1972); J. Foster 
and C. Woolfson, The Politics of the UCS Work-in: Class Alliances and the Right to Work, (London, 
1986); J. McGill, Crisis on the Clyde: The Story of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (London, 1973); and W. 
Thompson and F. Hart, The UCS Work-In (London, 1972). 
33 See A. Clark, “And the next thing, the chairs barricaded the door …’: The Lee Jeans Factory 
Occupation, Trade Unionism and Gender in Scotland in the 1980s’, Scottish Labour History, 48 (2013), 
pp. 116-135; R. McKay and B. Barr, The Story of the Scottish Daily News (London, 1976); and C. 
Woolfson and J. Foster, Track Record: The Story of the Caterpillar Occupation (London, 1988). 
34 See T. Clark, Sit-in at Fisher-Bendix (Nottingham, 1974); T. Eccles, Under New Management: The 
Story of Britain’s Largest Worker Co-Operative – Its Successes and Failures (London, 1981); S. 
Mustchin, ‘Conflict, Mobilization, and Deindustrialisation: The 1980 Gardner Strike and Occupation’, 
HSIR, 37 (2016); and ‘From Workplace Occupation to Mass Imprisonment: The 1984 Strike at Cammell 




Throughout the history of the British labour movement the steelworker has 
remained a distant and largely unrecognised figure.  Eclipsed by an aura of 
solidarity surrounding the miner, the docker, the engineer and the shipbuilder, 
and undistinguished by any folklore of deprivation or struggle, his occupational 
identity is distinct and his position within the ranks of manual work obscure.  As 
a source of sociological enquiry the steelworker and his industry have, until 
recently, proved strangely impenetrable.35 
 
As a new generation of historians busied themselves documenting more fashionable 
breeds of worker, it once again fell on scholars from ancillary fields to investigate the 
post-WWII experiences of native steelworkers.  Sociologists have surveyed responses 
to changing working practices, whilst political scientists produced organisational 
narratives on the role of the state, senior industry officials and, in some instances, 
trade union bureaucrats.36  Martin Rhodes and Vincent Wright have, for example, 
produced a scathing critique of the orthodoxy of those tactics adopted by European 
 
35 P. Bowen, M. Shaw and Robin Smith, ‘The Steelworker and Work Control: A Sociological Analysis 
and Industrial Relations Case Study’, British Journal of Industrial Relations (BJIR), 12.2 (1974), p. 249. 
36 See N. Bacon, N. Blyton and J. Morris, ‘Among the Ashes: Trade Union Strategies in the UK and 
German Steel Industries’, BJIR, 34.1 (1996), pp. 25-50; P. Bowen, Social Control in Industrial 
Organisation: A Strategic and Occupational Study of British Steelmaking (London, 1976); P. Brannen, 
E. Batstone, D. Fatchett and W. White, The Worker Directors: A Sociology of Participation (London, 
1976); R. Hudson and D. Sadler, ‘Region, Class and the Politics of Steel Closures in the European 
Community’, Society and Space, 1.4 (1983), pp. 405-427; K. Morgan, ‘Restructuring Steel: The Crises 
of Labour and Locality in Britain’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 7.2 (1983), 
pp. 175-201; D. Sadler, ‘Works Closure at British Steel and the nature of the state’, Political Geography 
Quarterly, 3.4 (1984), 297-311; and O. E. Smith, Productivity Bargaining: A Case Study in the Steel 
Industry (London, 1971).   
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and UK steel unions throughout the world steel crisis.37  Geoffrey Dudley and Jeremy 
Richardson, whilst investigating the overall political context of rationalisation under 
state ownership, provide a frustratingly limited general overview of the origins of anti-
closure campaigns.38   
 
Whilst these broad-spectrum works fail to consider workplace experiences beyond the 
superficial level, there are a handful of studies that provide at least a partial insight into 
the perspective of specific facilities.39  Dudley, for example, adopted a case study 
approach to explore how the Shelton WAC interacted with policymakers in an attempt 
to alter BSC’s chosen industrial development strategy.40  Scottish historian David 
Stewart has documented the fight to save Ravenscraig in the 1980s, providing an 
account of the role played by a Scottish lobby when persuading decisionmakers to 
 
37 M. Rhodes and Vincent Wright, ‘The European and Steel Unions and the Steel Crisis, 1974-84: A 
Study in the Demise of Traditional Unionism’, British Journal of Political Science, 18.2 (1988), pp. 171-
195. 
38 J.J. Richardson and G.F. Dudley, ‘Steel Policy in the UK: The Politics of Industrial Decline’, in Y. 
Meny and V. Wright (eds), The Politics of Steel: Western Europe and the Steel Industry in the Crisis 
Years (1974-84) (Berlin, 1987), pp. 308-367. 
39 One particular line of academic enquiry has been to probe the impact rationalisation had on steel 
regions and their inhabitants, with human geographers and sociologists directing their scholarly gaze 
on experiences in Consett, County Durham, a monotown that lost almost 4,000 jobs in August 1980.  
See R. Hudson and D. Sadler, ‘Anatomy of a Disaster: The Closure of Consett Steelworks’, Northern 
Economic Review, 6 (1983), pp. 2-17; K.M. Price, ‘Mass Unemployment: The Closure of Consett 
Steelworks’, Annual Conference of the British Sociological Association (1982); and F. Robinson and D. 
Sadler, ‘Consett after the Closure’, University of Durham Occasional Publications, 19 (1984).  For an 
overview of re-industrialisation policies in former iron and steel communities, see S. Young, ‘The 
implementation of Britain’s national steel strategy at the local level’, in Meny and Wright, The Politics of 
Steel, pp. 368-415. 
40 G. Dudley, ‘Pluralism, Policy Making and Implementation: The Evolution of the British Steel 
Corporation’s Development Strategy with Reference to the Activity of the Shelton Action Committee’, 
Public Administration, 57.3 (Autumn 1979), pp. 253-270. 
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temporarily shelve plans to rundown the huge North Lanarkshire works.41  However, 
whilst exploring grassroots anti-closure campaigns from the centre, none of these 
studies provide any specific details on workplace or extra-workplace experiences. 
 
The only two comprehensive investigations into a defence campaign from a rank and 
file perspective look at Bilston’s former sister plant in Northamptonshire.  Redundancy, 
Restructuring and the Response of the Labour Movement by Christopher Baker, and 
Allen Maunders’ A Process of Struggle, provide forensic accounts of the local, 
employee-led campaigns to save Corby works.42  As is the case with this thesis, both 
of these studies appraise the strategic framework adopted by local shop stewards; at 
the same time offering an exploration of the relationship that developed between an 
action committee and national trade union officials or political elites.  Moreover, they 
include a personal dimension, using interview data to provide a voice to rank and file 
steelmen fighting for their livelihoods.  They also offer a valuable insight into the 
internal dynamics of ROSAC, the Corby WAC.  The work of Maunders and Baker 
reveals how Northamptonshire steelmen who, unlike their Bilston colleagues, 
possessed a history of collective industrial action, remained fiercely independent 
throughout a campaign that was noted for high-profile fall outs with Parliamentary 
representatives and union headquarters.  Having cut ties with their respective 
Executives and the TUCSICC, they adopted a more formal organisational leadership 
 
41 D. Stewart, ‘Fighting for Survival: The 1980s Campaign to Save Ravenscraig Steelworks’, Journal of 
Scottish Historical Studies, 25.1 (2005), pp. 40-57.  For another investigation into the campaign to save 
the Scottish works, see G. Dudley, ‘The British Steel Corporation and Problems of Political 
Management’, The Political Quarterly, 55.4 (October 1984), pp. 427-437. 
42 See C. Baker, Redundancy, Restructuring and the Response of the Labour Movement: A Case Study 
of British Steel at Corby, University of Bristol (Bristol, 1982); and A.R. Maunders, A Process of Struggle: 
The Campaign for Corby Steelmaking in 1979 (Aldershot, 1987). 
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hierarchy, before employing a defence strategy that relied on the sustained 
participation of the wider community.  Notwithstanding these fundamental differences 
to a BJUAC model that, as this thesis asserts, relied heavily on the tactical and 
logistical support of regional and national labour movement figures, these works, 
nevertheless, represent the only two exhaustive rank and file studies into the defence 
of a Corporation facility during the period under review. 
 
The Historiography of the Black Country 
 
Mirroring the literary marginalisation of steel, are works on the Black Country.  Writing 
three decades ago, University of Wolverhampton lecturer and principal editor of 
Midland History, John Benson, reviewed the labour historiography of the region.  
Acknowledging and lamenting its narrowness, he was nonetheless optimistic about 
the future, confidently predicting, “in the years to come the study of Black Country 
labour history will become richer, and recognised as more interesting, than has 
sometimes been the case in the past”.43   
 
Concerned with factors beyond traditional paradigms of institutionalism or class 
conflict, a new body of work moved away from union headquarters and the shop-floor, 
focusing instead on identity, migration, culture and the everyday lives of working-class 
communities.  Sheila Blackburn and Carol Morgan, for example, have deepened our 
understanding of the role played by women in the local metal bashing industries 
 
43 J. Benson, ‘Black Country History and Labour History’, Midland History, 15.1 (1990), p. 100. 
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throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.44  Another well-furnished 
topic is race and ethnicity, with several researchers documenting the experiences of 
commonwealth migrants who arrived in the Black Country in their thousands in the 
post-WWII period.  Mark Duffield’s pioneering work on Indian foundry workers, for 
example, has been complemented with studies exploring community race relations.45  
Both Rosalind Singleton-Watkiss and Ian Peddie, have broken new territory with 
illuminating pieces on popular music and youth culture, whilst Benson’s own work on 
Gerald Howard-Smith has delved into sport and class in early twentieth century 
Wolverhampton.46  More recently, contemporary historians have turned their 
attentions to recording community life and the advent of social housing, focusing on 
the pioneering work of Otto Neurath and the Vienna Circle in post-war Bilston.47 
 
 
44 S.C. Blackburn, ‘Sweated Labour and the Minimum Wage: a case study of the Women Chainmakers 
of Cradley Heath, South Staffordshire, 1850-1950’ (University of London Ph.D. thesis, 1984); and C.E. 
Morgan, Workers and Gender Identities, 1835-1913: The Cotton and Metal Industries in England 
(Abingdon, 2001). 
45 See M. Duffield, Black Radicalism and the Politics of Deindustrialisation: The Hidden History of Indian 
Foundry Workers in the West Midlands (Aldershot, 1988); R. Dudrah, ‘British Bhangra Music as 
Soundscapes of the Midlands’, Midland History, 36.2 (2011), pp. 278-291; J. Street, ‘Malcolm X, 
Smethwick, and the Influence of the African American Freedom Struggle on British Race Relations in 
the 1960s’, Journal of Black Studies, 38.6 (2008), pp. 932-950; A. Hambler and R. Seifert, ‘Wearing the 
Turban: The 1967-1969 Sikh Drivers Dispute in Wolverhampton’, HSIR, 37.1 (2016), pp. 83-111; and 
S. Hirsch, In the Shadow of Enoch Powell: Race, Locality and Resistance (Manchester, 2018). 
46 See R. Singleton-Watkiss, ‘”What are you gonna do tonight?”, Wait for a phone call I suppose”’: Girls, 
Mod Subculture, and Reactions to the Film Quadrophenia’ in P. Thurschwell (ed.), Quadrophenia and 
Mod(ern) Culture (Basingstoke, 2018), pp. 151-172; Ian Peddie, ‘The Bleak Country? The Black 
Country and the Rhetoric of Escape’ in Ian Peddie (ed.), The Resisting Muse: Popular Music and Social 
Protest (Farnham, 2006), pp. 132-148;  and J. Benson, ‘Sport, Class, and Place: Gerald Howard-Smith 
and Early Twentieth-Century Wolverhampton’, Midland History, 37.2 (2012), pp. 207-221. 
47 M. Amati, ‘Otto Neurath and the Example of 1940s Bilston’, in R. Freestone and M. Amati, 
Engagement and Exhibitionism in the Era of High Modernism (London, 2014); and E. Harwood, 
‘Neurath, Riley and Bilston, Pasmore and Peterlee’, Twentieth Century Architecture 9 (2008). 
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Notwithstanding the application of new trends in social history, a detailed review of the 
literature on the region’s lay workers reveal no recent additions.  Benson has argued 
that this paucity of work can, in part, be explained by the endurance of the area’s 
dominant manager-owner system, which was determined by its distinctive modes of 
production.  Accordingly, the resilience of small-scale industrial units, in what was 
known colloquially as ‘the workshop of the world’, had an enduring impact on working-
class consciousness and behaviour.  Indeed, the persistence of smaller enterprises 
ran by paternalistic, omnipotent owners precluded any genuine enthusiasm for 
industrial action and, moreover, collectivism or self-organisation.  The endurance of a 
compromised, passive class of industrial worker, who enjoyed an intimate relationship 
with a patriarchal management, did little to enthuse the disciples of rank and filism who 
sought inspiration elsewhere.  The result is a strikingly limited historiography still 
governed by a small band of literary brothers and sisters.48  Benson, having labelled 
views within the pre-existing body of literature as “banal and condescending”, aimed 
to further explain the impact his luminaries had on wider perceptions of – and interest 
in – the Black Country’s labour history: 
 
It is perhaps not surprising that a small number of historians, seeking to explore 
developments in the same somewhat overlooked part of the country, and 
sharing broadly similar economic and institutional approaches towards labour 
history, should tend to present a consistent – and apparently convincing – view 
of the Black Country working class …49 
 
 
48 Benson, Black Country History, p. 100. 
49 Ibid., p. 101.  
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Benson’s lament centred on a circle of provincially minded scholars that emerged 
during what Neville Kirk has dubbed the “golden age” of British labour history.50  
Joining founding father Alan Fox was the likes of Marie B. Rowlands, Takao 
Matsumura, Eric Hopkins, Eric Taylor and George Barnsby.  Despite writing in an era 
of academic experimentation that witnessed the widespread advance of history from 
below, Rowlands persisted with a top-down approach that continued to 
overemphasise the role elites played in the development of the Black Country’s 
nascent industrial relations culture.51  Whilst Matsumura, Hopkins and Taylor widened 
their analytical framework to provide an insight into the experiences and activities of 
the area’s workers, all three were guilty of overstating the feebleness of regional 
working-class organisation.52  Furthermore, they elected to dwell on internal 
fragmentation and conflict – often ignoring genuine instances of concerted, solidaristic 
collective action.  Benson, frustrated by his peers’ overemphasis on the 
conventionalism and orthodoxy of Black Countrymen, charged, “… they all describe 
the working-class of the area in much the same way: as exceptional in its internal 
divisions, its acquiescence, its industrial weakness and its political conservatism”.53   
 
50 N. Kirk, ‘Challenge, Crisis, and Renewal? Themes in the Labour History of Britain, 1960-2010’, LHR, 
75.2 (2010), p. 169. 
51 M.B. Rowlands, Masters and Men in the West Midland Metalware Trades before the Industrial 
Revolution (Manchester, 1975); ‘Continuity and Change in an Industrialising Society: The Case of the 
West Midlands Industries’, in P. Hudson (ed.), Regions and Industries: A Perspective on the Industrial 
Revolution in Britain (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 103-131. 
52 E. Hopkins, ‘The Working Classes of Stourbridge, 1815-1915’ (London University Ph.D. thesis, 1972); 
‘An Anatomy of Strikes in the Stourbridge Glass Industry, 1850-1914’, Midland History, 2.1 (1973), pp. 
21-31; T. Matsumura, ‘The Flint Glass Makers in the Classic Age of the Labour Aristocracy 1850-1880, 
with Special Reference to Stourbridge’ (University of Warwick Ph.D. thesis, 1976); The Labour 
Aristocracy Revisited: The Victorian Flint Glass Makers, 1850-80 (Manchester, 1983); and E. Taylor, 
‘The Working Class Movement in the Black Country 1863-1914’ (University of Keele Ph.D. thesis, 
1974). 




If these erstwhile contemporaries aimed to draw scholarly attention to the apparent 
fragmentation and general passivity of the region’s rank and file, the same can’t be 
said for the prolific Barnsby, who assumed the role of the doyen of the Black Country’s 
social and labour history until his death in 2010.  From 1967 onwards, the steadfast 
Stalin apologist, political agitator and activist produced a large collection of books, 
scholarly journals and open access educational pamphlets on such topics as Black 
Country Chartism, the Bengal famine, the suffragettes, Robert Owen, social housing 
and domestic race relations.54  Barnsby proved to be an extremely controversial figure, 
with his writings on the area’s working-class movement receiving much warranted 
criticism for its overtly doctrinaire approach: 
 
There is much to admire in Dr. Barnsby's writing.  Its range and vigour are highly 
commendable and it amounts, in total, to a sizeable corpus of information on 
the history of labour in the Black Country.  It must also be said, however, that 
much of his interpretation is completely wrong-headed and in consequence his 




54 See G.J. Barnsby, A History of Housing in Wolverhampton, 1750 to 1975 (Wolverhampton, 1975); 
Chartism in the Black Country (Wolverhampton, 1980); The Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie: Social 
Control in the Nineteenth Century Black Country (London, 1972); Socialism in Birmingham and the 
Black Country, 1850-1939 (Wolverhampton, 1998); The Dudley Working Class Movement, 1832-80 
(Dudley, 1967); ‘The Standard of Living in the Black Country during the Nineteenth Century’, Economic 
History Review, 24.2 (1971), pp. 220-239; The Working Class Movement in the Black Country, 1750 to 
1867 (Wolverhampton, 1977); and Social Conditions in the Black Country, 1800-1900 (London, 1980). 
55 Taylor, The Working Class Movement, p. 486. 
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Indeed, when reading his work, it is difficult to ignore how the fervent evangelist of the 
‘hard-left militant tendency’ would blatantly distort his interpretation of empirical 
evidence in order to pigeonhole his analysis into a narrow Marxist framework.  
Reviewing Barnsby’s Social Conditions in the Black Country in the Nineteenth 
Century, which has become a standard text for students of the area’s working-class 
and labour movement, Taylor highlighted the subjectivity of his rival’s starkly dogmatic 
approach: 
 
The weakness of Dr. Barnsby's analysis lies essentially in its partiality, which 
derives from the requirement of his political creed, that it is the first duty of all 
workers to fight against the capitalist system.  The corollary of this is that any 
working-class activity or organisation is seized on and reported as a 
manifestation of militancy, and therefore, by inference, making some small 
contribution to the disruption of bourgeois society, or more hopefully, the 
overthrow of capitalism.56 
 
Notwithstanding such criticisms, the work of Barnsby at least offers an insight into the 
experiences of region’s workers.  His History of Wolverhampton, Bilston & District 
Trades Union Council, for example, provides a brief yet valuable snapshot of several 
grassroots campaigns organised by Black Country shop stewards in the post-WWII 
period.  These included protests supported by Bilston’s ex-steelworkers throughout 
the late 1970s and early 1980s.57   
 
56 Ibid. 





If Barnsby has drawn academic censure for his penchant for hyperbolising the 
militancy of the region’s working-classes, his rival Taylor is not himself beyond 
reproach – with his doctoral thesis, The Working-Class Movement in the Black 
Country, 1850-1914, belligerently adopting a stale, formulaic approach.58  Crucially, 
the work tends to present local industrial workers as a passive, vacuous huddled mass 
that were manipulated by industrial, trade union or political elites.  In subsequent 
publications, he specifically propagated the image of a disorganised, unruly and easily 
subjugated Black Country iron and steelworker.  His ISTC commissioned pamphlet, 
The Better Temper, which celebrated the advancement of collective bargaining, 
conciliation and arbitration in the local trade, provided an outdated top down account 
of the history of trade union apparatus and employers’ organisations.59  Unsurprisingly, 
the voices of the region’s lowly lay smelters are absent from his analysis. 
 
Taylor and his colleagues’ determination to establish a dominant narrative of the 
passive, insentient local worker has had clear implications on the study of the region’s 
twentieth century labour history.  Contemporary scholars, uninspired by its orthodoxy, 
have turned their attentions elsewhere, to larger centres of production where the 
labouring classes possessed higher levels of political and trade union consciousness 
and a history of concerted collective action.  Although, as has been revealed, some 
recent researchers have concerned themselves with the social and cultural heritage 
of the Black Country’s working-class communities, a shadow has been cast on the 
 
58 Taylor, The Working Class Movement. 
59 Taylor, The Better Temper. 
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perceived relevance of the study of the region’s post-WWII labour movements and 
workplace experiences. 
 
An absence of academic studies into the battle to save Bilston works is symptomatic 
of the wider exclusion of the post-war Black Country labour history and, moreover, that 
of the UK steel industry.  The treatment of the campaign is haphazard at best, with 
scattered and fleeting references featuring amongst a mere handful of superficial 
commentaries.  In Hard Labour, for example, Bill Sirs devotes a meagre two pages to 
the defence of iron and steelmaking in the Black Country.  Whilst praising his members 
for mounting what he described as a “tremendous struggle for survival”, the ISTC 
General Secretary, predictably, appears oblivious to his own role in Bilston’s eventual 
downfall.60  He was, for example, entirely accurate in his appraisal of the impact BSC’s 
discriminatory commercial practices had on the plant’s viability:  
 
The Corporation hoped to load up other units in Sheffield with the orders 
normally processed at Bilston.  This was a policy I had always condemned; 
customers rarely keep their orders with British Steel once their favourite plant 
had been closed.61   
 
Yet, in doing so, he overlooked his role in designing and co-signing national 
agreements that permitted management to confiscate lucrative sections of Bilston’s 
longstanding orderbook to protect members elsewhere. He also used his personal 
memoirs to erroneously distance himself from the epoch-making mothballing of the 
 




plant’s Blast Furnace Department in October 1977.  Instead, in what was a 
manifestation of a near permanently fragmented union landscape within steel, he laid 
the blame on members of the NUB, the ISTC’s rival production union:   
 
Bilston had one single blast furnace and the blastfurnacemen who manned it 
were persuaded to allow the furnace to be taken off so that a ‘repair’ could be 
carried out.  Whether there was any real urgency about the repair I shall never 
know, but the blast furnace was never brought back into operation and I do not 
think the Corporation ever intended that it should.62 
 
It should be noted that, in a bid to deflect pressure from his own Executive, Sirs had 
previously criticised his own Bilston members for allowing the vessel to be taken 
offline, handily omitting the fact that union headquarters had done little more than pass 
a resolution lamenting the decision.63  Furthermore, for the sake of historical accuracy, 
it is important to reveal the fundamental flaws in the union chief’s above depiction, with 
the onetime crane driver confusing the blast furnace decision with the cynical reduction 
of steelmaking operations fifteen months later.  This observation may appear 
somewhat pedantic, but it draws attention to Sirs’ lack of technical expertise; an issue 
that was repeatedly exposed during the TUCSICC’s ill-fated attempt to persuade 
policymakers to invest in pioneering steelmaking apparatus in the Black Country.   
 
 
62 Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
63 On the eve of the plant’s closure Sirs infuriated local steelmen by telling the press, “Yes, Bilston is 
difficult for us because our members there allowed the blast furnace to go off for what was supposed 
to be a temporary period …”.  See The British Steelmaker, April 1979. 
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Sirs’ former research assistant, Martin Upham, also makes a fleeting reference to the 
Bilston campaign in Tempered: 
 
A suddenly posted letter of intent to close Bilston Works early provoked 
dramatic events at Scarborough, where the 1978 ADC was meeting.  An 
emergency Executive authorised Sirs to make the only possible response to 
this attempt to dump procedure:  BSC was threatened with a national strike 
[over Bilston] unless the letter was withdrawn.  This was perhaps the high point 
of the resistance to closures.  Few who heard it would forget Sirs’ electrifying 
speech to the conference: it eloquently captured the grim mood of 
determination of every delegate … This ISTC action gave BSC the jolt it 
needed, and the notice was withdrawn inside a day: there now followed a 
lengthy series of meetings which gave representatives the opportunity to take 
their case to the wider movement.  It was a much-needed success …64 
 
In his fervent desire to throw praise at his then union bosses, Upham fails to 
acknowledge the role played by BJUAC leader Dennis Turner, who deliberately 
manipulated events to leave Sirs and the Confederation Executive with little choice but 
to threaten a national strike on their plant’s behalf.  It is notable how, in later works, 
Upham disclosed the insincerity of the June 1978 strike call.65   
 
 
64 Upham, Tempered, pp.126-127. 
65 Upham also admitted Bilston was closed without “national resistance”.  See Upham, Retrospect and 
Prospects, p. 10. 
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In a slightly fuller, yet even more unsatisfactory account, Wolverhampton academics, 
Dr. Frank Reeves and Professor Mel Chevannes devote a whole chapter of their 
sanctioned biography of Dennis Turner to the campaign.  Lacking in both basic 
research, empirical data and academic rigour, Real Labour provides the reader with 
little more than an approximate guide to local and national events.66  Misleadingly titled 
‘Saving the Steel Works’, the chapter is riddled with errors.67  The most striking of 
these are driven by the authors’ political beliefs which, like Barnsby, were of the hard 
left.68  Likewise, in their patent desire to lavish praise on the actions of Turner who, as 
a political activist and town Councillor had forged close personal links with the authors, 
they deliberately aggrandize certain aspects of the defence campaign.  Ignoring the 
many examples of workplace resistance orchestrated throughout the period, they 
boldly liken an isolated and extraordinary example of militancy at Bilston to one of the 
most effective examples of concerted workplace direct action in post-WWII Britain: 
 
The steelworkers’ take-over of production at Bilston, under Dennis’s leadership, 
was on a par with the ‘work-in’ led by Jimmy Reid to save shipbuilding on the 
Upper Clyde, but has remained largely unsung except in Bilston itself.69 
 
 
66 F. Reeves and M. Chevannes, Real Labour: The Biography of Dennis Turner (Wolverhampton, 2014), 
pp. 57-64. 
67 The long list of historical inaccuracies includes confusing the dates of mass meetings and public 
demonstrations, misnaming a major steel union, whilst excluding key personnel from the BJUAC line-
up.  Altogether, these deficiencies combine to undermine the legitimacy of Real Labour. 
68 Like Barnsby, Dr. Reeves was a member of Wolverhampton’s CPGB, contesting local elections on 
behalf of the party. 
69 Ibid., p. 6. 
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As a study sanctioned by the former BJUAC leader from his deathbed, the authors of 
Real Labour repeatedly ascribe too much agency to their friend and his action 
committee colleagues, wilfully omitting the contribution made by the hundreds of lay 
workers who helped maintain performance levels for almost a decade.  Aside from its 
obvious shortcomings, the work, nonetheless, provides context to Turner’s upbringing 
and his career as a community and political activist, as well as his time in local and 
national Government. 
 
One piece that does – albeit briefly – pay attention to the efforts of the wider workforce, 
as well as the BJUAC, is Barnsby’s abovementioned chronicle of the WB&DTUC, 
published over a decade after the works shut: 
 
The other case, which even more directly affected employment in 
Wolverhampton was the closure of Bilston Steel Works.  Again, there was a 
long history of neglect.  An attempt to close the works had been made in 1975 
but was thwarted by mass protest.  But in 1978 despite its products being sold 
profitably (but not profitably enough, claimed British Steel), closure was 
decreed.  An Action Committee was formed with Councillor Dennis Turner, who 
in 1987 became Bilston’s MP, in the leadership.  Deputations to the EEC and 
Bob Edwards’ intervention with Eric Varley, the Labour Industry Secretary were 
unavailing.  A go-slow of 450 workers immediately scheduled for the sack in 




70 Barnsby, A History of, p. 77. 
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Despite stressing the role of rank and file steelworkers and the support of a regional 
shop steward movement, Barnsby’s analysis includes absolutely no reference to the 
various strategic phases of the campaign.  Such a cursory account, penned by the 
Black Country’s most prolific labour historian, highlights the marginalisation of the 
battle for Bilston from the region’s already limited historiography.71 
 
This brief survey of the literature reveals how the twentieth century industrial relations 
history of both steel and the Black Country have been badly served by post-WWII 
labour historians.  The thesis looks to address the gaps in the historiography by 
providing an analysis of workplace resistance to industrial change and rationalisation 
undertaken within a state-owned facility during a period of economic restructuring and 
crisis.  The study seeks to shine a spotlight on patterns of accommodation as well as 
resistance, demonstrated by a traditionally moderate rank and file compelled to self-
organise in response to commercial mismanagement and the failings of the trade 
union and political establishment.   
 
It presents the fullest historical account of WAC activity from the workers’ perspective 
to date.  Here, locality is key, with the aforementioned exclusion of the Black Country 
from the labour historiography prompting a desire to produce a history of what Richard 
 
71 For two, largely inadequate, references to the Bilston campaign see G. Bamber, Militant Managers?: 
Managerial unionism and industrial relations (Aldershot, 1986), pp. 118-119; and C. Docherty, Steel 
and Steelworkers: The Sons of Vulcan (London, 1983), p. 135.  Meanwhile, an unpublished MPhil 
dissertation by Matthew Beebee delves into the Bilston experience.  By failing to consult surviving 
employees or the material held within BCA’s ITSOE collection, the author provides a rather narrow 
empirically limited perspective.  See M. Beebee, ‘Steel, Class, and Community: industrial work and its 
decline in Bilston’ (University of Cambridge M.Phil. dissertation, 2018). 
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Price has referred to as those who had “hitherto been without a history”.72  The work 
represents the only significant study documenting the post-war workplace experiences 
of the misrepresented and often overlooked Black Country industrial worker.   
 
Adopting a micro-history approach, there is a clear and intentional personal element 
to the work.  This was prompted, in part, by Harold Perkins’ call for “working-class 
history from the inside”: 
 
Working-class history there is plenty, too, but apart from memoirs of exceptional 
individuals it is almost entirely the story of the wage-earning majority as a class, 
the impersonal mass which left its chief record in the criminal records and other 
administrative statistics of government, the ‘poor’ who appear in the patronising 
memoirs of their betters, or the faceless institutional groupings of ‘organised 
labour’.  Working-class history from the inside, the history of real people with 
names and faces and lives to live which left little or no trace in the records … is 
rare indeed.73 
 
Likewise, by forensically examining local events, the research seeks to provide 
ordinary, provincial workers with “full historical citizenship”, as advocated by E.P. 
Thompson over six decades ago: 
 
The national historian still tends to have a curiously distorted view of goings-on 
‘in the provinces’.  Provincial events are seen as shadowy incidents or 
 
72 R. Price, ‘Histories of Labour and Labour History’, LHR, 75.3 (2010), p. 267. 
73 C.S. Davies, North Country Bred: A Working-Class Family Chronicle (London, 1963), p. 1. 
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accountable spontaneous upheavals on the periphery of the national scene, 
which the London wire-pullers try to cope with and put into their correct 
historical pattern.  And provincial leaders are commonly denied full historical 
citizenship; if mentioned at all, they are generally credited with various worthy 
second-class abilities, but rarely regarded as men with their own problems, their 
own capacity for initiative, and on occasions a particular genius …74 
 
Nevertheless, despite this thesis being written predominantly from the perspective of 
the worker at plant-level, it adopts an ecumenical analytical framework, fusing together 
labour, political, industrial, and economic history.  As such, it provides what McIlroy et 
al. have referred to as a “totalised” approach that incorporates: 
 
… a consideration of industrial politics, from above and below.  This 
necessitates an examination of politics not only at the level of the state, but 
inside unions and parties.  It requires address of politics not only inside these 
institutions but also inside the workplace, and in the values and actions of trade 
unionists.  Our concern must be not only with the politics of the labour 
movement, its activists and broader working-class but with the politics of capital 





74 E.P. Thompson, ‘Homage to Tom Maguire’, in A. Briggs and J. Saville (eds), Essays in Labour History: 
In Memory of G.D.H. Cole (London, 1960). 
75 McIlroy, British Trade Unions, p. 10. 
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Chapter 2: The Making of a Steel Town 
 
The purpose of this chapter is scene setting, placing the battle for Bilston into full 
historical context.  Its scope is extremely broad, covering a two-century period of the 
plant’s industrial and commercial heritage.  We start by briefly exploring the role the 
state traditionally played in the domestic iron and steel industry, which culminated in 
a second nationalisation under the Labour Government in July 1967.  It provides a 
detailed account of the commercial heritage of the Black Country metals industry, with 
a narrow focus on Bilston works.  It is suggested that, as rival producers struggled to 
cope with regular cyclical fluctuations in trade, the site flourished during the industry’s 
many economic downturns.  This, the chapter demonstrates, was a result of the 
parsimony of its diligent employees, as well as their relationship with regional steel 
users; two factors that ensured Bilston’s profitable record was sustained under public 
ownership.  Another was a multi-million pound investment scheme undertaken in the 
mid-twentieth century.  Nevertheless, it is revealed how, by prizing tradition over 
innovation, the plant’s owners sowed the seeds for its demise two decades later.   
 
The chapter also maps the evolution of the industrial relations culture of iron and steel.  
Charting the origins and development of the ISTC’s ideological underpinnings, it 
subsequently outlines the union landscape at Bilston works on the eve of 
renationalisation.  By contextualising what is revealed to be an extremely low level of 
union consciousness at the plant, it asserts that, under private ownership, Bilston’s 
temperate workforce developed an aversion to radical industrial action.  The chapter 
concludes by suggesting that, despite this phenomenon, senior shop stewards 
developed a tradition of actively participating in the political life of the Black Country 
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town.  This, it is argued, helped determine the early strategic approach adopted by the 
BJUAC. 
 
Steel and State: a Brief History 
 
The Labour Government brought into public ownership the fourteen largest domestic 
steel producers, a merger that created one of the biggest industrial organisations in 
the western world.1  The primary objective, according to Whitehall, was to permit this 
strategically important industry to modernise in an orderly and socially conscientious 
manner – a feat the steel firms had repeatedly failed to achieve.  Yet this was by no 
means the first instance of state intervention, which had become standard practice in 
the twentieth century iron and steel trade.   
 
The industry had been subject to some measure of public control since the Great 
Depression when, in 1932, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald agreed to shield 
domestic firms from foreign steel by way of state-sanctioned tariff protection.  In 
exchange, company bosses reluctantly accepted a limited degree of supervision from 
Whitehall.  The BISF, a trade organisation established by the National Government, 
was handed the unenviable task of coordinating future direction.  A key responsibility 
was to rationalise and modernise a trade that continued to be undermined by the 
prevalence of small family concerns stubbornly refusing to abandon unprofitable and 
 
1 Nationalisation left a substantial private sector steel industry consisting of 110 companies employing 
95,000 workers across 160 sites.  These units typically converted semi-finished steel into finished 
products, relying on special steel sourced from state-owned facilities such as Bilston. 
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technically backward Victorian-era plants.2  Although some degree of vertical 
integration did occur in the interwar period, the firms were patently unwilling to 
reorganise.  As the nation prepared for WWII, the industry’s organisational framework 
was still dominated by unambitious owner-management teams who possessed neither 
the necessary financial muscle, nor the dynamism required to oversee vital capital-
intensive modernisation schemes.  This situation led Derek Aldcroft to speculate: 
 
[The] suppression of competition rather than technical reconstruction and 
rationalisation of the industry appears to have been the primary object of the 
controlling authorities.  The principles of plant specialisation and integration of 
units were only tentatively applied (for example, in the building of a new 
integrated steel works at Corby), whilst only scant attention was paid to the 
question of extending best practice techniques.3 
     
Failure to reconstruct was briefly obscured by rearmament, with sizeable profits 
realised throughout the late 1930s and the war.  This revival in fortunes, nonetheless, 
obscured a painful reality.  Wartime demand encouraged the abandonment of major 
modernisation projects and the recommissioning of obsolete plant.  Machinery was 
run flat out, thus shortening its future lifespan.  By the cessation of hostilities, the basic 
structure and condition of the industry had hardly altered since WWI.  As such, the UK 
would begin the post-war period handicapped by small, antiquated, technically 
backward facilities ran by notoriously conservative steel companies that were happy 
 
2 For a review of the role of the BISF throughout the inter-war years, see McEachern, A Class Against, 
pp. 45-54.  
3 D.H. Aldcroft, The Inter War Economy, 1919-1939 (London, 1970), p. 173. 
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to simply rest on their laurels.  Nevertheless, the wartime experience would have 
serious consequences for the industry’s relationship with the state, with Reuben Kelf-
Cohen asserting that, from here on in, steel would become a “political football”.4   
 
As peace prospered, Clement Attlee’s post-WWII Labour Government advocated a 
Keynesian macroeconomic policy; pushing for key sections of the economy to be 
brought under the auspices of the state.  After numerous delays caused by the 
blocking action of the steel firms and their friends within Conservative opposition, the 
industry was finally nationalised in February 1951.5 
 
The first experiment with public ownership was intended to provide a unique platform 
from which the state could reconstruct the industry centrally and methodically.  
However, following eight months of inactivity on the development front, a Tory 
Government committed to denationalisation came to power.  Although Winston 
Churchill’s re-election prompted a return to the private sector, a measure of state 
supervision was maintained.  A new ISB consisting of Whitehall officials, steel 
company bosses and even union leaders, was handed the responsibility of overseeing 
reorganisation via Government-sanctioned five-year redevelopment plans.  With 
nationalisation off the agenda, a new sense of corporate optimism returned along with 
a decade-long upturn in the trade cycle.  Between 1950 and 1960, the combined 
annual profits of the twelve largest firms grew steadily.  Against a backdrop of 
 
4 Kelf-Cohen, British Nationalisation, p. 106. 
5 For an extensive overview of the decision to nationalise steel, see W. Fienbergh and R. Eveley, Steel 
is Power.  Meanwhile, opposition to state ownership is covered by R. Ranieri, ‘Partners and enemies: 
The government’s decision to nationalise steel, 1944-48’, in R. Millward and J. Singleton (eds), The 
Political Economy of Nationalisation in Britain, 1920-1950 (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 275-308; and Vaizey, 
The History of, pp. 121-128. 
`71 
 
unprecedented demand, the ISB ushered in several major modernisation plans and, 
with a moderate increase in capital investment, productive capacity grew gradually.6 
 
Whilst the steel firms and their political supporters congratulated themselves, the 
industry was operating within what social geographer David Heal has described as a 
“fair weather edifice”.7  Fiercely independent and risk averse, post-war domestic 
producers stood still as international rivals took full advantage.  In 1945, the UK was 
producing 12m t/p/a, while Japan, for example, registered an output of only 1m t/p/a.  
By 1967 this figure was a staggering 93m t/p/a, with the UK standing at a lowly 28m 
t/p/a.8  Elizabeth Cottrell has identified the role political uncertainty played in the firms’ 
reticence to expand, particularly with the Labour Party committing to renationalisation 
under the leadership of Harold Wilson.9  Conversely, John Redwood has more 
accurately established that the investment record of the private sector in the decade 
before renationalisation was “surprisingly credible”.10  The principal reason for this 
relative decline was in fact a reluctance to keep abreast of advances occurring 
elsewhere.  As domestic firms adopted an overly cautious approach, foreign rivals took 
giant leaps of faith in new steelmaking technology.  A clear technical gap emerged, as 
identified by Peter Brannen et al.: 
 
 
6 The post-war performance of the private steel firms is covered extensively by D. Burn, The Steel 
Industry, 1939-1959; and Keeling and Wright, The Development of, pp. 85-133. 
7 Heal, The Steel Industry, p. 103. 
8 The Asian powerhouse wasn’t the only steelmaking nation to leave the UK in its wake.  In 1950 West 
Germany was producing 14m t/p/a, rising to 45m t/p/a only two decades later.  See Man and Metal, 
June 1972. 
9 Cottrell, The Giant, p. 135. 
10 Redwood, Public Enterprise, p. 79. 
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Essentially the industry did not change its ways; concern with the maintenance 
of the autonomy of individual companies, and of private profit tempered only by 
considerations of the potential of public opinion, meant limited reorganisation 
and the policy of patching; essentially the continuation of a decades old habit 
which served merely to make any reorganisation more difficult.11   
 
Years later, some of the BJUAC’s political supporters blamed BSC’s woes on the 
failings of capital in this period: 
 
The post-war nationalisation was effectively sabotaged by the steel bosses, 
until their friends the Tories could get back into office to denationalise again.  
For the next fifteen years the new oxygen techniques which were being 
introduced in the rest of the world were ignored in favour of the out-dated coal 
burning open-hearth method.  The result of this was that by 1967, when the 
industry was re-nationalised, the average British steelmaking plant produced a 
mere 90 tons per man year, as against 210 tons pmy in an average plant and 
a Japanese figure of 250 tons pmy.12 
 
With Harold Macmillan’s Tory Government in a state of disarray, a rejuvenated Labour 
Party developed a new nationalising agenda.  In a March 1961 Parliamentary debate, 
shadow Chancellor Wilson decreed: 
 
 
11 Brannen et al., The Worker Directors, p. 63. 
12 Workers’ Unity pamphlet, 20 July 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/3, p. 3. 
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On the other hand, the Labour Party stands four square and resolved behind 
the proposition that the steel industry must be renationalised, that this essential 
industry must be owned and controlled by the nation and accountable to the 
nation which it exists, or should exist, to serve. That is the basic issue between 
us in this debate. I hope that there will be no shadow of any misunderstanding 
about the difference between the two sides of the House on this.13 
 
The October 1964 general election, which Wilson’s party won with a slight majority, 
was dominated by the ideological battle for the industry.  Although the Iron and Steel 
Bill was originally prepared in May 1965, the new Prime Minister was forced to spend 
his first ministry readdressing the huge balance of payments deficit inherited from his 
predecessors.  After securing an extended majority of 98 in March 1966, he would set 
about launching the next phase of his adventurous industrial strategy.14  
 
A History of Steelmaking in Bilston 
 
The cutting of the Birmingham-to-Wolverhampton canal in 1773 saw an embryonic pig 
iron industry emerge on the north-western edge of Bilston, a small pastoral parish in 
South Staffordshire.  The opening of the ‘cut’ heralded the dawn of a new age for a 
sleepy rural hamlet that, only two decades later, would be home to 15 of the UK’s 21 
coke-fired blast furnaces.15  With a potential capacity of 48,000 t/p/a, much of Bilston’s 
 
13 637 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1961) col. 597. 
14 For a damning critique of renationalisation, see G.W. Ross, The Nationalisation of Steel: One Step 
Forward, Two Steps Back (London, 1965).  Meanwhile, Ovenden, Politics of Steel, pp. 42-74, offers a 
fascinating insight into internal conflict within the Labour Party over the move. 
15 J.M. Price, The Story of Bilston (Bilston, 1951), p. 20. 
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crude pig iron was transported to local workshops or forges, where it was converted 
into a wide array of industrial or domestic hardware products.16  The expansion of the 
town’s principal industry was spearheaded by early generations of independent 
ironmasters known for their advanced technical expertise and business acumen.17  
During the Napoleonic Wars, South Staffordshire was transformed into one of the 
great ironmaking regions in the world, with Bilston its beating heart.   
 
In the 1840s, the industry suffered from what would be the first of a series of cyclical 
fluctuations.  Notwithstanding a temporary upturn, brought on by a brief spike in 
demand for bulkier goods, the area’s once all-powerful pig iron industry entered a 
period of terminal decline.18  By 1864, 58 of the region’s blast furnaces stood idle.19  
Two decades later, this figure had swollen to 123.  Pig iron, the basis of the area’s 
economy, suddenly found itself marginalised by cheap, mass-produced steel flooding 
in from rival regions.  This shift in spatial arrangement saw local ironmasters’ traditional 
customer base completely disappear, with Black Country iron confined to the 
 
16 James MacAulay, editor of The Leisure Hour, marvelled at the range of goods produced in the town, 
“Bilston is spoken of as the centre of the hardware trade.  It is famous for its grindstones (said to give it 
its name), and, moreover, has manufactories of tin-plate (for the million), and japanned and enamelled 
ware, including coal vases, trays, tea-caddies, baths, toilet services etc.  Among the curiosities of 
manufacture, it may be mentioned that more than 2,000 tea-caddies, and not less than 50,000 waiters, 
are made weekly …”.  See J. MacAulay (ed.), The Leisure Hour: An Illustrated Magazine for Home 
Reading (London, 1872), p. 429. 
17 The first generation of Black Country ironmasters were celebrated for their ability to innovate, with 
many making vital contributions to the advancement of their burgeoning trade.  They were also noted 
for their commercial pragmatism, constantly looking to vary their product portfolios in accordance with 
the demands of an everchanging domestic and international market.  See Shill, South Staffordshire. 
18  For a detailed overview of the collapse of the Black Country iron trades, see W.K.V. Gale, Black 
Country Iron. 
19 The British Association for the Advancement of Science, Birmingham and its Regional Setting: A 
Scientific Survey (Birmingham, 1950), p. 237. 
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manufacture of specialist, low value items such as chains, anchors and tubes.  By 
1904, output had plummeted to a lowly 0.34m t/p/a and, compounding matters further, 
the decline of iron overlapped with the retrenchment of the district’s auxiliary mining 
industry.20   
 
Several issues contributed to the demise of the Black Country’s independent iron 
trade.21  The foremost factor, according to historians, was the actions – or inactions – 
of the region’s ironmasters.22  As the rest of British industry underwent a period of re-
invention and diversification during the final years of Queen Victoria’s reign, local 
industrialists stood still; stubbornly refusing to embrace new technologies adopted 
elsewhere.  The distinguished steelmaker Henry Bessemer, for example, was roundly 
scoffed at when touring the area with his revolutionary production methods.23  By the 
turn of the century, the Black Country was home to only three fully-integrated iron and 
steelmaking firms.24  One of these was the Springvale plant, a facility that would later 
become known as Bilston works.   
 
20 Allen, Industrial Development, p. 283 
21 These included the exhaustion of local raw material supplies, a sharp increase in the costs of carriage 
and the collapse of the Atlantic home and hardware trade.   
22 W.K.V. Gale identified a “curiously insular attitude” amongst a final generation of Black Country 
Ironmasters who refused to neither, “disclose their methods nor pay heed to others”.  See Gale, Black 
Country Iron, p. 109.  Similarly, G. Barnsby identified a form of “entrepreneurial inertia”.  See Barnsby, 
Socialism, p. 75. 
23 Another damning indictment of the disdain these proud industrialists had for pioneering technology 
came from inventor Richard Tangye, “This is fair example of the way S. Staffs. ironmasters treated 
inventors ... the consequence being that their trade has left them and gone to districts where proprietors 
and managers are more enlightened”.  See R. Tangye, One and All: An Autobiography of Richard 
Tangye (London, 1889), pp. 98-99. 
24 The first major collapse occurred in 1877 with the closure of the nearby Shrubbery Ironworks, which 
was owned by the Mayor of Wolverhampton.  The closure of this well-known family firm sent 




Purchased in 1866 by a young and ambitious businessman called Alfred Hickman, the 
site had prospered as local rivals fell by the wayside.  If the demise of Black Country 
iron was foreshadowed by the relative backwardness of the final generation of 
independent masters, Bilston’s survival can be explained by its owner’s technical and 
commercial expertise.  The son of a successful master himself, Hickman was 
apprenticed as an iron merchant, acquiring first-hand experience of the trade’s 
commercial dealings; before training as metallurgist.  Alfred subsequently inherited 
extensive business interests from his father, providing the capital required to purchase 
his own works.   
 
The Springvale site had been neglected by the previous owner, leaving a measly 
overall productive capacity of 50,000 t/p/a.25  Hickman’s immediate concern was, 
therefore, to oversee a capital-intensive modernisation scheme, raising production in 
line with rivals in Northern England and Wales.  Between 1866 and 1880, the plant’s 
crumbling brick furnaces were replaced with larger, modern vessels, making the firm 
the leading producer of specialist pig iron in the entire Midlands.  The development 
programme also rendered the works one of the most technologically advanced 
operations in Europe.  Unlike his contemporaries, the dynamic Hickman knew the 
future lay primarily in steel and, to a lesser extent, high value wrought iron goods.  His 
decision to expand his firm’s product portfolio coincided with the discovery by Sidney 
 
such closures had on the population of the town, “The effect was soon felt, and in a short time thousands 
of families were on the point of starvation.  Everyday crowds of hungry labouring men could be seen 
blocking up the thoroughfares opposite the Town Hall, North Street, and the Union Workhouse on the 
Bilston Road, all clamouring for work and bread”.  See W.H. Jones, Story of the Municipal Life of 
Wolverhampton (London, 1903). 
25 The Ingot, July 1919. 
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Thomas and Percy Gilchrist of a process that enabled the widespread manufacture of 
lucrative special steels from the kind of phosphorous rich pig iron Hickman’s company 
specialised in.  Alfred immediately recognised the potential of the so-called ‘Thomas-
Gilchrist process’ and, having conducted a series of trials, became one of the first 
major domestic producers to adopt the revolutionary technique.26  New melting shop 
and finishing ends enabled the fully-integrated site to manufacture a range of precisely 
measured goods for a global market.27  Eventually, the ambitious experimental 
expansion scheme drew praise from industry’s principal trade magazine: 
 
The completely modern character of the great Spring Vale establishment 
makes it almost incongruous, situated as it is in the heart of a district whose 
weakness for many years has been the old-fashioned character of many of the 
existing plants.28   
 
Another key feature of Hickman’s successful business model was the application of 
an interminable and all-encompassing efficiency drive.  Witnessing first-hand the 
dramatic collapse of the local trade, the young industrialist was aware that the downfall 
of his fellow ironmasters was, in part, caused by a failure to source low-cost raw 
materials following the exhaustion of local coal, iron ore and limestone deposits.  To 
improve economies of scale, Alfred purchased several mineral estates outside his 
 
26 In what proved to be a shrewd move, Hickman invited Percy Gilchrist to join his board of directors. 
27 Although works concentrated on supplying special steels to the local electrical construction, 
engineering and motor vehicle industries, it also delivered to Europe and the United States.  The 
subsequent installation of a primary mill also ensured the firm could enter the domestic tube trade. 
28 The Iron Trade Review, 6 February 1908. 
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Midlands hub.29  Alarmed by spiralling transport costs, he also developed an 
interconnecting system of sidings linking the works to the national rail network, 
acquiring his own locomotives in the process.  Another cost-cutting tactic involved 
purchasing bankrupt stock and equipment from insolvent rivals.30  Likewise, the 
enterprising steel baron successfully exploited the waste gas produced by his blast 
furnaces to power the entire plant.  Another ingenious example of Hickman’s 
resourcefulness was his utilisation of basic slag as a road surface, thereby providing 
an additional revenue stream that countered the financial impact of the industry’s 
regular downturns.31  
  
By the turn of the century, one of the UK’s last surviving independent producers was 
sitting on the executive committees of prestigious national institutions like BITA, BMA 
and the Board of Trade.  Back in the Black Country, he served as the President of the 
Wolverhampton Chamber of Commerce and District Engineering Society.  As head of 
SISI, Alfred looked to address the relative backwardness of his fellow masters by 
inviting Europe’s most eminent industrialists to deliver papers on a range of technical 
matters.  The list of guest speakers included Frederick Siemens, Percy Gilchrist and 
Benjamin Talbot.  Concerned by the relatively antiquated nature of local blast furnace 
 
29 Although Bilston lay above vast coal and ironstone fields, they had been wastefully exploited by 
ironmasters.  With the gradual abandonment of the town’s mineral fields in the mid-1860s, the surviving 
ironworks were forced to rely on expensively sourced raw materials, thereby squeezing ever-shrinking 
profit margins even further.  A concerned Hickman responded by purchasing a number of collieries and 
ironstone quarries in Nuneaton, Banbury, Oxfordshire and North Wales. 
30  The machinery used to build his steelmaking plant, for example, was acquired from a bankrupt works 
in the North West.  See A Brief History of the Bilston Iron and Steelworks, WCA, DX894/9/3/2.  
31 In January 1905 Tarmac was opened next to Bilston works, with Alfred its Chairman.  When the plant 
was eventually closed over seven decades later, the former sister company purchased the site from 
BSC and, following a series of delays, redeveloped the land for commercial use and housing. 
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practice, he invited the illustrious inventor Edward A. Cowper who, in an opening 
address, singled out Alfred for praise, “I am quite satisfied that if Staffordshire is to 
hold her own in the manufacture of pig iron … other ironmasters may see their way to 
follow the example he has set”.32  Hickman’s contribution to the commercial and 
technical advancement of the industry was eventually recognised by his peers: 
 
His whole life has been devoted to the development of the industry which he 
now adorns, and although 77 years of age, he is hale, robust and vigorous, still 
planning new schemes to keep his great establishment not merely abreast, but, 
if possible, ahead of his time.  In mental outlook, it may be said that Sir Alfred 
will never grow old.  His passion for the very latest things in mechanics is shown 
by the arrangements he is making to install at the works of Alfred Hickman, Ltd., 
Spring Vale, Wolverhampton, electrical rolling mills, with reversing gear on, the 
principles described at the May meeting of the Iron and Steel Institute by D. 
Selby-Bigge, of Newcastle-on-Tyne.  When his paper was not two months old, 
Sir Alfred had already sketched out a plan for the installation of these mills at a 
cost, probably, somewhere near £70,000.  This rapid evolution of a new 
scheme very well exemplifies Sir Alfred’s habit of swift decision, and his genius 
for sizing up whatever is submitted to his clear, ripe and experienced 
judgement.  His views on the need of up-to-date methods were very well 
epitomized in the brief interview THE IRON TRADE REVIEW representative 
had with Sir Alfred at his charming London residence in Kensington Palace 
 
32 W.M. Larke, ‘South Staffs. Works Managers’, The Blackcountryman, 1.2 (1968), p. 41. 
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Gardens, overlooking Hyde Park: ‘You have got to be moving the whole time 
or you’ll be left behind.  The world never stops’.33 
 
In 1902 an aging Alfred handed the reins of the business to his son Edward, who had 
previously been employed at the works in various capacities.34  Like his father before 
him, the young entrepreneur eagerly embraced all aspects of the trade, demonstrating 
sound commercial judgement and an astute knowledge of experimental technology.  
Adopting a hands-on approach, he continued Alfred’s modernising agenda by 
transforming the facility into one of the largest family-owned steelmaking concerns in 
the UK.35  With demand increasing by nearly a quarter during WWI, Edward displayed 
his entrepreneurial zeal by opening an armaments plant.36  By now, the pattern of 
ownership in the UK iron and steel industry had already been completely transformed, 
with family concerns replaced by large corporate interests.  A stubborn Edward 
rejected repeated takeover bids, but in 1920 he finally relented, selling his family’s 
majority shareholding to S&L.   
 
Under the leadership of its enterprising young Chairman Allan MacDiarmid, the 
Scottish-based firm had become one of the most proactive domestic steel companies, 
 
33 The Iron Trade Review, 6 February 1908. 
34 Alfred had ensured Edward was grounded in all aspects of the trade by employing him as an 
apprentice, a salesman and a Deputy Director before joining the main board. 
35 In 1906, for example, Edward installed a Siemens-Martins OH furnace, which combined pig iron with 
scrap to produce basic steel in large quantities.  Like his father, he was an enthusiastic innovator, 
designing an experimental refrigeration unit next to his Blast Furnace Department.  However, when the 
unit proved defective, the frugal Edward retained it as an onsite larder. 
36 This would signal the start of long-term and highly lucrative arrangement with the MOD that continued 
until the site closed in April 1979. 
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described by John Vaizey as a firm ran by “dynamic people”.37  Between the wars, 
MacDiarmid oversaw an expansion strategy that centred on acquiring a number of 
smaller concerns, playing a key role in BISF supervised rationalisation programmes.38  
The Scotsman, who also headed S&L’s development committee, oversaw the building 
of the UK’s only new greenfield works at Corby, Northamptonshire.  The state-of-the-
art site was described as an, “exemplar of what many people inside and especially 
outside steel thought could be done if steelmen really tried”.39  Realising the financial 
opportunity presented by rearmament in the 1930s, the firm transformed Bilston into 
a lucrative and strategically important production unit that supplied tens of thousands 
of shells and pipes for the Normandy landings.40   
 
With the first nationalisation ending in failure, the facility would receive a complete 
makeover.  A decade on from WWII, its parent company, now under the stewardship 
of A.G. Stewart, looked to transform the works.  The first stage of his £16m nine-year 
modernisation and expansion project began in 1952, with the erection of a new 
flagship blast furnace.  Named Elisabeth, in honour of Stewart’s youngest daughter, 
she was the only vessel in the UK capable of producing high-quality pig iron from low-
cost iron ore.  Moreover, as a scavenger furnace, she was able to function using 




37 Vaizey, The History, p. 66. 
38 Bilston was joined by approximately twenty-two West Midland sister sites. 
39 Ibid., p. 72. 
40 During WWII, Bilston’s ‘A’ furnace achieved a world record output.  For a detailed account of the 
plant’s contribution to the war effort, see S&L, An Industrial War Record (Corby, 1946). 
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Elisabeth?  She was brilliant at producing iron, absolutely brilliant.  When she 
was built, she was an experimental hot blast furnace.  She could use coke with 
oxygen and air; she could use oil with oxygen and air; and she could use gas 
with oxygen and air.  And this is what made the place special.41 
 
Standing at 212ft, Elisabeth soon became a regional landmark and, as the sole 
surviving blast furnace in the Black Country, an incredible source of pride for the town’s 
inhabitants.  As a symbol of survival and industrial renewal, she was 
anthropomorphised as the Grand Old Lady of Bilston, though she would be forever be 
known as ‘Big Lizzie’ to the men.  Stewart subsequently turned his attentions to 
expanding Bilston’s melting shop, installing six oil-fired OH furnaces.  The 
redevelopment of the heavy-end amplified potential productive capacity to 0.7m t/p/a, 
whilst the installation of ancillary rolling mills enabled S&L to provide a diverse range 
of high-value semi-finished products for the lucrative Black Country metal bashing 
trade.  With the plant’s workforce swelling to 3,000, the period in question is today 
fondly remembered by older generations as the ‘golden age of steel’.   
 
Though the investment programme was celebrated by industry outsiders, Stewart’s 
attachment to OH steelmaking ultimately sowed the seeds of Bilston’s demise under 
BSC two decades later.  Having commissioned a costly flagship blast furnace, he was 
reluctant to abandon hot metal practices when looking to upgrade the Melting Shop 
Department five years later.  At this stage, however, traditional OHs were being 
superseded by electric arc furnaces at special steel producers elsewhere.  In 1962, 
for example, USC commissioned a new cold metal steelmaking complex in South 
 
41 Oral testimony from J. Vincent, recorded 15 October 2014, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
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Yorkshire.  The long-term impact this investment decision had on the fate of Bilston 
cannot be overestimated.  Later chapters will assert how BSC officials with 
professional links to USC decided to sacrifice the Black Country works in favour of 
more modern sites in Sheffield and Rotherham.42   
 
Although S&L’s malinvestment eventually sounded the death knell at Bilston, the plant 
proved a consistency profitable concern, producing carbon steels and tubes for the 
expanding and highly lucrative Midland car and engineering industries.43  In 1957 the 
facility was operating at 100 per cent capacity as demand for steel ingots and tubes 
rose by 16.6 and 12 per cent respectively.44  As Bilston entered the new decade, S&L’s 
board of directors were so concerned by a local labour shortage they began ferrying 
in experienced steelmen from Scotland.   
 
The plant’s longstanding profitable record was down to several factors.  Firstly, ‘Big 
Lizzie’ proved to be the most efficient vessel in the UK, providing the melting shop 
workers with a continuous supply of high-quality, low cost pig iron.  Secondly, its 
workforce developed a close relationship with their loyal customer base, consistently 
meeting the needs of hundreds of Black Country ‘metal bashers’.45  Lastly, they 
 
42 For an account of the development of electric arc steelmaking in South Yorkshire, see Heal, The 
Steel Industry, pp. 164-165; and R. Peddie, The United Steel Companies Limited 1918-1968, A History 
(Manchester, 1969). 
43 Whilst still maintaining its traditional output of tube-steel and high grade pig iron, the plant would 
expand its range of products, sizes and steel qualities; serving a wide range of local ‘metal bashing’ 
industries with high-quality ingots, blooms, billets, slabs and rounds. 
44 The Times, 1 February 1956. 
45 At the time of nationalisation, the plant’s metallurgical department employed approximately 70 
technicians who each performed quality control duties in the melting shop and rolling mills.  Supporting 
them was a team of chemists who tested each product before they left the works.  Along with the sales 
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learned to be frugal, ensuring profit margins were maximised at all times.  Each of 
these factors would contribute to the subsequent success under the Corporation, 
particularly after the onset of the world steel crisis in 1975.  With the rest of the industry 
haemorrhaging hundreds of millions of pounds, Bilston’s flexible and conscientious 
steelmen were still able to maintain their proud profitable tradition. 
 
The works’ immediate post-war commercial success proved to be short-lived.  Like so 
many of their domestic rivals, S&L suffered from falling demand and poor profitability 
prior to re-nationalisation.  In January 1963, having witnessed a disastrous 40 per cent 
drop in sales, Stewart warned shareholders: 
 
Capacity for steel production in this country, and indeed the rest of the free 
world, has reached a point at which it is in excess of demand and this position 
is likely to prevail over the next few years until increasing requirements restore 
the balance.  In this interim period, therefore, the emphasis must be on reducing 
production costs and improving quality.46 
 
Unlike his more proactive predecessor, the hapless industrialist was reluctant to 
invest; instead distracting himself with a campaign against nationalisation.  In March 
1964, he took out a full-page advertisement in The Times describing public ownership 
as “old hat”.47  Two years later, with the Labour Party now in power, the S&L board 
launched an extraordinary attack on Harold Wilson’s Government: 
 
division, these highly trained steelmen would make regular visits to customers in order to discuss any 
problems or specific requirements. 
46 The Times, 11 January 1963. 




Would a political know it all, irresponsible, juggling with dead statistics, teach 
us to do better in the long run? ... Now we have a Socialist Government 
committed to take into state ownership the major part of the Iron and Steel 
Industry.  It is bound by the shackles of its past, lacking the courage or the 
judgement to corral its sacred cow.  Its case for nationalisation is couched in 
emotional terms because it cannot be justified in any practical terms.  That the 
Government should represent that it had a majority support in the country for 
any such measure is a disingenuous confidence trick upon the people.48 
 
In a desperate twelfth hour attempt to fend off state control, the BISF scrambled to 
release the ‘Benson Report’, which proposed to work closely with the state in order to 
rationalise domestic steelmaking units.49  Joining the anti-nationalisation brigade was 
a considerable body of Bilston’s workforce.  One former worker reflects on the mood 
of the shop-floor on vesting day: 
 
Some of the younger men were excited by the prospect of state ownership.  
They believed it would bring improved job security and higher wages … But the 
vast majority of the workforce, particularly the old timers, had misgivings.  S&L 
had been good to them … They had created a family atmosphere at Bilston.  
Not only investing in plant and machinery, but people as well.  These weren’t 
 
48 The Times, 11 February 1965. 
49 BISF, The Steel Industry: The Stage 1 Report of the Development coordinating Committee of the 
British Iron and Steel Federation (London, 1966). 
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faceless corporations, but altruistic family firms.  Nationalisation was a step into 
the unknown, so there were some reservations on the shop-floor.50 
 
As the above testimony reveals, the plant’s traditionally conservative rank and file 
workforce enjoyed an espirit de corps with their private sector owners which, in turn, 
contributed to concerns over the prospect of nationalisation.  Such diffidence was 
shared by their trade union leaders, many of whom preached the virtues of ideological 
conservatism.   
 
The Trade Union Landscape of Steel 
 
Like so many other industries, the craft exclusivity and provincial parochialism of new 
unionism created an obstacle to effective organisation amongst nineteenth and early 
twentieth century British iron and steelworkers.  This would all change with the 
outbreak of WWI, after which David Lloyd George’s coalition Government became 
concerned by the potential impact a multitude of organisations representing sectional 
interests might have on industrial relations and, therefore, supply lines.  In 1917 the 
TUC General Council and Whitehall sought to rationalise an incredibly chaotic trade 
union landscape by persuading the many workers’ organisations to merge under the 
banner of BISAKTA, a specially formed umbrella organisation commonly known as the 
ISTC.51  For domestic steelworkers, this would be a watershed moment.  Decades of 
 
50 Oral testimony from anonymous, recorded 15 April 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
51 At the time of constitution, the ISTC saw the merger of organisations such as the British Steel 
Smelters, Mill Iron and Tinplate Union; The Associated Iron and Steel Workers of Great Britain and the 
National Steel Workers’ Association Engineering and Labour League; the Amalgamated Association of 
Steel and Iron Workers of Great Britain; the Tin and Sheet Millmens’ Association and the Wire Workers 
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geographical insularity and occupational sectionalism could finally be eradicated with 
the establishment of an all-powerful TUC-affiliated production union that could lobby 
Governments and employers on their behalf.   
 
From the outset, the ISTC sought to widen its political influence, with President John 
Hodge selected as the nation’s first Minister of Labour.  As leader of the anti-socialist 
British Workers’ National League, he was described by one Conservative Party peer 
as a “most patriotic Tory working man”.52  Meanwhile, the Confederation’s General 
Secretary, Arthur Pugh, was selected to lead the TUC, whilst also serving on the 
League of Nations’ economic consultative committee and the editorial board of the 
Daily Herald.  Following Pugh’s retirement in 1935, his successor, John Brown, also 
became a permanent member of the General Council whilst, at the same time, sitting 
on various Government committees including the Royal Commission on Equal Pay, 
the industrial panel of the Finance Corporation for Industry and the Civil Service 
Commission.53  With the Confederation’s political authority and influence secure, 
Lincoln Evans was chosen to lead the powerful industrial union through the post-WWII 
period.  Yet another conservative figure within the institutional labour movement, the 
Welshman sat on the NJAC, as well as the Economic Planning Committee and the 
General Council, where he and fellow right-wingers Arthur Deakin and Tom Williamson 
fought to block the spread of Marxism amongst Britain’s unions.  Evans also found 
infamy for assisting in the de-nationalisation of the industry, a stance that prompted 
Winston Churchill to award him a knighthood.  After seven turbulent years in charge 
 
Union.  A glaring omission was the NUB which, by retaining its own identity, became the industry’s 
second largest production union and a longstanding rival of the Confederation. 
52 Sir Arthur Griffith-Boscawen, Memories (London, 1925), p. 207. 
53 TUC, Report of the 1961 Annual TUC, p. 289. 
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of the Confederation, he was replaced by the outspoken Harry Douglass, the Chair of 
the British Productivity Council.  Then, on the eve of re-nationalisation, the aging 
Teessider stepped aside for another influential Welshman, David ‘Dai’ Davies, the 
former Treasurer and Chairman of the Labour Party.  
 
Under the leadership of these establishment figures, the Confederation deservedly 
earned a reputation for conservatism: standing firmly – and proudly – on the right of 
the union movement; adopting a moderate, pro-establishment position that sought to 
work for the national interest.  In the immediate aftermath of WWII, Pugh wrote:   
 
Today the Trade Union Movement is a powerful instrument, but power brings 
responsibility.  The assertion of ‘rights’ carries with it the obligation of duties, 
and the changes in the country’s economic life resulting from the exercise of 
that power, places upon the present generation of trade unionists the 
furtherance of a policy directed not to merely selfish ends but to the common 
good.54  
 
A further expression of its leadership’s temperance can be found in their attitude 
towards industrial action and, more significantly for this study, relations with 
management and lay members.  In what John Vaizey has described as a “steel 
philosophy” and Peter Bowen a “pattern of interdependence”, ISTC officials adopted 
a patently pro-management position that sought to suppress any sign of industrial 
protest amongst their members.55  During WWI, Hodge became an advocate of 
 
54 Pugh, Men of Steel, p. 591. 
55 Vaizey, The History of, p. 26; and Bowen, Social Control, p. 107. 
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patriotic labour, charging that industrial action was an act of treason, even threatening 
to prosecute striking Liverpudlian boilermakers under the Defence of the Realm Act.  
Although, with Pugh elected as President of the TUC, Confederation bureaucrats were 
compelled to support the 1926 General Strike, they did so with a great deal of remorse: 
 
[It was] absolutely legally wrong, nay, it was a morally wrong … It is no good 
mincing words; we made a grave breach of the traditions built up so slowly but 
surely during the past forty years, and there was no man more grieved than I 
was that we had discarded that tradition of arguing first.56 
 
Relations with the state and capital were further solidified under Evans, a General 
Secretary that frequently endorsed the adoption of policies that went against the 
interests of his own membership.  In 1947, for example, his Executive threatened any 
Confederation man considering protesting a national weekend working agreement 
with permanent expulsion: 
 
We believe in trade union discipline without which a trade union becomes a 
rabble.  If membership has to be sacrificed in order to maintain it, better so, 
because if the rotten branch is not cut off the whole tree will become poisoned.57 
 




56 Hodge, Workman’s Cottage, pp. 366-367. 
57 Pugh, Men of Steel, p. xiii. 
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He believed that without discipline a trade union becomes a rabble.  He 
believed in the peaceful settlement of industrial differences, that strikes at best 
were an ugly and painful necessity and at worst were suicidal folly.  Outworn 
shibboleths of a past age found no place in his philosophy and he spurned the 
cheap popularity often to be gained by repeating them.  He preferred to face 
the facts and to advocate and pursue policies which his judgement and wide 
knowledge persuaded him were in the best interests of the men and women he 
served.58 
 
Davies was another loyal devotee to his predecessors’ conservatism.  Responding to 
a July 1972 strike request from one of Bilston’s few militant shop stewards, he 
presented his union’s longstanding position on radical industrial action: 
 
Regarding your proposal that the Executive Council should, if necessary have 
a national strike to halt the growing number of sackings and closures, may I 
remind you that this could be a self-defeating exercise.  There are in fact a 
number of plants whose future must be uncertain, and I should have thought 
that if the British Steel Corporation was forced to close these plants down, as 
would be inevitable in a national strike, then it would be very highly unlikely 
indeed that the plants concerned would ever re-open.  This surely is hardly a 
result which your members would desire.59 
 
 
58 Man and Metal, August 1970. 
59 Letter from D. Davies to D. Hamilton, 31 July 1972, MRC, MSS.36/2000/258.  The Confederation’s 
pro-management stance would continue after nationalisation, with a number of branch officials expelled 
for participating in unofficial strike action.  See Upham, Tempered, p. 67. 
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A strict determination to uphold the sanctity of formal agreements, nonetheless, led to 
above average national pay for members and what has been described as, “a record 
of labour relations that, size for size, was hardly surpassed”.60  But these 
achievements failed to appease members who repeatedly accused their leaders of 
authoritarianism.61  They were entirely accurate in their assessment, with Evans 
revealing the tight grip Swinton House held over its own rank and file: 
 
It is not leadership which demands that the responsibility for making decisions 
must be thrown on the mass of men who have had no opportunity of hearing 
the case argued; it is an abdication of it.  The readiness on the part of some 
leaders to justify referring a decision to the rank and file as an essential 
democratic process, finds its roots more often than otherwise, not in any 
passionate desire to observe some democratic principle but as a convenient 
means of escaping the responsibility for making a decision which calls for some 
degree of moral courage.62     
 
More recently, Hartley et al., in their study of the 1980 steel strike, have highlighted 
the supreme power union headquarters wielded: 
 
This system is one that in practice gives the General Secretary considerable 
power, for if he is able to generate support among a majority of the EC – which 
under normal circumstances is likely, given his greater experience and expert 
 
60 Bowen, Social Control, p. 18. 
61 Unlike every other major industrial union, the ISTC stubbornly refused to organise an ADC or 
leadership election contests for lay members. 
62 Pugh, Men of Steel, pp. xii-xiii. 
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power – he is unlikely to lose command as the result of a single year’s election.  
Moreover, in addition to his administrative and executive responsibilities for the 
union machine the General Secretary has much discretion, crucially in his 
power to call Executive meetings and declare strikes.63 
 
In terms of development, ISTC leaders traditionally adopted a pro-modernising 
agenda, with Hodge publicly celebrating the mechanisation of the industry: 
 
[We] never rebelled or placed any obstacle in the way of any automatic 
appliance being utilised, either in the melting furnace or in the rolling mills, my 
policy having been to advise the men not to work against the machine, but to 
make the greater possible use of it, provided we got a fair share of the plunder 
resulting from any new automatic or other appliances.64 
 
In his post-war history of the ISTC, Martin Upham described his organisation as, “a 
union in and of the steel industry, so committed to it that it co-operated with change 
whenever it was in the industry’s interest, even when that meant painful 
experiences”.65  This outlook led to charges that union headquarters was all too willing 
to sacrifice jobs for the promise of investment. 
 
 
63 J. Hartley, J.E. Kelly and N. Nicholson, Steel Strike: A Case Study in Industrial Relations (London, 
1983), p. 29 
64 Hodge, Workman’s Cottage, p. 90.  One policy statement, published at the height of the Great 
Depression, proclaimed, “We recognise that in the process of adjusting an unorganised industry, 
displacement of labour must occur”.  See Man and Metal, January 1973. 
65 Upham, Tempered, p. 72. 
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The Confederation inevitably developed a highly fractured relationship with fellow steel 
unions.  In the post-war period, its leaders vigorously courted all grades of industrial 
worker, prompting the NUB to become suspicious of the ISTC’s determination to 
absorb its members.  Moreover, scholars have highlighted the problematic relationship 
that developed between industrial and craftworkers: 
 
Relations between craft and production workers within the steel industry have 
always contained considerable elements of conflict.  National and local officials 
of ISTC have often perceived craft workers as elitist, the craft side of the 
industry as ‘overmanned’, and the craft unions as politically ambitious within the 
industry (perceptions which were partly mirrored in craftworkers’ views of the 
ISTC).66 
 
Relations with white-collar organisations were equally as hostile, with one 
management union official contending: 
 
Having grown from its original strength among steel process-workers, ISTC 
then became the dominant steel union.  However, it had many clashes with 
other unions.  Such clashes partly mirrored its dictum that the steel industry 
should be left to the ISTC alone.  ISTC has often been jealous of interventions 
by other unions.67  
 
 
66 Hartley et al., Steel Strike, pp. 140-141. 
67 Bamber, Militant Managers?, p. 22. 
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When the industry was once again handed over to the state in July 1967, it continued 
to suffer from a disorderly trade union structure, with BSC employees at some plants 
attached to over two dozen different organisations.  It was prevailing concerns over 
the fragmented union landscape and its potential impact on negotiation and 
conciliation that prompted the Government and the TUC to establish the Steel 
Committee.  This formal body, which was completely independent of Congress House, 
was handed the responsibility of negotiating all non-wage matters on behalf of 
affiliated unions.  Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated throughout this thesis, the 
unification of these rival organisations did little to thwart internal conflict, and the 
TUCSICC was often rendered impotent in the face of closures.   
 
Indeed, the longstanding historic traditions of the ISTC would have a direct impact on 
attitudes and, more importantly, policy during the period under review – proving H.A. 
Turner’s submission that: 
 
The character of organisations is very much the product of their ancestry … 
British trade unions, more than those of most countries perhaps, are historical 
deposits and repositories of history.68   
 
A key factor in the rationalisation of the industry was, for example, the steel unions’ 
ongoing determination to work in the national interest.  The issue of union leaders 
becoming what Ralph Milliband referred to as “junior partners of capitalist enterprise”, 
has been further outlined by Robert Taylor in The Fifth Estate:69 
 
68 H.A. Turner, Trade Union Growth, Structure and Policy (London, 1962), p. 14.  




Unions can never afford to lose sight of what they are here for.  ‘Moderation’ 
should not mean wage restraint, feeble bargaining, obedience to a mythical 
‘national’ interest, which is part of the ritual language of British politics.  The 
danger is not that unions will become instruments for ‘extremist action’ … More 
serious, unions could lose their independence by finding themselves enmeshed 
in the machinery of the state as a partner, even a policeman, of government.70 
 
As organisations, “whose philosophy had been based upon the notion of constructive 
cooperation” with the Government and capital, the steel unions would continue to 
adopt a pro-management, pro-modernising philosophy under state ownership.71  In 
the words of one observer: 
 
The unions had a tradition of co-operating with the employers to exert power 
over the workforce.  This co-operation, combined with the union’s control over 
jobs, subsequently helped BSC to rationalise the industry, without generally 
having to confront much concerted union opposition.72 
 
In the interim, nevertheless, the Confederation cemented its place as one of UK’s 
largest unions, with its ranks swelling to 115,000 on the eve of nationalisation.  
Reporting to union headquarters at Swinton House on Gray’s Inn Road, London was 
a 21-man Executive consisting of representatives from various geographical 
 
70 R. Taylor, The Fifth Estate: Britain’s Unions in the Seventies (London, 1978), p. 123. 
71 Bowen, Social Control, p. 134. 
72 Bamber, Militant Managers?, p. 22. 
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divisions.73  Each area had a small team of full-time officials, led by a Divisional Officer 
who liaised with his nominated EC member.74  At plant-level, members were organised 
into branches representing a particular section of the works.  Local officials included a 
Chairman and Secretary who were supported by a group of shop stewards or 
convenors.75  At larger sites with multiple branches, there was typically a formal Joint 
Branches Committee, whose leadership would mediate with local management.   
 
By July 1967 Bilston was home to approximately 2,500 Confederation members 
spread over half a dozen branches, the largest of which was ISTC Springvale No.1, 
representing the plant’s melting shop workers.  Other prominent Confederation 
branches included the finishing end (ISTC Springvale No.6) and a recently established 
Joint Staff Committee, representing a growing legion of white-collar employees.  There 
were three other affiliated unions at the works.  Around 200 blast furnace workers 
made up a solitary NUB lodge and another 150 men employed in the sprawling 
Transport Department were attached to the TGWU.  The picture was completed by a 
handful of craftworkers, mainly bricklayers with UCATT.76 
 
The plant’s trade union landscape was dominated by shop stewards known for their 
temperance and close relationship with management: 
 
73 For an outline of the ISTC’s internal structure see Docherty, Steel and Steelworkers, pp. 50-53. 
74  The Midlands were represented by Area No.4, with Divisional Officers based at a small office on the 
outskirts of Birmingham. 
75 The role of Chairman was often symbolic, typically being handed to the most senior shop steward.  
The Secretary was responsible for communicating with members and union headquarters, whilst a team 
of convenors handled day-to-day branch affairs. 
76 There were previously branches of the AUEW and the ETU at Bilston but the ISTC had aggressively 




That generation, you trusted bosses, if you like, to a certain extent … they were 
above reproach.77 
 
The works newspaper featured a series of articles titled ‘Know Your Union Man’, which 
reveal the mindset and personal outlooks of many of the branch officials who went 
onto play an active role in the anti-closure campaign.  What is particularly striking is 
interviewees’ aversion to militant industrial action: 
 
I am of the belief that strikes, pure and simple, cannot benefit except in 
extremis.  Most bones of contention can only be satisfactorily ironed out by 
negotiation – striking at the drop of a hat only wastes time and frays tempers.  
In the end one has to talk around a table.  Call me an idealist if you like.  I am 
bound by the old traditions in that I am convinced that only by belonging to a 
union can employees get a fair deal but I also believe that we will only get that 
fair deal by bringing the union up-to-date.  Common sense tells me that not all 
management are ogres; not all union men are St. George.78 
 
Another future BJUAC leader adopted a parallel position: 
 
But do not go away with the idea that I am a rabid left-winger.  I believe in the 
socialist ideal but in my view that does not mean I must be an extremist.  I am 
a moderate.  The trades unions must support the Government whether they like 
 
77 Oral testimony from G. Howe recorded 25 January 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
78 The Steel News: Bilston, Wolverhampton and Birchley Edition, 31 October 1975. 
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it or not.  We must realise that we have to knuckle down to it if we are to survive.  
Strikes are no answer.  In the end the negotiating table is the only solution.79 
 
Beyond this conservative vanguard, Bilston’s wider workforce exhibited a low level of 
trade union consciousness, with one senior shop steward bemoaning widespread 
apathy, “Half a dozen members, no matter how staunch, should not make decisions 
for 145.  I would like to see members take union matters a little more seriously”.80  
Another complained: 
 
Our greatest problem is in getting all our members together for union meetings.  
And, unfortunately, because we are so widespread, there is a marked degree 
of apathy amongst our people.81   
 
Such indifference was a direct consequence of the traditionally close working 
relationship that had developed between local management and the workforce under 
private ownership.  A critical factor in shaping a uniquely peaceful industrial relations 
culture was the personnel and social policies introduced by two exceptionally altruistic 






79 The Steel News: Bilston, Wolverhampton and Birchley Works Edition, 18 July 1975. 
80 The Steel News: Bilston, Wolverhampton and Birchley Works Edition, 29 August 1975. 
81 The Steel News: Bilston, Wolverhampton and Birchley Edition, 14 November 1975. 
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Uncertain Loyalty: unionism at Bilston in historical perspective 
 
The retraction of the pig iron trade throughout the second half of the nineteenth century 
coincided with a series of major labour conflicts.  These disputes, often provoked by 
attacks on wages, were customarily organised by informal combinations of ill-
disciplined men who, despite plenty of endeavour, were easily subjugated by an 
especially ruthless breed of local ironmaster.  A major turning point came in April 1863, 
when a region-wide protest pre-empted the emergence of a small band of labour 
leaders who would go onto establish the very first generation of formal workers’ 
organisations.82  Under their supervision, workers furiously lobbied for formal 
conciliation and arbitration apparatus, culminating in the establishment of one of the 
UK’s first wages board in July 1872.  In a unique experiment that would dramatically 
alter the direction of the industry’s nascent industrial relations culture, a sliding scale 
was introduced and, when a local disagreement occurred, democratically elected trade 
union officials were given the opportunity to sit down with the masters to mutually 
discuss a new pay deal.83  After years of crippling disputes, both sides finally appeared 
willing to reconcile their many differences.  Moreover, the democratic nature of the 
wages board indicated that the area’s steelworkers, who had developed a reputation 
for ill-discipline, were ready to respect the authority of their union leaders.  Their 
 
82 The dispute saw the successful adoption of a multi-works rolling strike strategy, briefly convincing 
local ironworkers of the potential benefits of collective action.  Victory for the masters prompted the men 
to form the Associated Ironworkers of Great Britain, one of the first formal unions in the region.  For a 
detailed and empirically weighted account of the origins and early development of the iron and steel 
unions in the Black Country see either Taylor, Working Class Movement; or Howard, Strikes and 
Lockouts. 
83 Barnsby has described the establishment of the board as an early example of an “alliance 
philosophy”.  See Barnsby, Social Conditions, p. 78. 
`100 
 
loyalty, however, would soon waver, as many continued to unilaterally negotiate 
separate pay deals with their employers.  With the board rendered impotent, local 
workers were lambasted by their Northern counterparts: 
 
We cannot say more than that the ironworkers of the South were never placed 
in a more pitiable position than they are present.  In the mass they have proved 
treacherous and unreliable on union matters with eagerness to rob each other 
or the breaking up of lodges, which is truly deplorable: and after they had made 
themselves the laughing stock of intelligent men, have completed the work of 
folly by standing before the trade as traitors to the union and mere talkers about 
conciliation, and after three years’ experience the life of this somewhat noisy 
infant has ceased to exist.84 
 
In 1887 a new nationwide organisation was established under the guise of the 
AISWGB, but formal combination continued to be an alien concept to Black Country 
ironworkers.  With the union failing to get a foothold in the area, its leadership was 
forced to issue a circular criticising their Midland members: 
 
If the Wages Board is to be dissolved or is to be made a power for good instead 
of evil, it can never be done by disorganised workmen.  “Only complete 
organisation can either make the Wages Board an instrument of justice or 
replace it with some other method which shall secure the legitimate rights of the 
worker.  Whether these rights shall be secured rests entirely with the non-union 
men.  Disorganised, disbanded workmen can do nothing – but slide 
 
84 Pugh, Men of Steel, p. 53. 
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downwards!  Evils exist which demand immediate attention.  Conditions are 
imposed which ought not to be tolerated for a day, yet the board is powerless 
to act because the representatives have no body of support behind them, and 
even the employers’ section fear to enforce adherence to its rules because of 
giving offence to those employers who simply look upon the board as a 
convenience for imposing unjust conditions upon their workmen”.85 
 
Nevertheless, a growing number of the region’s steelworkers belatedly adopted the 
banner of trade unionism in the first decade of the twentieth century, before joining en 
masse after WWI.   
 
But there was one notable exception.  Steelmen employed at Bilston continued to 
display a lukewarm attitude to formal combination.  Both the Hickmans and S&L were 
known for adopting a more sophisticated approach to man-management than their 
contemporaries, introducing a series of innovative welfare and personnel policies 
across their respective stewardships.  The result of this altruistic paternalism was to 
establish an informal social contract between the manager-owners and their loyal 
employees; engineering a positive plantwide industrial relations culture.   
 
After purchasing the facility in 1866, Alfred Hickman proved to be an extremely 
compassionate employer, taking an active interest in the welfare of a workforce that 
had suffered greatly at the hands of previous proprietor John Sparrow.  The infamous 
ironmaster was part of a generation of unscrupulous industrialists who had emerged 
as the pig iron industry began to retrench.  Adopting a highly patriarchal and 
 
85 Ibid., p. 73. 
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authoritarian attitude, their behaviour was exposed by one of the Bilston’s church 
leaders in his controversial sermon, ‘On the Sins of the Iron Trade’:  
 
The iron trade – I speak to those who know the trade well, to those who are 
smarting the shameless dealings which have recently characterised it – the iron 
trade is replete with such men.  Men, did I say?  Forgive me the expression, 
brethren, I wrong humanity – they are mushrooms, rather, rotting, and yet 
ripening on their own rottenness; soap bubbles: glittering in the sunshine of 
their prosperity with the most gaudy colours, swelling all the time larger and 
larger, yet full only of emptiness: till ever and anon they ‘break’ and burst, and 
leave only a spot of filthiness – and half-a-crown in the pound – behind.86  
 
As their empires began to crumble around them, Bilston’s remaining independent 
ironmasters became even more determined to violently suppress any sign of protest.  
Industrial actions were punished under the Masters and Servants Acts, with George 
Barnsby establishing that Wolverhampton had the highest prosecution rate in the 
UK.87 
 
Aware of the damaging impact such behaviour could have on overall performance, 
Hickman sought to foster closer industrial relations by bucking the trend established 
by his more combative peers.  Concerned by his men’s personal wellbeing, he took 
an interest in accident prevention, providing furnace-hands with breathing apparatus 
 
86 Rev. C. Lee, A Sermon to Ironmasters, Merchants and Others on the Sins of the Iron Trade, WCA, 
LS/LB8p. 
87 Barnsby, Social Conditions, p. 46. 
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designed to prevent respiratory diseases.  He also financed an independent study into 
the prevention of workplace accidents, leading to an industrywide initiative requiring 
all boiler units to possess a formal safety certificate.  In the event of a work-related 
accident, Alfred installed a state-of-the-art medical centre that housed fully trained 
nursing staff, whilst introducing a generous compensation scheme for injured or sick 
employees and their family members.  He was also one of the first ironmasters to 
advocate the eight-hour day.  For those unlucky enough to be working on Christmas 
day, the Hickman family personally provided a turkey dinner and a healthy supply of 
beer.  Such was his standing amongst the men, he was affectionately handed the 
moniker of ‘Little Alfie’: 
 
We now come to little Alfie Hickman,  
Who to square at his foes is a quick man, 
His true English pluck shall better the luck  
Of puddler, and roller, and pickman!88 
 
Hickman’s concern for the common man eventually transcended the confines of his 
works.  From his modest manor house on the outskirts of Bilston, he and his wife 
administered a wide range of philanthropic activities.  Receiving a knighthood in 1891, 
Sir Alfred used his new national platform to mount a successful run on Parliament.  
Throughout his political career, the popular ironmaster became a leading advocate for 
legislation designed to improve the lives of industrial workers and their dependents.89  
 
88 “Little Alfie” election handbill, WCA, DX-634/134. 
89 Hickman backed the Conciliation Act, the Coal Mines Regulation Act, the Truck Act, the Employer’s 
Liability Act and the Workmen’s Compensation Acts.  He was also a vocal supporter of the unsuccessful 
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His Parliamentary support for the Workmen’s Dwellings Acquisition Bill of 1896, for 
example, revealed a social conscience rarely exhibited by a captain of industry, “It was 
a disgrace to the civilisation of the country that a large portion of the working classes 
should be housed worse than were horses and dogs, and in some cases even worse 
than pigs”.90  
 
Upon leaving Westminster, The Iron Trade Review praised him for improving the lives 
of his constituents, many of whom were his employees.  In honour of the contribution 
he had made to the economic and social well-being of the local community, a public 
fund was organised, culminating with the presentation of a commemorative gift 
inscribed with the words, “He sits high in all the people’s hearts”.91  At a civic banquet 
held in his honour, the master of ceremonies provided an insight into the relationship 
Hickman had with the townsfolk: 
 
The 4,226 subscribers to the gift now offered you represent all social grades of 
our local community, but the fact that the large majority of them belong to the 
working class will, we think, be particularly pleasing to you as showing that in 
their opinion you have allowed no class prejudices to influence you in the 
consideration and support you have always given to the just and reasonable 
claims of labour.92 
 
 
Prevention of Accidents Bill, the Child Messenger’s Bill and a scheme banning boys less than fourteen 
years of age working in mines. 
90 38 Parl. Deb. H.C. (4th ser.) (1896) col. 131. 
91 The Iron Trade Review, 21 February 1907. 
92 The Iron Trade Review, 6 February 1908. 
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The man now known as the Iron King of South Staffordshire died only three years 
later.  His funeral was an extraordinary demonstration of reverence, with thousands of 
mourners joining a three-mile procession behind his casket.93  Any prevailing concerns 
that the munificent owner’s death might signal the end of his progressive management 
style were, nevertheless, quickly pacified.  Edward Hickman not only inherited 
commercial and technical nous from his father, but also his benevolent nature, with 
the young operator establishing an even more far-reaching personnel programme.  A 
full-time Welfare Officer was recruited to oversee and administer sick benefits, and a 
new system of grants introduced to cover the funeral costs of all current and past 
employees.94  With his workforce growing and prosperity returning to the industry, 
Edward personally oversaw the construction of a workers’ institute that contained a 
24-hour licensed canteen, a swimming pool and showers.95  He also organised 
daytrips for workers and more needy members of the local community.  His most 
popular policy was to provide a free daily beer allowance to employees struggling with 
the intensity of hot metal production, a tradition that continued under BSC.  He was 
also keenly aware of the importance of opening channels of communication with 
employees and, in June 1919, launched a works newspaper.   
 
The centrepiece of his personnel policy was, however, an innovative initiative that 
represented one of the earliest examples of worker participation and class 
collaboration within the domestic steel trade.  Employees were invited to purchase a 
stake in the business via a preferential share issue, with 50,000 shares offered to 
 
93 The Iron Trade Review, 31 March 1910. 
94 The Steel Times, November 1965. 
95 The Ingot, July 1919. 
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production workers under a PAYE plan.  Each share could be purchased with an 
affordable down payment and the balance deducted from wages over an agreed 
period.  When trade was booming, a dividend of 6.5 per cent was guaranteed and any 
surplus profit shared equally between both preference and ordinary shareholders.  
Dividends were protected for employees and, if the company’s profits proved 
insufficient, a guaranteed payment would still be made.   
 
In what was a unique experiment in industrial democracy, Hickman invited major 
worker shareholders to join his company’s board: 
 
We do not want the money.  What we want is your cooperation in the conduct 
of our business.  We want every man and every woman who is employed here 
in any capacity whatever to have, in his and her heart and mind, the benefit of 
the whole concern ... We want you to help us, and by helping us help 
yourselves, to make a larger dividend than we have done in the past.96 
 
Although the enlightened approach adopted by the paternalistic Hickman family was 
principally motivated by a genuine concern for the well-being of their workforce, there 
was an ulterior motive.  The pragmatic ironmasters introduced a uniquely progressive 
management style in a deliberate move to temper any potential shop-floor discord.  
Likewise, as the second half of the nineteenth century progressed, Alfred sought to 
forestall the spread of trade unionism.  As a titan of industry and a devoted Tory, the 
values of collective action and outside arbitration were contrary to his view of the 
established relationship between capital and labour.  When political campaigning, he 
 
96 The Steel News: Bilston and Wolverhampton Edition, 6 July 1978. 
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had had a public spat with the leaders of the WB&DTUC, who raised doubts over the 
sincerity of his benevolence: 
 
I must admit that my unswerving faith in Mr. Hickman’s professions of 
disinterested solicitude and love for the working man received a final blow ... 
and I say perish Conservatism if it has to be bolstered up by a system which 
means the lowering of wages and the degradation of the working man.97   
 
Alfred’s relationship with the trade union movement continued to be strained.  Some 
years later, he declared that anyone supporting a national coal strike were the, “worst 
enemy” of the men.98  Although incredibly rare, whenever industrial action did occur at 
the works, the Hickman family would seek to undermine organisers by inviting the 
families of striking employees to the works canteen for free hot meals.   
 
The strategy proved extremely effective, with the company enjoying a uniquely 
harmonious industrial relations record under their stewardship.99    Moreover, it 
achieved its objective of precluding the spread of trade unionism.  In June 1884, the 
South Staffordshire Millmen’s Association was established in Bilston but, with little 
interest from the plant’s employees, the union soon folded.  The first trade union 
branch at Hickman’s, representing the Steel Smelters and Iron and Steelworkers, 
wasn’t established until 1911, long after Alfred had died.  The next year, the TGWU 
 
97 The Express and Star, 21 November 1885. 
98 The Iron Trade Review, 24 August 1905. 
99 Disputes were customarily resolved at plant level and the relationship between the Hickman family 
and the men remained incredibly close across their stewardship. 
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secured a foothold, before being joined by the ISTC in 1921.  However, these powerful 
organisations struggled to attract significant numbers until after the Great Depression. 
 
S&L thereby built on the model of mutual cooperation laid down by their popular 
predecessors.  As the depression took hold, Allan MacDiarmid demonstrated a socially 
conscientious approach by signing loss-making contracts to avoid short time working 
and compulsory redundancies, whilst persuading his directors to accept a pay cut.100  
This and other gestures ensured a “loyal and harmonious relationship” continued to 
exist throughout the interwar years, with MacDiarmid publicly thanking the men for 
their “able and painstaking work”.101  As prosperity returned to the trade, S&L 
introduced a holiday pay scheme long before Neville Chamberlain’s National 
Government had passed their much lauded Holidays with Pay Act.  Then, on the eve 
of WWII, MacDiarmid contributed £90,000 of his own personal wealth to a company 
Employee’s Benefit Fund, whilst fellow directors agreed to make a regular annual 
donation of £70,000.102   
 
S&L also focused on welfare provision, with its Labour Committee sanctioning a brand-
new social centre and recreational complex at Bilston.103  Often referred to as the 
‘club’, this sprawling facility would become the cultural hub of the works; a place where 
workmates could escape the toil of hot metal production: 
 
 
100 The Times, 28 March 1924. 
101 The Times, 13 May 1936. 
102 The Times, 17 May 1940. 
103 As a sign of their appreciation, the men made a voluntary contribution to the cost of furnishing the 
social centre.  In return, S&L handed them the deeds.  For an account of the company’s overall 
personnel and welfare policy at Corby, see Scopes, Development of Corby, pp. 110-118. 
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We did, yeah.  I very rarely used it at night, but at lunchtimes, yes, because 
there was so much to do.  I mean, you’d got rifle shooting, they’d [got] a rifle 
range.  When I first went there, there was a swimming baths, a heated 
swimming baths, heated by the blast furnace.  And it got quite warm in there 
sometimes!  … it was a beautiful swimming pool when I first started.  So there 
was a lot to do.104 
 
I was quiet when I first started but I got to know a few buddies and we started 
hanging around together.  It was nice to be able to go down to the social centre 
of a dinner time, have a sandwich, play a game of snooker when we could get 
on!  Obviously, the guys who had been there a lot longer than us dominated the 
tables …  It was a great place for camaraderie.  Every Friday, because we got 
paid cash in hand – your money would be in a little brown packet which you 
fetched from the wage’s office … You’d go to the social centre and have your 
coke; it wasn’t beer because they wouldn’t let us have one … But there was 
some great guys there.  A guy called Bowell, and guy called Rozzle … we 
looked up to these people because they were what we wanted to be.  I didn’t 
know what they did like, but I just wanted to be part of it … I have some great 
memories of that social centre.  As I became one of the operational guys and 
all that, we spent a lot more time there.  We’d go down at night, for Christmas 
parties and there’d be big bands on there; we’d play cricket and football, 
snooker, it was fantastic.  The good thing about it was, all the guys were there, 
and you had a cracke with them, you know!?105 
 
104 Documenting the Workshop of the World, 2007, WCA, LS/LB6/2, p. 18. 




The company’s benevolence would continue after MacDiarmid’s untimely death in 
1945.  As part of A.G. Stewart’s aforementioned post-war redevelopment scheme, the 
company installed a state-of-the-art training centre that provided accredited 
apprenticeships and City & Guild qualifications to young Bilstonians.106  In the decades 
before nationalisation, a Works Council was established.  Composed of democratically 
elected manual workers rather than shop stewards, this formal body worked alongside 
management to tackle all non-wage issues such as personnel, welfare, health and 
safety and productivity.  Moreover, as a managerial instrument for promoting shop-
floor cooperation and harmony, the Works Council successfully diluted any signs of 
post-war shop-floor militancy.107   
 
Like the Hickmans, anti-union S&L bosses had deliberately fostered a bilateral 
relationship centred on the value of reciprocity and mutual interest.  As ownership 
passed into the hands of the state, the wider workforce possessed an extremely low 
level of trade union consciousness.  There was, however, a tradition of senior shop 
stewards participating in the civic and political life of the local community, a precedent 





106 Bilston’s steelmen were incredibly attached to the training centre, with many serving apprenticeships 
there.  The facility also provided a vital community function, offering training workshops to local school 
leavers.   
107 In 1956, when the rest of the UK steel industry was experiencing a damaging national craftworker 
dispute, the Works Council persuaded local trade unionists to ignore direct calls from national leaders 
to withdraw their labour. 
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The Politics of Steel at Bilston 
 
From the very outset, the ISTC concentrated considerable resources on obtaining 
political influence through Parliamentary representation, strategically sponsoring 
Labour Party candidates in traditional steel communities.  At Bilston, a small group of 
steelmen, led by Councillor Tommy Marks, met in early 1921.  After forming the plant’s 
first Confederation branch, they looked to establish direct links between union 
headquarters and the Bilston CLP.  Shop stewards subsequently persuaded local 
party officials to nominate John Baker, their Assistant General Secretary, as the 
preferred candidate for the November 1922 general election.108  Although the 
Yorkshireman narrowly lost the contest, the nature of his defeat convinced his 
organisation’s ambitious Parliamentary Panel to support another bid at the October 
1924 contest.  To improve his chances of victory, the Confederation employed 
legendary political agent Sam Hague to manage the campaign.  The trade union 
leader was subsequently elected as Bilston’s inaugural Labour Party MP, defeating 
war hero and famed Everest explorer Charles Howard-Bury.   
 
Known locally as the ‘men of steel’, Baker and Hague proved an impressive and 
exceptionally popular double act, described by one regional commentator as “pioneers 
of the trade union and political movement”.109  With the latter taking a seat on Bilston 
Council, they worked alongside shop stewards to set about transforming the town’s 
 
108 Baker was co-founder of the National Amalgamated Society of Enginemen, Cranemen, Boilermen, 
Firemen and Electrical Works and a founding father of the Confederation.  For a biographical account 
of Baker, see Pugh, Men of Steel, pp. 22-30. 




CLP into one of the largest in the West Midlands.  A new Labour Club with offices and 
function rooms became a hive of community and political activism.  To maintain its 
organising strength, Baker and Hague ensured that party officials continued to enjoy 
a close working relationship with ISTC convenors at the steelworks, a tradition that 
would continue over the next half century.  Baker was eventually unseated at the 
October 1931 general election, with Hague also leaving the Black Country a short time 
later.  The two ISTC men had, nevertheless, made their mark, vastly strengthening the 
influence of the Bilston CLP and the WB&DTUC. 
 
The man chosen to contest the November 1935 election was Welshman David 
Llewellyn Mort, another Confederation-sponsored candidate and EC member.  
Despite only spending a brief period in the Black Country, the former steelworker 
helped consolidate the organising work previously undertaken by his fraternal 
brothers.  Local trade union officials developed personal links with radical socialist 
firebrands such as Benjamin Bilboe, an UWM organiser who became the poster boy 
for the region’s unemployed movement.  With joblessness amongst Black Country 
steelworkers reaching a staggering 64 per cent, Bilboe invited Fenner Brockway to 
Bilston.110  In Hungry England, the influential social commentator described a 
community on the edge: 
 
In Bilston I get the impression of a district devastated by war.  There are large 
waste stretches pocked with holes and ridges just as though they had suffered 
a heavy bombardment.  There are large patches of weeds and grass growing 
thinly over cinders.  There are large patches of cinders with no grass at all.  
 
110 Barnsby, Socialism, p. 535. 
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There are houses in ruins, with bricks scattered in confusion.  There are houses 
with cracked walls and roofs, only prevented from falling by wooden beams 
propped against them.  So looked the towns of Flanders before they were 
repaired … We cross one of the waste patches, with those crude holes and 
ridges of cinders and weeds.  I find the explanation is devastation of peace, not 
of war.  ‘The site of a devastated steel-works,’ says my friend.  ‘The machinery 
sold as scrap iron, the bricks – what haven’t been left about [he kicks one] – 
sold to some jerry builder’.  There are still huge steel works standing, but I notice 
that smoke comes from the chimneys of only a few.  ‘Closed down,’ says my 
friend.111  
 
As the crisis deepened, Bilboe and his supporters launched an attack on the middle-
class ‘do-gooders’ running Bilston Council, pooling their meagre resources with local 
communists to contest a series of elections.  With the campaign reaching fever pitch 
in November 1933, the so-called ‘champion of the poor’ was arrested whilst protesting 
a state-sponsored works scheme reviled for paying below recommended union wage 
rates.  Bilboe, who was famously elected as a Councillor whilst sitting in a local gaol, 
eventually agreed to swap his allegiances and join the Labour Party.  With Mort 
departing the area, Bilboe was elected as Mayor, whilst the plant’s shop stewards 
continued to actively participate in community politics.112   
 
 
111 F. Brockway, Hungry England (London, 1932), pp. 41-43. 
112 Two such individuals were Thomas Cornes and Walter Fellows who, after joining a Labour Party 
summer school established by Mort and Bilboe, went on to serve as Councillors, with the latter 
eventually emulating his mentor by becoming Mayor.   
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The legacy of these men of steel would have a major impact on the defence campaign 
waged decades later.  By determining a socialist tradition within the local Labour Party 
apparatus, they helped usher in the election of ILP leader and trade unionist Bob 
Edwards as MP for Bilston in May 1955.  As this thesis will reveal, the Liverpudlian 
would become a key political ally and strategist for the action committee.  Moreover, 
they inspired a new generation of Bilstonians to engage in trade union and community 
politics.  This included Dennis Turner, a young steelman who would work alongside 




The scope of this chapter has been deliberately broad, providing historical context to 
the campaign to save Bilston throughout the 1970s.  The first half concentrated on the 
industrial heritage of iron and steel, chronicling the development and commercial 
performance of Bilston works between 1866 and nationalisation a century later.  Of 
great significance, certainly for this thesis, was the ability of its highly skilled and 
industrious workforce to adapt and flourish during the industry’s many cyclical 
downturns.  This, it is later determined, greatly contributed to Bilston consistency 
posting a profit during the subsequent world steel crisis.  Another crucial factor was a 
post-war reconstruction project which, by retaining hot metal practices, forced down 
production costs.  However, paradoxically, these same investment decisions also 
sounded the death knell of the facility a quarter century later.   
 
The second half of the chapter specifically traced the evolution of steel’s trade union 
landscape.  In 1917, following decades of disruption caused by provincial parochialism 
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and sectionalism, order was restored with the state-sponsored creation of the ISTC, 
the industry’s largest and most powerful production union.  Across its history, this 
politically influential organisation earned a reputation for institutional conservatism, 
customarily developing a close relationship with management whilst adopting a strict 
modernising agenda.  The union leadership’s longstanding willingness to sacrifice vast 
numbers of members in exchange for investment in new technology is key to this 
thesis, as it set the tone for future behaviour.  As did the ISTC’s relationship with its 
rival steel unions.  Despite the Government’s intervention in 1917, the industry 
continued to suffer from a chaotic trade union landscape, with over two dozen different 
organisations represented at the twenty-one fully-integrated iron and steelworks 
absorbed into the Corporation in July 1967.  Indeed, of crucial importance to our story 
was the traditionally fractured nature of inter-union relations which, it is later argued, 
would prohibit any coordinated pan-organisation response to closures during the 
crisis. 
 
The chapter has charted the development of the industrial relations culture of Bilston 
works.  By adopting a progressive personnel and welfare policy, its paternalistic 
owner-managers successfully installed an espirit de corps with a moderate workforce 
who thereby displayed a longstanding aversion to collective action and self-
organisation.  The men’s trade union leaders, nonetheless, developed a tradition of 
participating in civil society and the political life of the town.  Decades later, shop 
stewards associated with Bilston CLP would spearhead local resistance alongside 




The next chapter begins by documenting the experiences of local steelworkers during 
the formative years of the Corporation.  As many of their colleagues basked in the 
warm glow of public ownership, Bilston’s employees were systematically marginalised 
by an explicitly biased management team seeking to safeguard those more modern 
facilities inherited in July 1967.  This process of managed decline would culminate in 
the Ten Year Strategy, a Government-backed modernisation programme that 
sanctioned the closure of older inland facilities such as Bilston.  Local responses to 





Chapter 3: The Managed Decline of Bilston Steelworks 
 
This chapter documents the experiences of Bilston’s steelworkers during the first six 
years under public ownership.  It demonstrates how nationalisation originally brought 
a renewed sense of optimism to UK steelmen who benefitted from an array of 
progressive personnel policies introduced by socially conscientious senior industry 
and Whitehall officials.  All this would change with the June 1970 election of Edward 
Heath, with the Conservative Party determined to clip the wings of an underperforming 
‘lame duck’ public sector industry.  It examines the new Government’s treatment of 
state steel and the negative impact its intrusive industrial strategy had on the 
Corporation and its employees.  Following an assessment of management’s ‘bigger is 
better’ approach to development, which was sanctioned by Whitehall, it sheds light on 
how planners systematically marginalised Bilston works whilst excluding the facility 
from their new modernising agenda. 
 
The chapter critically reviews the preliminary responses of the steel unions to 
workplace restructuring which, in a foreshadowing of what was to occur throughout 
the remainder of the decade, was lacking.  It is established that these pro-
establishment institutions consented to management prerogative in regard to 
development policymaking.  The failure of union leaders in London to protect 
threatened plants prompted members to organise themselves into local grassroots 
pressure groups.  These so-called WACs mounted the first serious instances of 
mobilised resistance to rationalisation without the assistance of their ambivalent 
national leaderships.  The chapter concludes with an account of the origins and early 





BSC: The Early Years 
 
As custodians of a publicly owned enterprise, the first generation of senior Corporation 
officials sought to build a positive relationship with employees and their unions.  
Chairman Lord Julian Mond Melchett was particularly eager to adhere to the social 
principles of the Iron and Steel Act and, in August 1967, his First Report on 
Organisation promised, the “socially responsible utilisation of human resources”.1    
Guided by a reformist Labour Government, BSC went above and beyond these 
obligations, becoming an “exemplar of social and industrial policy”.2   
 
With Melchett’s backing, Director for Personnel, Ron Smith, quickly set about 
improving conditions of employment.  In the area of pay, the former UPW leader 
successfully negotiated wage deals with each of the steel unions.  Production workers 
benefitted greatly, with substantial pay hikes handed to ISTC and NUB members.  The 
average weekly earnings of public sector blast furnacemen, for example, rose by 22 
per cent – compared with an average national increase of 17.4 per cent for UK 
industrial workers.3  Additional settlements covering non-wage elements meant 
shorter hours, longer and better paid holidays, improved sickness benefits and a 
generous pension scheme.  In terms of health and safety, the dynamic Smith 
 
1 BSC, Report on Organisation, HMSO Cmnd. 3362, August 1967.  Lord Julian Melchett, a merchant 
banker and Tory life peer, was a surprise choice by the Labour Government.  A tenacious yet 
sympathetic character, he subsequently earned the respect of his employees, their unions and 
Whitehall for his enlightened approach. 
2 M. Upham, ‘Passages on the Path to Privatisation: The Experience of British Steel’, IRJ, 21.2 (1990), 
p. 87. 
3 The Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, 3 June 1971. 
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introduced a quarterly journal, a charter to prevent accidents at the pre-injury stage 
and a JWP with the TUCSICC called JAPAC.  He also oversaw the formation of an 
Education and Training Advisory Committee, which provided career development 
pathways to all employees.  At Bilston, the cherished training centre was upgraded, 
thus ensuring the proud tradition of on-site education continued to flourish:4   
 
They were great on training; they had a proper set-up where you were shown 
what the steelworks were all about.  They had their own cinema there.  It was 
fantastic, they’d show you films … on Bilston, on Elisabeth, the reason she 
made so much noise … They did first aid there; I’ve still got my first aid 
certificate.  They did a full training package where they tried to build you up into 
men.  Because I was only a boy, you know … The apprenticeships were 
fantastic, what they were selling to us, there were various kinds.  You could go 
into the electrical side, the mechanical side and there was also a joint one.  
There was also the office side, where you could go into wages … We had lots 
of trips as well.  We went to Coombs Wood, to see how that operates, that was 
up in Blackheath way.  We went to Hosier Beds and watched how they drew 
the steel by hand, wow, amazing mate, absolutely amazing!  And then from 
Hosier Beds we went to Weldless Steel, just up the road from where we live 
now and watched the mandrills.  So, they made sure we understood the 
 
4 In March 1970 a record 98 employees received a City and Guilds in Iron and Steel Operative or 
Technician courses, whilst a further nine were awarded a certificate in Supervisory Studies from the 
National Examination Board.  Four more earned a degree from Wolverhampton Polytechnic.  See The 
Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, March 1970. 
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industry we were working in; it was really fantastic the way they led us into the 
industry.5 
 
It was, however, in the area of participation and joint consultation that Smith was most 
active.  One of his first measures was a worker-director scheme designed to forge 
closer links between the shop-floor and management.6  Grosvenor Place placed great 
emphasis on the need for a “good system of internal communication” and a 
“decentralised approach to human relations”, which Smith asserted, could not thrive 
in an “atmosphere of remoteness and isolation”.7  He, therefore, launched a free 
monthly newspaper, whilst establishing sectional JCCs at plant-level.  The introduction 
of these and other measures prompted Elizabeth Cottrell to describe the Corporation 
as a “pioneer in employee participation”.8  Peter Brannen and his University of Warwick 
colleagues reflect on the mindset of senior industry officials during this early period: 
 
In the words of the then chairman of the Steel Corporation: ‘It was essential to 
let some people in this mammoth set-up feel they had some influence in the 
way its policies and future were shaped.  We had little hope of carrying through 
nationalisation unless we could get a spirit of genuine involvement’.  The 
corporation set out as a matter of policy to achieve this involvement through the 
introduction of comprehensive consultation machinery, the expansion of 
collective bargaining and the appointment of worker directors to group boards.9 
 
5 Oral testimony from P. Winmill recorded 16 March 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
6 For two accounts of BSC’s worker director scheme, see Brannen et al., The Worker Directors; and J. 
Bank and K. Jones, Worker Directors Speak (Aldershot, 1977). 
7 The Steel News: Northern and Tubes Group Edition, April 1968. 
8 Cottrell, The Giant, p. 13. 




BSC’s social functions were extended to its prospective rationalisation and closure 
programme.  One condition agreed with Congress House was that no major final 
restructuring decision would be sanctioned until senior industry officials had consulted 
– and negotiated with – workers and their representatives.  If the proposals affected 
100 or more men, it was management policy to ensure that no redundancies would be 
made for at least six months after closure was ratified.  In the case of a fully-integrated 
works, this could be extended for up to three years.  In the interim, the men and their 
trade unions would be given every opportunity to sway management thinking via their 
own in-house counter-proposals.10  Moreover, Smith offered cast-iron guarantees that 
any such development schemes would be appraised with an open mind.   
 
In the event of a final permanent closure decision, BSC’s Social Policy Division was 
tasked with the responsibility of cushioning the human cost of rationalisation.  The 
Department was led by former Labour Government Minister Kenneth Robinson who, 
upon assuming the role, outlined his intentions to The Steel News: 
 
I see my task as one of ensuring that any works closure, or run-down, is carried 
through with the least possible hardship to individuals or damage to 
communities.  I recognise that some degree of hardship is inevitable in this kind 
of situation, but I believe that the Corporation, through the social policy function, 
is determined to do everything that an enlightened employer can be expected 
 
10 If the men failed to provide a convincing alternative to closure, the second period of three months 




to do, and to ensure that modernisation and rationalisation humanely carried 
out.11 
 
Like Melchett and Smith, Robinson was a bureaucrat with a soul.  Under his watch the 
Corporation negotiated an Employment and Incomes Security Agreement with 
Congress House, providing an additional cushion from industrial change.  If, after the 
aforementioned consultation process, a unit was indeed to shut, Robinson’s 
Department would seek to redeploy interested parties elsewhere.12  Otherwise, 
management actively worked alongside state agencies to attract alternative industry 
and employment to rationalised steel communities.13  Meanwhile, all outgoing 
employees would receive a guaranteed redundancy payment 25 per cent above the 
rate provided by the Government’s August 1965 Redundancy Payments Act.   
 
Irrespective of these measures, between 1967 and 1971, streamlining occurred at a 
deliberately measured pace.14  Rundown schemes were secured, for the most part, 
with the compliance of the unions and affected members, the majority of whom were 
able to reconcile closures with BSC’s social policy measures.  Robinson was 
particularly successful at redeployment, with approximately 40 per cent of affected 
 
11 The Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, 1 April 1971. 
12 In such an instance, the Corporation would cover any additional travel or household expense incurred 
by relocation, whilst guaranteeing a five-shift weekly rota with a minimum wage of 80 per cent of 
previous earnings under the GWW. 
13 The scheme centred on joint ventures with regional planning authorities, Councils and private 
enterprise to build new industrial units on former Corporation land. 
14 In the first year of operation, for example, the Corporation shut only a handful of minor plants or mills-




employees accepting roles elsewhere in the organisation.15  For the remainder, the 
impact of unemployment was alleviated by substantial compensation packages and 
the apparent success of management’s new job-creation programme.  With the 
economy booming, formal partnerships were established with local authorities and the 
private sector.  After the running down of the Renishaw and Park Gate, for example, 
BSC entered into a £7m industrial development project with John Finland, attracting 
4,000 new jobs to Sheffield and Manchester.  On Teesside, Robinson signed a deal 
with Swan Hunter to retrain redundant steelworkers as shipbuilders. 
 
Meanwhile, on the commercial front, the Corporation enjoyed a period of high demand 
between 1968 and 1970.16  Witnessing his workforce smash all pre-nationalisation 
production records, a delighted Melchett announced: 
 
Great credit is due to all those who have helped to achieve this record.  
Tremendous effort has been made by management and the workforce 
throughout BSC to overcome very great operational difficulties during the last 
few months.  In producing tonnages of this magnitude, the British steel 
industry has done more than break records – it has demonstrated its great 
potential.17 
 
15 The Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, 1 April 1971.  When a melting shop at BSC’s Brymbo 
works was closed, 103 of the 129 affected men were redeployed.  At Scunthorpe, with the cessation of 
steelmaking and rolling at Appleby-Frodingham, only 37 men were declared redundant out of the 1,300 
employed at the original facility.  See Man and Metal, July 1974. 
16 In 1967/8 BSC produced 22.9m t/p/a, beating forecasts by 6.25 per cent.  Output subsequently 
climbed to 24.2m t/p/a the following year.  In 1970/1 this figure reached 24.7m.  See BSC, Annual 
Report and Accounts 1970-71 (London, 1971), p. x. 




Increased sales, however, did not translate into profitability.  In the face of a buoyant 
seller’s market, financial returns were underwhelming, with the Corporation posting 
losses of £19m and £23m in 1967/8 and 1968/9 respectively.18  Although Grosvenor 
Place finally registered a profit of £12m in 1969/70, its Director of Finance was in no 
mood to celebrate, “Until they [financial problems] are overcome we shall have no 
prosperity cake to divide.  That for 1970-71 has already crumbled before we can put 
a knife into it”.19 
 
The industry’s poor financial performance can be partially attributed to a matrix of 
external factors that management had little or no control over.  Saddled with a crippling 
opening debt of £1bn, they were obliged to pay the Treasury astonishingly high interest 
repayments.20  Compounding this situation was Harold Wilson’s fiscal policy, with his 
November 1967 devaluation of the pound dramatically increasing production costs.  In 
1968/9, the industry was forced to absorb £50m in additional expenses, whilst a 
system of restrictive Government price controls diminished revenue by approximately 
£70m that year alone.21   
 
 
18 BSC, Annual Report and Accounts 1970-71 (London, 1971), p. x.  For studies of BSC’s overall 
financial performance see by A.M. Blair, ‘The British Iron and Steel Industry since 1945’, Journal of 
European Economic History, 26.3 (1997), pp. 571-581; and Bryer et al., Accounting for British Steel. 
19 The Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, September 1970. 
20 In 1967/8 Grosvenor Place were forced to pay £20m interest on capital loans.  See BSC, Annual 
Report and Accounts 1967/8 (London, 1968), p. 10. 
21 BSC, Annual Report and Accounts 1967/8 (London, 1968), p. 4; and BSC, Annual Report and 
Accounts 1968/9 (London, 1969), p. 4. 
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The situation compelled Keith Ovenden to conclude that early financial losses came 
as a result of “political intervention rather than incompetence on the part of the BSC”.22  
This judgement, however, overlooks the many internal failings that squeezed profits in 
this formative period.  Several new development schemes, for example, were behind 
schedule, whilst those that were eventually completed were plagued with technical 
problems.  The Corporation also experienced a series of labour disputes, most notably 
at Port Talbot, where the entire Blast Furnace Department was mothballed for two long 
months in 1970.  These and other internal factors meant BSC were left unable to 
satisfy lucrative contracts.  Grosvenor Place thereby earned a reputation for 
unreliability, prompting domestic users to turn to foreign rivals.23  Eventually, these 
private sector re-rollers would choose to develop their very own steelmaking facilities 
rather than return to the Corporation.24 
 
In the face of these production problems, pressure was on senior management to get 
on with the task of reconstruction.  It was expected that planners would move swiftly 
to devise their inaugural modernisation plan.  They instead became distracted by the 
administrative work involved with reorganisation, meaning the announcement of 
BSC’s maiden development strategy was postponed until January 1969, eighteen 
months after vesting day.  The delay was caused by the industry’s first organisational 
model; with the original geographical group boards encouraging regional autonomy 
 
22 Ovenden, Politics of Steel, p. 189. 
23 In 1968/69, as pressure from domestic steel users mounted, a humiliated BSC was forced to 
purchase imported semi-finished steel to supplement its own output and meet demand.  This move not 
only cost Grosvenor Place millions of pounds but also its reputation amongst private steel producers. 
24 Cottrell, The Giant, p. 73. 
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and internal rivalries.  As a result of this, very few major schemes were commissioned 
in the first two years of operations: 
 
This initial structure perpetuated the investment policy of the private industry, 
with each regional (and otherwise heterogenous) group submitting its own 
plans.  Since it encouraged local autonomy, at the expense of central 
investment and rationalisation planning, and hence ran directly counter to the 
aim of building up a unified business entity.25 
 
When it was finally laid bare, the plan revealed that Grosvenor Place was committed 
to certain existing production sites.  Misleadingly labelled the ‘Heritage Plan’, it 
pursued a relatively ambitious capacity target of 34m t/p/a by 1974/5, setting an 
average annual budget of £175m.  An overall manpower reduction of 40,000 would be 
achieved by way of voluntary early retirements, natural wastage and phased 
recruitment – and not compulsory mass redundancies.26  Although the Corporation 
foresaw the rundown of a handful of individual departments or units, no fully-integrated 
sites were expected to close until 1975 at the very earliest.  Rationalisation would be 
gradual, allowing the continued effectiveness of the Corporation’s social policies.  
 
Despite an interim commitment to traditional Victorian-era sites, an entirely different 
long-term approach had already entered management thinking.27  The first strategy 
 
25 Abromeit, British Steel, p. 123.  For an analysis of the original organisational framework, see 
Ovenden, Politics of Steel, pp. 145-150. 
26 Approximately 12,000 of these workers were expected to be absorbed in new developments. 
27 Heal described the first development plan as a “series of interim decisions” that allowed the 
Corporation to utilise existing plant until planners had settled on a long-term strategy.  See Heal, The 
Steel Industry, p. 162. 
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funnelled the majority of the development budget into facilities that were seen to have 
a viable long-term future beyond heritage and, over the next half-decade, investment 
was largely concentrated on only a handful of steelmaking sites.28  In the case of 
Bilston’s special steels sector, the main beneficiary was a collection of works in South 
Yorkshire.  Under the Heritage Plan, £5.5m was invested in a brand-new bar rolling 
complex at Rotherham, with a further £8m earmarked to expand steel-making 
facilities.29  When making the announcement, an industry spokesperson revealed the 
Corporation’s long-term objective of concentrating the bulk of special steels production 
on a 12-mile square corridor in the Sheffield-Rotherham area: 
 
This scheme is only part of the bar rolling complex being planned for 
Rotherham.  Provisional planning approval has been given by the BSC for the 
development of a proposal to install a high production modern design mill of 
about 400,000 tons capacity to roll straight bar.  It is intended that the mill will 
incorporate all the latest features to achieve high efficiency and product quality.  
It could be located on a levelled site at Aldwarke and would allow further 
rationalisation of the production of special steel bars.30 
 
The strategy of focusing resources and production on specific regions can be traced 
back to March 1968, when industry planners visited Japan for a factfinding mission.  
Led by Melchett’s Deputy and heir apparent, Dr. Montague ‘Monty’ Finniston, the BSC 
 
28 Major investments under the first plan, including £42m at Port Talbot; £133m at Scunthorpe; £38m 
on Teesside; £34.5m at Ravenscraig and £42m at Newport.  See BSC, Annual Report and Accounts 
1968/9 (London, 1969), p. 13. 
29 The Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, 18 March 1971. 
30 The Times, 12 March 1971. 
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team became convinced that the Asian powerhouse’s remarkable post-war revival was 
the result of its steel industry being rationalised into only a handful of fully-integrated 
super plants relying on advanced technology.31  Arriving back in the UK, the 
Corporation’s ideas man outlined his plans for the industry:  
 
[The] gains to be made from scrapping existing plants and building new ones 
is so great that it may be better not to wait until pieces of equipment have 
measured out their economic lives.  We cannot wait until everything dies a 
natural death … This leads to the concept of large blast furnaces, of increased 
LD steelmaking, rolling mills with more flexible output, lower usage of 
manpower, ports capable of taking large bulk carriers for the import of high-
quality iron ore, and sophisticated finishing plants.32   
 
Despite temporarily committing to traditional productions units, the Corporation had 
already made the decision to import the Japanese model, a fateful decision according 
to steel industry scholar Charles Docherty: 
   
The biggest single investment made, the Ten Year Development Strategy, was 
based upon a hysterical reaction to Japanese success whereby the Japanese 
model was taken as being the only ideal.  No thought was given to a flexible 
approach utilising existing British conditions, and developing a number of 
 
31 Dr. Finniston earned a PhD at the Royal College, before becoming the chief metallurgist at the UK 
Atomic Energy Authority at Harwell.  His interest in Japanese industry began in 1964 when he helped 
negotiate a contract to supply fuel elements to the country’s Atomic Power Company. 
32 The Steel News: Northern and Tubes Group Edition, April 1968.  
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medium-scale steelmaking sites; a futile attempt was made instead to create 
Japan in Britain.33 
 
Seeking to import this development model, planners were already seriously doubting 
the long-term commercial viability of smaller integrated facilities such as Bilston.  
  
A Better Tomorrow? 
 
Whilst Monty Finniston and his team worked on the second development strategy, 
they faced the prospect of an altered political environment, with Edward Heath’s 
rejuvenated Conservative Party securing a shock election victory in June 1970.  The 
Tory manifesto, ‘A Better Tomorrow’, had promised to adopt a “hands-off” approach 
to those industries previously nationalised by their Labour counterparts.34  However, 
upon assuming office, Industry Minister, John Davies, refused to deny press rumours 
surrounding denationalisation.  This led to a great deal of anxiety at Grosvenor Place, 
with Melchett forced to issue a public statement: 
 
The industry must have a period of stability to consolidate and move rapidly 
ahead with developments which within the next decade will re-establish this 
country among the world leaders …  We have had a long period of uncertainty 
and under investment throughout British industry.  Steel has suffered more than 
most due to its massive political involvement – a complete decade without any 
major investment and many instances of inadequate maintenance of old 
 
33 Docherty, Steel and Steelworkers, p. 230. 
34 J. Campbell, Edward Heath: A Biography (London, 1994), p. 442. 
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facilities.  We must establish a pattern of sustained growth in this country 
accompanied by a much higher rate of investment.  We shall only do this if we 
stop changing the rules of the game the whole time and get on with play.35 
 
This desperate call for stability was, nonetheless, disregarded by an administration 
opposed to BSC’s very existence.  Speaking in December 1970, Davies hinted he was 
looking to “scrutinise” the ownership pattern of the industry.36  This would come in the 
form of two separate reviews.  The first concerned pricing, with Whitehall balking at a 
management request to sanction a 14 per cent increase that would generate an 
additional £165m in turnover per annum.  The Government, looking to protect their 
friends in the private sector, halved the price hike.  Explaining his decision, Davies 
made it known that, by curbing overall revenue, he was looking to force management 
to live within their means: 
 
My action will clearly compel the Corporation to operate within a greater 
financial restraint and will thus make it necessary for it to press ahead with its 
efforts to reduce costs and maximise efficiency.37 
 
This arbitrary decision coincided with the arrival of a temporary depression.  With 
political pressure on Melchett mounting, Davies ordered his organisation to breakeven 
by March 1973.38   
 
35 The Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, 5 November 1970. 
36 The Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, 17 December 1970. 
37 The Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, 22 April 1971. 
38 In the meantime, he was forced to give guarantees BSC would limit its annual losses to £100m over 
each of the next two financial years.  For a full examination of the price control issue see Cottrell, The 




The new Government’s ideologically driven steel strategy came as a severe shock to 
industry insiders, with The Steel News describing it as “hard as steel”.39  On the one 
hand, Whitehall had deliberately slashed vital sales revenue, whilst on the other, it 
demanded unworkable financial gains.  Grosvenor Place was now faced with an 
unenviable situation: a sharp fall in demand, spiralling costs and a Government statute 
preventing the generation of much needed supplementary income.  This three-
pronged assault would have significant repercussions for tens of thousands of 
steelworkers.   
 
With the industry’s cash flow position worsening, management was forced to expedite 
a series of rationalisation measures originally scheduled to begin in the second half of 
the decade.  In March 1971 they announced the advanced closure of Openshaw in 
Manchester; Gorseinon in South Wales; and two sites in South Yorkshire.  At a press 
conference the following month, a remorseful Melchett confirmed a further ten sites 
were to shut early.  Crucially, in a move that signalled a major departure in BSC’s 
burgeoning rationalisation programme, the cull included the permanent closure of a 
complete iron and steelworks works at Irlam in Salford.40  The under-fire industry chief 
was by now cutting an increasingly lonely figure.  Responding to press rumours, he 
 
39 The Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, 22 April 1971. 
40 The Irlam announcement represented an alarming departure from the past, as it involved the 
proposed closure of a major, fully-integrated iron and steelworks.  The decision opened a proverbial 
Pandora’s Box and, by January 1972, a further 13,000 redundancy notices had been posted at works 
across the UK.  During the first six months of that year, 22 minor plants were either shut permanently 
or partially closed, with the loss of a further 5,000 jobs.  See The Times, 8 January 1972; and The 
Times, 24 June 1972. 
`132 
 
unconvincingly denied charges that the closure announcements were the result of 
political pressure: 
 
The present falling off in demand for steel, had presented the BSC with more 
flexibility to organise these proposals, than it had had during the boom 
conditions of last year.  But I must emphasise that these measures have 
emerged from our planning over a long period and would have been proposed 
in any event.41 
 
To many, Melchett’s protestations rang hollow.  Weeks later, during a TV interview, a 
weary industry chief pleaded with his Whitehall paymasters:  
 
I want a considerable degree of government confidence in the board and the 
top management team and the chaps on the floor doing the job.  Let them get 
on with it for a bit.  And if they haven’t got that confidence don’t interfere in 
detail, change the chap at the top but don’t try and drive from the back seat.42 
 
The appeal fell on deaf ears.  Amidst calls for his sacking from leading Conservative 
Party official Sir Gerald Nabarro, Melchett was forced into the indignity of handing over 
duties to his Deputy and new Chief Executive Monty Finniston.43  Moreover, one of his 
 
41 The Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, 6 May 1971. 
42 The Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, 8 June 1972. 
43 Whitehall and Grosvenor Place presented the management shake-up as an opportunity for Melchett 
to focus on developing BSC’s external relations, though this was widely interpreted as a vote of no 
confidence.  Dr. Finniston would be handed direct executive powers, with control over major policies, 




closest allies and Head of Sales, Will Camp, was sacked by a Government that refused 
to forgive him for previously working as an election adviser to Harold Wilson.  An 
accomplished marketer, Camp had recently delivered the Corporation’s successful 
‘Steel Appeal’ campaign and represented a major loss to the industry.  In a further 
attempt to undermine Melchett, his Director of Finance, Will Molyneux, was also forced 
to stepdown.  Still, much worse was to come.  Although the Government had resolved 
not to fully denationalise steel, they still hived-off some of its more profitable 
operations.44  Meanwhile, with BSC’s long-term modernisation plans still not yet 
resolved, Grosvenor Place would come under even greater Ministerial scrutiny. 
 
The Corporation had by now already presented the Government with a provisional 
draft copy of their second development strategy, the ‘Corporate Plan’.  Whitehall, 
however, refused to endorse calls to spend £11bn extending overall capacity to 42.5m 
t/p/a by 1980/1.45  Following a series of clashes, Davies forced BSC officials to work 
within a JSC.46  Described by Labour Party spokesman on steel, Eric Varley, as a 
“constitutional monstrosity”, the Committee was handed the responsibility of re-
appraising capacity targets.47  At the same time, the Government employed a U.S. 
based consultancy firm to produce their own parallel study.  In May 1972 it was 
revealed the JSC, acting on the Americans’ advice, had downgraded future capacity 
 
44 This included an agreement to sell sections of the Special Steels Division’s River Don works in 
Sheffield to Firth Brown.  In exchange, BSC took over the company’s Shepcote Lane site.  However, 
despite assurances that the Corporation could now act with complete commercial freedom, the 
Conservative Government continued to implement price constraints for the remainder of their period in 
office. 
45 According to Richard Pryke, BSC’s original demand forecasts caused “alarm and incredulity” within 
the Government.  See Pryke, Public Enterprise, pp. 188-189.  
46 For an examination of the JSC, see Ovenden, Politics of Steel, pp. 175-183. 
47 851 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1973) col. 263. 
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to 28-36m t/p/a.  This figure, by international standards at least, appeared extremely 
conservative, with output in Japan and West Germany now standing at 93m and 45m 
respectively.  Present domestic output, on the other hand, was already at the lower 
end of the new capacity target.  Since entering office, the Conservatives had delayed, 
rejected and now downgraded the management’s plans.  With their wings clipped, 
BSC’s much maligned Planning Division were handed the unenviable task of 
establishing the future pattern of production. 
   
In December 1972 Peter Walker, who had recently replaced Davies at the DTI, signed-
off the new modernisation programme.  It was confirmed all commercial steelmaking 
would be concentrated on huge costal BOS plants in Port Talbot, Llanwern, 
Ravenscraig, Lackenby and Scunthorpe known as the ‘Big Five’.48  In a move that 
would have serious ramifications for Bilston, the manufacture of all special steels 
would indeed take place in the Sheffield-Rotherham area.  In a subsequent 
Parliamentary debate, Walker refused to address the fate of individual works, much to 
the annoyance of steel constituency MPs within the Labour Party.  They would have 
to wait until the publication of a White Paper three months later.   
 
When it arrived, the ‘Ten Year Strategy’ confirmed all existing OH plants would be shut 
by 1980; with overall manning levels reduced by 40,000: 
 
 
48 A cluster of huge fully-integrated iron and steel producing works, ring fenced by BSC’s long-term 
development strategy, were collectively dubbed the ‘Big Five’.  This tagline is a slight misnomer.  
Although the plan prompted the concentration of commercial, bulk steelmaking at these sites, all special 
steel production would be centred at a group of smaller sites located in South Yorkshire.  This area 
would be protected at the expense of Bilston. 
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The implementation of the agreed strategy will bring major changes in the 
pattern of the Corporation’s plants.  The now obsolete open-hearth furnaces 
will be closed before the end of the decade.  Bulk steelmaking by the oxygen 
process will be concentrated at the five main existing plants and the new 
Teesside works.  Electric arc steelmaking will continue for stainless and alloy 
steels, and this capacity will be modernised and expanded; there will also be 
some modern electric steelmaking capacity for general steels.  These works 
together are expected to provide the whole of the Corporation’s steelmaking.  
At other centres steelmaking will eventually be phased out; although BOS and 
electric arc steelmaking will continue at some of the smaller plants until at least 
the end of the decade.49 
 
Despite considerable fanfare, the Corporation’s £3bn development strategy was both 
inherently flawed and, ultimately, poorly delivered.  Derided by Heidrun Abromeit as 
the “great leap forward”, it proved to be ludicrously overambitious, especially in light 
of the coming world steel crisis.50  Improved economies of scale, the entire rationale 
for the chosen ‘bigger is better’ approach, could only be achieved under maximum 
load conditions.  When projected market trends failed to come to fruition, those larger 
units not working at 95 per cent of their overall capacity incurred huge financial 
losses.51  Moreover, the decision to manufacture certain steel products at only one 
 
49 BSC, Ten Year Development Strategy. HMSO Cmnd. 5226, February 1973. 
50 Abromeit, British Steel, p. 129.  Richard Pryke suggests that, in a duplicitous attempt to justify decision 
to import the Japanese model, planners engaged in a process of “statistical legerdemain”; deliberately 
manipulating the results of planning exercises to suit their own expansionist agenda.  See Pryke, Public 
Enterprise, p. 190. 
51 A. Cockerill, The Steel Industry: International Comparisons of Industrial Structure and Performance 
(Cambridge, 1974).  
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facility meant technical delays, power shortages or local strikes prohibited the 
Corporation from sourcing alternative supplies.52  Monty Hughes, a steelworker from 
South Wales, highlighted these and many other shortcomings: 
 
Where did the Ten Year Strategy go wrong?  The corporate strategists did not 
design BSC to cope with the current world steel crisis.  It is easy to criticise 
with hindsight, but the first strategy was too ambitious in the first place.  It was 
based on a number of assumptions ... BSC seemed to disregard the ever-
increasing world overcapacity, the greater role of developing countries with 
their raw materials and need to employ large numbers.  Economies of size 
and scale were once regarded as the great principles of business.  BSC went 
for five coastal plants but they lacked flexibility of response.53 
 
The final sentence refers to BSC’s decision to ignore the commercial benefits of 
smaller works such as Bilston.  These traditionally profitable facilities enjoyed intimate 
relations with their customers, the majority of which were situated in close proximity.  
The West Midlands, for example, contained 57 per cent of the Corporation’s home 
market for special carbon semis, 55 per cent of which was supplied by Bilston.54  One 
of Bilston’s leading shop stewards identified the symbiotic relationship his colleagues 
had developed with local steel users: 
 
 
52 This issue was later highlighted by the enforced partial closure of South Yorkshire’s special steel sites 
during the January 1979 haulage strike. 
53 Man and Metal, July/August 1978. 
54 JWP, The Future of Bilston Works, 31 March 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/4, p. 4. 
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The Corporation has never learned how to sell steel.  We know our customers 
here in the Midlands.  We can give them what they want.  We can even run 
through small orders for engineering firms when they run out of stock.  We are 
flexible and that’s what our customers expect.  If we can’t provide what they 
want they import.55 
 
Indeed, small tonnage orders were Bilston’s bread and butter, with the plant supplying 
61 per cent of BSC’s carbon billet orders below 20 tonnes.56  But this successful ‘less 
is more’ approach put it at odds with the Corporation’s new grandiose vision: 
 
‘We could get an order for a five-ton ingot and turn it out overnight.  But that’s 
just about four ounces of dolly mixtures in BSC terms’ ... with the emphasis on 
what [Mr Turner] calls the ‘big boss plants’, small outfits like Bilston are at the 
bottom of the Corporation’s priority treatment list.57 
 
Such operating flexibility, combined with lower capital costs, allowed Bilston to retain 
profitability at much lower production levels than what Black Country steelmen 
sardonically labelled ‘Cathedrals-by-the-sea’.   
 
The Corporation were patently aware of the many benefits of traditional, smaller 
production units, with one leading planner acknowledging: 
 
 
55 The Guardian, 1 July 1978. 
56 JURUE, The Future of Bilston Steelworks: An Appraisal, March 1979, ITSOE, BCA1/4, p. 41. 
57 The Observer, 2 July 1978. 
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But do not let us assume for one moment that massive capital investment in 
modern equipment is an absolute guarantee of efficient, low-cost production.  
If one examines the results at existing Works within the Corporation, it is not 
always the plant on which vast sums have been lavished which provides the 
best result.  The most efficient plants, measured either by technical or 
commercial standards, are scattered across the whole range of Works, large 
or small, old or modern, well or badly located.  Why is this so? ... it may be 
due to more intangible factors, such as top-rate management with its finger 
closely on the pulse of production, with complete understanding between men 
and management and a recognition of the necessity to succeed which is often 
engendered by small communities, anxious to keep a local industry going.58 
 
When published in February 1973, however, the White Paper’s position on mini-works 
was deliberately vague.59  The document mentioned Bilston, Shelton and Irlam as 
potential recipients of a new electric arc steelmaking facility.  The issue was taken up 
in Parliament by Varley, who highlighted management’s contradictory stance: 
 
That brings me to the mystery of the mobile mini-mills. Whenever an hon. 
Member asks him about the fate of any doomed area, the Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry puts in his thumb and pulls out a mini-mill.  When the 
hon. Member for Manchester, Withington (Sir R. Cary) asked what was to 
become of Irlam, the Secretary of State replied: Irlam is a possible candidate 
 
58 The Steel News: Northern and Tubes Group Edition, March 1969. 
59 For an extended review of the management decision to completely overlook smaller works, see Bryer 
et al., Accounting for British Steel, pp. 81-88. 
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for a mini-mill in the future. — When my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-
on-Trent, South (Mr. Ashley) asked about Shelton, back came the Secretary 
of State, quick as a flash: ‘Shelton is … a possible site for a minimill’.  We are 
told, too, that Bilston is on the mini-mill list.  The Government have deliberately 
created the impression that before long, wherever one goes in England, 
Scotland and Wales, it will be difficult to avoid stumbling over a gleaming new 
mini-mill.  The Minister for Industry gave the game away on Monday of this 
week at Question Time.  When he was asked about mini-mills by the hon. 
Member for Withington, who wants one for Irlam, he admitted that there were 
to be only two mini-mills in the whole of Britain.  One is already allocated to 
Scotland.  So, the question is, who gets the other mini-mill?  Will it be Shelton, 
Irlam or Bilston, or will none of those three get it?60 
 
Varley’s suspicions were well placed.  Weeks later, it was revealed that a second mini-
works would only be required in “certain special eventualities”.61   
 
As Grosvenor Place engaged in a completely counter-productive tonnage race, private 
sector producers eagerly embraced the mini-works concept.  Between 1972 and 1977, 
nine electric arc vessels were built by Black Country firms.  The Corporation would 
later admit that the expansion of the private sector in the region “pre-empted the 
justification for any new investment” at Bilston.62  Disregarding the commercial 
success of private sector mini-works, management stubbornly refused to adapt their 
 
60 849 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1973) cols. 685-86.  
61 The Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, 5 April 1973. 
62 Letter from R. Scholey to W. Sirs, 30 January 1979, ITSOE, BCA1/6. 
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thinking.  Instead of stepping back and re-assessing the suitability of the Ten Year 
Strategy, Grosvenor Place steadfastly stuck to the ‘bigger is better’ premise 
throughout the world steel crisis.63  In April 1979, the same month Bilston’s heavy-end 
was shut, BSC’s Chief Executive was asked if his organisation would finally consider 
focusing resources on viable mini-works rather than lossmaking coastal plants.  His 
response was perplexing: 
 
That is all very well but the fact is we have a lot of investment in bulk steel 
capacity and can’t just spirit that away.  We must make our bulk steel products 
fit for more demanding uses and that is why we are investing in quality 
improvement ... OK, there is some flexibility to go up market, but at the end of 
the day bulk steel plants produce bulk steel – you can’t turn that into gold or 
silver.64 
 
With the premise of the second development plan already unsound, management 
contrived to exacerbate the situation with its delivery.  A comedy of errors saw eye-
watering sums of public money thrown at what the Bilston men labelled ‘Finniston’s 
Follies’.  A new multi-million-pound blast furnace installed at Redcar was never lit, 
whilst £5m was spent breaking ground for an electric arc furnace at Shelton that didn’t 
see the light of day.  At Bilston BSC would invest £0.75m relining the blast furnace, 
only to mothball her eight weeks later, whilst a transport hub costing £1.6m remained 
 
63 J.J. Richardson and G.F. Dudley asserted the Ten Year Strategy proved to be of, “central importance 
in determining the scope and nature of the steel crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s”.  See 
Richardson and Dudley, Steel Policy, p. 330. 
64 The British Steelmaker, April 1979. 
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unopened.  A 1980 report revealed a staggering £353m was written-off on “abortive 
expenditure” under the Ten Year Strategy.65 
 
The Marginalisation of Bilston 
 
There had in fact been questions over Bilston’s short-term future long before the 
publication of the White Paper, with the Corporation overseeing a process of managed 
decline on the ground.  Upon formation, BSC officials reorganised the industry into 
multi-product Groups that operated independently from each other.  Bilston, like all 
former S&L sites, was placed in the Northern and Tubes Group.  The group was led 
by former company boss Nial MacDiarmid, who sought to protect the interests of his 
former plants at boardroom level.66  However, it soon became apparent that the 
original organisational framework was impeding development.  Grosvenor Place 
responded in March 1970 by re-dividing the industry into specific Product Divisions; 
meaning all works producing the same or similar items would be run by one single 
management team, regardless of their geographical location. 
 
The impact reorganisation had on the future of Bilston cannot be overestimated, as it 
set in motion a series of events that would ultimately seal its fate a decade later.  In a 
move that some saw as illogical, the plant was bundled into the unfamiliar 
surroundings of the Special Steels Division.  The structure of Bilston’s new home was 
straightforward.  The Division was separated into two separate components: the 
 
65 BSC, A Business Proposal (London, 1979). 
66 MacDiarmid proved to be a controversial figure, regularly criticising public ownership in the press 
whilst receiving a paycheque from Grosvenor Place. 
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Forges, Foundries and Engineering Group and the Steel Works Group.  Bilston was 
absorbed into the latter, which comprised of facilities producing stainless, alloy and 
high-grade carbon steels.  The Steel Works Group’s principal production units were 
S&TP and Rotherham, a cluster of sites in South Yorkshire.  Between them, they 
employed 22,000 men, approximately 79 per cent of all those employed by the Group.  
Bilston, along with Wolverhampton and Birchley rolling mills, was brought under the 
banner of BWB. 
 
Bilston would be governed by a divisional management team housed at The Mount, a 
stark neo-classical building in Sheffield.  Its offices were dominated by men who 
possessed close personal ties with South Yorkshire and, more specifically, the USC.  
New Special Steels boss, H. P. Forder, was a former General Managing Director.  His 
Deputy and eventual replacement, P. Bromley, joined United Steels as a commercial 
trainee, before becoming a Director in 1963.  Alongside Forder and Bromley was 
another former company man, Robert Scholey.  A future Corporation Chief Executive 
and Chairman, he would play a key role in the closure of Bilston, earning him the 
moniker ‘Black Bob’ from local steelmen.  Another ex-USC man was Dr. David ‘Mother 
Hubbard’ Grieves, Divisional Director of Personnel who, as future head of BSC’s 
Social Policy Division, would also be directly involved in Bilston’s demise.   
 
By the time the industry had been reorganised a second time in April 1976, almost all 
of the Corporation’s senior positions were filled by South Yorkshiremen, with four 
former USC employees named amongst the organisation’s five Managing Directors.  
In July 1980, the same month Scholey and Grieves ordered the closure of Bilston’s 
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mills, the ISTC highlighted the historical domination South Yorkshiremen had over 
policymaking: 
 
BSC has been immeasurably harmed by having all the members of its top 
executive tier drawn from just one of the 14 former companies (United Steels) 
and from only one part of the country (Yorkshire).  The monopoly of power has 
resulted in too many costly errors and too narrow an outlook.67 
 
Moreover, private sector steelmakers made a similar observation, with the editor of 
The British Steelmaker concluding: 
 
All those cracks that were flying around a few years ago about the Mafia (i.e. 
United Steel) getting all the top jobs in British Steel Corporation now appear to 
have been prophecies rather than jokes.  Look at the first appointments in the 
new system of organisation and what do we find?  Four United Steel men 
named as managing directors of the new geographical divisions, and only one 
outsider.  Score for the Mafia, 80%.68 
 
This situation prompted Greg Bamber to conclude that the behaviour of the so-called 
Sheffield Mafia was driven by an unbridled belief in their own permanency: 
 
United Steels had been dominant there (Sheffield) and former United Steels 
directors gained a strong position in BSC’s internal political system.  Informal 
 
67 The ISTC Banner, July 1980. 
68 The British Steelmaker, November/December 1975. 
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alliances between such powerholders are especially important during periods 
of uncertainty and may help to alleviate feelings of vulnerability.  Hence most 
BSC directors and managers in Sheffield felt more secure than their 
counterparts elsewhere.69 
 
In the meantime, divisional management exhibited an explicit bias towards their former 
company facilities at the expense of Bilston.  They thereby adopted a number of 
discriminatory trading practices that would negatively impact the plant’s commercial 
viability.  An intrusive personnel policy, for example, saw management repeatedly and 
consistently poach Bilston’s best and brightest staffers and middle-managers, robbing 
the plant of vital experience and expertise.  Workers were frequently head-hunted, 
with H. B. Hawksley, Head of Sales, transferred northwards to become the Division’s 
Commercial Director.  He was followed by Keith Goodchild, Primary Mills Manager, 
who was appointed as the Head of Operations at The Mount.  Another was the much-
loved Works Doctor James Carson, an internationally renowned expert on industrial 
health, who was transferred to Rotherham following two decades in the Black Country.  
Bilston’s steelmen also waved goodbye to Stuart Walters, who was appointed Works 
Engineer at Rotherham.  The Mills Manager had been employed since 1962, during 
which time S&L sponsored his degree in mechanical engineering.  Later in the decade, 
the Corporation would cynically transfer staffers known to have supported the anti-
closure campaign.   
 
Heading in the opposite direction were several apprentice managers from South 
Yorkshire, with Bilston functioning as a training school for The Mount.  At the time of 
 
69 Bamber, Militant Managers?, p. 117. 
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the first reorganisation, for example, the plant’s General Manager was Gordon Forster, 
an expert metallurgist who joined Bilston as an apprentice during WWII.  Despite 
complaints from the men, the popular boss was forced into early retirement.  Rather 
than replacing Forster internally, as had always been the case under S&L, BSC 
parachuted in Derek Saul, the poster boy of the South Yorkshire special steel industry.  
A Rotherham native, he had earned a degree in metallurgy in Sheffield before joining 
BSC.  The unpopular figure proved to have no affinity to the Black Country or indeed 
its inhabitants, demonstrating very little sympathy to his men when the Ten Year 
Strategy was announced.  He later found infamy for mocking the accents of union 
negotiators on the eve of the 1980 national steel strike.  After only twelve months at 
Bilston, Saul returned to Sheffield as Director of the Steels Works Group.  He was 
succeeded by P. Allen, yet another ex-USC man.  In a move that caused a great deal 
of consternation, his new assistant was Bill Church, an accountant who possessed 
little technical knowledge of the industry.  Before his arrival, the 33-year-old had 
overseen an internal audit that had prompted the expedition of BSC’s closure 
programme.70  The managerial merry-go-round continued, with Allen replaced as 
Bilston’s General Manager by Eric Cotterill, yet another Rotherham man.  The plant 
would eventually become a rudderless ship when his replacement, George Blakeley, 
was transferred to Rotherham.  The decision not only left Bilston with no resident 
manager on the ground, but also without representation within the corridors of power 
in South Yorkshire.   
 
The overall impact of BSC’s revolving doors strategy was subsequently outlined by 
one union official: 
 




The promise of a higher degree of autonomy to works managements which 
heralded in the new Chairman of the BSC has not materialised, and we now 
feel that the directive from 33 Grosvenor Place is merely diffused through 
Divisional management, leaving in very few cases, works managements who 
care for the welfare of the units they supervise.  Gone is the day when a works 
manager was prepared to fight tooth and nail for his own unit.  Indeed, as we 
have seen, so fluid is the position of works managers, that the provision of a 
caravan to each could be regarded as a cost saving exercise.71 
 
Another highlighted the impact this had had on Bilston: 
 
We have noted in recent years the management of the Special Steels Division 
have not been prepared to leave a permanent manager in charge of the 
Bilston plant, and that the plant has had to suffer a succession of managers, 
who regarded the job at Bilston as nothing more than a stepping stone.  These 
are management techniques that must sadden the heart of every industrial 
economist who is looking for industrial efficiency within any company.72 
 
The mistreatment of Bilston wasn’t limited to The Mount’s personnel policy, with 
management introducing several harmful trading practices that prompted one 
particular convenor to complain, “I am very suspicious of the motive of the Sheffield 
people.  It would appear to me that they are quite prepared to deliver all the pain to 
 
71 Proceedings from ISTC No.4 Division Conference of Branch Officers, 15 April 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/5. 
72 Man and Metal, January/February 1979. 
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Bilston and keep all the goodies themselves”.73  By lodging this complaint, the 
frustrated steelworker was specifically referring to the problem of unfair or preferential 
plant loading – a process that began with reorganisation and intensified over the next 
decade.  In January 1972, for example, Bilston’s entire tube order book was 
confiscated and reallocated to South Yorkshire.  Despite overcoming the loss of these 
lucrative orders by expanding its product portfolio, the decision to siphon off Bilston’s 
tube market was an assault on profitability.74  The Works Council was subsequently 
informed that a new centralised ordering system had been introduced, meaning control 
of Bilston’s orderbook was transferred to Sheffield.  From here on in, works in South 
Yorkshire were allocated the Division’s most lucrative orders, many of which had been 
secured by Bilston’s Sales Department.  Approximately 20,000 tonnes of round billet 
business was transferred to S&TP, though half of the tonnage eventually drifted back 
to the Black Country due to customer complaints over quality.75  An independent report 
revealed how divisional management ignored calls from UK steel users to be supplied 
by Bilston: 
 
BSC’s centralised ordering system at Rotherham creates a number of problems 
in determining the ‘real’ demand for Bilston’s products since many companies 
claimed that their preferences for Bilston steel were not being met by BSC.  This 
is, perhaps, almost inevitable with such a centralised system and BSC would 
undoubtedly argue that they use the system to try and provide the best service 
 
73 The Steel News: Bilston and Wolverhampton Edition, 18 November 1977. 
74 The decision to transfer a lucrative contract supplying 100,000 t/p/a to Newport works was made 
despite complaints from Welsh steelworkers that replacement steel from South Yorkshire was of an 
inferior quality. 
75 JWP, The Future of Bilston Works, March 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/4, p. 5. 
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to the clients of the Sheffield Division as a whole.  Nevertheless, 5 companies 
expressed strongly the opinion that re-routing occurs, since they have found 
that consistently preferencing Bilston on their BSC orders carries no guarantee 
that their steel will actually come from there.76 
 
With the Corporation re-routing more and more orders to supposedly lower cost 
facilities, Bilston was eventually forced to operate at only 77 per cent of its overall 
capacity rating, whilst facilities in Sheffield and Rotherham worked at 88 and 98 per 
cent respectively.  Management’s preferential loading policy not only placed Bilston 
steelmen in an invidious position, but it also led to reduced earnings and manning 
levels.  Meanwhile, their colleagues in South Yorkshire worked overtime hours to 
absorb Bilston’s orderbook.  The morality of this was questioned by local shop 
stewards who argued that, if their plant was indeed part of the Corporation’s ‘special 
steel family’ – as stated during reorganisation in March 1970 – orders should be spread 
evenly.77  Union officials agreed, with Congress House asserting: 
 
The Liaison Committee take the view that BSC in deciding on plant loading 
should not throw ethical considerations out of the window.  They argue that this 
is precisely what BSC are doing in taking away Bilston’s traditional orders, 
which are in fact “their” orders by right.  On the contrary, the policy should be 
to distribute the order load in such a way as to ensure that all works can survive 
in hard times.  Mutual assistance in adversity was one of the underlying ideas 
of nationalisation itself.  Related to this line of argument is the Liaison 
 
76 JURUE, The Future of Bilston Steelworks: An Appraisal, March 1979, ITSOE, BCA1/4, p. 44. 
77 Minutes of TUCSICC meeting, 11 May 1978, MRC, MSS.292D/611.41/13. 
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Committee’s belief that the Sheffield-based management who now control the 
destinies of Bilston are biased against the works, in favour of Sheffield works.78   
 
The most significant effect of reorganisation concerned investment, with management 
systematically withdrawing the works from their new modernising agenda.  Having 
been crowbarred into Special Steels, the Black Country site suddenly found itself 
thrust amongst the largest network of electric arc steelmaking facilities in Europe.  The 
vast proportion of which had been built in South Yorkshire by USC.  Bilston, on the 
other hand, was the proverbial runt of the litter, with its OH furnaces installed during 
S&L’s ill-fated post-war reconstruction.   
 
As a profitable unit located in close proximity to its core market, it had originally been 
earmarked by Northern and Tubes Group chiefs to receive major investment.  A 
proposed £12m ‘BEACON’ scheme, featuring two twin electric arcs and new Mills and 
Finishing End Departments, was drawn up by local shop stewards and management.  
In exchange for a relatively modest investment, the men had accepted cuts of 650 
production jobs.  Already sanctioned by Group management, the scheme was awaiting 
clearance when the industry was reorganised.  However, with the Corporation 
preparing to concentrate on existing steelmaking facilities in South Yorkshire, 
BEACON was permanently shelved.  Capital, meanwhile, was directed into Sheffield 
and Rotherham.  Bilston, however, received only minor adjustments, with 
management operating what can be described as a patch and mend policy.  What little 
modernisation that did occur under the first plan was entirely piecemeal.  In November 
1970, for example, the Corporation spent £140,000 ensuring Bilston complied with 
 
78 TUCSICC, The Delay Paper, September 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/4, p. 3. 
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weights and measures legislation.79  Moreover, in a move that caused further concern 
on the shop-floor, management commissioned the building of a road-rail freight centre 
at the back of the works.  The hub, designed to transport huge quantities of Yorkshire 
steel to Black Country re-rollers, was clear proof that BSC saw no long-term future for 
iron and steelmaking at Bilston. 
 
The mistreatment of BWB under Special Steels Division did not go unnoticed.  
Bemoaning management’s attitude towards Bilston’s sister plant in Birchley, Peter 
Archer, Labour MP for Rowley Regis and Tipton, told Parliament: 
 
We know that a large mill at Rotherham is envisaged producing about 8,000 
tons a week.  This was not announced baldly as a sudden sensation.  Our 
complaint is not that the Corporation failed to cushion a sudden blow, but that 
it piled the cushions so as to conceal what it was doing, until it was burned 
through, and it was only when events revealed the process that it was 
discovered that orders were directed elsewhere and employees suspected, 
perhaps not unnaturally, that the mills were being quietly run down ...80 
 
Following the marginalisation of their works under the Heritage Plan, local steelmen 
were hardly surprised by the recommendations of the Ten Year Strategy.  Paragraph 
57 of the White Paper confirmed their worst fears: 
 
 
79 The Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, 5 November 1970. 
80 842 Parl. Deb. (5th ser.) (1972) col. 1819. 
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Only a small proportion of present steelmaking capacity is located in the West 
Midlands and the North West.  As already announced, the remaining open-
hearth plant at Irlam will close by June 1974.  That at Bilston, together with the 
Kaldo steelmaking at Shelton, must also be expected to close during the 
decade.81 
 
On the day of its publication, an industry spokesperson announced the further 
expansion of Rotherham works.  A new £23m state of the art complex would produce 
carbon steel for the Midland automotive and engineering industries – Bilston’s primary 
market.  Over the coming years money continued to pour into South Yorkshire and, by 
March 1978, an astonishing £152.5m or 76 per cent of the divisional budget had been 
allocated to facilities in either Rotherham or Sheffield.  As Bilston was left to whither 
on the vine, the plant fell into a general state of disrepair.  The minutes of subsequent 
Works Council meetings catalogue a succession of complaints over health and safety, 
with local engineers forced to plug holes in a leaking Primary Mill roof.82 
 
Preliminary Trade Union Responses to Rationalisation 
 
In the TUCSICC, the six major organisations involved in the industry possessed a 
ready-made platform from which to coordinate a coherent anti-closure plan from the 
centre.  However, with the rival unions in a state of conflict, Congress House would 
 
81 BSC, Ten Year Development Strategy. HMSO Cmnd. 5226, February 1973. 
82 Minutes of Primary Mills Joint Consultative Council meeting, 1 February 1979, WCA, DW-173/1/1. 
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only muster a fragmented and passive response to the Corporation’s preliminary 
rationalisation programme.83 
 
The Steel Committee was chaired by the ISTC’s Dai Davies.  Following nationalisation, 
the Welshman developed a problematic relationship with TUC General Council 
members who accused him of supporting anti-union legislation by refusing to back 
their 1971 ‘Kill the Bill Campaign’.84  The General Secretary was also unpopular with 
his steel union colleagues.  The previous Labour Government had originally hoped 
that, by establishing the TUCSICC, the rival production, craft, general and white-collar 
unions would reconcile historic differences, but the alliance merely exposed old 
wounds.  Firstly, there had been a protracted fall out between the Confederation and 
the white-collar unions over staff representation.  There was also what was described 
as the “long war of attrition” with SIMA over middle-management recognition.85  Within 
the Steel Committee, the ISTC constantly clashed with the NCCC-affiliated craft 
unions whilst, on the production side, there were concerns amongst the NUB that 
Swinton House was a power hungry monolith.  Such intra-organisational rivalry 
scuppered early attempts at a coordinated response to rationalisation.  By the time the 
TUC managed to bring the warring unions together to discuss a formal counter-policy, 
two whole years had passed since the first wave of expedited mass redundancy 
announcements.  Notwithstanding the summit, the TUCSICC organisations would be 
 
83 Despite historically enjoying an insider status, J.J. Richardson and G.F. Dudley have identified how 
the steel unions struggled to find a, “coherent role” in the development of public sector steel.  See 
Richardson and Dudley, Steel Policy, p. 325.  
84 Two years later, when Congress organised a May Day strike to protest the Government’s prices and 
income policy, Davies prohibited members from participating. 
85 Upham, Tempered, p. 76. 
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in a near-permanent state of fragmented impotence for the remainder of Davies’ term 
in office.86 
 
Of key significance was a strict refusal to produce an alternative to BSC’s development 
strategy, in addition to a reluctance to support any one particular threatened works 
over another.  The reason for this inertia was later outlined by Congress House: 
 
Ever since nationalisation, the Committee have thought fit not to formulate a 
detailed and specific policy of their own with regard to BSC’s corporate 
planning.  The main reason for this has been their desire to avoid making 
proposals which would inevitably, because of the logic of the situation, have 
led them to specifically accept that at least some works would have to close – 
at a time when every works in the country was absolutely opposed to any idea 
of closure.  The Committee felt that their acceptance, even in principle, that 
certain specific plants would have to close would have cut the ground from 
under the feet of the workers concerned and almost certainly have led to a 
transfer of their loyalty to unofficial bodies ...87 
 
Despite having significant resources at their disposal, the TUCSICC displayed zero 
interest in producing its own modernisation plan.  Some individual unions acted 
independently.  The AUEW, for example, published a paper forecasting that 
approximately 100,000 steelmen would eventually be shed under the Corporation’s 
 
86 Although in July 1975 the ISTC and NUB met to discuss how to reduce intra-organisational rivalry, 
relations remained uneasy throughout the period covered by this thesis. 
87 Minutes of TUCSICC meeting, 13 April 1978, MRC, MSS.292D/611.41/13. 
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second development plan, but failed to establish ways in which this could be 
prevented.88  The NUB leadership supported an alternative strategy proposed by their 
Scunthorpe members.  The Fabian Society, meanwhile, produced a hybrid strategy 
that called on management to retain profitable mini-works as flexible support plants 
for the Big Five.89  In the view of Peter Bowen, the most vocal opposition came from 
Transport House: 
 
The clearest opposition to the philosophy of ISTC, however, was expressed by 
the TGWU.  The TGWU recruits in the field of semi-skilled and unskilled labour 
in areas of the industry outside direct production.  At its biennial delegate 
conference in July 1973 it rejected BSC’s steel strategy on both social and 
economic grounds and called upon the TUC’s Iron and Steel Consultative 
Committee to secure its reversal.  Meanwhile, it pledged support to its members 
in the industry to the point of selected strikes, sit-ins, work-ins and workers’ take 
overs.90   
 
Nevertheless, without the support of the Steel Committee, and management 
steadfastly committed to the Japanese model, these views were easily snubbed by 
decisionmakers.  
  
The ISTC, as the largest and most powerful steel union, was expected to establish its 
own policy.  Davies was a vocal critic of Conservative Government interference, 
 
88 AUEW, An expanding Future for British Steel (London, 1974). 
89 Fabian Society, Crisis in Steel (London, 1974). 
90 Bowen, Social Control, p. 159. 
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accusing Edward Heath of lacking a “social conscience” and assuming the mentality 
of a Victorian-era ironmaster.91  Whilst turning his ire on the Prime Minister, the 
outspoken union leader was, nevertheless, muted in his criticism of the Ten Year 
Strategy.  At Congress in 1972, for example, he lambasted an NCCC resolution 
attacking management’s plans: 
 
On the contrary, Lord Melchett is entitled to full credit for the great fight he has 
put up to preserve the public sector in the state in which the Labour Government 
put it.  We know this is a fact and I think he is entitled to full credit for it.  I think 
he was encouraged by the certain knowledge that the trade unions in the 
industry fully supported him … Those who supported the principle of public 
ownership did so because they believed it was only a publicly-owned steel 
industry that could make the decisions necessary to make the industry efficient, 
competitive and economically viable. The unions knew that when the industry 
was nationalised, changes were inevitable.  The argument, therefore, was not 
so much about the need for change as it was about the atmosphere in which 
changes took place.92   
 
 
91 Man and Metal, April 1971. 
92 The Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, 14 September 1972.  With the debate over, Davies 
and his fellow TUCSICC leaders were guests of honour at a BSC reception – a tradition that would 
continue throughout the decade.  Following Melchett’s death, the ISTC expressed its admiration for the 
manner in which he had oversaw rationalisation, “Dedicated as he undoubtedly was to modernising the 
nationalised steel industry to make it efficient and competitive, he was not insensitive to the human 
problems involved in the British Steel Corporation’s modernisation programme”.  See Man and Metal, 
July 1973.  
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The speech reveals an extension to the pro-modernising agenda traditionally adopted 
by Swinton House.  Having met with Monty Finniston in November 1972, Davies had 
pleaded with his Executive not to block management’s plans, “otherwise the 
Confederation’s [future] influence would be greatly restricted”.93  A warning not to rock 
the boat was immediately conveyed to members: 
 
The intense anger and deep resentment felt by the Corporation employees are 
the natural and understandable emotions of men and women faced with 
unemployment, but there is a danger that these emotions might provoke 
resistance to all modernisation plans – even those by a future Labour 
government.94 
 
Faced with a dilemma of choosing between greater prosperity and job security for 
members employed at the Big Five or protecting those at traditional steelmaking sites, 
the Confederation opted to sacrifice the latter on the altar of technological progress.  
Davies’ position was further outlined in December 1972.  When responding to Peter 
Walker’s confirmation that BSC’s second development strategy would indeed sound 
the death knell for tens of thousands of his members, he astonishingly proclaimed the 
news had brought a “sense of relief”: 
 
While it may not be the primary function of a trade union to promote economic 
logic, to completely disregard it would be a betrayal of many thousands of 
workers who will be employed in the modern steel industry of the future.  To 
 
93 Minutes of ISTC EC meeting, 15 November 1972, MRC, MSS.36/ISTC/4/9. 
94 Man and Metal, July 1972. 
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insist that uneconomic plant should be kept operational regardless of the 
consequences would be to court disaster.95 
 
Davies even warned steel constituency MPs against voting down the White Paper, 
claiming it would be reckless and selfish of them to, “pretend that modernisation of the 
steel industry can be carried out without the closure of out-to-date plant”.96   
 
In a failed attempt to pacify affected parties, the Confederation leadership espoused 
a ‘no redundancies before alternative jobs’ posture, crystallised in a formal resolution 
drafted in March 1973: 
 
Should these investigations conclude that a plant closure is inevitable such 
closure shall not take place until satisfactory job opportunities have been made 
available in the locality for all those who will be made redundant, and in this 
connection special attention is drawn to the major responsibility which the 
Government bears.97 
 
The decree, whilst calling for the temporary postponement of all planned closures until 
replacement jobs had been secured, made absolutely no attempt to question the logic 
behind the ‘bigger is better’ approach – effectively endorsing the dismantling of the 
industry.  To add a veil of legitimacy to this controversial position, Swinton House 
arranged a historic national conference in London.  Astonishingly, on arrival, the 150 
 
95 The Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, 25 January 1973. 
96 Man and Metal, February 1973. 
97 Man and Metal, May 1973. 
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delegates in attendance discovered the resolution was immutable.  Following a 
completely fatuous mandatory vote, attendees engaged in a verbal sparring match 
with a leader who they accused of unilaterally imposing his will on members.  Davies 
then merely inflamed the situation further: 
 
But I don’t use the social problems and frustrations caused by economic 
change to promote my own personality – I get down to the thankless task of 
doing what I am paid to do and my record in the steel industry stands in 
comparison with anyone else’s in or outside the industry.98 
 
Notwithstanding the strength of opposition from the rank and file, the national 
resolution became the Confederation’s mantra for the remainder of Davies’ tenure and 
beyond.  But the alternative jobs strategy would prove entirely flawed.  As this chapter 
has identified, Grosvenor Place had introduced a series of measures that initially 
alleviated the human cost of rationalisation.  When exposed to a worldwide recession, 
however, these measures were rendered woefully inadequate.  Even though Davies 
would acknowledge to a June 1973 Parliamentary Select Committee that his union’s 
defence strategy had already been undermined, he continued to support 
management’s development policy: 
 
There is no longer reasonably full employment and in many of the areas where 
closures are taking place, or to be expected, the chances of redundant workers 
finding work outside the steel industry are not good ... Failure to keep abreast 





reasons would, even if the necessary subsidising could be reconciled with 
ECSC. regulations, be disastrous for the long term future of British industry.99 
 
The ISTC summit merely exposed a rift that had already appeared between Swinton 
House and its lay members.  The reaction to Peter Walker’s statement elicited an 
angry response from one member, who demanded an end to redundancies for the 
sake of progress: 
 
During the past years, steel workers in this country have been plagued with the 
common disease of technological change.  Of course, the experts tell us that 
this is an industrial disease, a hazard of industry that we must accept and 
endure in the interests of progress.  We are told, repeatedly and untiringly, that 
in order to survive we must rationalise.  In the interest of this progress and 
rationalisation 50,000 redundancies are forecast, so I pose the question 
‘Progress for whom?’ ... I suggest the time is long overdue to cry halt to this 
‘slaughtering’ of our members.100 
 
The events surrounding the April 1973 special delegate conference illustrate how, in 
the words of Huw Beynon, “if the [union] leadership becomes isolated from the 
masses, its autonomy degenerates into empty talk”.101  The compliance and ‘empty 
talk’ of steel union bureaucrats placed the burden of responsibility on ordinary 
steelworkers.  The limited nature of the Corporation’s preliminary rationalisation 
 
99 Man and Metal, June 1973. 
100 Man and Metal, January 1973. 
101 H. Beynon, Working for Ford (London, 1973), p. 178. 
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programme had meant there were, at first, few examples of grassroots resistance.  
This would all change under Heath, with the March and April 1971 redundancy 
announcements prompting some of the UK’s more proactive rank and file workers to 
self-organise.  The first official WAC was formed by workers at Stanton in Derbyshire, 
though they were soon followed by colleagues at sites possessing a more pronounced 
trade union consciousness or a longstanding tradition of organisation.  These included 
the Welsh plants of Ebbw Vale, East Moors and Shotton, as well as River Don in 
Sheffield and Irlam – facilities that were threatened by the Conservative Party’s 
intrusion into BSC’s affairs.   
 
Although each WAC was unique, they all had the same two objectives: 1.) to postpone 
rationalisation, 2.) and to persuade policymakers to incorporate their respective plants 
into the industry’s long-term operating plan.  The following paragraphs will briefly 
explore the origins, membership, tactics and success of some of the more high-profile 
action committees who coordinated the initial wave of local resistance.   
 
The first-generation WACs were typically formed in response to either a formal closure 
notice or, in a handful of cases, the spread of rumours denoting their possible demise.  
They were, in the main, spearheaded by unionised senior production workers and local 
community stakeholders concerned about the potential socio-economic impact of 
retrenchment.  The principal tactic employed at larger fully-integrated iron and 
steelworks was, therefore, to lobby sympathetic senior industry figures at national 




The most determined and arguably successful campaign in this experimental period 
was conducted by shop stewards at River Don.  Large sections of the special steels 
plant were originally expected to shut as part of the Conservative’s hiving-off policy, 
threatening 4,500 jobs.  An action committee, which was dominated by AUEW 
convenors, launched their struggle in July 1971 with a boisterous rally through the 
cobble-stoned streets of Sheffield.  Public donations were absorbed into a special 
Fighting Fund, which was used to cover the wages of a group of men planning a work-
in.  Thousands of local steelmen unanimously backed a resolution refusing to permit 
their new owners to enter the shop-floor, essentially occupying the site.  Such 
militancy, nevertheless, was unique to South Yorkshire and the remaining WACs 
upheld the traditional conservatism long associated with domestic steelworkers.   
 
The principal strategy employed by shop stewards was to participate in talks with 
senior industry officials, as per BSC’s social policy provisions.  Lord Melchett, keen to 
demonstrate that his organisation was willing to engage in meaningful consultation, 
agreed to delay the rundown of River Don, Shotton, Ebbw Vale, Shelton and Irlam.  
When announcing the decision to extend the lifespan of the latter by an additional 
three years, the industry press celebrated the effectiveness of BSC’s consultative 
machinery: 
 
Meaningful consultation is one of today’s most overworked phrases.  In many 
industries it means no more than management telling work people what it has 
decided.  So it was not surprising that some steel workers and their union 
representatives regarded the Corporation’s consultative machinery in respect 
of closures with scepticism.  ‘What is the point of consulting if management 
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has already made up its mind to effect a closure?’, they asked.  The news that 
the Irlam stage two proposals should therefore make them think again.  This 
has been done entirely as a result of the consultations which have taken place 
between the management and the trade unions.102 
 
The impact the WACs had on management thinking at this preliminary stage was 
obvious, with the overall size of BSC’s workforce falling by only 2,600 in 1972/3.  This 
contrasted to the 16,400 jobs shed twelve months earlier at the behest of the Tory 
Government.  Still, the success of these early campaigns should ultimately be 
measured by their leaders’ ability to influence management’s long-term strategic 
thinking.  By earning a stay of execution, the onus was now on the men to persuade 
industry planners to invest in their doomed plants.  To achieve this, they would need 
the support of their Executives.   
 
In a bid to widen their sphere of influence, Welsh steelmen sought to establish a NAC.  
A summit of 90 delegates representing some 26 WACs met in Shotton days after the 
controversial ISTC conference:   
 
[In May 1973] the rank and file national action committee at its second meeting 
in Manchester promised support for workers’ sit-ins against closure and banned 
the re-direction of materials from works threatened with shutdown.  There could 
be little doubt that the unofficial campaign found its origins in an alleged lack of 
action by union national leaderships.103 
 
102 The Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, 23 September 1971. 




Attempts at organising a meaningful collaborative approach, however, were hindered 
by the TUCSICC’s refusal to support what they considered to be a rival co-ordinating 
body.  The NAC was, therefore, dead at conception.  Meanwhile, steel union leaders 
tarnished their reputations further by refusing to formally back individual campaigns.  
Geoffrey Dudley has noted how the Shelton WAC was left stunned when, during a visit 
to the works, Davies refused to speak to any workers affiliated to a rival union.104  At 
this stage, the ISTC leadership’s attitude towards the first generation of action 
committees was predominantly driven by a desire to protect its central authority.  Tony 
Cliff has identified how trade union bureaucrats seek to restrict the autonomy of rank 
and file members: 
 
One thing that terrifies the trade union bureaucrats more than anything else is 
the independent actions of workers.  Nothing is better calculated to cut down 
their importance, their status, their prestige.  And nothing is more likely to 
strengthen their attachment to the status quo.  That attachment is not 
straightforward.  The trade union bureaucrat is not a capitalist, but he’s not a 
worker either.  He lives off class struggle, but he can’t let it go beyond the point 
of mediation, or negotiation.  His basic rule is to keep the contestants alive and 
able to fight – gently.105  
 
 
104 Dudley, Pluralism, Policy Making, p. 260. 
105 Taylor, The Fifth Estate, p. 106.  With the relationship between rank and file members and union 
hierarchies becoming increasingly polarised, it was often left to sympathetic Divisional Officers to 
maintain links between headquarters and the regions. 
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Respective WAC leaders subsequently turned their attentions to preparing 
autogenous development proposals, the most successful of which was submitted by 
workers at River Don who persuaded Grosvenor Place to permanently shelve their 
rundown plans and invest in new machinery.  Elsewhere, BSC agreed to install a new 
bar mill at Shelton, incorporating the plant’s finishing end into their long-term plans. 
 
Despite these two relatively minor victories, BSC still refused to deviate from the 
premise of the Ten Year Strategy.  Having seen their counterproposals rejected, the 
remaining WACs were left with little option but adopt a watching brief.  Still, hope was 
not entirely lost.  With the Conservative Government in a state of near permanent crisis 
– and a revitalised opposition Labour Party vowing to review the Corporation’s long-
term development strategy – UK steelworkers approached the February 1974 general 
election contest with anticipation.  They were joined by a group of shop stewards at 
Bilston who had established their own action committee. 
 
The Origins of the BJUAC 
 
Notwithstanding the systematic and deliberate marginalisation of their works, Bilston’s 
steelmen performed admirably during the formative years of public ownership.  In May 
1970 melting shop operatives broke pre-nationalisation production records on two 
separate occasions.106  With the help of Bilston, the Special Steels Division was by far 
the most profitable section of the industry, registering £31.2m in 1970/1; £10m in 
 
106 The Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, May 1970. 
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1971/2 and £20m in 1972/3.107  Moreover, as BSC was hit by a surge in unofficial local 
strikes under the Conservative Party, local workers maintained their exemplary record 
of peaceful industrial relations.  Unlike colleagues elsewhere, Bilston’s steelmen also 
supported BSC’s Green Book initiative by facilitating shift reductions that led to several 
partial de-manning schemes.108  They exhibited a willingness to adapt production 
methods, successfully trialling a prototype of automated billet testing equipment that 
was subsequently adopted throughout the industry.109  Meanwhile, owing to the skill 
and flexibility of finishing end employers, Bilston was able to manufacture round bars 
between 80mm and 350mm in diameter, the largest range of sizes produced in a 
steelworks outside the USSR.110  
  
As the plant’s production workers got on with the task of producing high-quality steel 
profitably, a small band of supervisory staff and middle-managers was becoming 
increasingly concerned by the behaviour of The Mount; and their decision to shelve 
the BEACON scheme in particular.  Following the April 1971 rationalisation 
announcement, this informal group of ‘staffers’ met locally.  Participating in the talks 
was Terry Hyde and Geoff Richards, leaders of the 66-strong ISTC Middle-
Management branch.  They were joined by Rail Traffic Manager, Frank Chaney, and 
 
107 JURUE, The Future of Bilston Steelworks: An Appraisal, March 1979, ITSOE, BCA1/4, p. 17.  
Although results for individual units were not published until 1973/4, Bilston was known to have 
functioned as a profitable concern during the intervening period. 
108 Some workers also agreed to drop their craft status. 
109 The Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, 7 December 1972. 
110 The Steel News: Special Steels Division Edition, 22 March 1973.  
`166 
 
Blast Furnace Department boss, David Hunter – representing 80 SIMA-affiliated 
middle-managers.111   
 
Joining this middle-management team was a group of senior supervisors led by Reg 
Turley, the softly spoken Chairman of the plant’s Joint Staff Branches Committee and 
an ISTC stalwart.112  At his side was the likes of Colin Simpkiss, Joe Clarke, David 
Hamilton, Ian Turner and Cecil Baines, a tight-knit team of joint branch officials who 
enjoyed a close working relationship.  Turley’s closest friend was Baines, a 47-year-
old non-destructive testing supervisor from the laboratories.  Like so many of his 
colleagues, he had long-established ancestral ties to the works, with his grandfather 
once employed by the Hickman family.  The Secretary of the ISTC Technical Staff 
Branch had recently joined forces with Turley to form a charity organisation that sought 
to, “build a better future” for Bilston.113  Indeed, a common trait of these men was a 
passion for their hometown and, as such, they were primarily motivated by a concern 
for the social and economic well-being of future generations.  Baines had grown up 
during the Great Depression and was still haunted by the experiences of a close family 
member who, as an unemployed ironworker, had been forced to suffer the indignity of 
working at the same ‘Poverty Bonk’ Benjamin Bilboe had protested: 
 
111 Chaney entered the industry as a shunter with Dorman Long in his native Redcar, before coming to 
Bilston as the Rail Traffic Section Manager in 1968.  The popular Hunter had originally plied his trade 
at Normanby Park works in Scunthorpe, before moving to Bilston in June 1970.  Since then he had 
become a popular figure, involving himself with a number of social activities.  He was also known to 
serenade his men with his trusty bagpipes.  
112 Since joining the works in 1949, Turley had immersed himself in union business; becoming Secretary 
of the ISTC Staff Branch; Chairman of the BWB ISTC Joint Staff Branches; head of the combined works 
JCC; and a member of the Joint Staff Branches Negotiating Committee.  At national level, he was 
elected to serve on the ISTC Staff Negotiating Committee. 




He was a strong socialist and he was a man who wanted to work.  The 
indignities he suffered because he could not find a settled job made me realise 
that no man should be put in that position.  I resolved that if ever I could do 
anything to ensure it would not happen again I would do so.114   
 
Hamilton, meanwhile, had recently established the ‘Bilston Jobs Action Group’, 
working alongside researchers at the University of Birmingham to produce a report 
exploring ways in which to attract new employers to the town.  As the outspoken 
Chairman of the ISTC Security Branch, he earned the moniker of ‘Little Leprechaun’ 
owing to his diminutive stature and heavy Irish accent.  Unlike his fellow shop 
stewards, Hamilton was a militant, anti-establishment figure who had joined the CPGB 
as a young man growing up in Northern Ireland.  An enthusiastic reader of The Morning 
Star, he was also a vocal advocate of the growing ‘right to work’ movement, as outlined 
in a letter published in The Steel News: 
 
My own opinion is that it is very difficult to ask 165,000 people on the dole to 
work harder, also we have approximately another 2,000,000 on short time.  We 
have over 1,000,000 homeless people in England alone and the rest of us 
(working people) struggling to bring up families, pay mortgages and rents, and 
very high cost of food to feed ourselves.  The people of Britain have always 
been prepared and done an honest day’s work, but the employers have always 
resisted to the extreme paying them a fair day’s wages.  Steelworkers should 
know this when Dr. Monty Finniston wants to abandon 50,000 steelworkers to 
 
114 The Steel News: Bilston, Wolverhampton and Birchley Works Edition, 28 November 1975.  
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unemployment and much reduced living standards.  I find it very hard to take 
any notice of people who live in palaces telling me and others like me to work 
harder and pull my belt tighter.115 
 
The role that Bilston’s senior supervisory staff and their middle-managers played in 
planting the first seeds of resistance contrasted with production worker colleagues, 
who were relatively slow to formally respond to the unfolding threat.  This phenomenon 
can be interpreted as a clear manifestation of the industrial relations culture that had 
evolved under private ownership, with Bilston’s manual grades traditionally exhibiting 
a reticence to self-organise.   
 
This would change in February 1972, when Monty ‘Finish ‘em’ Finniston arrived in 
Wolverhampton to speak to the annual dinner of the SISI.  At the end of what was a 
characteristically self-aggrandising keynote speech, the Corporation’s ideas man 
broke protocol by disclosing that Grosvenor Place was specifically looking to abandon 
Bilston by March 1975 at the latest.  Alarmed by Finniston’s startling admission – and 
facing the very-real prospect of receiving a formal 24-month closure notice by the end 
of the next financial year – local shop stewards scrambled into action.  Responding to 
a request for clarification from the ISTC Joint Staff Branches, an unsympathetic Derek 
Saul refused to refute his Chief Executive’s statement, adding: 
 
Regarding his comments on steelmaking by the open-hearth process, it is 
common knowledge that steelmaking by this process is an obsolete 
technology and in consequence open-hearth furnaces only have a limited life.  
 
115 The Steel News: Bilston, Wolverhampton and Birchley Works Edition, 14 November 1975. 
`169 
 
What Dr. Finniston said therefore about the eventual phasing out of this 
process should not have come as any great surprise … You will appreciate 
that the Corporation as a whole cannot avoid continuing rationalisation if it is 
to meet world competition in steel, but the redundancies which are inevitably 
associated with this exercise are by no means lightly regarded.116 
 
Frustrated by their unpopular General Manager’s stance, Turley instinctively turned to 
union bureaucrats in London: 
 
This statement made by Dr. Finniston at a private function, to me seems totally 
irresponsible, especially when there has been no prior consultation with the 
employees of these works.  There has been a distinct feeling of depression and 
low morale at the Bilston Works for a considerable time due to the precarious 
state of the trade and rationalisation plans of BSC, therefore, remarks like this 
do nothing at all to help.  Could I ask if you will take whatever action you 
consider necessary to safeguard the interest of the Confederation members at 
Bilston.117 
 
The proud Confederation member was, nonetheless, left bemused by Dai Davies’ 
ambivalence: 
 
Although I can fully appreciate the likely effects of this statement on the morale 
of the operatives at the Bilston Works, I think it has to be conceded that it has 
 
116 Letter from G. Saul to P. Watts, 7 March 1972, MRC, MSS.36/2000/282. 
117 Letter from R. Turley to D. Davies, 23 February 1972, MRC, MSS.36/2000/282. 
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been generally understood that the advent and development of oxygen 
steelmaking would inevitably affect the continued operation of the open hearth 
practice.  This trend is developing in every steel-producing country in the 
world, so that in making this statement Dr. Finniston was merely drawing 
attentions to an inescapable fact.118 
 
The reaction was one of alarm, with the Bilston men issuing a damning statement: 
 
This is what all the concern at Bilston is about, it is obvious even to the simple-
minded that the future of Bilston is in the balance and that is why [sic] because 
we are paying members to an organisation which has for its first principle the 
safeguarding and protection of its members we are asking you as General 
Secretary to take action on our behalf.  At the end of the discussion the 
following resolution was unanimously adopted: - “This Committee insists the 
General Secretary presses the BSC and the Secretary of Trade and Industry 
for its assurance that the Bilston Group of Works will be given the necessary 
development to enable it to carry on its role as the premier steelmaking works 
in the West Midlands.  Further to this the Committee insists you visit the Bilston 
Works within the next 7 days to give the necessary help which should be 
forthcoming in exchange for the payment of dues”.119 
 
 
118 Letter from D. Davies to R. Turley, 25 February 1972, MRC, MSS.36/2000/282. 
119 Letter from A. Taylor to D. Davies, 17 March 1972, MRC, MSS.36/2000/282. 
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However, the belligerent General Secretary, after ignoring the invite, alienated his 
Bilston members further by publicly acquiescing to management’s rationalisation 
programme when attending a SISI talk in nearby Wolverhampton: 
 
I would be failing in my duty if I did not say this:  We will cooperate with all 
reasonable steps to make the British Steel Corporation efficient, and 
economically and commercially viable …120 
 
A candid Hamilton accused Davies of, “showing a complete lack of ability and interest” 
in the plight of his colleagues, before criticising his Executive’s pro-modernising 
agenda: 
 
We feel that the General Secretary as head of our Union is not doing enough 
in the fight against closures in the Steel Industry.  It is not his job to modernise 
the Steel Industry or to assist in this.  It is his job to save our jobs.  The 
Executive Council is showing a complete lack of ability and interest in the fight 
to save the Steel Industry, bearing in mind that the AEW [sic] Executive 
Council has issued a public statement that they will use all the resources of 
their Union to defend their members interest in the Steel Industry.  We think 
the Executive Council should have confidence in the ability of the members to 
carry out this fight.121  
 
 
120 The Express and Star, 17 February 1973. 
121 Letter from D. Hamilton to D. Davies, 3 May 1973, MRC, MSS.36/2000/258. 
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A war of words ensued, with the sharp-tongued Hamilton criticising his leader for 
accepting a knighthood from the Tory Government.  Bilston’s Head of Security 
eventually persuaded his fellow staffers to pass a formal vote of no confidence in 
Davies.122 
 
Shocked by their union leader’s apathy, the men had little option but to look elsewhere 
for assistance.  Many had maintained the plant’s historically close relationship with the 
area’s CLPs.  Reg Turley, for example, was Chairman of the Springvale Ward of the 
Party and a leading member of Wolverhampton’s South East CLP.  Joining him was 
Ian Turner, who had recently been chosen as a future Labour Party candidate for the 
next round of Council elections.  As political activists, they had developed a close 
relationship with MP for Bilston, Robert Edwards, who agreed to intervene on behalf 
of his concerned constituents.123   
 
Securing the backing of such an experienced politician was a real coup de maitre for 
Bilston’s staffers.  Born in Merseyside to dockworkers, he had joined the Co-operative 
Movement and the ILP as a teenager.  The political activist rose through the ranks of 
the Party, joining a delegation of young socialists to Russia and leading an 
International Militia during the Spanish Civil War.124  Firmly entrenched on the far left 
of the UK political scene, the Liverpudlian chaired the ILP between 1943 and 1948, 
before being elected as the Labour and Co-operative candidate for Bilston seven years 
 
122 Letter from D. Hamilton to D. Davies, 8 May 1973, MRC, MSS.36/2000/258. 
123 Edwards was actively involved in Turley and Hamilton’s community work, assisting with the formation 
of both the ‘Bilston Action Group’ and the ‘Bilston Jobs Group’. 
124 During his trip to Moscow, the impressionable young political activist met Joseph Stalin, Vyacheslav 
Molotov, Bela Kun and his hero Leon Trotsky.  In Spain he commanded the likes of George Orwell, 
Robert Smillie and Stafford ‘Staff’ Cottman. 
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later.  Edwards brought to the table an incredible amount of organising experience.  
As a veteran of the trade union movement, he had served as a message carrier for 
the TUC in 1926, before moving to the U.S. to work alongside renowned labour leader 
John Lewis.  Upon his return to the UK, he became General Secretary of the Chemical 
Workers Union and a National Officer for the TGWU.  Edwards was also a seasoned 
campaigner, having led the Lancashire hunger marchers during the Great Depression.  
This experience had an obvious impact on his subsequent Parliamentary career.  A 
passionate advocate of right to work campaigns, he frequently spoke out against the 
inherent evils of corporate greed and redundancy: 
 
I suppose that I am the only hon. Member who has led an unemployment march 
on London.  I did so in 1934 and was ejected from the Gallery for interrupting 
the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald.  I was disgusted at his wistful rhetoric 
which had no meaning for the 2½ million working people who were 
unemployed.  Many millions feel today as I felt then … In the 1930s, the 
consequences of large-scale unemployment across Europe led to the military 
dictatorship in Italy, the rise of Hitler and the military dictatorship in Germany 
and to the Second World War.  Fundamentally, it arose out of our failure to 
maintain the dignity of our people by providing them with useful and 
constructive work.  That shows how important this problem is.  All the efforts of 
the Government, useful as they are, can be wiped out by a half a dozen 
multinational companies closing factories and moving them to Latin America, 
South Africa or other places where there are tax havens or where the workers 
are not organised in unions and pay is low … The Bilston steel works in my 
constituency is threatened with closure, although it has never run at a loss. It 
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is still a profitable factory. I do not know why we allow private enterprise firms 
or nationalised organisations to close down factories that are viable and that 
supply local services to local industry and to the local community. Many 
factories are being wiped out in this way.125 
 
As this thesis will determine, the decade-long struggle to defend Bilston would be 
underpinned by Edwards’ personal political doctrine and his influence in Whitehall: 
 
Bob Edwards was tremendous … The support he gave us, the places he got 
us into, the people he got us to meet … He always used to meet us when we 
went to Parliament, he’d take us in, look after us.126 
 
With the MP now on board, a formal multi-union group representing all grades of 
worker was established.  Elected officials from local ISTC, TGWU, SIMA, NUB and 
UCATT branches were absorbed into the BJUAC.127  Adopting a more established 
operational model, David Hunter was made Secretary, with Reg Turley assuming the 
role of Vice-Chairman.  Works Transport Controller, Dennis Turner, was confirmed as 
Chair.  A well-known figure around Bilston, the 30-year-old had previously worked as 
a door-to-door salesman, a job that had introduced him to some of the most vulnerable 
members of society: 
 
 
125 943 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1978) cols. 148-50. 
126 Oral testimony from G. Howe recorded 25 January 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
127 Although the action committee was no longer the exclusive domain of ISTC or SIMA-affiliated 
staffers, at this relatively early stage they had a considerable influence over the body. 
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I really needed to make a lot of money very quickly, and since I’d always had 
an outgoing personality, to become a Betterware person was really right up 
my street.  Because I love people and, I was able to meet a lot of people, and 
it gave me my first insight into people’s problems, which was a very big 
encouragement to me to take up politics later.  I became a member of the 
Labour Party when I was 16, and so I was a member of the Labour Party even 
when I was a Betterware man.  I only did that for a couple of years, it’s 
something that you do for all those experiences.  I never did make any money 
out of it because I used to spend more time talking to people about their 
problems than getting on with the selling.128 
 
These experiences prompted Turner to become a community leader and champion of 
the common man, organising several charity drives that raised funds for a new citizens 
centre, youth club, theatre, women’s refuge and homeless shelter.  It was as an 
aspiring political activist that he first caught the eye of his would-be mentor Edwards.  
Having joined the Labour Party, he was elected as Youth Mayor of Bilston and the 
head of the town’s Young Socialists.  Whilst canvassing for the October 1964 general 
election, he formed a close relationship with the recently widowed MP.  Moving 
permanently into his constituency home, the Bilston man would listen intently to his 
housemate’s reminiscences of the General Strike and the Spanish Civil War.  By the 
time of the March 1966 general election contest, Turner and his brother were acting 
as Edwards’ official political agents, coordinating a highly successful campaign that 
extended the MP for Bilston’s already substantial majority.  Weeks later, the favour 
was returned as Edwards backed Turner’s successful bid to become Wolverhampton’s 
 
128 Documenting the Workshop of the World, 2007, WCA, LS/LB6/2, p. 2. 
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youngest-ever Councillor, representing a ward with a history of electing socialist 
candidates such as Benjamin Bilboe.  The admiration the Bilstonian had for his mentor 
was revealed two decades later, when replacing him as MP for Wolverhampton South 
East: 
 
I come to the House following a legend – the legend of Bob Edwards, who was 
a fine parliamentarian, and who devoted all his life to the interests of the people.  
If I can serve the people of my constituency one quarter as well as he did, I 
shall be very pleased.  Bob Edwards made a wider contribution than that, from 
the days when he sat with Trotsky as a young man, and with Mao Tse Tung.  
He fought in the Spanish civil war.  All that is known to the House.  He is such 
a modest man.  He served through the years with such humility.  It is a great 
privilege to follow him.  To have had him as a mentor over the past 20 years 
has been of great value to me.129 
 
As a Councillor, Turner threw himself into his casework and, by the time he assumed 
the leadership of the BJUAC, he was already chairing Wolverhampton’s Policy and 
Humanities, General Purposes, Economic Development and Transport 
Committees.130  Whilst nurturing his entry into mainstream electoral politics, Edwards 
also ensured his young apprentice fully immersed himself in the trade union 
movement.  Initially volunteering as a pence card steward for the ISTC, Turner became 
 
129 118 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1987) col. 698 
130 Turner had developed a close working relationship with a large network of local officials whose 
influence and professional expertise would prove crucial in the years ahead. 
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a senior convenor in the mills, before being nominated by Edwards as the 
Wolverhampton CLP’s Trade Union Liaison Officer.   
 
As a community organiser, political campaigner and public servant, the young 
steelworker had honed a variety of skills that would be integral to the struggle for 
jobs.131  Whilst possessing a considerable Black Country brogue, he was an 
accomplished and eloquent public speaker and could often be found on the campaign 
trail offering a rendition of The Red Flag whilst drumming up support for his fellow 
Labour Party candidates.  Intellectually lucid and voracious, he would regularly 
bemuse his opponents by quoting long passages from the works of Robert Tressell or 
Omar Khayyam.  When the battle for Bilston received a national platform, he began 
signing-off letters with a William Morris quote that reveals a conviction that everyone 
had the right to work: 
 
It is right and necessary that all men should have work to do which shall be 
worth doing, and be of itself pleasant to do; and which should be done under 
such conditions as would make it neither over-wearisome nor over-anxious.  
Turn that claim about as I say, I think of it as long as I can, I cannot find that it 
is an exorbitant claim; yet again I say if Society would or could admit it, the face 
of the world would be ended.  To feel that we were doing work useful to others 
and pleasant to ourselves, and that such work and its due reward could not fail 
 
131 For an insight into Turner’s upbringing, activism and entry into local politics see Reeves and 
Chevannes, Real Labour, pp. 11-56. 
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us!  What serious harm could happen to us then?  And the price to be paid for 
so making the world happy is Revolution.132 
 
Turner also possessed what E.P. Thompson described in his Homage to Tom Maguire 
as the “qualities of mass leadership”.133  A blue-sky thinker with an imperious self-
belief, his undaunted sense of optimism and personal magnetism commanded the 
extreme loyalty of his many followers:   
 
I met Dennis probably about ’73 or ’74, he was working in the Transport 
Department at the bottom end of the Finishing and I was working A point, B 
point, C point … I got to know the guy like that [crosses fingers] … What I know 
of Dennis … it was very much about camaraderie, people, fairness.  He 
certainly wouldn’t want big business to dictate how we live our lives.  A very, 
very fair man, very open and honest man.  Because he struggled with his 
breathing, Dennis did, and if he was on a roll because someone had really 
wound him up, he would say it and say and say it – “That isn’t true, that isn’t 
right, that’s not how it should be”; and he’d be out of breath, you could hear it.  
So passionate! … He was a political animal, it was his world … I know his father 
was a trade union type guy, so he was steeped in it.  And [of course] he was 
very close to Bob Edwards, the MP.  So, it was very much about this tradition 
– the working man!134 
 
 
132 BJUAC, The Bilston Dimension, undated, ITSOE, BCA1/3. 
133 Thompson, Homage, p. 161. 
134 Oral testimony from P. Winmill recorded 16 March 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
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Another quality was his ability to persuade and cajole, having developed powers of 
personal communication whilst working as Edwards’ political agent.  In addition to his 
drive and verve, he was a leader of some imagination who possessed a penchant for 
the theatrical – as demonstrated when he audaciously hijacked his union’s ADC in 
June 1978 or when he led a works takeover in February 1979.  Above everything, 
Turner was a pragmatist and a shrewd operator with sound logic, often adapting the 
BJUAC’s defence strategy according to changing political, economic and industrial 
landscapes.135 
 
Evidently concerned by their colleagues’ previous interactions with Dai Davies, the 
men bypassed Congress House altogether and instead recruited a team of influential 
political stakeholders to do their bidding.  In doing so, they demonstrated an 
awareness that any fight for jobs would need to be political in nature – a strategy 
advocated by Richard Hyman: 
 
Just as growing numbers of workers appreciate that the fight for employment 
cannot be resolved on an individual level … so there is increasing awareness 
that sectional competition is also ineffectual: that the issue is a political one 
which must be pursued at a national level.136  
 
 
135 For now, the positions of Chair and Vice-Chair were largely symbolic, with the BJUAC adopting a 
horizontal organisational model.  Policymaking was established on democratic lines, with resolutions 
authorised by each union branch.  If the opportunity arose, the action committee would call a mass 
meeting of available workers, who would be asked to back them any major strategic decision with a 
show of hands. 
136 R. Hyman, Industrial Relations: a Marxist Approach (London, 1975), p. 182. 
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At a subsequent meeting with the West Midlands Labour Party, MPs Renee Short, 
John Gilbert and Peter Archer each agreed to exert political pressure on the 
Corporation and the Conservative Government to reveal their long-term plans for 
Bilston.  In Parliament, MP for Wolverhampton North East and NEC member, Short, 
tabled a written question to John Davies, asking him to confirm any planned 
compulsory redundancies.137  The Minister’s Parliamentary Undersecretary, Nicholas 
Ridley, provided a pre-determined stock answer, explaining the reasoning behind the 
decision to jettison OH facilities.  In an act of political self-preservation synonymous 
with the Heath Government, Ridley deflected responsibility by explaining that any 
decision on the future of individual works was, “entirely the responsibility of the 
BSC”.138   
 
Unsatisfied, Bilston’s new political lobby went straight to the top, bombarding 
Grosvenor Place with a flurry of correspondence.  The letter writing campaign was 
somewhat effective, with Lord Melchett personally looking to appease their concerns: 
 
As I am sure you are aware, the Corporation has embarked upon extensive 
measures to modernise its plant with a view to preparing itself to compete 
effectively at home and abroad.  These measures involve considerable degrees 
of rationalisation, including the need to dispense with the high cost and 
technologically obsolete open-hearth furnaces for steelmaking and to replace 
these with the most modern ironmaking facilities and basic oxygen convertors 
and/or electric arc furnaces.  It was with this in mind that Dr. Finniston was 
 
137 Letter from R. Short to D. Hunter, 27 March 1972, ITSOE, BCA1/1. 
138 Letter from N. Ridley to R. Edwards, 10 March 1972, ITSOE, BCA1/1. 
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speaking when addressing the Staffordshire Iron and Steel Institute Annual 
Dinner on 18th February.  To this extent there must be a question mark over the 
iron and steel making facilities at Bilston, as has been explained to the 
workforce there.139 
 
This well-meaning yet clumsy attempt to clarify the controversial Finniston speech 
raised more questions than answers.  Gilbert, who also held concerns over the 
possible closure of a small BSC site in his Dudley constituency, protested by rejecting 
a personal invite to attend a black-tie event at industry headquarters: 
 
I ought to tell you that, in general, I do not approve of public money being 
spent on political entertaining ... As, moreover, many of my constituents are 
facing redundancy as a result of the Corporation’s announced decision to cut 
back on the Cookley Complex, and as hundreds more are faced, with their 
families, with great anxiety as to the future security of their jobs at the Birchley 
and Bilston plants, my wife and I regret that we do not feel that we have 
anything to celebrate with the senior management of the British Steel 
Corporation at this time.140 
 
Meanwhile, Bilston’s convenors and their new Westminster allies concerned 
themselves with forcing policymakers to prematurely reveal their plans for mini-works.  
BJUAC Secretary, David Hunter, penned an astonishingly vitriolic letter to Finniston: 
 
 
139 Letter from J. Melchett to R. Edwards, 26 April 1972, ITSOE, BCA1/1. 
140 Letter from J. Gilbert to J. Melchett, 14 June 1972, ITSOE, BCA1/1. 
`182 
 
I have, on behalf of the committee and workpeople of these works, some 
comments to make on the case for mini-steel works and on the regrettable 
tardiness that the British Steel Corporation have shown in taking it up ... Now 
however, the private sector of the Steel Industry has jumped on the band-
wagon proposing mini works in the West Midlands, Chesterfield and 
Manchester.  The proposed Cooper Lloyds Ltd., development in the West 
Midlands is a particularly bitter pill, inasmuch as it is very similar to the 
BEACON scheme, albeit on a somewhat smaller scale than envisaged at the 
Bilston Works.  Should the B.S.C. allow these private sector developments to 
go forward unopposed, then in effect some of the B.S.C. [sic] most profitable 
business will have been hived off.  Workpeople in many of the older long 
established (though often profitable) works will be thrown out of employment.  
It would be a tragedy for this to happen merely because of the tardiness of the 
B.S.C. heads to recognise the economic value of the mini-works concept.141 
 
A busy Edwards also took up the issue in Parliament: 
 
I have been making some inquiries about what is happening in the steel industry 
in America and in the steel industry in Germany.  I discover from my trade union 
friends that in those countries they are moving away from the great mass-
production steel factories and developing mini-steel factories catering for local 
demand.  They are moving away from the whole concept of mass production in 
large massive factories towards mini production in the two major steel-
producing countries of the world, America and Germany.  This development is 
 
141 Letter from D. Hunter to M. Finniston, 20 June 1972, ITSOE, BCA1/6. 
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taking place based upon experience.  I hope that we are not going to have to 
learn this lesson based on our bitter experience by closing down establishments 
like this … We just do not understand the policy of the British Steel Corporation. 
We do not accept that the Corporation has complete autonomy to run the 
business as it likes, when people's jobs are being put in jeopardy in the Black 
Country, where every day we hear of redundancies and of small factories 
closing down in the very heart of Britain.  The Black Country, the West Midlands, 
is the strong arm of Britain. The Industrial Revolution started there. It cradled 
the iron and steel industry; it cradled coal production; and it cradled great 
engineering work. The whole area is now threatened, in our opinion, with very 
serious redundancies, and we believe that one of the contributory factors in that 
is the policy of the Corporation. Steel is the barometer of British industry and of 
Britain's future, and that is what troubles us today.142 
 
Back in the Black Country, manual grades and middle-management worked alongside 
a talented furnace-hand to develop a revolutionary new steelmaking process that 
extended the lifespan of OH furnaces.  The ‘double-ended firing’ system involved 
blasting oxygen during smelting and, following a series of provisional tests, proved to 
dramatically reduce production times and, therefore, costs per unit.  However, neither 
Swinton House nor Grosvenor Place showed any interest in the technique as it 
challenged the basic premise of the industry’s long-term development strategy – and 
with it guarantees of billions of pounds of capital investment.  
  
 
142 842 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1972) cols. 1824-28. 
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The Bilston men and their allies, therefore, looked to launch an all-encompassing, top-
level campaign involving the press, the regional labour movement and the wider 
community.  In April 1973, a mass meeting was called at the plant.  Responding to a 
rousing speech from Turner, hundreds of steelmen enthusiastically backed the action 
committee leader’s call to resist any prospective rundown.143  The meeting sent a clear 
message to the outside world: the BJUAC had secured a mandate to defend the 
livelihoods of approximately 3,000 workers.  Early, popular support for the anti-closure 
campaign can primarily be explained by an occupational collectivism that was directly 
linked to the very nature of steelwork itself.  Firstly, a clear sense of pride was 
engendered by participating in the manufacture of high quality, specialist steel, as 
outlined by BJUAC supporter John Vincent:  
 
When you did a job, you got a self-satisfaction, you know.  You’d contributed, 
you’d done something.  And I think that’s why people that stopped there really 
liked it.  I mean, when we used to go on courses, they used to say we were 
arrogant at Bilston, because we considered ourselves to be the best, and we 
were trained the best.144 
 
Secondly, this pronounced occupational identity was further enhanced by the dangers 
of hot metal production: 
 
There was one death … whilst I was there.  One of the shunters, he was coming 
out of the loading bay and his sock must have been caught, you know, in the 
 
143 In a further move to legitimise the authority of BJUAC, its members were chosen by their respective 
branches. 
144 Oral testimony from J. Vincent, recorded 15 October 2014, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
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[train] wheels.  It dragged him along and killed him.  I remember that because 
at the time I was 18, I’d have been on days labouring, and I had to clean the 
mess up.  So that stuck with me.145 
 
[There] was a chap called Sid Fellows, he had his arm chopped off.  The 
ganniston on the blast furnace was … after the blast furnace was tapped, the 
tapping hole was blocked off with a plug of ganniston, which is like clay, and it 
was put into place by the ganniston gun which basically a barrel with a piston 
sliding down pushing the ganniston out of the end into the tap hole.  But the 
chap I’m on about, he was a maintenance man.  He’d put his safety card on, 
his danger card … whenever you were doing work on any machines you used 
to put a danger card on, and a danger card could not be moved by anybody 
else except the man who’d put it there … he’d put his danger card on, he’d done 
everything right, and he was working with his arm inside the ganniston gun, and 
somebody started it up, and it pushed his arm … cut his arm off, I think just 
below the elbow.  But it pushed his arm out of the end of the ganniston gun, it 
dropped on the floor, obviously, and he picked it up, and walked down the ramp, 
and went into the medical centre, with his arm in his hand.  And he waited there 
until the nurse came out, he didn’t even go in screaming or anything like that.  
And he was taking a walk of probably 200 yards.146 
 
Former Welfare Officer, Andree Hickey, describes how this manifested itself into a 
heightened sense of shop-floor solidarity:  
 
145 Oral testimony from J. Boulton, recorded 15 October 2014, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 




Everyone was so friendly to everybody.  It was one big family; and if anyone 
was ill or had an injury, you can’t imagine how many people used to collar me 
around the works.  If they saw me walking around or if I was in the works car, 
they’d flag the car down: “What’s happening to so-and-so”, you know.  They all 
wanted to know.  It was a very close community.147 
 
Another factor in explaining widespread solidaristic action was a discernible 
camaraderie that had resulted from sectional working and the continental shift pattern: 
 
  … the lovely part of the steelworks, as anyone will tell you, it’s a village.  It’s a 
wholly contained community of people, and because you work on a continental 
rota, you spend more time, effectively, with your work colleagues than you do 
with your family.  And the place operated like that; the workmen’s canteen, the 
beer flowed … So it was a real home from home in a sense … works colleagues 
became somewhat closer and more familiar in terms of living together.  So that 
was my perception of the steelworks, was one of very wholesome sort of 
extended family living, and there was great partnership and great comradeship 
amongst people.148 
 
You were part of a family.  It was a home away from home because you spent 
weekends, you know.  I mean, the first two years I was there I spent working 
Christmas day because we let the married men with children go and have their 
 
147 Oral testimony from A. Hickey, recorded 15 October 2014, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
148 Documenting the Workshop of the World, 2007, WCA, LS/LB6/2, pp. 5-6. 
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Christmas.  And us single blokes, who weren’t bothered, you know, we went 
[in].  That’s how it was, give and take, people looked after one another.149 
 
I mean, I’ve got to say, if you wanted anything doing, or you wanted anything, 
somewhere on the steelworks there was someone who could do it.  If you 
wanted your hair cut, you had your hair cut, if you wanted a packet of cigarettes, 
if you wanted to put a bet on they were all over the place, if you wanted a 
washing machine, if you wanted tyres, no problem, and that’s the way it was.  I 
mean, it was a thriving community within the works.150 
 
These and other factors would underwrite the popularity of the campaign for several 
years.  Assured of their support base, Turner and his colleagues immediately informed 
WMBC, the West Midlands Labour Party and the WB&DTUC of the nature of their 
campaign, before co-authoring a detailed press release with members of Edwards’ 
administrative team.  The issues around which the Bilston men initially intended to 
defend the works included: its ongoing profitability; returns on capital previously 
employed; the inherent flaws of management’s development strategy; and the 
potential of double-ended firing.151  
  
But before the first shots of what would be a protracted fight for survival could be fired, 
Turner and Turley were invited to an unscheduled meeting in Sheffield.  There they 
were handed a prepared written statement outlining the Corporation’s updated plans 
for Bilston.  Under sustained political pressure – and in light of its ongoing profitability 
 
149 Oral testimony from J. Vincent, recorded 15 October 2014, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
150 Documenting the Workshop of the World, 2007, WCA, LS/LB6/2, pp. 33-34. 
151 Letter from R. Edwards to R. Turley, 5 April 1973, WCA, DW-173/1/5.   
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– management had decided to absorb the plant into the industry’s new medium-term 
operating plan, thus guaranteeing a future of at least five years.  Hearing the news, 
Edwards and the BJUAC decided against activating the campaign and to instead 
adopt watching brief.  They agreed that, “... in light of this statement it would be folly 
to overplay or expose our hand too much at the present time, but we feel an occasional 
dig at this Tory dominated public sector will do no harm”.152  Meanwhile, their political 
patron offered an assurance, “We should have a general election within the next two 
years, and Labour should have no difficulty in becoming the Government and this will 
mean the cancellation of all recommended closures”.153  As the next chapter will 




Despite a promising start, whereby their conditions of employment were dramatically 
improved, Bilston’s early experiences of public ownership were mostly negative, with 
their unfashionable plant being systematically marginalised by management.  
Implementing the first phase of a decade-long rundown process, an explicitly biased 
divisional management employed a series of discriminatory trading practices designed 
to safeguard works in South Yorkshire at the expense of Bilston.  The plant’s long-
term prospects were further undermined by planner’s ill-fated decision to relocate all 
domestic iron and steelmaking to a handful of sites; an industrial renewal strategy that 
was fundamentally flawed.  By acceding to management prerogative, both the Labour 
and Conservative Governments failed to properly probe the rationale behind the 
 
152 Letter from R. Turley to R. Edwards, 15 May 1973, WCA, DW-173/1/5.   
153 Letter from R. Edwards to R. Turley, 23 May 1973, WCA, DW-173/1/5. 
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‘bigger is better’ approach to renewal.  Neither did the pro-establishment steel unions, 
whose stringent modernising agenda obliged structural rationalisation through 
compulsory mass redundancies and the closure of all fully-integrated inland works, 
regardless of performance.   
 
It has been established how executive responses to pre-crisis closure proposals were 
woefully inadequate.  By adopting an inflexible and ultimately futile ‘alternative jobs 
posture’, the steel unions, led by an apathetic Dai Davies, meekly complied with 
management, effectively sacrificing large swathes of their membership in exchange 
for the promise of investment in the Big Five.   
 
This policy of acquiescence placed the burden of responsibility on steelworkers, many 
of whom responded to their leaders’ ambivalence by establishing ad-hoc protest 
groups known as action committees.  At Bilston, the plant’s traditionally passive 
workers formed the first incarnation of the BJUAC, a multi-union grassroots protest 
group.  Led by community activist, steelworker and Councillor, Dennis Turner, and 
political patron, MP Bob Edwards, the new action committee set its strategic stall out 
early.  Enlisting the support of a cross-party network of influential regional political 
figures and community stakeholders, they were able to successfully lobby sympathetic 
policymakers into adding the Black Country plant to their updated medium-term 
operating plan. 
 
The BJUAC’s principal argument for retention was their plant’s ongoing profitability, 
which was based, in part, on the facility’s ability to produce its own pig iron.  The next 
chapter will demonstrate how management, responding to an unprecedented world 
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steel crisis, abused established consultation apparatus and local steelmen’s goodwill 
to forcibly mothball Elisabeth.  It is revealed how the unilateral move signified a 
deliberate attack on the Black Country plant’s profitability and the very basis of the 





Chapter 4: The Mothballing of Elisabeth 
 
This chapter provides a review of initial responses to an economic crisis that would 
engulf BSC for over a decade.  It begins with a brief assessment of the new Labour 
Government’s policy towards state steel.  Having denounced the previous ministry’s 
role in expediting the rationalisation of traditional steelworks, Harold Wilson ordered 
the temporary delay of all closures proposed under the Ten Year Strategy.  The impact 
of the Government’s political intervention on the prospects of Bilston is assessed, as 
is the collapse of the trade in mid-1975.  
 
It is revealed how a hostile senior management team, headed by new BSC Chairman 
Sir Monty ‘Finish ‘em’ Finniston, responded to the escalating crisis by cynically shifting 
the blame for its own deficiencies on ordinary workers.  The chapter dissects union 
reactions to Finniston’s advanced rationalisation plan, demonstrating how recently 
appointed TUCSICC and ISTC leader, Bill Sirs, yielded to management’s false 
narrative by signing damaging national productivity agreements. 
 
The conduct of Bilston’s assiduous steelmen is measured, with the shop-floor readily 
adapting workplace practices in order to successfully protect their plant’s proud 
tradition of profitability.  They were justly rewarded when yet another new BSC chief, 
the seemingly more progressive Sir Charles Villiers, absorbed the plant into his 
updated medium-term strategy.  However, Bilston’s future was again put into doubt as 
the crisis returned following a brief respite.  With the Corporation’s precarious financial 
situation deteriorating, management looked to use the aforementioned productivity 
deals to rundown older facilities by transferring more and more orders to those sites 




The chapter details the effect this had on Bilston.  In a move that was described by 
trade union leaders as one of the “dirtiest tricks” ever played on the nation’s 
steelworkers, BSC abused established consultation machinery to permanently 
mothball the plant’s blast furnace.1  The impact this insidious move had on the plant’s 
viability is investigated, as is the strategic response of the BJUAC.  
 
The World Steel Crisis 
 
Whilst in opposition, Labour had committed itself to an industrial strategy that sought 
to intensify state intervention.  An undertaking to review management’s rationalisation 
programme was confirmed in ‘Labour’s Programme’, a political manifesto vowing to 
bring, “new life and hope to the traditional steel communities”.2  After the February 
1974 election victory, new Industry Minister Tony Benn enthusiastically ordered a 
tripartite review of the Ten Year Strategy to be headed by Labour peer Lord Frank 
Beswick.  In what was a reminder to management of their statutory social 
responsibilities, the former Minister for Technology ordered new BSC chief Monty 
Finniston to delay all planned closures (excluding Irlam) for two to four years.3  In the 
case of Glengarnock and Shelton, new steelmaking technology was promised, a 
decision lauded by party officials as a remarkable example of meaningful consultation.   
 
1 Sirs, Hard Labour, p. 66. 
2 The Labour Party, Labour’s Programme (London, 1974), p. 31. 
3 Finniston became BSC Chairman in June 1973, following the untimely death of his predecessor.  
Despite Melchett’s many commercial failings, his loss was mourned by employees who had come to 
appreciate his enlightened approach.  His replacement, on the other hand, had already developed a 
reputation for being an abrasive figure who revelled in confrontation.  Sir Monty and his new Chief 




Notwithstanding these two pardons, the Beswick Review was little more than a political 
compromise designed to reconcile rationalisation with its duty to traditional working-
class steel communities.4  Although well-intentioned, the decision to focus on the 
social consequences of the previous Government’s modernisation plan meant that an 
opportunity to address its inherent technical and commercial flaws was completely 
missed.5   
 
When the results of the Review were announced in Parliament in February 1975, there 
was one notable omission.  Despite originally being incorporated by Benn, Bilston was 
withdrawn following yet another personal intervention by Bob Edwards.  In December 
1974, the re-elected MP for the new constituency of Wolverhampton South East 
travelled to Whitehall alongside Chair of the Parliamentary Steel Committee, Geoffrey 
de Freitas; and NEC member, Renee Short, for talks with Benn and Beswick.  
Edwards, who enjoyed a close personal relationship with a Labour peer he had 
commanded in Spain, swayed the argument by directing discussions to Bilston’s 
profitable record, as well as the potential social and economic implications of closure 
to his constituency.6  Following the talks, Benn informed a frustrated Grosvenor Place 
that the facility was to be included in the Corporation’s recently updated medium-term 
 
4 In a damning critique, Cottrell described the Beswick Review as an “election gimmick”, see Cottrell, 
The Giant, p. 58. 
5 J.J. Richardson and G.F. Dudley revealed that, by not radically altering the strategy, the Government 
was anxious not to alienate management by further delaying the long-awaited development of the Big 
Five.  See Richardson and Dudley, Steel Policy, p. 334. 
6 All five Labour officials shared similar political outlooks, occupying the left of the party.  Benn and 
Edwards, in particular, were kindred spirits: institutional outsiders whom had developed an uneasy 
relationship with members of their own Government.   
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strategy, covering the period 1975/80.  In what would prove to be an extremely 
optimistic appraisal of the situation, an enthusiastic Edwards declared: 
 
The works now have a long future.  The Government is so confident about the 
works that it is investing new capital into them … This is great news for the 
3,000 workers – particularly as under the Tory Government it was scheduled 
for closure.  We have stopped this by proving this plant is a viable steel works.7 
 
A month later, the popular MP spoke to local workers, further raising the possibility of 
lifesaving investment.  Shop-floor hopes were heightened when new BSC Deputy 
Chairman Bob Scholey arrived days later for a Works Council meeting.  Confirming 
that their livelihoods were secure until the end of the current decade at least, he 
suggested Bilston could fulfil a long-term role processing orders overlooked by bulk 
steelmaking facilities:  
  
The new billet mills planned for Redcar would be high capacity units and their 
final markets have not been definitely defined.  Bilston, being located in the 
Midlands area where markets for special billets in sizes and quantities which 
large plants might not find attractive, could give advantages to Bilston, upon 
he did not wish to further elaborate.8 
 
 
7 The Express and Star, 18 January 1975. 
8 Minutes of Bilston Works Council meeting, 13 February 1975, WCA, DW-173/1/1.  Scholey personally 
assured Reg Turley that his works would figure somewhere in the long-term development plan; adding 
he was constantly recommending the installation of an electric arc furnace to his boss.   
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For the second time in the space of two years, Bilston’s future appeared to have been 
safeguarded by their Westminster allies.  However, whilst the men celebrated the 
news, they failed to realise that their exclusion had worked to their disadvantage.  As 
was the case with Shelton and Glengarnock, Bilston possessed a powerful claim for 
investment.  Its experienced workforce, with the support of local authority officials, 
could have used the review to showcase the impressive BEACON scheme to 
sympathetic Whitehall figures.  Whilst colleagues elsewhere were at least afforded the 
opportunity to present their case for development, Bilston was instead handed what 
proved to be little more than a temporary release from the straitjacket. 
 
The return of a Labour Government had coincided with an extended period of 
prosperity, with the Corporation enjoying record sales turnover following the February 
1974 election.  Nevertheless, during the final quarter of the 1974/5 financial year, the 
industry was consumed by a worsening order situation.  As inflationary pressure took 
hold, costs of production also skyrocketed.  Accounts reveal BSC barely broke-even 
in the second half of the financial year.  Moreover, Grosvenor Place warned that 
indications for 1975/76 were “discouraging”, with the industry facing the prospect of 
massive additional financial losses.9  By July 1975 sales had indeed plummeted to 
0.26m tonnes per week, representing a staggering 33.3 per cent drop from the 
previous year and the lowest for a quarter century.10   
 
Whilst the Corporation’s public relations machine looked to blame the industry’s 
failings on the Beswick Review, it is evident that, under Sir Monty’s stewardship, its 
 
9 BSC, Annual Report and Accounts 1974/5 (London, 1975), p. 5. 
10 Man and Metal, September 1975. 
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overall commercial performance deteriorated badly.  As an engineer with little sales 
experience, Finniston failed to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the 
unexpected discovery of North Sea Oil, with Grosvenor Place refusing to tender for 
some £1.2bn worth of public contracts.11  With widespread concerns over quality and 
delivery times, the likes of British Leyland, GKN and Ford turned their backs on the 
Corporation altogether by diversifying their supply chains. 
 
As his organisation’s financial situation became ever more perilous, Sir Monty sought 
to secure extensive labour cost savings at the so-called Beswick plants.  To deflect 
attention away from his own failings, the BSC Chairman repeatedly used the national 
press to advocate the need to cut manning levels by way of compulsory redundancies: 
 
We are in a difficult recession which is not confined to the steel industry.  Quite 
undoubtedly this has an effect on the manpower we have to employ in getting 
steel out which is not wanted.  I think inevitably, some people will be laid off.12   
 
In April 1975, he sent shockwaves through the industry by revealing plans to shed 
20,000 jobs over the coming twelve months.13  This move caused outrage in 
Westminster, forcing Benn to once again intervene.   
 
 
11 Astonishingly, these contracts were eventually awarded to rival steel producers in Italy and Japan. 
12 The Times, 11 April 1975. 
13 The plan called for the closure of heavy-ends at Clyde Iron, Clydesbridge and Ebbw Vale and Shotton, 
as well as reduced operations at the likes of Shelton, East Moors, Teesside and Workington.  As a 




The TUCSICC was now led by Bill Sirs, whose appointment as ISTC chief only weeks 
earlier was intended to represent a change in trajectory for an organisation that, under 
his predecessor, had displayed a de facto acceptance of rationalisation.  A former 
crane driver, Sirs had impressed rank and file steelworkers when speaking about his 
own experiences of unemployment and poverty in his native Hartlepool.  Significantly, 
as a Divisional Officer, he had accused his EC of not doing enough to prevent 
retrenchment: 
 
In 1970 I moved to Cheshire to cover that county, Lancashire and North Wales.  
While I was in Cheshire I came face to face with something that was to haunt 
me for years to come: a works closure.  The works was Irlam in Lancashire and 
although we fought for the plant we were very much on our own.  I shall never 
forget the look on the faces of the workforce as they filed out of the Irlam gates 
for the last time … But looking back at the Irlam experience, I must admit that 
sometimes trade union hierarchies are also pretty hard to move.  When I 
attended the ISTC Executive to plead for action to defend the plant, warning 
that if we did not make a stand we would lose one works after another.  I was 
told by the then general secretary Dai Davies, ‘OK, Brother Sirs, you can go 
back to Irlam and tell them you’ve made your speech!’14 
 
Unlike his predecessor, he publicly recognised the legitimacy of the WACs.  If Davies 
was yesterday’s man, Sirs presented himself as the future – a progressive who sought 
to modernise an industrial union that had become increasingly archaic.  Upon taking 
 
14 Sirs, Hard Labour, pp. 52-53. 
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office in May 1975, a supremely confident Sirs set out his stall by firing a warning shot 
to management: 
 
The age of the employer’s prerogative is over.  Investment decisions which 
result in large or even small scale redundancies can no longer be made 
unilaterally by industrial entrepreneurs … This right of workers to be taken into 
consideration when investment decisions which profoundly affect them are 
being contemplated is a moral one.  But where industrialists refuse to 
recognize it, a degree of trade union strength may be necessary to enforce it 
– without implying that might is right.  Responsible workers will not abuse their 
power by halting technological progress so long as it can be demonstrated 
that technology will not destroy the industrial and social lives of the workers.15 
 
Benn, whose sympathies clearly lay with the unions, handed Finniston a public 
dressing-down, before ordering him to sit with Steel Committee officials and discuss 
mutually acceptable ways in which to tackle the crisis.  Following ten hours of talks, 
the two parties struck a compromise deal.  In exchange for management dropping 
their original de-manning target, the unions agreed to a five-point cost-cutting plan 
known as the May 1975 agreement: 
 
• voluntary redundancies at works where over-manning was acknowledged by 
local union officials;  
• the elimination of all unnecessary overtime working;  
• a reduction in absenteeism;  
 
15 The Times, 19 May 1975. 
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• more flexibility for the Corporation to determine levels of loading at Beswick 
plants;  
• and the rigorous control of all future recruitment.   
 
In a spirit of cooperation that obscured any animosity that may have previously 
developed on the shop-floor, Bilston’s steelmen enthusiastically and conscientiously 
embraced the challenges set before them.  Local shop stewards answered calls to 
reduce labour costs, with sectional JWPs established across the works.  In the 
Transport Department, TGWU convenors worked alongside management to 
reorganise the rail-traffic section.16  ISTC-affiliated branch officials oversaw a revamp 
of the mills, reducing the section to a 15-shift operation that also boosted production 
by 700 tonnes per shift.17  As the 1975 summer shutdown approached, some of 
Bilston’s steelmen agreed to take an extended, unpaid two-day holiday.   
 
These initiatives were all part of a wider cost reduction programme, with local workers 
ensuring every possible economy was achieved.  The Works Council, for example, 
introduced an ideas scheme that reduced annual costs by £160,000.18  One former 
steelworker remembers his colleagues enthusiastically embracing this new era of 
austerity: 
 
Although it took a colossal effort from every single worker, in many ways it 
came natural to us.  We had always been the sort of plant that did better than 
 
16 The Steel News: Bilston, Wolverhampton and Birchley Edition, 3 October 1975. 
17 Ibid. 
18 The Steel News: Bilston, Wolverhampton and Birchley Edition, 20 June 1975. 
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most in a recession.  Whilst others were struggling, we knew how to step up 
to the plate.19 
 
Energy and fuel bills were also tackled, with a unique ‘Sammy Save It’ poster 
campaign encouraging employees to ‘SAVE POWER. SWITCH-OFF’.20  In another 
moneysaving scheme, UCATT convenors sourced free refractory bricks from obsolete 
BSC plants in North Wales.  Elisabeth’s blast furnacemen made the greatest financial 
contribution.  The decision to abandon the use of oil and higher-cost burden saved 
management an impressive £0.35m p/a.21   
 
In the works offices, the commercial team looked to compensate for the loss of orders 
re-routed to South Yorkshire.  Firstly, they exploited their intimate relationship with 
Black Country steel users, offloading unwanted material that had been sitting in the 
stockyard since the slump began.22  Secondly, they attacked emerging markets 
outside their traditional stronghold.  In October 1975, the Sales Department secured 
a lucrative monthly contract supplying octagonal tubes to North Sea Oil.23  Bilston also 
established itself as a leading exporter, with semi-finished steel sold to America, 
Australia, Europe, India and the Middle East.  By March 1976, approximately 19,000 
tonnes had been dispatched overseas, generating an additional £1.6m p/a in sales.24  
 
19 Oral testimony from anonymous, recorded 15 April 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
20 The Steel News: Bilston, Wolverhampton and Birchley Edition, 14 November 1975. 
21 The Steel News: Bilston, Wolverhampton and Birchley Edition, 16 January 1976. 
22 Some 7,500 tonnes of dead stock were sold by a team that included Dennis Turner.  As a stock-taker 
and former door-to-door salesman, the BJUAC leader used all of his commercial experience to convince 
local steel users to purchase the surplus material.  See The Steel News: Bilston, Wolverhampton and 
Birchley Edition, 28 November 1975. 
23 The Steel News: Bilston, Wolverhampton and Birchley Edition, 14 November 1975. 
24 The Steel News: Bilston, Wolverhampton and Birchley Edition, 12 March 1976. 
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In order to penetrate these markets even further, Bilston’s flexible and highly skilled 
workforce produced an entirely new range of specialist products, expanding its 
portfolio to over 500 items.  An innovative carbon-free cutting steel was delivered to 
British Leyland, a company which had previously complained about the unreliability of 
steel produced elsewhere in BSC.  Bilston was also made an approved MOD supplier, 
enabling the works to secure additional Government contracts.  Finally, the plant 
became a pioneer in the manufacture of ‘super jumbo rounds’, at the time the largest 
cylindrical metal bars in the world.25   
 
As new and unfamiliar orders came flooding in, the men responded in kind.  In June 
1975 local millmen smashed their shift output record by producing 1,253 tonnes.  Days 
later, melting shop workers achieved a record average hourly output of 16.56 tonnes.26  
Bilston’s steelmen knew the key to maintaining a high-level of profitability, particularly 
in a shrinking market, lay in pleasing the customer.  One particular study revealed a 
rejection rate during this period of only 2.3 per cent and a successful delivery rate of 
94 per cent on all domestic orders.27  A duty to supply their loyal customers was also 
the principal reason for Bilston’s NUB members defying national orders to strike in 
solidarity with colleagues at Llanwern.  Ignoring threats of expulsion, the plant’s 120 
blast furnacemen remained at work for the entire stoppage.  A further example of their 




26 The Steel News: Bilston, Wolverhampton and Birchley Edition, 18 August 1975. 
27 The Steel News: Bilston and Wolverhampton Edition, 22 April 1977. 
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[One] of the blast furnace blowers went down, and I’d worked on turbines at 
one time, and so they asked me if I’d go in and help in the turbine house, the 
blower house.  This is the air that blows into the blast furnace – there were two, 
but one had gone down big time; the blades had broken off, massive thing … 
we re-bladed the turbines, A1 turbine.  And we worked, believe it or not; we 
were working 120 hours a week, that was worked hours.  We were sleeping 
there, food was brought to us, and all we did was work, for 18 hours a day, and 
we grabbed a bit of sleep when we could, until the job was done … I did that 
for a month.28 
 
The men’s performance didn’t go unnoticed, with a senior BSC official praising his 
employees, “The understanding they [the men] have shown of our economic situation 
has been better, I believe, than anywhere else within the Corporation – due to sensible 
people working together”.29  Such pliability is a testimony to the assiduity of British 
steelmen, as identified by Peter Bowen in Social Control: 
 
The steelworker responds to what has gone before; he stands within the 
tradition of steelmaking.  But he possesses the capability to change that 
tradition.  The impetus to change is rooted in his occupational experience.  It is 
this experience above all which creates for him what is real and what is unreal.  
Men respond to their situations but they may also re-create them.30   
 
 
28 Documenting the Workshop of the World, 2007, WCA, LS/LB6/2, p. 23. 
29 The Steel News: Bilston, Wolverhampton and Birchley Edition, 14 November 1975. 
30 Bowen, Social Control, p. 21. 
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Six months on from the May 1975 agreement, BSC employees had secured 
management cost savings of £76m.  Yet this still wasn’t enough to turnaround the 
industry’s deteriorating financial performance.  In November 1975, Grosvenor Place 
revealed a record-breaking deficit of £125m for the first six months of the financial 
year.  With an additional £200m loss expected for the remainder of 1975/6, 
management would now place incredible pressure on the unions to make further 
sacrifices.31  
 
Tempering the Truth  
 
Frustrated by perceived Government interference in their rationalisation plans, senior 
industry officials reacted by constructing a false narrative that blamed production 
workers and the unions for BSC’s worsening financial situation.  Following the May 
1975 agreement, a series of press releases bemoaned labour efficiency rates at older 
facilities.32  Repeatedly referring to unfavourable international comparisons, the 
Corporation conveniently ignored the fact that foreign steel companies routinely 
adopted a system of measurement that excluded non-manual grades.  Conversely, 
UK management doctored their own figures by including ancillary workers such as 
apprentices, medical staff, cleaners and canteen workers.33  The domestic steel 
industry was by no means the most efficient by international standards, but any 
prevailing concerns were offset by one of the lowest wage bills in Western Europe.  
 
31 The eventual overall loss for 1975/6 was £246m.  This contrasted to a £3.1m profit at Bilston. 
32 The overmanning myth was enthusiastically disseminated by a servile right-wing press.  During the 
1980 national strike one newspaper headline claimed, “Output per man is 866 in Japan, but in Britain it 
is 141”.  See The Times, 8 January 1980. 




However, BSC deliberately concealed this information, with Robert Scholey 
complaining labour costs were Grosvenor Place’s greatest single deterrent to a 
prosperous future.34  Nevertheless, Richard Pryke calculated that over the first decade 
of BSC’s existence, UK steelworkers’ relative earnings only rose by 10 per cent.  
Although the industry’s white-collar staffing costs increased by a staggering 45 per 
cent, senior officials focused all of their energies on sacking production workers.35  
Indeed, from here on in, improving cashflow by way of de-manning would be the 
singular strategy adopted by management: 
 
However, closures apart, relatively little was done to improve BSC's 
performance.  Those in charge were well aware that action would have to be 
taken, but thought that there was still time in which to persuade the unions and 
effect the changes that were necessary.  Hence although it would be unfair to 
say that the Corporation's leaders were doing nothing – they were busily closing 
works – they are open to the criticism of having done too little.36 
 
Having conducted their cynical smear campaign, BSC looked to place pressure on the 
unions.  In November 1975, Congress House was informed further labour savings of 
£170m would be required to breakeven.  This objective, management argued, could 
only be achieved by: 
 
• terminating the GWW agreement; 
 
34 The Times, 22 August 1975. 
35 Pryke, Public Enterprise, p. 204. 
36 Ibid., pp. 205-206. 
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• ending all unnecessary overtime;  
• diverting further orders away from older works to new facilities; 
• and significant compulsory redundancies.37   
 
Presenting the proposals, Scholey, who was by now revelling in his moniker of ‘Black 
Bob’, revealed that, if no consensus could be achieved by the New Year, he would 
take unilateral action.  In rejecting the proposals, a resolute Sirs launched a boisterous 
counterattack: 
 
They are taking us back to the harsh employer attitudes of the 1930s where 
people could be hired and fired at will.  You can rest assured that we will garner 
all the forces of the trade union movement and political forces – which are very 
considerable – to ensure that this proposition does not succeed.38 
 
With BSC refusing to backdown, the head of the TUCSICC called for the assistance 
of new Industry Minister, Eric Varley: 
 
The Government must act in this matter or else no union in the public sector 
will have confidence in negotiated agreements or procedure.  It is no use any 
Minister hiding behind the statement that he ‘is not in a position to give the 
Corporation instructions’.  The issues raised by employers in a nationalised 
 
37 Sir Monty was looking to shed a further 44,000 jobs.   
38 The Times, 12 December 1975. 
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industry repudiating a collective agreement are too important to be ignored: 
their repercussions are too far reaching.39 
 
Following Downing Street talks with Varley and Harold Wilson, the pro-establishment 
Sirs softened his stance.40  Another compromise deal was thrashed out.  With the 
Corporation promising to uphold the hallowed GWW agreement, the steel unions 
consented to the implementation of an eight-point plan designed to reduce short-term 
‘recessionary overmanning’ by voluntary means.41   
 
Although the right-wing press lauded the deal as a victory for Sirs and the unions, it 
would eventually open the door to long-term mass redundancies.42  Attached to the 
original document was a joint statement specifically referring to the need to end “in-
built overmanning”.43  The agreement, signed by each TUCSICC official, included the 
same apocryphal labour productivity statistics that Grosvenor Place had previously 
disseminated to perpetuate the myth of the overpaid, inefficient public steelworker.  By 
signing the deal, Sirs and his colleagues simply helped reinforce the notion that their 
members were at fault for the crisis.  The union leader later complained that the 
January 1976 agreement was, preceded by “years of continual pressure on myself 
and on the unions as BSC sought to reduce capacity by closing the older, less efficient 
 
39 Man and Metal, January 1976. 
40 The conservative General Secretary warned members against participating in unofficial strike action, 
having become concerned at reports suggesting hard-left political groups were recruiting his disgruntled 
members. 
41 The bulk of these redundancies would initially fall on the sixteen Beswick plants. 
42 The Times, 24 January 1976. 
43 BSC and TUCSICC, Reductions in Employment Costs and Improvement in Labour Productivity, 23 
January 1976, ITSOE, BCA1/6.  
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plants”, yet this was achieved with the assistance of a compliant Congress House.44  
One TUCSICC official, for example, adopted a pro-management position by publicly 
supporting claims of poor productivity: 
 
Britain is now an extremely inefficient industrial country.  Successive reports 
on steel and other industries suggest we achieve lower levels of productivity 
than our principal competitors ... If certain Labour Party members are not 
prepared to accept the cuts, what is their alternative?  Unpleasant though the 
cuts are, there is little else that can be done, except a siege economy and 
further unemployment.45 
 
Reflecting on the January 1976 agreement, Martin Upham bemoaned his former trade 
union colleagues’ readiness to take sole responsibility for improving performance: 
 
Generally, unions have not understood the significance of productivity drives.  
They have shared the management assumption that employees hold the key 
to improved performance, that co-operation leads at once to a rise in 
competitiveness … The unions seemed to accept that they bore a prime 
responsibility for restoring Corporation fortunes.  They allowed the attachment 
of a highly tendentious tonnes per man year table to the agreement.  
Seemingly, it was the unions’ job to pull BSC up to ‘international manning 
levels’, and this was the path to success for the whole Corporation.46 
 
44 Sirs, Hard Labour, pp. 63-64. 
45 Man and Metal, November 1976. 




Fatefully, the agreement also permitted management to extend their policy of 
preferentially loading newer works at the expense of older ones.  For Bilston this also 
meant that, as demand fell elsewhere, those new orders recently secured would also 
be re-routed to South Yorkshire. 
 
The workforce, nevertheless, accepted the January 1976 agreement with a customary 
spirit of cooperation, with vast numbers of senior workers volunteering for early 
retirement.  At the first of many ceremonies, a cohort of mill-men with almost eight 
centuries of loyal service received their cheques.  By January 1978, a total of 302 
workers voluntarily left the works, robbing it of vital expertise but saving management 
hundreds of thousands of pounds.47  Elsewhere, following a year of continuous crisis, 
a relative calm beset the industry.  With the new productivity agreement taking effect, 
even the customarily obdurate Scholey ventured to praise the attitude of the unions 
whilst visiting Llanwern works.  The BSC Executive was in Wales to oversee a lighting 
ceremony for a new £27m blast furnace that had been delayed by a pay dispute.  
Standing beside him was NUB leader Hector Smith who, only weeks earlier, had 
responded to his counterpart’s request for a ‘copper-bottomed agreement’ by dropping 
his trousers.  In contrast, the union chief now adopted a much more sanguine stance, 
remarking that he hoped the new vessel would consume any “parochial views, 




47 JWP, The Future of Bilston Works, March 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/4, appendix 12. 
48 The Times, 17 February 1976. 
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A Temporary Respite 
 
As a fragile peace returned to the industry, so too did a period of prosperity, with an 
upturn in the demand cycle coinciding with the signing of the January 1976 agreement.  
Two months later, BSC plants were operating at 90 per cent capacity.  Recently 
appointed Prime Minister James Callaghan who, at this stage, was fully committed to 
state steel, permitted Eric Varley to introduce an array of supportive industrial policies.  
As a practical way of ensuring the Beswick plants remained in production until their 
official closure dates, Downing Street handed BSC £70m to manufacture counter-
cyclical stockpiles of semi-finished goods.  Other state-sponsored mechanisms 
included the sanctioning of four major price increases over twelve months and an 
extension to BSC’s borrowing powers.  In terms of development, Varley spoke publicly 
of expanding capacity to 37m t/p/a.   
 
It was, nevertheless, the Government’s decision to end Monty Finniston’s reign of 
terror that brought most joy to the unions and their members.  The Corporation’s 
bogeyman was replaced by Sir Charles Villiers who, as an Eton educated true-blue 
Tory of royal descent, was a seemingly surprise choice.  A closer look at his CV, 
nevertheless, reveals the Government’s thinking.  In a response to the failings of his 
predecessor, he was no technocrat, but a vastly experienced salesman.  As an 
extremely affable character with great charm, Whitehall also hoped he would be less 
confrontational than his abrasive predecessor.49   
 
49 As a former head of the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation, Villiers oversaw the restructuring of 
the UK electrical and ball bearing industries, which he achieved with the support of the workers and 




For a short period at least, they were right in their assumption, with the new man 
successfully wooing union leaders.  Upon appointment, he wrote to Congress House, 
outlining his plans for the industry.  Unlike Finniston, Sir Charles made all the right 
noises, talking of winning back the domestic market, satisfying the customer, 
maximising output at existing sites, whilst improving job security for rank and file 
workers.  Although Beswick closures would indeed still go ahead, he vowed to adhere 
to the original timetable.  When rationalisation did occur, he would use his contacts in 
the City to attract new industry to affected communities.  He also expressed a desire 
to usher in a period of closer industrial relations by improving existing consultative 
arrangements: 
 
My friends ... We must get to the point where we can confidently say ‘BSC 
cares and BSC delivers’.  To do that we have to consult continuously between 
the men and management at all levels.  We are partners, seeking to convince 
each other by practical arguments – not dogma – how to make our business 
better.  Thereafter, Unions deliver and Managers manage ... Together get 
moving by pushing decision-making more and more down to the divisions and 
plants.  Some responsibilities have to be kept at the centre, but we should get 
decisions made as near to the shop-floor as possible.50 
 
Villiers initially delivered on this promise, revealing proposals designed to expand 
industrial democracy whilst establishing new consultative apparatus at national and 
 
50 Man and Metal, September 1976.  Won over by Villiers’ charms, the ISTC published an editorial in 
Man and Metal congratulating him on his appointment whilst endorsing the policies outlined in his letter.   
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plant-levels.  In a speech to the ISTC, he announced the expansion of the worker-
director scheme as well as his intention to introduce a ‘steel contract’.  In a further 
effort to pacify Congress House, Sir Charles assumed the chairmanship of BSC 
Industry, a development agency established to attract private investment and new jobs 
to rationalised communities.51  This particular move impressed the ISTC, whose 
General Secretary had already committed himself to his predecessor’s ‘alternative 
employment’ policy.  When subsequently announcing his decision to extend the 
lifespan of Shotton, Villiers was dubbed ‘Uncle Charles’ by overjoyed steelmen.  His 
appointment also coincided with a mini-boom. 
 
The sense of optimism sweeping the industry made its way to the Black Country and, 
in January 1976, Bilston steelworks achieved its highest monthly output since October 
1962.  Management was once again quick to praise their men, “Everyone concerned 
in this performance deserves credit.  It is good to be able to demonstrate success like 
this to those outside the industry who are always ready to knock it”.52  At a June 1976 
Works Council meeting, the Works Accountant confirmed recent financial results had 
by far exceeded those first predicted by planners.  The men’s response to the crisis 
helped post a profit of £3.1m for 1975/6.  This contrasted with £16.5m and £246m 
losses at divisional and national level respectively.53  As one worker put it, “The 
Staffordshire knot had propped up the Yorkshire rose”.54 
 
 
51 With Villiers on board, BSC Industry sought to exploit his contacts within the world of high finance to 
attract new tenants to defunct sites in Lancashire, Scotland and South Wales.  However, this proved a 
forlorn task once the crisis returned. 
52 The Steel News: Bilston, Wolverhampton and Birchley Edition, 30 January 1976. 
53 JURUE, The Future of Bilston Steelworks: An Appraisal, March 1979, ITSOE, BCA1/4, p. 17. 
54 Oral testimony from C. Simpkiss, recorded 8 March 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
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The recent sacking of the architect of their doom also brought a sense of relief to 
Bilston’s shop-floor.  Villiers’ ‘no customer, no business’ philosophy, combined with 
the revival in trade, led to renewed hope for future investment.  The new Chairman 
had publicly acknowledged the contribution of smaller facilities, whilst vowing to adopt 
a much more flexible approach to development.  As part of his steel contract, ‘Uncle 
Charles’ announced a whistle-stop tour of the industry’s older, less fashionable 
facilities, with Bilston scheduled for a November 1976 visit.  This would be the first 
time a BSC Chairman had made his way to the Black Country and, in the eyes of local 
shop stewards, provided an opportunity for them to stake a claim for major investment. 
   
Indeed, Villiers’ appointment had coincided with a series of minor development 
schemes, as planners finally looked to inject some capital into the busy works.  
Approval was given for the installation of a £4m fume extraction unit, which would 
ensure Bilston’s melting shop complied with environmental legislation coming into 
force at the end of the decade.  Upon hearing the news, one employee adopted a 
remarkably optimistic tone: 
 
This investment must do much to allay the fears of Bilston employees and 
their families regarding the immediate future of these Works.  It is up to all of 
us now to see that the development provides a steppingstone into a future 
which not so long ago appeared to be non-existent.  I am delighted that the 
Board has approved the expenditure, providing as it does, a substantial 
environmental improvement as well as a vehicle to carry Bilston into the 
1980’s.55 
 




Villiers also sanctioned a £1m hydraulic press that would enable the plant to supply a 
wider variety of products to the lucrative export market.  Then, in July 1976, Elisabeth’s 
lifespan was extended by an additional five years.  News of the reline project was 
enthusiastically welcomed by the BJUAC: 
 
This takes us up to the 1980-82 period ... The men here want to be allowed to 
go on making steel to satisfy our tradition [sic] customers who come back 
again and again by saying they only want Bilston steel.  We are proud of our 
record of loyalty and cooperation in good times and bad.56 
 
Villiers also agreed to trial double-ended firing, almost four years after it had first been 
proposed.  Meanwhile, the new man, who secured an improved annual development 
budget from the Government, confirmed his conviction in the commercial viability of 
smaller works by backing Lord Beswick’s electric arc furnace project at Shelton.  
Bilston had been provided a tabula rasa 
 
When Sir Charles’ Rolls-Royce pulled into A-Gate, spirits were at their highest since 
nationalisation.  The BSC Chairman was immediately greeted by Works Council 
leaders who had been tasked with conducting a charm offensive.  After being walked 
through the double-firing technique and given a tour of the iconic Big Lizzie, the 
dignitary was led to Alfred Hickman’s oakwood boardroom and treated to a five-star 
luncheon featuring traditional Black Country fayre.  The visit ended with a lively Q&A 
 
56 The Express and Star, 16 January 1976. 
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session in the training centre.  In a well-received opening statement, Villiers 
enthusiastically praised Bilston’s performance throughout the crisis: 
 
I think that Bilston and Wolverhampton too are super, no doubt about it, the 
way you work and the way your work together and the speed at which you 
work are absolutely right and I would like to see this and feel that this is 
everywhere in the Corporation, perhaps this is sometimes easier in medium 
or smaller works than big works.  There is a wonderful tradition at Bilston … 
[you have] never made a loss, and those things are very important and 
certainly Bob Scholey, Dennis Murray and myself place a tremendous amount 
of importance upon the super quality of work done and the level of 
absenteeism and all the other factors that go to producing Bilston and 
Wolverhampton’s performance.57 
 
Villiers then discussed the possibility of Bilston being absorbed into BSC’s long-term 
operating plan: 
 
I promise you that the BSC is at Bilston to stay, we are not going to abandon 
it.  Firstly because of what I have said about the workforce, secondly, because 
you are in the right place and there is nowhere else in the Corporation, on the 
edge of the Black Country, where we are so close to the market – the whole 
sales business is geared to the market and thirdly, because you have some 
very good kit here – the mills and the finishing end.  Looking back at history 
and all that has been said about Bilston – in another few years possible closure 
 
57 Statement by C. Villiers to Bilston Works Council, 26 November 1976, WCA, DW-173/1/1. 
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– since 1972 always stretching it out a little more and a little bit further away – 
I really feel and I am absolutely sure that you will be making iron and steel 
here until 1982 plus.  How much the ‘plus’ will be I am unable to say – business 
is an incalculable thing and in 6 or 7 years all sorts of things might happen, 
new development might take place.  I would like you to accept that you have 
a super business here, run it as hard as it will go and keep it going hard and 
as long as she will go, Open Hearths as well, and during this time I am sure 
that a natural solution to this problem will appear.  I beg you do not get over 
excited, worried and miserable about what will happened.58 
 
Responding to a question on the long-term future of small integrated works, the BSC 
Chairman proclaimed: 
 
Sir Charles felt that he thought we should look upon plants such as Bilston and 
Wolverhampton as being existing plants with a super workforce, which we will 
use so long as they are making a big contribution to BSC.  The billet mill and 
finishing mill will continue to do so as far as can be seen.  As far as the Melting 
Shop is concerned – as I have said you have 7 years, I cannot go any further 
than that but during 7 years a lot of things can happen.59 
 
These remarks would eventually come back to haunt Villiers but, for now at least, the 
men were overjoyed by his pledge that hot metal production would continue until 1982 






with a bespoke enamel box manufactured by a prestigious local enamelware 
company.  The trinket’s lid featured an etching of Elisabeth produced by Black Country 
native and official portrait artist to the Queen, Harry Ecclestone.  Shop stewards looked 
to leave one final impression on Villiers by transporting him to Norton Villiers 
motorcycle works, established by his ancestor and namesake Sir Charles Pelham 
Villiers: 
 
Charlie Villiers was coming down to Bilston and we’d got to try to impress him 
… we wanted him to see the best of Bilston, and I had to present him with a 
Bilston Enamel.  [He] wanted to see Villiers Street where they made Villiers 
Engines, and that was his uncle.60 
 
Having waved goodbye to Charlie, the workforce returned to their stations, assured 
that their plant’s medium-term future had been secured.  Moreover, they were excited 
by the very real prospect of securing substantial new investment.   
 
This would all change, however, over the coming twelve months, as the crisis returned 
with a vengeance.  Rather than representing a full recovery, the recent upturn had 
proven to be little more than a fleeting period of convalescence.  As the industry 
entered the New Year, its commercial and financial prospects worsened.  On one 
hand, the export market collapsed under the weight of tariff protection in the U.S., 
whilst on the other, the domestic motor vehicle and shipbuilding industries also 
retracted.  Moreover, Villiers had failed to win back the Corporation’s share of the 
 
60 Oral testimony from C. Simpkiss, recorded 8 March 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
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domestic market lost under his predecessor.61  For all his talk of cuddling the customer, 
service had deteriorated badly under his watch.  A 1977 survey revealed only six per 
cent of British steel users thought that BSC’s delivery performance was better than 
rival producers.62 
 
At a July 1977 press conference, an uncharacteristically sombre Sir Charles 
announced that, despite the mini-boom, his organisation had posted a disastrous 
£83m deficit, with further record-breaking losses expected the coming year.63  Under 
the media spotlight, he cut an altogether different figure to the one praising Bilston’s 
workforce only months prior.  Speaking at the NUB’s ADC that month, he shocked 
delegates by complaining that £65m per annum was being wasted needlessly 
maintaining older facilities.64  Invoking the spirit of Monty Finniston, he began referring 
to the need to secure international manning levels and slash labour costs.  With little 
sign of recovery, a decision was made to defer all non-essential investment schemes.  
This, however, did nothing to improve BSC’s worsening cash-flow situation and, with 
weekly losses amounting to £3m, panic set in.  Senior industry officials secretly began 
preparing proposals to expedite the closure dates of the Beswick plants.  Moreover, 
under the auspices of the January 1976 agreement, they began re-routing more and 
more orders to newer facilities.   
 
 
61 A half-year report published the following month revealed that, under Villiers, BSC had only increased 
its share of the UK market from 55.7 to 56.1 per cent.  See The Times, 11 November 1976. 
62 Pryke, Public Enterprise, p. 196. 
63 BSC, Annual Report and Accounts 1976/7 (London, 1977), p. 26. 
64 The Times, 8 July 1977. 
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The spectre of the crisis haunted Bilston.  In April 1977, local management were forced 
to quash shop-floor rumours that the works was “on the road to closure”; promising 
the men that Villiers’ November 1976 statement still rang true.65  But these 
reassurances were undermined by Divisional Director Dennis Murray at the Works 
Council’s annual review meeting a month later.  In a worrying move, he announced 
that the promised fume plant had been postponed permanently, arguing it was, “better 
to have full bellies than clean air”.66  The decision was particularly galling in light of the 
Corporation pressing ahead with identical schemes in South Yorkshire.  Likewise, the 
installation of the hotly anticipated gag press was also deferred, preventing the 
manufacture of lucrative new products.67  The senior industry official ended his review 
by announcing that a recent Government decision to terminate their stockpiling 
strategy meant management would be seeking to reduce iron plate production by 
capping Elisabeth’s output.  It was suddenly dawning on Bilston’s steelmen that, 
despite recently securing yet another annual profit of £4.8m, their efforts had been 
diluted by failings at the top.68 
 
A Fait Accompli 
 
Responding to the announcement, David Hunter and union officials participated in a 
series of joint consultative meetings at The Mount.  It was mutually agreed that, to help 
improve BSC’s worsening cashflow position, Bilston’s Blast Furnace Manager would 
 
65 The Steel News: Bilston and Wolverhampton Edition, 1 April 1977. 
66 Minutes of Bilston Works Annual Progress Review meeting, 11 May 1977, ITSOE, BCA1/6. 
67 Murray then compounded matters by announcing that the installation of double-end firing had also 
been deferred, obstructing attempts to improve the efficiency of Bilston’s OH furnaces.   
68 JURUE, The Future of Bilston Steelworks: An Appraisal, March 1979, ITSOE, BCA1/4, p. 17. 
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restrict output to 0.26m t/p/a, the lowest at which Elisabeth could continue to operate.  
Management, nonetheless, provided assurances that the decision would be reviewed 
in three months’ time.69  Melting shop workers would meanwhile accommodate 
reduced iron output by temporarily operating a three-furnace steelmaking operation.   
 
Recognising the seriousness of the overall situation, local steelmen and their middle-
management team had approached discussions with an open mind.  Yet only days 
later, The Mount ordered a shocked Hunter to temporarily switch the vessel off, before 
revealing that a unilateral decision had been taken to effectively close Bilston’s entire 
Blast Furnace Department: 
 
I should point out that, at the end of March – after Elisabeth has been 
mothballed for six months and in spite of extremely heavy usage of cold iron 
by the Division’s arc furnaces – it looks as though there will be enough cold 
iron still in stock to supply Bilston’s requirements for a further 18 months to 2 
years.  And this is without allowance for any of the mismatch tonnage arising, 
mentioned in your letter, which normally accounts for a substantial tonnage.70 
 
Responding to shop steward complaints over the deceitful manner in which they had 
forced through the move, Corporation officials claimed they had, “meticulously 
followed our high standards of consultation”.71  The comments were rejected out of 
hand, with Dennis Turner accusing them of presenting a fait accompli to local 
 
69 Letter from S. Bull to Bilston works management committee, 5 July 1977, WCA, DW-173/1/1. 
70 Letter from J. Pennington to D. Turner, 31 October 1977, WCA, DW-173/1/1. 
71 Letter from D. Murray to D. Turner, 29 September 1977, MRC, 755/4/4/5. 
`220 
 
management.72  At a subsequent JCC meeting in Sheffield, a typically mild-mannered 
Hunter launched an unprecedented attack on The Mount:73 
 
The Middle Managers and Red Card Managers of Bilston Works feel the need 
to criticise higher management for the way in which the Mothballing of Blast 
Furnace Elisabeth was handled.  It was deplorable!  After all the words that 
have been uttered and written about consultation and devolution, it was 
disgraceful to present a ‘FAIT ACCOMPLI’ to the Bilston and Wolverhampton 
Works Council as was the case on 25th August 1977.  It should have been 
obvious to whoever made the final decision to Mothball, that the effect would 
be traumatic, especially to the people directly affected.  If we are expected to 
put any credence to the uttering of higher management it should be seen that 
they practice what they preach.  Some people’s lives and incomes have been, 
and others soon will be affected by this closure.  Such a decision should not 
have been seen to have been made without consultation, and no matter how 
much senior managers protest, meaningful consultation did not take place 
during August.  It was all the more apparent because meaningful consultation 
had taken place in May, June and July, at all levels, about, the short order 
book, the cash flow problem and the ever increasing Pig/Plate Iron stocks.  
This culminated in a proposal put to the Bilston and Wolverhampton Works 
Council by Management that was discussed and accepted by the Council.74 
 
72 Letter from D. Turner to D. Murray, undated, MRC, 755/5/4/5. 
73 As the last remaining Black Country Blast Furnace Manager, the Scotsman formed an intimate bond 
with a vessel his 8-year-old daughter had relit only fifteen months earlier.  As part of the blowing-out 
ceremony, a concerned Hunter carried his bagpipes to the top of ‘Big Lizzie’ and played Scottish 
threnody hymn ‘Flowers of the Forest’. 




Decades later, Colin Simpkiss is still incensed by the manner in which Elisabeth was 
taken offline: 
 
… our steel was wanted, and somebody was stopping us from producing; 
whether it was Sheffield or whatever the case may be, our orders went down.  
Those sneaky lot!  I think it was Bill Church at the time who said, “We are only 
mothballing you for a short period of time”.  Well you know if you mothball a 
bloody furnace you’ve got to have a reline after, and how much is that going to 
take?  £2.5 million!  Nobody is going to do that.75 
  
Elisabeth’s mothballing was just the latest example of management exploiting 
established consultative arrangements to secure predetermined objectives.  Since 
nationalisation, when the principles of partnership and industrial democracy were first 
established, local steelmen had eagerly embraced new consultative apparatus.76  
However, they were often left frustrated.  At the aforementioned February 1975 Works 
Council meeting with Bob Scholey, shop stewards complained, “It was generally 
accepted that the consultative arrangements were sound for communications but not 
for pre-decision consultation and that more participation was required to use the 
experience of the workforce”.77  Reg Turley, a lifelong advocate of worker participation, 
argued consultative arrangements lacked teeth, “I have always felt that although we 
have this consultation machinery there has never been enough participation – 
 
75 Oral testimony from C. Simpkiss, recorded 8 March 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
76 Bilston was one of the first BSC works to establish departmental JCC’s and six-monthly review 
meetings between the Works Council and management.  
77 Minutes of Bilston Works Council meeting, 13 February 1975, WCA, DW-173/1/1. 
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consultation, yes; information, yes, – but very little participation of workers”.78  Two 
and a half years later, these complaints were substantiated by the manner in which 
Sheffield Division sabotaged ironmaking.  Bemoaning the disingenuous nature of 
BSC’s approach to joint consultation and participation, former steelworker Charles 
Docherty concluded: 
 
No attempt was made by managements jealous of their privilege and authority 
to create unity between themselves and their workers; instead, they supported 
and encouraged a costly and unwieldly system of so-called joint consultative 
committees where no real dialogue took place and whose only purpose seemed 
self-perpetuation … The golden opportunity that nationalisation had given for 
managements to create a unity of purpose with those they managed was 
thrown away and the opportunity to jointly plan a mighty industry not taken up.79 
 
The impact of the Lizzie decision on overall performance, and the defence campaign, 
cannot be overestimated.  It forced the works to process imported cold iron plate, 
thereby slowing tap-to-tap times by approximately four hours.  Output per man 
decreased exponentially, with production costs moving in the opposite direction.80  
Moreover, once internal stocks had diminished, Bilston’s OH furnaces would be forced 
to rely on low quality iron manufactured elsewhere, leading to a higher customer 
rejection rate.  The clandestine move represented a direct assault on profitability, the 
basis on which the men had consistently defended their livelihoods.  Having previously 
 
78 The Steel News: Bilston, Wolverhampton and Birchley Edition, 4 April 1975. 
79 Docherty, Steel and Steelworkers, p. 230. 
80 Production costs rose by £20 per tonne as a result of the enforced decision.  See JURUE, The Future 
of Bilston Steelworks: An Appraisal, March 1979, ITSOE, BCA1/4, p. 20. 
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overseen the managed decline of Bilston, management were now forcibly engineering 
a loss-making situation, thereby clearing the ground for a future assault. 
   
The next phase would come almost immediately.  In November 1977, six weeks after 
Hunter had been ordered to switch-off Elisabeth’s fuel line, recently appointed 
Sheffield Division boss John Pennington travelled to the Black Country for an extra-
ordinary Works Council meeting.81  Standing at the very same spot from which Sir 
Charles Villiers had made his pledge twelve months prior, he revealed: 
 
The situation as I see it now is the same as was originally envisaged – that 
there is no likely requirement for steelmaking at Bilston in 1980, even though 
we may have hopefully started to climb out of the present recession by then 
1980 will soon be only two years away anyway and we should have had to sit 
down and start discussions on the closure of iron and steel making at this time, 
and I see no obvious alternative to doing just this.  You have rightly pointed 
out that the uncertainty surrounding the works cannot go on, and I am replying 
to you without equivocation to meet that point.  Whether there is any longer-
term role for the Bilston billet mill will have to be the subject of further 
discussion.82 
 
During a heated exchange, he confirmed that any future rundown notice would be 
discussed with the TUCSICC.  In the meantime, the men would be afforded the 
 
81 In April 1976 Special Steels was rebranded; the addition of ‘Sheffield Division’ to the plant’s signage 
caused great deal of consternation on Bilston’s shop-floor. 
82 Statement made by Mr. J. Pennington, 8 November 1977, ITSOE, BCA1/2. 
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opportunity to produce their own counterproposals as per the Corporation’s social 
policy.  This, Pennington advised, should come in the form of a joint body.  However, 
with very little faith in the industry’s consultative procedures, shop stewards were 
initially reticent to support any such scheme, with one accusing The Mount of trying to 
lead the men up the “garden path”.83   
 
The BJUAC Returns 
 
Responding to the Dennis Murray announcement, the BJUAC abandoned their 
watching brief.  Although the action committee had been dormant, its members, as 
senior shop stewards, had played a key role assisting in the implementation of the two 
national productivity agreements at plant-level.  Interviewed in July 1975, one member 
outlined its current strategy, which was to help management maintain profitability, “We 
have to try to work with management, not against them – especially in these difficult 
times when there is a severe recession”.84 
 
Meanwhile, since their last period of activity, Dennis Turner’s political stock had risen 
considerably.  Re-elected as a WMBC and WMCC Councillor, he was also selected 
to contest the Parliamentary constituency of Halesowen and Stourbridge.  Although 
the Bilstonian twice lost the Tory safe seat by the finest of margins, his performance 
impressed both ISTC and Labour Party officials.  Moreover, the activist had 
 
83 Minutes of Bilston Works Council meeting, 18 January 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/2. 
84 The Steel News: Bilston, Wolverhampton and Birchley Edition, 4 July 1975. 
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spearheaded anti-closure campaigns at local manufacturing firms.85  Not only did this 
extend Turner’s campaigning ability, but it also reinforced his authority in the eyes co-
workers. 
 
Whilst the BJUAC maintained a watching brief, a vanguard had emerged amongst its 
ranks.  Joining Turley and Turner on the leadership team was the latter’s older brother 
Bert, a charge-hand from the finishing end and Chair of ISTC No.6, representing 150 
men.  A man of deep loyalties, the future Mayor of Wolverhampton was extremely 
proud of his sibling’s fledgling political career and had acted as his campaign manager 
during his most recent election bids.  There was also Chairman of ISTC No.4, Graham 
Fazey, a no-nonsense 34-year-old who had recently been appointed Vice-Chair of the 
ISTC Joint Branches.  Over the next eighteen months, he and Bert would become 
Dennis’s aides-de-camp, acting as intermediaries between the BJUAC Chair, senior 
shop stewards, branch members and the wider workforce.  
 
Joining Fazey was his branch Secretary Ted Wall who, as a former AEUW official, 
would later be called upon to the garner the support of workers at local engineering 
firms.  Another was Jack Jones, representing over 500 melting shop employees.  The 
charge-driver had been an outspoken critic of senior management, responding to the 




85 After being informed by workers at Bilston Bath Company of their critical cash-flow situation, Turner 
persuaded fellow Councillors to purchase the firm’s entire back stock.  Meanwhile, he supported a failed 
workers’ cooperative scheme at the troubled Norton Villiers’ Wolverhampton plant. 
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May I make a few suggestions for Man and Metal which may help to put the 
poor old BSC on its feet.  I am sure these suggestions would help to take them 
out of the red and save some of our jobs.  First let’s start at the top for a change 
and leave the poor low-paid worker alone and believe me there are still some 
in the BSC!  Being aware that cuts have to be made my first proposal is that 
instead of the Chairman sacking 22,000 men, we suggest to him and all his 
puppets (down to and including General Managers) that they take a 20 per 
cent reduction in salary, and introduce a five per cent reduction for all staff 
earning £4,500 a year or more.  I still think they could live comfortably, not like 
the poor old labourer whose time they keep cutting.  I am sure fellow workers 
will agree that the people who keep crying out to cut costs start at the wrong 
end of the scale ...86 
 
Although Jones was known to be a somewhat cantankerous figure, as the leader of 
the plant’s largest union branch his involvement was vital to the success of the 
campaign.  Representing the 300-man TGWU branch were John Booth and Yorkshire-
born Graham Howe, friends of the Turners.87  As convenors in the rail traffic section 
of the Traffic Department, they represented a team of workers recognised for 
possessing a distinct occupational culture and identity: 
 
Loco men have their own jargon.  “Going up the Burma Road” means going 
along the stretch of straight track to the scrapyard; “The Tommy Woods” road 
 
86 Man and Metal, August 1975. 
87 Graham Howe was connected to the CLP, with the loco shunter driver’s father-in-law serving as 
Secretary of Bilston Labour Club. 
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is the track leading out to what was Bilston Station, and named after a former 
wagon repairer who used to have a cabin at the end of the track.88 
 
There was Eli Ball, he was a character; “never trust human flesh whilst it’s 
warm”, he used to say [laughs].89 
 
Joining them was UCATT convenor Frank Robinson, a bricklayer whose charm and 
quick wit made him a popular figure around the works.  Finally, there was NUB man 
Malkit Singh.  Born in India, he entered the works as a general labourer before rising 
through the ranks to become a blast furnaceman.90  Another popular figure, he was a 
familiar face in and around the plant’s busy Social Centre.   
 
The BJUAC could also rely on a supporting cast of younger shop stewards who would 
mobilise branch members when required.  Joining his fellow ISTC No.6 officials was 
Peter Winmill, whose grandmother was a much-loved employee in the works canteen.  
Then there was Scotsman Frank ‘Big Jock’ Farrell, a louder than life character around 
the finishing end.  Parachuted into the Black Country in the early 1960s to build S&L’s 
rolling mills, he had developed a deep bond with the town’s inhabitants.  Although, like 
many of Bilston’s convenors, he was actively involved in his CLP, trade union politics 
was where his true passion lay.  From the NUB was Singh’s close friends Gurdeep 
Ram and Amaljit Toora, two furnace hands who assisted their Branch Secretary 
 
88 The Steel News: Bilston and Wolverhampton Edition, 4 July 1975. 
89 Oral testimony from G. Howe recorded 25 January 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 




mobilise their many BAME colleagues.91  The campaign also benefitted from the 
support of a small group of female office workers.  Dubbed the ‘little birds’, the likes of 
Doreen Whyman, Carol Crane and Geanette Man secured confidential information 
that was secretly communicated to the action committee. 
 
The BJUAC re-emerged in August 1977, seeking clarification over management’s true 
intentions vis-à-vis Elisabeth.  Concerned by the ambiguity of Sheffield Division’s initial 
communiques, they looked to block the ‘temporary’ order by arranging for all ISTC 
branches to pass a scripted resolution: 
 
There shall be no co-operation from ISTC members employed at the works in 
finding alternative jobs or employment for displaced blast-furnace or other 
personnel.  This situation will remain until such time guarantees can be given 
as to the future operation of the Blast Furnace within the structure of the 
Bilston Plant.92 
 
It was anticipated that, by preventing the approximately 150 men employed in the Blast 
Furnace Department from working elsewhere, the Corporation would be forced into 
withdrawing the order.93  Unsurprisingly, the resolution was completely ignored by 
 
91 A March 1978 report identified 438 foreign-born employees, representing a quarter of the entire 
workforce.  Under the leadership of Ram, Toora and Singh, these men would play an active role in the 
campaign.  TV footage of a subsequent public protest, for example, shows a significant contingent of 
BAME steelmen standing shoulder to shoulder with the BJUAC leadership. 
92 Letter from R. Turley to S. Bull, 27 September 1977, WCA, DW-173/1/4. 
93 With the closure of the Blast Furnace Department affecting less than 1,000 workers, management 
was prohibited from making its employees redundant.  By seeking to reassign these workers elsewhere 




management.  The BJUAC responded by organising a September 1977 mass meeting 
whereby, following a clarion call for unity, workers backed the launch of a top-level 
pressure campaign.  Those in attendance also unanimously voted through a resolution 
permanently establishing the basis from which their leaders would conduct all future 
negotiations:  
 
• to fight for the retention of iron and steelmaking;  
• only if all alternatives to closure had been completely exhausted, to permit the 
TUCSICC to negotiate a redundancy package.94 
 
The order deliberately locked each of Bilston’s union branches into the campaign by 
ensuring individual workers couldn’t negotiate voluntary redundancy without the 
backing of their sectional colleagues.95  Despite providing an extra-layer of armour, it 
would later prompt accusations of autocracy from some.  Decades later, a candid 
Turner reflected on the reasoning behind the tactic: 
 
Well, in order to get the best possible terms, they’d got to fight for their jobs.  
They’d got to fight for the plant, and they couldn’t very easily … separate the 
two parts.  They had to accept the first part to get to the second part.  And the 
question was ... you might say it was disingenuous, but I never regarded it as 
such … they never knew when the first part was lost, and so they had to 
continue, and once every branch on the plant had carried that resolution, and 
 
94 Referencing Villiers’ November 1976 pledge, the BJUAC announced that, in the event of full closure, 
they expected to be paid until November 1982. 
95 The resolution proved prophetic, with Grosvenor Place later targeting vulnerable workers at doomed 
plants with mouth-watering redundancy packages. 
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once they’d carried that resolution they were committed to the very end.  And 
of course that [later] caused a [great deal] of schisms on the plant, because of 
you went around the plant you’d see either “Turner for Pope” or “Turner is a 
bastard”, and it was written on white paint …96 
 
Nevertheless, at this early stage, the BJUAC could rely on the full cooperation of the 
shop-floor.  One campaign supporter remembers the atmosphere at the mass 
meeting: 
 
We were packed in like sardines.  When Dennis approached the stage, a 
deadly silence descended on the social centre.  Many of the older shop 
stewards could send you to sleep, but Dennis, we hung on every word … The 
way they stole ‘Lizzie’ from us was a knife in the back.  Although a few of the 
blast furnace workers were despondent, the vast majority of us were angry.97 
 
Surveying the mindset of rank and file workers at this stage, it is evident that the 
manner in which management unilaterally mothballed Elisabeth had engendered a 
wider feeling of righteous indignation.  A clear sense of injustice spurred even the most 
insentient of workers into answering local shop stewards’ call to arms.  Moreover, it 
induced a new form of camaraderie, as identified by shop steward Pete Winmill: 
 
The place was always good any way, for spirit and camaraderie, that’s what I 
loved about the place.  You had the cracke, there was some great people there 
 
96 Documenting the Workshop of the World, 2007, WCA, LS/LB6/2, pp. 10-11. 
97 Oral testimony from anonymous, recorded 18 February 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
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mate … But when it got to the point where we all knew we were going down the 
slippery slope, I think it brought people closer together.  I’ve got a particular 
friend called Mike Worrall and I only really knew him from 1977 onwards and 
that was because we were starting to close.  We got to meet each other at one 
of the [mass] meetings in the Social Club where the convenors were talking to 
us about what was going on … and I still go out with this guy to this day and we 
still talk about the steelworks.98 
 
Having secured a fully binding mandate, the BJUAC resolved to once again seek 
political intervention, with Turner penning a letter to Downing Street demanding 
management be exposed to a greater degree of accountability.99  By November 1977, 
with ‘Big Lizzie’ now lying dormant, the men still hadn’t received a response from 
James Callaghan’s office.  Edwards once again agreed to coordinate a letter-writing 
campaign targeting sympathetic Labour Party officials.  They subsequently organised 
an intensive process of stakeholder engagement, establishing a new network of 
influential regional and national political supporters.  Unsurprisingly, the first to 
respond were Turner’s colleagues at WMBC.  The May 1976 local elections had 
ushered in a much friendlier political climate locally, with the Labour Group taking full 
control of the Council.  Under the leadership of Ken Purchase, a close friend of Turner, 
the local authority formed a task force investigating the potential impact closure might 
have on the wider community.  Civic leaders were principally concerned by local male 
unemployment rates, which between 1960 and 1976 had risen from 0.7 to 6.6 per 
 
98 Oral testimony from P. Winmill recorded 16 March 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
99 Letter from D. Turner to J. Callaghan, 21 September 1977, WCA, DW-173/1/5. 
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cent.100  Moreover, in the face of widespread industrial decline, they had become 
alarmed at how central Government policy had undermined Wolverhampton’s 
traditional manufacturing base.101  The task force’s findings were startling.  Employing 
approximately one tenth of Bilston’s population, closure would raise overall 
unemployment figures to approximately 9 per cent, whilst the loss of business rates 
would leave a considerable hole in WMBC’s annual budget.102  Disturbed by the study, 
a delegation of cross-party Councillors travelled to Westminster to petition Ministers.  
 
With their external support base widening, the Bilston men garnered the official 
backing of their constituency political parties.  Wolverhampton South East 
Conservative Association demanded a public inquiry into Elisabeth’s mothballing.  
They were joined by the Wolverhampton CLP who, in a sharply worded letter to 
Callaghan, criticised their Government’s industrial strategy: 
 
 ... we feel that it is very short-sighted, and contrary to the idea of industrial 
planning, to run down capacity simply because we happen to be in a 
recession.  Recovery in the next few years must be a certainty, and so it is 
important to sustain productive potential, especially in the basic industries 
such as steel, so as to be well-prepared.103 
 
 
100 The Express and Star, 17 July 1979. 
101 Harold Wilson’s New Town Acts (1965 and 1968) had had the effect of pushing traditional 
manufacturing industries out of Wolverhampton and towards neighbouring counties.   
102 WMBC, The Social and Economic Impact of the Closure of British Steel – Bilston, February 1978, 
ITSOE, BCA1/4. 
103 Letter from R. Boffy to J. Callaghan, 14 November 1977, WCA, DW-173/1/6. 
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The men also received the backing of the West Midlands Labour Party, who passed 
the following resolution: 
 
The West Midlands County Labour Party view with concern the proposed 
closure of the British Steel Corporation Iron and Steel Works located at Bilston 
in the West Midlands.  This proposal was disclosed by Mr. J.S. Pennington, 
Managing Director of the Sheffield Division, of which Bilston is a part, to a 
Works Council meeting on Tuesday, 8th November, 1977.  There are no plans 
for Iron and Steel making at the Works after 1980, and the resultant loss of 
2,300 jobs, combined with the loss of rates to the Corporation with all 
suppliers, shops and services affected, would pose a serious threat to an 
already impoverished area”.  We trust you will take serious note of our concern 
bearing in mind, that the West Midlands used to be the prosperous, industrial 
heart of the country, but over the last ten to fifteen years it has been run down 
by successive Governments, that industrially it is becoming a depressed 
area.104 
 
In December 1977, the BJUAC leadership met Midland Labour MPs in the Commons.  
Never ones to miss an opportunity to publicise their crusade, they arranged for a press 
photographer to capture a group of placard waving workers standing alongside the 
likes of George Park and Bruce Grocott in Parliament Square.105  Inside the House, 
Turner made an impassioned speech revealing his fears for the future of the regional 
economy.  Impressed by the presentation, they agreed to lobby Eric Varley: 
 
104 Letter from G. Andrews to E. Varley, undated, WCA, DW-173/1/5. 




As you are aware, these [Bilston] steelworks employ approximately 3,000 
people; they supply specialised steel, and in some cases hot ingots, to local 
metal manufacturers.  It is a viable plant, makes a surplus every year and any 
suggestion if its closure would be a very serious blow to the local community.  
It was my clear understanding, following talks with the Chairman of the BSC, 
Sir Charles Villiers, that they were putting more money into the steelworks and 
expanding its production, rather than closing it.  In light of these 
circumstances, I wonder if you have any observations to make and whether 
you would agree to meet representatives of the Trade Union Action Committee 
that has been established because of these rumoured new developments.106  
 
By once again mobilising a powerful provincial lobby to do their bidding, the BJUAC 
placed great pressure on Varley to act.  The Minister arranged for his 
Undersecretaries, Les Huckfield and Gerard Kaufman, to meet a delegation of 
workers.  The talks would have a considerable impact on the future direction of the 
campaign.  Huckfield, himself a Birmingham native, sympathised with the men’s plight 
and provided reassurances that no firm decision had been made regarding Bilston’s 
long-term future.  When giving personal guarantees that any counterproposal would 
be scrutinised by civil servants as well as management, the junior ministers revealed 
all future investment decisions would be made on strictly commercial – and not social 
– lines.107  A somewhat relieved BJUAC returned to the Black Country and, acting on 
the advice, committed to Pennington’s JWP exercise: 
 
106 Letter from R. Edwards to E. Varley, 11 November 1977, WCA, DW-173/1/5. 




Remit as agreed by vote on 6th January 1978:- To retain maximum possible 
employment at Bilston Works.  By backing the Working Party on the future of 
the Works to produce the most feasible report with regard to: 1) existing 
process at the works; 2) additional prospects identified to enhance or extend 
the existing product range; and 3) additional prospects identified through 
involvement of British Steel Industries or otherwise.108 
 
Turner immediately outlined the new strategy to fellow workers:  
 
The committee were concerned about the future of Bilston Works.  We put the 
view that there is a future for Bilston within the BSC strategy.  Bilston has 





After the turmoil of the Edward Heath ministry, the return of Harold Wilson’s Labour 
Government initially brought new hope to public sector steelmen, particularly those 
employed at traditional production units overlooked by the Ten Year Strategy.  
However, the Beswick Review proved to be a false dawn.  The Government’s decision 
to focus on the social implications of the previous regime’s development model meant 
its many technical and commercial flaws were overlooked.   
 
108 BJUAC Remit, 6 January 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/3. 




The provisions of the review were immediately rendered meaningless by the arrival of 
the steel crisis, with BSC’s overall performance deteriorating even further under its 
hapless new Chairman Sir Monty Finniston.  The confrontational industry chief was 
determined to improve his organisation’s worsening cash flow situation by way of 
compulsory mass redundancies and expedited plant closures.  Blaming production 
workers for their own many failings, management used apocryphal labour productivity 
statistics to persuade the steel unions to sacrifice members at older plants.  The 
appointment of Bill Sirs had meant to foreshadow a more resilient phase in the anti-
closure movement.  Yet the General Secretary merely persisted with those defective 
deferment policies implemented by his much-maligned predecessor.  Bereft of ideas, 
he and his fellow General Secretaries accepted management prerogative by signing 
two national productivity deals that legitimised Finniston’s false narrative. 
 
Responding to this new era of austerity, Bilston’s diligent and highly skilled 
steelworkers adapted workplace practices, coordinating a sweeping cost reduction 
programme and marketing campaign that ensured their facility remained one of the 
few profitable concerns in the entire industry.  For a brief period, a feel-good factor 
returned to the shop-floor, with the recruitment of a seemingly more progressive BSC 
Chairman commissioning new machinery and absorbing their works into his updated 
medium-term operating plan.  However, without significant investment, Bilston 
remained vulnerable.  When the crisis returned, Sir Charles Villiers sought to rundown 
older plants.  Exploiting established consultative arrangements – and the goodwill of 
Bilston’s moderate shop stewards – management unilaterally mothballed the plant’s 
blast furnace.  The forced cessation of hot metal practice constituted industrial 
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sabotage and heralded a more formal phase in the rundown process.  By deliberately 
engineering a lossmaking situation, BSC had not only cleared the ground for a future 
assault but also undermined the very basis of the men’s erstwhile defence campaign.   
 
Spurred on by a clear sense of injustice, a revamped BJUAC scrambled into action.  
After seeking the advice of Whitehall allies, they decided to retain a low public profile 
whilst participating in a joint management exercise that called for the retention of their 
plant on commercial lines.  This, the next chapter will demonstrate, was a fool’s errand.  
With a much-changed political landscape, the Corporation would seek to forcibly 
rundown steelmaking operations once and for all, prompting the Bilston men to make 





Chapter 5: The Road to Scarborough 
 
This chapter is principally concerned with responses to a Labour Government decision 
to concede to management prerogative and disengage from state steel.  It begins with 
a review of the JWP exercise, demonstrating how Bilston’s steelmen produced a 
detailed and sophisticated counterproposal convincingly advocating the retention and 
development of their facility on commercial grounds.  However, as they busily 
prepared their survival blueprint, wider economic and political events would overtake 
local actions.  Swayed by Grosvenor Place’s claims of overmanning and overcapacity, 
the Government sanctioned a closure stampede.  Left to their own devices, planners 
snubbed calls for investment and sought to negotiate the closure of the Bilston plant 
at national level. 
 
The chapter sheds light on the action committee’s tactical response to these events, 
which saw them enter a new strategic phase in their anti-closure campaign.  It is 
determined how a streamlined leadership team widened its support base by mobilising 
the Black Country labour movement and cultivating closer ties with their union leaders 
in London.  Of particular interest is their relationship with Bill Sirs who, following an 
intensive round of lobbying, finally agreed to back their most recent survival plan.  The 
chapter subsequently examines the impact this had on the mindset of workers who 
were displaying early signs of battle weariness.  It ends by providing a detailed account 
of how anxious shop stewards, concerned by the conduct of union officials, sought to 








Spearheading the JWP was a group of shop stewards tied to the BJUAC.  Four open 
access sub-committees were established for interested parties to voluntarily 
contribute, drawing on the support of dozens of enthusiastic steelmen.1  In a further 
display of solidarity, some of Bilston’s most influential middle-managers promised to 
“sink or swim” with their men.2  As experienced researchers and report writers, they 
played a key role in delivering the final document.  In another expression of shop-floor 
harmony, Red Card managers agreed to transfer each JWP member onto daytime 
shifts, meaning they could devote their entire energies to producing the report.  At this 
stage, workers continued to enjoy close relations with local senior management, 
refusing to blame them for the actions of industry officials: 
 
We went to a meeting and the acting manager of the works then, was a chap 
called Stan Bull, who I knew quite well, only because he didn’t live that far from 
where I used to live – this was before I’d got my own house – so I knew Stan 
Bull quite well, and a nicer bloke you couldn’t wish to meet.  And he had to 
stand in front of a pretty hostile workforce and tell them that the blast furnace 
was only being mothballed and when times got better it would be started up 
again.  He was telling men that knew it could never happen.  And I felt sorry for 
him, because all he was, was a mouthpiece, without a doubt.3 
 
 
1 The sub-committees were established to deal with any technical, commercial, personnel and financial 
issues not covered by the main body. 
2 Preliminary JWP meeting, 24 November 1977, ITSOE, BCA1/2. 
3 Documenting the Workshop of the World, 2007, WCA, LS/LB6/2, p. 36. 
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The JWP immediately looked to determine their overall objectives and terms of 
reference.  John Pennington had provided a completely open brief – with options 
ranging from large-scale investment to partial or complete closure.  After receiving a 
mandate to retain the maximum number of jobs at the September 1977 mass meeting, 
the action committee refused to discuss a mills-only scheme.  They were specifically 
concerned that the Corporation had previously convinced colleagues at threatened 
works to accept the closure of their heavy-end in exchange for the continuation of re-
rolling, only to later renege on their promise.  A local management team, led by Stan 
Bull, would be forced to study this option by themselves.  The trade union side of the 
JWP, therefore, explored three alternatives:  
 
• the redevelopment of production and finishing facilities; 
• the continuation of operations using current plant and equipment; 
• or permanent closure. 
 
Acting on the guidance of Les Huckfield, they absorbed the Council study on socio-
economic implications of closure into the appendices of the final report, meaning the 
main body focused exclusively on the commercial case for investment.  A key JWP 
argument was that, by discarding Bilston, the Corporation would considerably weaken 
its voice in the West Midlands.  Cognizant of Charles Villiers’ pledge to win back BSC’s 
home market share, the authors highlighted the unavoidable risk of transferring 
Bilston’s current orderbook to alternative sites, “Without Bilston the Corporation would 
considerably weaken its voice in the local market place and could well reduce its whole 
market credibility in the Midlands”.4  Substantiating this, the report cited previous cases 
 
4 JWP, The Future of Bilston Works, March 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/4, p. 4. 
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whereby the transfer of orders away from Bilston had led to Black Country clients 
taking their business elsewhere.  To verify their claim, the JWP surveyed the plant’s 
customer base, determining 46,700 t/p/a would be lost if management had their way.5   
 
With the document establishing the benefits of maintaining a public sector presence 
at Bilston, it proceeded to outline the case for industrial renewal.  In line with Bob 
Scholey’s February 1975 statement to the Works Council, it was argued that, by re-
establishing the plant as a flexible support unit, BSC could fulfil small tonnage orders 
overlooked by the Big Five and South Yorkshire.  The report then produced an 
exhaustive review of potential investment schemes.  It was resolved that the most 
viable option was to install an electric arc furnace capable of producing 0.44m t/p/a.  
For a relatively insignificant outlay of £13.84m, a cumulative profit of £23m could be 
realised by March 1982.  Looking to address the need to cut labour costs, the report 
proposed the shedding of 1,154 men and £5.8m per annum in wages.  
  
The last, capitalised sentence reminded management of the contribution Bilston had 
made to the Corporation since nationalisation: 
 
WHILST IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO EVALUATE THE EFFECT OF ALL THESE 
FACTORS IN STRICTLY FINANCIAL TERMS, IT CANNOT BE DISPUTED 
THAT THE CORPORATION HAS DERIVED CONSIDERABLE BENEFIT 
FROM THIS SITUATION IN THE PAST, AND COULD CONTINUE TO DO SO 
IN THE FUTURE.6 
 
5 Ibid., appendix 5. 




The industrious JWP team had finished the detailed 29-page report a month ahead of 
schedule.  In the meantime, shop stewards looked to further advance the commercial 
viability of their facility.  Working with middle-management, they delivered a ‘Think 
Customer’ campaign reassuring steel users that Bilston was open for business: 
 
We have really got to go out and sell Bilston steel as Scarborough sells its 
tourism.  Despite the present uncertainty it is no time for a negative attitude 
among the people who work at Bilston.  What we want is a positive contribution 
from everyone, and a determination that the customer comes first in our 
approach to the future ... Our slogan is that Bilston steel is best.  Our 
customers wants [sic] it to stay that way, and we are determined that it will.7 
 
In a wider effort to secure additional sales, Dennis Turner wrote an impassioned letter 
to private metal bashers: 
 
On behalf of the Bilston Joint Union Liaison Committee, who, together with 
many other Agencies and Establishments, profoundly believe in Bilston’s 
ability to make steel, coupled with our desire to give service, quality and 
satisfaction to our customers, whom we know in return have responded to 
Bilston by indicating their choice and preference for Bilston steel!  We would 
wish to place on record our sincere and humble thanks to all those customers 
who in these past difficult months for Bilston, have continued to show the 
workforce at Bilston, and the plant of which we are duly proud, their support 
 
7 The Steel News: Bilston and Wolverhampton Edition, 2 December 1977. 
`243 
 
for Bilston in the best way possible: identifying Bilston as their source of 
steelmaking requirements! To those who do not indicate a preference for 
Bilston steel for whatever reasons, a right and privilege incidentally, which we 
both uphold and sustain, we would urge you to consider what practical help 
and support might be afforded the Bilston Steel works, not only thereby 
contributing to the sustenance of a long term future for Bilston, but also and 
probably of more significance in retaining the flexibility of your future steel 
requirements, which must be from a business point of view worthwhile 
preserving for the future.8 
 
Decades later, Turner outlined the BJUAC’s new customer-focused strategy: 
 
We felt that it was important to produce the arguments that British Steel had not 
taken any time to produce, and particularly that of the customers – their 
customers – that were using Bilston steel and felt strongly about the quality of 
Bilston steel, that it was the right quality and the service that they got from 
Bilston was very, very satisfactory to their needs … there was a very, very 
powerful case for its retention from the customers.  And I used to be at the sharp 
end of that because … I was sending the steel to the customers, so I was getting 
the vibes from the lorry drivers and people who were bringing back messages 




8 Letter from D. Turner to miscellaneous, 4 July 1978, MRC, 755/4/4/5. 
9 Documenting the Workshop of the World, 2007, WCA, LS/LB6/2, pp. 9-10. 
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The Road to Viability 
 
By focusing their survival blueprint on commercial considerations – and not social ones 
– Bilston’s steelworkers had given themselves the best possible chance of convincing 
planners to invest.  The efforts of the JWP were, however, soon overtaken by wider 
political events.  In December 1977, days after the Working Party was established, a 
SCNI published a damning study into the future of BSC.  Led by a coalition of cross-
party MPs, the committee endorsed management’s claims of overcapacity and 
overmanning: 
 
The Corporation, in its present difficulties, should place the greater part of its 
efforts on raising the productivity of existing works through the achievement 
of rational manning levels rather than incurring higher overall costs through 
the introduction of new facilities, the provision of which may contribute further 
to ...... the chronic excess of capacity over demand.10 
 
Recent crisis meetings between BSC and the unions had ended in stalemate, with the 
latter unwilling to consent to calls to expedite the closure of the Beswick works.  Public, 
media and Parliamentary scrutiny regarding the Corporation’s finances eventually 
forced an increasingly vulnerable Eric Varley to intervene.  Although the Minister 
revealed his Government was still willing to lend its support to the industry, he informed 
Congress House that BSC and the TUCSICC had to be seen taking joint action.  In 
February 1978, the unions softened their stance, agreeing to negotiate the closure of 
the Beswick plants on the following basis: 
 




• no compulsory redundancies; 
• closure only with the consent of the workforce;  
• and a new Severance Agreement.11 
 
The final stipulation was an indication of how official trade union policy had shifted 
since the return of the crisis.  In August 1977, when responding to members’ 
complaints regarding their failure to act on the April 1973 national resolution, the ISTC 
Executive admitted:  
 
The General Secretary read correspondence received from this branch 
expressing concern about the possibility of early closure of certain departments 
within the Works prior to the Beswick date.  They also protested at the fact that 
the resolution carried at the 1973 Special Delegate Conference was not being 
adhered to by the Executive Council.  A discussion ensured when the Executive 
policy was reiterated, namely that they would oppose any attempts to close 
plants prior to the Beswick dates, but that a different situation existed at the 
present time than which existed during the period when the resolution was 
passed in 1973 and this organisation would have extreme difficulty in 
implementing the terms of the resolution.12 
 
 
11 TUCSICC discussion document: Future BSC Investment Strategy and Works Closures, 7 March 
1978, MRC, MSS.292D/611.41/13. 
12 Minutes of ISTC EC meeting, 17-19 August 1977, MRC, MSS.36/ISTC/4/10. 
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Three months later they came up with a new five-point plan, described by Upham as 
something of “a retreat”.13  At its core was a decision to abandon the alternative 
employment strategy in exchange for a new national redundancy scheme or a golden 
handshake.14  The plan merely prompted management to use lucrative compensation 
packages to secure their ultimate goal: the negotiated closure of all older plants 
outside the Big Five and South Yorkshire. 
 
Sirs would later sum up the impact this ploy had on persuading vulnerable sections of 
workers to relinquish their livelihoods: 
 
How can you get workers, many of them in their fifties, some of them in debt, 
others needing a new car or new furniture or a holiday, to turn down huge sums 
of money and instead fight the employers with tough, sustained industrial and 
political action?  The fact is, you cannot.15 
 
This perspective, however, conveniently ignores the role his EC played in encouraging 
the cynical management tactic: 
 
I again appealed to the Minister, and the government did do something they 
thought would help us.  They allowed the British Steel Corporation to make 
much bigger redundancy payments to those workers who accepted early works 
closure and early redundancy.  But the offer of greater golden handshakes was 
 
13 Upham, Tempered, p. 125. 
14 Minutes of ISTC EC meeting, 16-18 November 1977, MRC, MSS.36/ISTC/4/10. 
15 Sirs, Hard Labour, p. 67. 
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the last thing we needed.  I knew in my heart that now we would never 
successfully fight a closure, even if the workers agreed to give it a go.  BSC of 
course, was delighted … they went over our heads direct to the workforce and 
the lure of a few thousand pounds severance pay was enough to make the 
majority of workers vote for acceptance of BSC’s offer.16  
 
Until now, WAC leaders had been able to appeal for the support of colleagues by 
focusing on the values of shop-floor solidarity, fraternal brotherhood and the ‘right to 
work’, but BSC’s new policy meant the future of an entire plant could be decided by 
financial self-interest.  Eventually, a common pattern would emerge, which Anthony 
Tudor, a Wolverhampton-based TGWU official, disclosed in a letter to Transport 
House: 
 
Their [BSC] policy seems to be one of closure of Furnaces one by one in 
certain plants, placing the personnel who have been displaced on the 
guaranteed week and making the personnel concerned so disenchanted by 
the severe loss of earnings incurred that they then begin to queue up for 
severance payments being offered, thereby bringing about the closures the 
Corporation evidently desire.17 
 
Tudor’s assertion would prove prophetic, with the Government acquiescing to 
management prerogative by officially sanctioning the buying-off of workers in a March 
1978 White Paper.  At only 11-pages, the optimistically titled ‘Road to Viability’ sought 
 
16 Ibid., p. 68. 
17 Letter from A. Tudor to R. Harrison, 1 February 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/5. 
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to outline how management, with Whitehall’s blessing, would save the industry.  The 
new strategy represented a paradigm shift.  In the face of a new economic and political 
reality, the Government was now willing to abandon the commitment made in Labour’s 
Programme.   
 
With the consent of Whitehall and the unions, BSC returned to the Beswick sites, 
securing expedited closure agreements at Clyde Iron, East Moors, Hartlepool and 
Ebbw Vale.  Although the Road to Viability provided few details on the futures of 
remaining sites outside the Big Five and South Yorkshire, it repeatedly referred to 
“high-cost” facilities.  Crucially, there was now nothing to prevent Grosvenor Place 
from extending their rationalisation programme beyond the confines of Beswick.  
Aware of this, a concerned Bob Edwards confronted Varley in the Commons: 
 
Is my right hon. Friend in a position to say whether the Bilston steelworks comes 
within the category that he described as a high-cost plant?  If so, I suggest that 
that is very debateable because it has never made a loss since nationalisation.  
Is he aware that if the Bilston plant is closed that will double unemployment in 
my constituency and create serious problems for the whole of the metal industry 
in the West Midlands?18 
 




18 946 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1978) cols. 1526-27. 
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It cannot be said that conditions are favourable to our industry, nor to our 
Corporation, nor to joint consultation.  We have too much capacity – in Europe 
as a whole there is 30 per cent too much ... when we identify plants which, if 
closed, would enable steel and steel products to be made cheaper elsewhere 
within the Corporation, we shall have to get into closure procedure.  Everybody 
loathes this situation.  I cannot bear to recount the cases.  And the arguments 
on both sides are totally familiar with me.  For as long as possible my 
colleagues and I have held back to give every chance for the market to 
improve; to see if new arguments would come forward and for alternative 
ideas to be developed.  But there are cases where the arguments for closure 
are inescapable, where avoidable losses could be eliminated, where lower 
cost plants could deliver substantially better and cheaper steel and where the 
road to viability inexorably leads.  In those cases we dare not flinch or we shall 
betray the interests of the majority who work in BSC.19 
 
The Corporation was now talking openly of matching future capacity with expected 
demand.  In advance of the White Paper, Grosvenor Place had provided civil servants 
with data capping forecasted output at 16m-22m t/p/a over the next five years.20  With 
capacity already standing at 25m t/p/a and, with an additional 5m tonnes set to come 
online at the Big Five, there was no room for additional schemes.  Varley assented to 
both projected sales figures and management’s discriminatory preferential loading 
policy, as revealed in his response to Edwards’ question in the House: 
 
 
19 The Steel News: Bilston and Wolverhampton Edition, 22 June 1978. 
20 BSC, Prospects for Steel, April 1978. 
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I have no precise financial figures for particular plants.  One difficulty is that, 
given a demand for only 17 million tonnes of British Steel Corporation 
production this year against a theoretical capacity of 25 million to 26 million 
tonnes, loading the plants does not have a great effect.  It means that some 
plants can be loaded to produce a profit, while others, which are generally 
described as low-cost plants, are loaded inefficiently.  That is a difficult 
management problem for the Corporation.21 
 
The Road to Viability thereby halved planned capital expenditure, permanently 
shelving the Shelton and Glengarnock projects in the process.22  
 
The change in Whitehall’s steel strategy could not have come at a worse possible time 
for Bilston.  Arriving days before the JWP report had been submitted, it ended any 
prospect of planners approving the electric arc scheme.  The next month the men 
presented their findings to divisional management in Sheffield.  Chairing proceedings, 
a self-assured John Pennington cast doubt over the legitimacy of the report’s customer 
survey, audaciously accusing its authors of adopting a parochial view of Sheffield 
Division’s ability to produce quality steel.23  He revealed that, after purportedly 
consulting Bilston’s customer base, The Mount had received cast-iron assurances that 
Black Country steel users would continue to order from BSC if the plant was to indeed 
shut.  Turner refuted this submission, implying the result of the JWP exercise was 
preordained: 
 
21 946 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1978) col. 1527. 
22 BSC, The Road to Viability. HMSO Cmnd. 7149, March 1978. 
23 Minutes of meeting between the Bilston JWP and Sheffield Division Steelworks Group Planning 




Mr. Turner indicated that in his view the strategic approach in Sheffield 
Division had failed to take proper account of Bilston as part of the Division.  
Within planning exercises, little consideration had been given to the possible 
transfer of work to Bilston and that had led to the situation where the Division 
could say that Bilston was not required.  The whole basis of planning had been 
what could be done in Sheffield, which was a negative approach to the 
strategy; there was little need to carry out the exercise through the Working 
Party if discussion related only to present capacity and facilities.24 
 
Dennis Murray inflamed an already tense situation by highlighting that, with Bilston 
losing money, permanent closure would secure immediate cash-flow savings for BSC.  
An unconventionally animated Reg Turley reminded his Group Director of the very 
reasons the Black Country facility had become economically unviable: 
 
Mr. Turley commented that the closure option would, on the face of it, bring 
financial benefits quicker than the development option.  However, closures in 
other parts of the Corporation had been of loss-making works and Bilston, until 
the mothballing of the blast furnace, been profitable.  Although the advantage 
of loading lower cost route was accepted, the cost savings already made by 







Sheffield Division officials, nonetheless, refused to be drawn into a debate on the 
impact of the Big Lizzie decision, with Pennington avoiding scrutiny by bringing 
proceedings to a premature end. 
 
The BJUAC leadership held very little hope management had been persuaded to 
invest.  Their fears were soon realised.  Deliberating for just fourteen days, and not 
two months as originally planned before the release of the White Paper, Pennington 
delivered his verdict to the Works Council in April 1978.  Taking his seat in the training 
centre, he categorically rejected the JWP recommendations.  Justifying his decision, 
the Sheffield Division boss advanced the same overcapacity/overmanning argument 
peddled by Grosvenor Place and recently endorsed by the Government: 
 
In line with the overall excess of steelmaking capacity in the Corporation, we 
have in the special billet and bar area a substantial surplus of liquid steel 
capacity compared with the forecast in the medium term ... Our competitive 
position at home and abroad is seriously impaired in the medium term whilst 
we carry the fixed costs associated with this imbalance ... In view of the wide 
margin of capacity compared with demand there appears to be adequate 
cover should the demand forecasts turn out to be substantially understated.  It 
then follows that any new arc capacity would have to be balanced by closure 
of existing modern arc capacity elsewhere, and I would find it difficult to 
support any proposal for expenditure on increasing arc steelmaking capacity 
in the foreseeable future.26 
 
 
26 Memo from J. Pennington to R. Scholey, 27 April 1978, MRC, 755/4/4/5, pp. 1-2. 
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He once again broke consultation procedure by advising the men to request union 
leaders negotiate advanced redundancy terms on their behalf.  In a move designed to 
heap further pressure on employees, Pennington also declared that he had already 
asked Scholey to place Bilston on the agenda for BSC’s May 1978 TUCSICC meeting.  
It is clear the failure of the JWP exercise, which entailed hundreds of man-hours, was 
entirely inevitable.  As was the case with Elisabeth, management evaluated the impact 
of closure on the narrow criteria of reducing capacity and improving cash-flow.   
 
Closing the meeting, Pennington made a point of thanking those workers, “who had 
remained” and listened to him, “in a reasonable and rational way”.27  This particular 
comment was aimed at Turner who, anticipating the judgement, had interrupted 
proceedings with a prepared statement: 
 
We the Committee resolved unanimously this morning to inform him 
[Pennington] that whatever his recommendations, the status quo should be 
retained at the Bilston Works until 1982 plus, in line with the statement of Sir 
Charles Villiers on Friday 26th November, 1976.28 
 
The action committee leader then announced that he no longer placed any credence 
to anything promulgated by The Mount, before leading a mass walkout of shop 
stewards.   
 
 
27 Minutes of an Extraordinary Meeting of the Bilston Works Council, 28 April 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/6. 
28 BJUAC statement to Bilston Works Council, undated, ITSOE, BCA1/2. 
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The men had by now become frustrated by the worsening behaviour of divisional 
management, with the rejection of the JWP plan being the latest in a series of moves 
designed to create what was described locally as an “embryo closure situation”.29  As 
management distracted the men with an entirely fruitless planning exercise, they were 
determined to rundown the works by backdoor means.  In February 1978, for example, 
local engineers discovered parts of Elisabeth had been secretly removed and 
reportedly sold for scrap – despite a previous joint agreement stipulating she would be 
maintained in full working order.  The next month, David Hunter was transferred to 
Rotherham, leaving the Blast Furnace Department rudderless and the BJUAC without 
a vital ally.  A formal complaint was ignored by Pennington, as were repeated requests 
for a copy of the divisional order book.  At the JWP meeting in Sheffield, the Managing 
Director had resorted to lying about consulting Bilston’s customer base over their 
future intentions.  A letter, written by Sheffield Division’s Head of Sales after the talks 
had taken place, revealed no such survey had yet been carried out: 
 
Without prejudicing or anticipating the final decision, it would be prudent for us 
to consult with each customer separately about the continued sourcing of his 
orders from other parts of the Corporation.  There is a clear realisation on our 
part that any transfer of orders must take with it the maintenance and 
improvement of customer service in its widest sense, i.e. flexibility, delivery 
accuracy, quality assurance.30   
 
 
29 Letter from J. Clarke to W. Sirs, 21 April 1978, MRC, MSS.36/2000/282. 
30 Letter from D. Houghton to unknown, 28 April 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/6. 
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These and many other acts of deception caused an irreparable breach of trust, with 
local shop stewards from here on in referring to divisional management as the 
‘Sheffield Mafia’.  As the principal protagonist in Bilston’s downfall, Pennington 
assumed the role of pantomime villain throughout the remainder of the campaign.  
Following the mass walkout, he developed an intense personal rivalry with Turner, 
who called for his Managing Director’s dismissal on several occasions.  He was 
eventually christened ‘Captain Bumblington’ by some of the men, on account of a 
partial stutter and his resemblance to an army drill sergeant.  
 
Approaching the TUCSICC 
 
Although the JWP experiment ended in disappointment, it would have a major impact 
on the future direction of the BJUAC.  The experience prompted the establishment of 
a leadership team that chiefly consisted of: 
 
• John Booth, TGWU 
• George Burgess, ISTC 
• Graham Fazey, ISTC 
• Bob Higgins, ISTC 
• Graham Howe, TGWU 
• Ian ‘Knocker’ McCulloch, ISTC 
• Frank Robinson, UCATT 
• Malkit Singh NUB 
• Reg Turley, ISTC 
• Bert Turner, ISTC 
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• Dennis Turner, ISTC 
• Ted Wall, ISTC31 
 
Henceforth, the BJUAC would be dominated by production workers, the bulk of which 
were employed in and around the finishing end or ancillary departments.  This area of 
the works was known for its tight-knit social fabric, with production workers adopting a 
buddy system that encouraged sectional solidarity.  Bert Turner describes the kinship 
that had developed there: 
 
You were going to work with your mates, you worked as a team.  If you were 
working the Sunday you would have a day off in the week – and you would 
have people who went off together.  Some went fishing or golfing or to the 
horse race, whatever sports you were interested in.32 
 
Although many of their supporters had left under the May 1975 and January 1976 
agreements, the overall authority of the BJUAC does not appear to have diminished.  
The men all held senior positions within local trade union apparatus whilst, as branch 
officials, they represented every major section of the works.  Sharing uniform values 
and political outlooks, the action committee would now function as an incredibly 
coherent campaigning unit.   
 
 
31 Although the likes of David Hamilton and Jack Jones would continue to back the campaign, they 
weren’t considered to be full-time members of the BJUAC leadership team.  
32 The Express and Star, 4 July 2012. 
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With the rejection of the JWP report, they sought to remobilise their network of political 
supporters.  Bob Edwards and a delegation of West Midland Labour MPs met with 
Labour Party officials in London, only to be told the Government had no intention of 
interfering with BSC’s development plans following the publication of the Road to 
Viability.  Ally Tony Benn, now Energy Minister, lobbied his former department, 
prompting an indifferent response from Gerald Kaufman: 
 
Les Huckfield and I met a delegation from the works led by Bob Edwards MP 
and Councillor Denis [sic] Turner.  I explained to the delegation that the BSC 
currently faces very serious problems owing to the worldwide recession in the 
demand for steel, and the substantial overcapacity in the industry in this 
country and overseas.  The situation was described in some detail in the 
Government’s recent White Paper “British Steel Corporation: The Road to 
Viability” (Cmnd 7149), which also set out the action which will be required for 
dealing with the problems of the industry.  The White Paper made clear that 
the Government has accepted that a number of steelworks will need to close 
and stated that it will be for BSC to begin negotiations on this.  The White 
Paper also made clear that no action will be taken without prior consultation 
with the TUC Steel Committee and the local workforces.  I understand that the 
Corporation have recently begun discussions with the unions on the future of 
the works, and that these discussions have not yet been completed.33 
 
Earlier chapters of this thesis have outlined how the BJUAC had come to rely on a 
political lobby to successfully petition policymakers on their behalf.  Now a vastly 
 
33 Letter from G. Kaufman to A. Benn, 23 May 1978, WCA, DW-173/1/5. 
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altered landscape would force its leadership to reappraise their strategic framework.  
As the above letter confirms, absolutely no action could be taken at plant-level without 
prior consultation with national union leaders.  By closely inspecting the TUCSICC’s 
February 1978 defence policy, which determined no further closures would be 
sanctioned by Congress House without the full consent of the workforce, the Bilston 
men focused their energies on securing the support of the Steel Committee unions.  
This shift in policy was outlined in a letter written by Edwards: 
 
We [the BJUAC] have met the Ministers concerned, the West Midlands Group 
of Labour MPs on three occasions, the Wolverhampton Council Committee 
dealing with unemployment problems and the Steel Committee of the TUC.  
Everything has been done to state the case for the retention of the steel works 
at Bilston.  The major concentration should be on the trade union side, where 
the major decisions will be made by the TUC Steel Committee in consultation 
with the British Steel Corporation.  They should refuse to agree with BSC to 
the closure of the Bilston plant and if necessary create a crisis situation in this 
regard.34 
 
The first step in this tactical transition was to secure the backing of the regional trade 
union movement.  Following talks in Birmingham, the action committee obtained the 
support of the CSEU, with one leading official hitting out at what he perceived to be 
widespread shop-floor apathy towards job cuts:35 
 
34 Letter from R. Edwards to J. Miles, 5 June 1978, WCA, DW-173/1/3. 
35 Founded in December 1890 as the Federation of Engineering and Shipbuilding Trades, by 1978 the 




They do not appear to be unduly bothered about the job cutbacks which are 
being announced in this area nearly every day.  There is apathy amongst the 
shop stewards.  They do not appear to want to do anything about this serious 
situation until they find themselves under threat of being made redundant.  By 
then it is too late.  The fight for survival in the Midlands is on now.36 
 
Also lending his support was Sir David Perris, Secretary of the West Midlands TUC, 
who agreed to ask his General Council to place pressure on Congress House.  
Meanwhile, the BJUAC established a close working relationship with the WB&DTUC.  
The body’s senior management committee, which was dominated by a group of 
militant shop stewards linked to the AUEW and the TGWU, were looking to draw public 
attention to the ongoing retrenchment of the area’s industrial base.  Following a series 
of meetings arranged by Turner and Edwards, Trades Council leaders agreed to 
petition TUC President Len Murray: 
 
We therefore wish you to support and make representation to HM Government 
to: Immediately instruct British Steel Corporation management to maintain the 
Bilston plant in full production and to programme modernisation; protect the 
public sector of the steel industry by controlling imports and ensuring that the 
private sector is not granted any favours or privileges not readily available to 
the public sector.37 
 
 
36 The Express and Star, 11 May 1978. 
37 Letter from S. Clarke to L. Murray, 26 May 1978, WCA, DW-173/1/3. 
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The WB&DTUC subsequently organised a conference of approximately 40 local senior 
conveyors.  A large number were employed at Black Country manufacturing firms that 
relied on Bilston for their semi-finished steel.  A resolution opposing the Corporation’s 
recent actions was immediately forwarded to the TUCSICC: 
 
There is a strong feeling of resentment towards BSC and the manner they 
propose of affecting that closure, for to us we cannot conceive that a company, 
that shows high profitability, high class products, but above all, all round good 
industrial relations should be shut down.38 
 
The TGWU branch at Wolverhampton’s Qualcast foundry, itself under the threat of 
closure, registered concerns over the future of the region’s diminishing manufacturing 
base: 
 
This branch is extremely concerned at the situation in the steel industry, 
particularly with the situation in Bilston.  We feel that many more jobs other 
than the steel workers being threatened, will be lost.  It is our view that our 
area will become extremely depressed, with widespread unemployment if the 
threatened closure takes place ... The people of Bilston will not stand by and 
watch their livelihood being taken from them.39 
 
Meanwhile, AUEW officials at each of GKN’s West Midland facilities helped publicise 
a petition signed by thousands of Black Country trade unionists: 
 
38 Letter from W. Little to D. Turner, 23 May 1978, WCA, DW-173/1/3. 




Our members stand rock firmly behind your cause, and hope that the efforts 
of your action committee and indeed the Bilston population will meet with 
complete success and a reversal of the Steel Board’s decision will be a reward 
for everyone’s efforts.40 
 
The BJUAC itself looked to secure Steel Committee support for their recently rejected 
electric arc proposal.  Each member thereby petitioned their respective full-time trade 
union officials.  Anthony Tudor, a regional organiser with the TGWU, wrote to his 
General Secretary Moss Evans: 
 
Our Shop Stewards are also of the confirmed opinion that Sheffield Special 
Steels Division are using the Bilston plant as the whipping block, despite the 
fact that Bilston has been the biggest contributor to profits to one division that 
has remained profitable even during the steel recession.  I am now even more 
convinced than ever of the fear that I have expressed to you on a number of 
occasions that British Steel are attempting to enforce closure of Plants by back 
door methods, thereby making nonsense of the negotiations taking place at 
National Level between the Steel Committee and the Corporation.41 
 
He subsequently called on his Executive to rebuff any hint of a negotiated closure from 
Grosvenor Place.  Assistance was also provided by Andrew Chudley (NUB), David 
Beards (UCATT) and Greg Bamber (SIMA), all Area Officers of the unions represented 
 
40 Letter from H. Penny to D. Turner, 3 February 1978, WCA, DW-173/1/3. 
41 Letter from A. Tudor to R. Harrison, undated, ITSOE, BCA1/5. 
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on the BJUAC.  On the ISTC side, Divisional Officer Jack Gavin lobbied Bill Sirs 
tirelessly.  The experienced Teessider, who had resided in the Black Country for over 
a decade, was particularly close to Dennis Turner and Reg Turley.  Crucially, he had 
the ear of the Confederation top brass, recently assuming the position of acting 
General Secretary whilst Sirs recovered from illness.   
 
A sustained period of intensive lobbying prompted TUCSICC Secretary Dennis Delay 
to meet with a Bilston deputation in London.  Armed with an abridged version of the 
JWP report, the two-part plantwide resolution and a transcript of Charles Villiers’ 
pledge, the BJUAC leaders confirmed they were seeking to block any attempt by 
Congress House and Grosvenor Place to open rundown discussions before March 
1982, the date cited in their Chairman’s November 1976 speech.42  Convinced by the 
strength of their argument, Delay encouraged the Bilston men to petition his Steel 
Committee bosses in person.  
  
With trademark enthusiasm, Turner and his colleagues went one step further, working 
alongside his newfound allies in the Black Country labour movement to organise a 
huge demonstration they labelled the ‘March on London’.  On the morning of the May 
1978 national talks, a convoy of coaches transported hundreds of Bilston’s 
steelworkers into central London.  Arriving at daybreak, they disembarked at 




42 Minutes of TUCSICC meeting, 11 May 1978, MRC, MSS.292D/611.41/13. 
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There really is something immoral about it.  Bilston has always made a profit 
since nationalisation and for some years before.  There is a big market for 
Bilston steel in the Midlands, but the Corporation had used Bilston’s profits to 
build new plants elsewhere.  The fundamental point is, why should people and 
plants which have been making a profit and a contribution to the industry have 
to be put on this sacrificial altar?  We are prepared to ask that question and 
they will have a bloody hard job answering it.43 
 
The address ended with a warning to management: their recent behaviour had 
aroused extremely hostile feelings amongst his colleagues and their supporters.  
Turner’s fiery address was met with loud cheers from a crowd swelled by a contingent 
of Black Country trade unionists ferried in by the WB&DTUC.  The protest then snaked 
its way down Gray’s Inn Road and onwards to ISTC headquarters. 
 
Upon witnessing the throbbing mass of placard waving demonstrators forcing morning 
rush-hour traffic to a standstill, Sirs agreed to grant an audience to a small delegation 
of fraternal brothers.  In what was a crucial encounter, the General Secretary 
confirmed his EC’s formal support for new electric arc steelmaking at Bilston, later 
telling The Guardian that management would “run into a bit of trouble” if they looked 
to unilaterally rundown the works.44  The demonstrators made their way to Congress 
House, where TUCSICC officials were handed an abridged version of the JWP report 
and a copy of their petition.   
 
 




The steel union chiefs, impressed by the sophistication of the survival plan, agreed to 
formally push for new steelmaking apparatus at Bilston when speaking with 
policymakers later that day.  One Steel Committee member, seemingly impressed by 
the protest taking place outside, called on his colleagues, “to make a stand against all 
further closures”.45  The men, meanwhile, headed to BSC headquarters, where Turner 
berated senior industry officials: 
 
We are not going to allow Bilston steel works to be led like a sacrificial lamb 
to the slaughter … We do not believe that our plant should be made the 
scapegoat for the mistakes British Steel has made in the past, because the 
Bilston works has consistently made a profit.46 
 
They then held a symbolic vigil in memory of Elisabeth; only breaking the silence to 
applaud the arrival of their General Secretaries. 
   
Inside, Sirs used the results of the JWP’s customer survey to repudiate John 
Pennington’s unsubstantiated claims over the future of Bilston’s orderbook.47  Hector 
Smith, known for his baiting of Corporation officials, recited Villiers’ November 1976 
pledge.  As Pennington floundered, the ISTC contingent asked why management 
appeared so determined to shut a high-performance unit that, with minor investment, 
could secure much needed profits?  The Corporation team, seemingly taken aback by 
their counterparts’ newfound resilience, had no answer.  Forced onto the backfoot, 
 
45 Minutes of TUCSICC meeting, 11 May 1978, MRC, MSS.292D/611.41/13. 
46 The Express and Star, 11 May 1978. 
47 Minutes of meeting between the TUCSICC and BSC, 11 May 1978, MRC, MSS.292D/611.41/12. 
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Bob Scholey looked to move discussions onto Glengarnock, another plant he had in 
his sights.  Regarding Bilston, BSC’s hatchet man agreed to establish a JPC with the 
unions to conjointly investigate the merits of the men’s recently spurned investment 
proposal.48 
   
The BJUAC would have been pleased by events in London.  Firstly, they had received 
the formal backing of the industry’s most powerful trade union leaders, with Sirs 
appearing particularly sympathetic to their plight.  Secondly, their survival plan would 
be re-examined by a joint panel consisting of influential trade unionists and national 
planners.  Meanwhile, the impact of the March on London was felt locally.  Since 
Pennington’s November 1977 statement, a malaise appears to have descended on 
the shop-floor.  This manifested itself in several ways.  At a meeting of the JWP a 
month later, the works Melting Shop Manager Bryn Jones revealed he had received 
very little cooperation from some of his men.49  Worryingly, the exceptionally high 
standards of Bilston’s customarily diligent workforce had dropped considerably, with 
delivery rates reaching an all-time low of 80 per cent.  The change in mood was 
expressed in more abstruse shop-floor behaviour.  Head of Security, David Hamilton, 
complained to The Steel News about a spate of thefts carried out by disenfranchised 
workers.  Ignoring repeated calls to stop, the number of incidents merely increased.50  
 
48 The idea of establishing a formal joint body had previously been mooted by both the TUCSICC and 
BSC, with the Bilston dispute prompting both sides to act.  The Committee’s overall brief was wide-
ranging, though it would initially focus on forensically examining the Bilston’s men’s counterproposal.  
As this thesis will reveal, the JPC proved an entirely fruitless endeavour that enabled management and, 
to a lesser extent the unions, to dilute rank and file protest. 
49 First meeting of the Technical Sub-Committee of the JWP, 2 December 1977, ITSOE, BCA1/2. 
50 Ignoring Hamilton’s warning, a group of workers stole copper piping from the main amenity block.  
See The Steel News: Bilston and Wolverhampton Edition, 17 March 1978. 
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Hamilton wasn’t the only one registering concerns at the mindset of rank and file 
workers.  The Works Accountant, Dave Anderson, warned the BJUAC that it was the 
men – and not divisional management – who were now undermining Bilston’s overall 
financial performance.51  More troubling and, in a sign of what was to come only a year 
later, some steelworkers on the GWW had begun glancing enviously at redundancy 
packages negotiated elsewhere. 
 
Reflecting on the mindset of Bilston’s production workers at this stage of the campaign, 
it is evident that they were displaying what Richard Hyman has identified as 
“unorganised conflict”, leading to a spontaneous and partial “withdrawal from work”: 
 
The evidence indicates that absenteeism, bad time-keeping, turnover, low 
productivity, and even industrial accidents, can represent conscious or 
unconscious responses to discontents which derive from identifiable features 
in the work situation … Individual sabotage, indiscipline and various forms of 
withdrawal from work typically involve spontaneous individual action – or 
reaction – in the face of uncongenial work relations.52 
 
Seeking to exploit this changing situation was a small group of shop stewards linked 
to the Joint Staff Branches.  Following the mothballing of Lizzie and the subsequent 
rejection of the JWP report, these men had seemingly adopted a lukewarm attitude 
towards the BJUAC leadership team.  Moderate in nature, they had refused to 
 
51 First meeting of the Personnel Sub-Committee of the JWP, 20 February 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/2, p. 4. 
52 Hyman, Industrial Relations, pp. 187-190. 
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participate in the April 1978 mass walkout, with one dissenter openly disputing the 
authority of Turner and his collaborators:  
 
Mr. Frank Wall (a trades union representative who stayed behind when the 
other trades unionists walked out) stated that he shared the concern of the 
other trades unionists but that he did not think the statement made by Mr. 
Turner was entirely correct in as much as the workforce were prepared to stay 
here if necessary until 1982.  There was a lot of apathy at Bilston at the 
moment, and Mr. Wall felt that if it was put to the actual workforce, as opposed 
to the leaders, of closure or negotiation, then the workforce would go for 
closure.53 
 
The mutineer subsequently prepared a report attacking the direction of the campaign: 
 
The purpose of this paper is an attempt to present an assessment of the 
situation as seen by an employee who shares the concern of fellow employees 
but who harbours the belief that the present policies being pursued by the 
Action Committee require examination and accountability.54 
 
The three-page document provided a scathing critique of the BJUAC and steel union 
bureaucrats, calling on co-workers to independently seek a negotiated early closure 
agreement in exchange for generous redundancy terms:  
 
 
53 Minutes of an Extraordinary Meeting of the Bilston Works Council, 28 April 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/2. 
54 Frank Wall Paper, undated, ITSOE, BCA1/3. 
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Reluctantly we must prepare for the worst and this is precisely what the Action 
Committee are not doing.  Quite simply they are concentrating their efforts to 
the benefit of a minority of the workforce to the exclusion of the majority.  If 
common sense is to prevail, this imbalance has to be recognised and 
corrective measures taken.  Meaningful negotiations must be entered into to 
obtain the highest compensation available for the majority of the workforce (if 
not all of us) who will inevitably be deprived of their employment.55 
 
At this stage at least, the small band of rebels seem to have had very little influence 
on production workers, with recent events in London legitimising the BJUAC’s overall 
authority.  The national demonstration had galvanised the wider workforce, producing 
a sense of purpose not witnessed since the response to the May 1975 and January 
1976 agreements.  Days later, when a major breakdown of equipment threatened 
production, Bilston’s revitalised steelmen worked around the clock in atrocious and 
dangerous conditions to maintain current production levels.  This vital intervention 
prompted management to praise their commitment and bravery: 
 
Their efforts have won admiration and thanks from myself and other 
managers.  Few men, having received the kind of news which Bilston has had 
in the past few weeks would have shown such spirit and worked such long 
hours in atrocious conditions ... and without a word of complaint.  If anyone 
deserves a reward it is these men ... Everyone associated with the work 
deserves the highest praise.  They were often covered from head to toe in oil, 





without complaint … The attitude of the people who worked on both these 
problems was one which is not often found in the industry today.  They pulled 
out all the stops, worked in very dirty conditions, and put with personal 
hardships to see the job through.56 
 
The Loss of Shelton 
 
As Bilston’s steelmen moved onto a new chapter in their defence, their Shelton 
colleagues finally succumbed to defeat following a spirited campaign of resistance.  
The Government-backed decision to cancel Beswick’s electric arc steelmaking 
scheme had prompted Bob Scholey to notify national union leaders of his intention to 
permanently shut the North Staffordshire works by June 1978.  The TUCSICC’s 
immediate response was to seek to block any such action.57  But BSC were steadfast 
in their position.  Ignoring multiple requests from Congress House to delay taking 
unilateral action, new Director of Social Policy, Dr. David Grieves, castigated steel 
union leaders for dragging their feet.58  When Eric Varley refused to intervene, 
management merely went over the heads of the unions by negotiating a closure 
agreement at plant-level, a tactic previously employed at Hartlepool.  These events 
brutally exposed the underlying flaws of the Steel Committee’s ‘wait and see’ approach 
to defending individual works.  With union leaders dillydallying, BSC could simply 
target vulnerable sections of a battle-fatigued shop-floor. 
 
 
56 The Steel News: Bilston and Wolverhampton Edition, 9 June 1978. 
57 Minutes of TUCSICC meeting, 13 April 1978, MRC, MSS.292D/611.41/13. 
58 Minutes of meeting between the TUCSICC and BSC, 7 June 1978, MRC, MSS.292D/611.41/13. 
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The Shelton affair caused a degree anxiety at Bilston, with some raising concerns that 
indecisiveness at executive level could undermine the overall effectiveness of the 
defence campaign.59  They were entirely correct in their assumption.  With the 
TUCSICC distracted by events in Shelton, management made their move in the Black 
Country.  John Pennington, having recovered from his humiliation at the last round of 
talks, unexpectedly contacted union officials.  The first half of his communique again 
focused on refuting the JWP report’s market share argument: 
 
148 out of 150 customers from Bilston are already receiving supplies from 
other works in the Corporation, to whom the order book would be transferred.  
The large sizes which used to be unique to Bilston works can be supplied from 
other works, which has a similar primary mill and has established that the size 
range can be rolled.  The response from customers following the debate in the 
media over the future of Bilston works has been encouraging, the underlying 
theme being that they wish to be associated with a supply from the most 
modern and competitive process route.  It is felt that any loss of tonnage would 
be marginal if properly managed and thus the full benefit of the reduction in 
fixed costs obtained.60 
 
Despite Bilston’s future still being discussed separately by the JPC, management were 
looking to secure a negotiated closure at plant-level by the end of July 1978, with 
Pennington even preparing a provisional rundown timetable.  The Mount was willing 
 
59 The action committee leaders possessed an intimate knowledge of the events surrounding Shelton’s 
closure, having agreed to establish a formal alliance with the plant’s WAC only weeks prior. 
60 Letter from J. Pennington to D. Delay, 30 May 1978, MRC, 755/4/4/4. 
`271 
 
to maintain current production levels until the summer shutdown (21 July – 6 August 
1978), when operations would be halved.  Steelmaking was to end the next month, 
with the mills closing in April 1979.  Having been frustrated by the strength of 
resistance, BSC were clearly seeking to force their will.   
 
The BJUAC responded by calling an emergency summit of senior shop stewards, who 
unanimously rejected the Pennington proposal.  With their fates in the hands of the 
TUCSICC, they requested national leaders visit the Black Country to discuss a 
potential dual strategy: 
 
In view of the recent developments regarding the Bilston and Shelton Plants, 
the Joint Union Liaison Committee have resolved to invite yourself, and the 
full membership of the TUC Steel Committee to an urgent meeting here at the 
Bilston Plant as soon as arrangements can be made.  We do believe that it is 
imperative that TUC Steel Committee should discuss with us urgently any 
contingency plans that are being made for the support and defence of the 
Bilston plant in the likelihood of a precipitate move by BSC to close Bilston.61 
 
Although Bill Sirs vowed the TUCSICC wouldn’t be “panicked” into any decision by the 
Corporation, he rejected the invitation, suggesting it would be “inappropriate” to meet 
at such an early stage.62  Unperturbed, the Bilston men called on Jack Gavin to push 
 
61 Letter from D. Turner to W. Sirs, 11 June 1978, MRC, MSS.36/2000/225.  
62 Letter from W. Sirs to D. Turner, 14 June 1978, MRC, MSS.36/2000/225. 
`272 
 
for a meeting, only to be informed that the Steel Committee leader was far too busy 
preparing for his union’s forthcoming ADC.63 
 
This was not the first time the Bilston men had been exposed to Sirs’ capricious 
behaviour.  In January 1978, Gavin scribed an urgent letter to Swinton House titled 
‘No.4 Division Closures’; requesting his Executive made an “urgent arrangement” to 
visit the Black Country in view of the, “deteriorating morale” of local workers.64  This 
was followed by an even more desperate plea, “Further to my letter of 27th January 
much as I hate having to add to your current intolerable work load I would be obliged 
if you could [sic] some dates for visits to the above plants [Bilston, Shelton and 
Cookley]”.65  Weeks earlier, in the wake of Elisabeth’s mothballing, the BJUAC had 
travelled down to London to speak to a pre-arranged meeting with the TUCSICC.  
Upon arrival, they were informed that Sirs had pulled out at the very last minute.  Such 
elusiveness would eventually prompt Dennis Delay to complain: 
 
The ISTC Conference is this week and I do not know what will emerge as Mr 
Sirs communicates nothing to anybody.  I am thinking about what advice to 
give the Committee.  The main problems in the way of getting any co-ordinated 
action are, as you known, Mr Sirs’ uncooperative attitude and his prolonged 
absences from his office and from this country, which have helped to give any 
 
63 Letter from J. Gavin to D. Turner, 21 June 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/5. 
64 Letter from J. Gavin to W. Sirs, 27 January 1978, MRC, MSS.36/2000/225. 
65 Letter from J. Gavin to W. Sirs, 3 February 1978, MRC, MSS.36/2000/225. 
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even more bitter edge to the Corporation’s attitude than would otherwise be 
the case.66 
 
The December 1977 Congress House meeting raised questions over the often-
dysfunctional manner in which steel union leaders operated.  David Hunter, as a 
member of a non-TUC affiliated trade union, was refused entry.  The Blast Furnace 
Manager, who would have offered a valuable insight into the controversy surrounding 
the recent ‘Big Lizzie’ decision, was forced to suffer the indignity of waiting outside.  
Following the talks, sympathetic ISTC EC member Eric Wilson expressed his 
frustration at the behaviour of some of his steel union colleagues: 
 
Any [rundown or closure] proposals should be presented jointly at a properly 
constituted meeting between local management and the workers concerned 
with Divisional Officers in attendance, and if at the ‘end of the day’ these 
proposals are unacceptable to the workers at the plant, both the TUCSICC 
and the ISTC Executive Council have previously resolved to resist the closure 
by every means at their disposal.  I will object to any attempt to whitewash and 
water down that commitment unless some measure of agreement has already 
been reached with the workers concerned.67 
 
 
66 TUC inter-departmental correspondence, D. Delay to L. Murray, 19 June 1978, MRC, 
MSS.292D/611.432/43. 
67 Letter from E. Wilson to G. Fazey, 18 December 1977, WCA, DW-173/1/2. 
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Another warning would come from the Scunthorpe action committee, who advised the 
Bilston men against placing their fates in the hands of steel union bureaucrats and, 
instead, recruit the support of the British shop steward movement: 
 
Last year, when I was talking to Joe Herbertson of Sheffield, I made a 
prediction, that if the Bilston action committee was only prepared to work 
through the established channels, procedure, etc, then Bilston was finished! 
… I urgently request that now you and your committee act unreasonably and 
irresponsibly but I fear that it may be too late.  Your committee should now 
concentrate all its available expertise in creating maximum publicity for your 
case and maximum embarrassment for the BSC and T/U leadership.  This can 
be done in numerous ways but I will stress that they can be effective outside 
of the steel industry … I realise only too well that you and your committee will 
have had a belly-full of well-meaning advice from all sorts of well-meaning 
people but I hope, sincerely, that you will treat this letter differently.  I’m afraid 
you have indulged in the usual format:- lobbying of MPs, questions in the 
House, tea and sympathy from the T/U leadership, tea and sympathy from 
Varley and Kaufman, sympathy from the middle-class university intellectuals, 
but honestly – to what avail!  The system can accommodate all of the above 
and really loves it!!68 
 
As was the case at Shotton and Corby, the Scunthorpe men had continued to distance 
themselves from their union leaders.  Those WAC leaders who aligned with Congress 
House, on the other hand, were left unimpressed with the support they received.  
 
68 Letter from P. Johnson to D. Turner, 18 March 1979, ITSOE, BCA1/5. 
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Shelton’s steelmen, for example, had fallen out with Hector Smith and the NUB, whilst 
the East Moors WAC would later take legal action against Swinton House for the 
advice they had received during their abortive campaign.   
 
Conversely, it appears the BJUAC were willing to overlook such warning signs, instead 
seeking to establish a much closer working relationship with the Steel Committee and 
Sirs in particular.  It is evident that any specific concerns were assuaged by some of 
the campaign leaders’ previous personal dealings with the General Secretary.  As an 
ISTC stalwart, Reg Turley had sat alongside the then Divisional Officer on the 
organisation’s CNC for almost a decade.  Similarly, Dennis Turner felt indebted to a 
fraternal brother who had repeatedly supported his burgeoning political career.  As a 
member of the Confederation’s Parliamentary Panel, Sirs sponsored his Bilston 
member’s recent general election bids.  Turner was also impressed by the handful of 
interactions he had had with Sirs since the latter’s promotion to General Secretary.  
During a 1976 conference in Sheffield, he witnessed the ISTC leader deliver a speech 
pledging to protect all viable older works.  The next year, accepting a personal 
invitation from local shop stewards to speak at Bilston, he made a well-received 
presentation on how his Executive planned to minimise the impact new technologies 
would have on manning levels.  Weeks later, the Bilston man revealed his growing 
admiration for the General Secretary by describing a Labour Party conference speech 
as both “spirited” and “valuable”.69  Then, when responding to the mothballing of 
Elisabeth, Sirs had scripted a national resolution that provided a great deal of 
assurance for his anxious Bilston members: 
 
 
69 D. Turner, Report on Annual Conference of the Labour Party, undated, WCA, DW-173/1/10. 
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The General Secretary reported on correspondence which had been passed 
between this Action Committee and the Prime Minister concerning the 
decision to moth-ball the blast furnace at Bilston, and after consideration it 
was resolved: - ‘That the Executive Council give all support and help possible 
to this Committee in their fight to maintain jobs at the Bilston Works’.70 
 
In January 1978, with press rumours circulating over Bilston’s short-term future, Sirs 
granted Turner and Turley a personal hearing, during which he vowed to persuade his 
fellow Steel Committee officials to oppose any prospective move by management.  
Responding, an appreciative BJUAC Chairman proclaimed, “The action committee 
hope everyone here will take great encouragement from what Mr Sirs has promised 
us”.71  Four months later, in the aftermath of the March on London, Turner penned a 
message to his General Secretary, expressing his sincerest gratitude for the manner 
in which he had welcomed the Bilston delegation during their visit.72  The admiration 
Turner and Turley had for union headquarters was clear.   
 
Notwithstanding this, recent events at Shelton had led to concerns amongst some of 
Bilston’s more sceptical shop stewards over Congress House’s approach to defending 
individual sites.  The action committee would look to force the TUCSICC’s hand by 
engineering a national debate around the Corporation’s updated closure programme.  
The ISTC’s ADC in June 1978 provided the ideal platform. 
 
70 Minutes of ISTC EC meeting, 16-18 November 1977, MRC, MSS.36/ISTC/4/10. 
71 The Express and Star, 13 January 1978. 
72 An emphatic Turner described the Steel Committee’s decision to block BSC’s closure proposal as an 





The Bonfire of all Conventions 
 
On day one of the ADC, approximately 150 delegates, including Graham Fazey, David 
Hamilton and Dennis Turner, listened intently as keynote speaker, Sir Charles Villiers, 
pushed his overcapacity/overmanning argument for rationalisation: 
 
We can’t do it unless the Corporation becomes competitive internationally.  If 
we are not competitive I’ll tell you what will happen.  The customers will 
certainly drift away to other suppliers.  Our market share will fall.  The business 
will go.  Our losses will mount.  Parliament and the people will lose patience 
with us or cut off our money supply.  And what would happen to us?  We’d 
wither on the bough and all jobs would be like autumn leaves, crumbling and 
blown away … Unless we do improve performance throughout the whole of 
the BSC, as we’ve already done in some vital areas, the future of bulk 
steelmaking in this country is in danger and it’s in doubt and jeopardy.73 
 
As ironic groans filled the auditorium, it was clear that the man the BJUAC were calling 
‘Mr Pastry’ (on account of his tendency to crumble under pressure) had completely 
underestimated the mood of workers still reeling over recent closures.  During an 
extraordinarily awkward encounter, Bill Sirs presented him with a handcrafted figurine 
produced by a Shelton-based artist.  In a response that would later come to haunt him, 
Villiers pledged that no action would be taken at any other threatened works without 
full and meaningful consultation.  With the pleasantries over, the ADC could get down 
 
73 Man and Metal, July/August 1978. 
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to business, with delegates debating a first round of resolutions that, unsurprisingly, 
focused on rationalisation.  Seeking to drive proceedings, Hamilton tabled an 
emergency motion calling on his EC to: 
 
THIS Conference calls upon the Executive Council to formulate contingency 
plans immediately in order to protect members of this Union against further 
contractions of the Steel Industry outside of the Beswick proposals and that 
this Union informs the Steel Committee and the Trades Union Congress 
General Council of its intentions to support the Bilston Steel workers’ fight for 
survival.  It requests that all unions involved will in no way handle materials or 
orders diverted in such a way as to expedite the closure of Bilston or any other 
non-Beswick plant.74 
 
In a passionate oratory, the accomplished public speaker asserted, “human 
considerations had now taken a backseat to BSC’s master plan”, before reminding 
delegates of the insanity of a loss-making company deliberately undermining a 
profitable unit.  Referring specifically to the decision to mothball Elisabeth, he asked 
fellow delegates, “Brothers if you were responsible for the loss of £0.75m how long 
would you have a job?”.  When outlining the devastating impact BSC’s, “Roman 
strategy of divide and rule” was having on British steelworkers, the Little Leprechaun 
urged each of the steel unions to unite against closures, “Do we have to be picked off 






The rallying cry had an immediate impact, with a long line of delegates approaching 
the rostrum offering to assist their fraternal brothers at Bilston.  A member of the 
Glengarnock WAC called on steel union leaders to, “finally take a stand and say to the 
BSC that we’ve had enough: halt the threat of closures to the non-Beswick plants”.75  
Another demanded the Steel Committee involve themselves in policymaking by 
pushing for investment in mini-works: 
 
Communities that depend on steel cannot be left out.  Those with high 
unemployment levels could well be projected far higher.  There are quite a 
number in this position.  These plants need development because they can 
make products many of the bigger units can’t.  The emergency resolution of 
Bilston shows the trend ... it was not just industries but communities that were 
threatened.  For a small amount of money, a future for both could be 
secured.76 
 
After contributions from several rank and file members, Alan Farley, the recently 
elected West Midlands Executive member, sought to whip up EC support for the 
Bilston motion: 
 
BSC’s central order loading policy allowed them to use companies as farms.  
Bilston has been consistently profitable since nationalisation.  Its last five 
years total profit was £22.1m; in the last two years £8.9m.  Even this year 






mothballing the furnace after an expensive reline.  Performance had always 
been top class and disputes had not caused a real loss of production since 
nationalisation.  Few BSC plants could match their 90 per cent on-time 
delivery record.77   
 
The Stourbridge man then turned towards Villiers and proceeded to read out an 
excerpt from his November 1976 speech:  
 
I think Bilston [is] super ... The way you work together and the speed in which 
you work are absolutely right ... I promise you that the BSC is at Bilston to stay 
... We are not going to abandon it ... there is nowhere else in the Corporation 
... so close to the industrial markets ... You have a super business here.  Run 
it as hard as it will go and keep it going as hard and as long as it will go.78 
 
Amidst a chorus of ironic cheers and boos, a red-faced senior industry official 
demanded the right to reply, only to be ordered to stand-down by conference 
organisers.  Emboldened, one shop steward declared: 
 
If anybody thinks that they’re going to close Bilston and move through this 
industry like a bulldozer picking off plants, whether they be Beswick or non-







By presenting the emergency motion, Bilston’s shop stewards hoped to create a 
situation whereby union leaders were given little option but to act on the demands of 
an increasingly anxious rank and file membership.  The tactic appeared to have 
worked.  When voting for the resolution himself, Sirs admitted that the time had come 
for the TUCSICC to take a stand: 
 
The emergency resolution means taking action over transfer of orders.  This 
was the voice of the industry’s workers.  While he did not want to engage in a 
wholesale strike, this resolution gave the power to do it.  “If you’re passing that 
motion unanimously I shall see to it that it’s given the full treatment it deserves.  
You don’t have to worry about me. 
 
The BJUAC would have been extremely satisfied with day one of the conference.  Not 
only had they received the formal backing of 150 senior convenors from across the 
UK, but also the entire leadership of the industry’s largest union.  Nevertheless, an 
opportunity to secure an even greater strategic coup now presented itself.  As Turner 
entered the lobby of Scarborough’s Grand Hotel on the final morning, he was in 
possession of a copy of a confidential order from divisional management: 
 
In view of the deteriorating trading situation, it has been necessary to review 
the plant loading across the Steelworks Group.  I am required to prepare plans 
to support a two-furnace operation as from 6th August with a further proposal 
to stop steelmaking at Bilston at the end of October 1978.  It will be necessary 
for us to meet formally to discuss these proposals and to reach an agreement 
on manning levels across the Traffic Department before implementation.  It is 
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not our intention to declare any man redundant, all displaced workers will be 
paid guaranteed earnings according to Income & Security agreements until 
such time that the TUCSICC and the BSC have discussed and reached 
agreements on the future of Bilston Works and the future employment 
prospects of our workforce.79 
 
With the ISTC leadership otherwise engaged, The Mount had sought to force through 
John Pennington’s rundown proposals in the Black Country.  Rather than immediately 
report the instructions to conference organisers, a shrewd Turner appears to have 
patiently sat on the intelligence.  Seeking to achieve the maximum possible impact, he 
waited until a lively debate was taking place on management’s recent abuse of 
consultation procedures, before handing a startled Sirs the instruction.  After the 
General Secretary read out what would be dubbed the ‘Bilston letter’, he opened the 
floor to ascertain the views of delegates.  One of the first to speak was an unusually 
animated Jack Gavin, who sent a stark warning to his close friend and boss: 
 
[I cannot] let this challenge go by without speaking from the rostrum in support 
of Bilston.  The honour of the Confederation was at stake.  Unless resistance 




79 Letter from R. Griffiths to J. Booth, 29 June 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/6. 
80 Man and Metal, July/August 1978.  The Scotsman had been deeply affected by the loss of Shelton, 
leaving Bilston as the sole surviving state-owned iron and steelworks in his entire division. 
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The popular full-time official was joined at the rostrum by angry delegates, with one 
declaring: 
 
… it was one thing to shut a plant through negotiation and consultation, but 
BSC were “treating us as the lowest form of animal.  I’m saying now we’ll fight 
them, we’ll fight them all the way”.81 
 
Such words clearly resonated with Confederation leaders, as influential EC member 
Graham Hett bemoaned decisionmakers’ unquenchable thirst for rationalisation: 
 
What was happening to Bilston could happen to anyone whether in a Beswick 
or non-Beswick plant.  The transfer of orders was the first step towards 
undermining a plant, leaving men operating one furnace for nothing.  “Let us 
stand firm behind the people from Bilston and any other works that are 
prepared to stand firm themselves”.82 
 
Another top ISTC official asserted: 
 
… the union had given BSC every consideration by demanning on a grand 
scale and supporting closures.  “It still isn’t enough; the BSC want more, he 
added.  “I think the BSC are cocking a snook at us and if we stand still and do 
 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid.  Hett was a vastly experienced trade unionist, having been Secretary of the Hawarden Steel 
Committee for six years and a works representative at Shotton for fourteen years prior.  As a Labour 
Councillor himself, he had developed an affinity with Dennis Turner.  Unfortunately for the BJUAC, their 
close ally died as the battle for Bilston reached its final stage. 
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nothing about it, we deserve everything we get”.  After Bilston, Corby and 
Shotton would be next!83 
 
The intervention of these respected figures, combined with the mood of outraged 
delegates, left Sirs with little option but to act.  Abandoning the entire ADC, he 
appeared to acknowledge that union apathy had negatively impacted traditional 
steelmaking communities: 
 
I think you will recall that over the years since nationalisation, a nationalisation 
in which we asked for the industry to be handed to the people and run by the 
people, we have been subject to a lot of dictation.  The people running this 
country have made good decisions and bad decisions, but we haven’t had any 
part in them, although communities have suffered considerably, we have given 
all the assistance possible.  We’ve seen a lot of suffering … I’ve been through 
all this and it’s heart-breaking to have to go through it, but nevertheless I’ve 
given this Corporation a tremendous amount of support in order to try and 
build for this country an industry that we can be proud of, that will live for a 
long, long time.  I don’t think I’m ashamed of what I’ve done in trying to build 
something. 
 
Returning from an emergency session of his EC, he conceded that, with mounting 






To be quite frank, I just cannot tolerate that situation now.  With what’s 
happened today at Bilston, it’s been suggested by our Executive that the 
credibility of this Union is at stake.  And the credibility of my position is at stake 
because I cannot continue to co-operate with leaders of the BSC if they are 
going to stand here on the rostrum as happened two days ago and tell us that 
never again will they have a Shelton, that never again will they take decisions 
until after there’s been full consultation.  The day following that statement they 
state very clearly that they intend to run down Bilston and close it by a certain 
date.  That is absolutely not tolerable ...84 
 
Sirs then sought to placate angry delegates by ordering the first industrywide stoppage 
since the General Strike: 
 
There’s a deadline date on this letter of the August 6th, 1978, and we have to 
tell the Corporation that if it hasn’t been removed by then, the industry will stop 
(Prolonged Applause and standing ovation) …  And if this industry does stop, 
let me tell you very clearly – I will stop steel moving in this country, there won’t 
be an ounce of it moved.  I shall inform the International Metalworkers right 
throughout the world that they must not send any steel here.85 
 
The shock announcement was met with a standing ovation from a relieved rank and 
file.  Over the past seven years, steelworkers had heard much talk from leaders but 






TUCSICC-affiliated union endorsed the ISTC’s strike order; thereby placing Bilston at 




Working alongside local management, Bilston’s dynamic shop stewards produced a 
sophisticated counterproposal outlining the commercial case for redevelopment, whilst 
coordinating an imaginative ‘Think Customer’ marketing campaign that reinforced the 
plant’s viability.  These local actions were, however, quickly overtaken by wider events 
at the centre.  Consenting to management’s crude overcapacity/overmanning 
argument, James Callaghan’s under-fire Labour Government abandoned its earlier 
manifesto commitment to traditional steelmaking communities.  Facing new political 
and economic realities, they authorised management to extend their rationalisation 
programme beyond Beswick.  The short-term impact on Bilston’s prospects were 
severe; ending any chance of the JWP’s survival plan being sanctioned whilst 
encouraging BSC to engender an embryo closure situation on the ground.  Moreover, 
the so-called ‘golden handshake clause’ meant that, in the long run, the defence 
campaign could now be decided by financial self-interest. 
 
The use of record-breaking redundancy cheques was actively encouraged by steel 
union hierarchies who had assented to the Corporation’s case for rationalisation.  As 
a policy vacuum developed at executive level, an emboldened BSC negotiating team 
went above their heads and negotiated the closure of the final Beswick sites locally.  
With the Black Country plant in management’s sights, a streamlined BJUAC was 
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forced to reappraise its entire strategic framework, pinning their colours firmly to the 
mast of the Steel Committee and its Chairman Bill Sirs. 
 
However, whilst the support of union Executives galvanised Bilston’s battle-weary 
workforce, some local shop stewards became concerned that Congress House’s ‘wait 
and see’ approach to defending individual works could compromise their campaign.  
The enterprising action committee leadership, therefore, looked to shape overall policy 
from within.  Scarborough was perhaps the high-point in the battle for Bilston, 
representing something of a strategic coup for local officials.  Not only had they 
engineered a national debate around plant closures, they had prompted the first strike 
order since 1926. 
 
These events appeared to have awoken the TUCSICC organisations from their 
collective slumbers.  With the onus now on the union hierarchies, the Bilston men 
returned to the Black Country anticipating a complete overhaul of Congress House’s 
defence strategy.  As the next chapter will demonstrate, they were sorely mistaken.  
With the steel unions remaining hopelessly fractured, there would be no significant 





Chapter 6: Bottom Blown Steelmaking 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the national landscape in the wake of the 
tumultuous events of June and July 1978.  It begins by assessing the adequacy of the 
TUCSICC’s conduct following management’s retreat in light of Scarborough.  Having 
been handed a platform from which to coordinate an effective collective response on 
behalf of the remaining older sites, it exposes how institutional conflict triggered yet 
another round of inactivity. 
 
With a lack of organised resistance at the centre, the BJUAC were once more forced 
to seize the initiative for themselves.  The chapter appraises local actions, establishing 
how Bilston’s dynamic shop stewards remodelled their entire defence campaign.  
Spotting a potential loophole in the Road to Viability White Paper, they recruited 
outside expertise to assist them in formulating a new survival bid centred on a 
revolutionary production method that, if sanctioned, could safeguard the nation’s 
remaining OH steelmaking plants.  The chapter highlights the methods adopted by the 
Bilston men in order to generate momentum for their latest counterproposal, revealing 
how they oversaw a sophisticated national PR campaign that targeted the many 
intellectual and commercial flaws of the industry’s state-sponsored rationalisation 
programme. 
 
Having demonstrated how, after an intense round of lobbying, the BJUAC secured the 
support of customarily ambivalent TUCSICC officials, the chapter concludes with an 
assessment of BSC’s response.  It is revealed that management used a joint union 
consultation initiative to rebuff the men’s survival bid, whilst continuing to undermine 




A Missed Opportunity 
 
Within 24-hours of his national strike order, a resolute Bill Sirs led the TUCSICC into 
summit talks at Grosvenor Place.  David Grieves revealed he had ordered the 
withdrawal of the ‘Bilston letter’ and the abandonment of divisional management’s 
rundown schedule.  John Pennington, whose sacking union officials were demanding, 
was told to maintain current production levels until the JPC had made its final decision.  
Although the Corporation urged these talks should take place as early as possible, 
Congress House called for a moratorium on all negotiations: 
 
Given the formal withdrawal by the Corporation of the local letter and the 
effective withdrawal by the Corporation of the May 30 run-down timetable, the 
ISTC now withdraw its strike deadline.  Further discussion about the future of 
Bilston and other works should be deferred until the JPC had been able to 
review the situation across-the-board.  It would be inappropriate to seek to fix 
an early meeting of the JPC; what was now needed was a pause for 
consolidation.1 
 
Following the events at Scarborough, humiliated industry officials beat a hasty retreat, 
described by Congress House as an “absolute climb-down”.2  Steel union bureaucrats 
had been presented with an opportunity to formulate a meaningful response.  Would 
they take it? 
 
1 Minutes of meeting between the TUCSICC and BSC, 30 June 1978, MRC, MSS.292D/611.41/13. 




For a brief moment, at least, the signs were encouraging.  Dennis Delay, who had 
been left frustrated by his employer’s past ambivalence, mooted a list of potential 
policy options: 
 
The Secretary suggested that the Committee would sooner or later have to 
decide what their stand on closure was going to be.  Were they going to say 
that the suffering had reached its limit and there must be no more closures, 
notwithstanding arguments about BSC losses and so forth?  Were they going 
to set themselves, as a Committee, to argue in great detail about the technical, 
economic, commercial and social implications of each closure?  Or, as had 
just been suggested, were they going to press for a renewed Beswick 
exercise?3 
 
Conceding that existing policy was “manifestly unsatisfactory”, the TUCSICC agreed 
to, “reconcile its ‘firefighting’ function with a long-term planning role”.4  Yet there was 
still little consensus over what any new strategy should entail.  The Secretary’s 
intervention prompted a prolonged and characteristically frenzied discussion, with 
each union official offering his own disparate point of view.  Some wanted to block all 
closures until the Government agreed to coordinate another Beswick style tripartite 
review of BSC plans.  Others, meanwhile, sought to sponsor an independent 
consultancy firm to produce an alternative development strategy.  The industrial 
unions, however, waved aside both suggestions, upholding their traditional stance of 
 
3 Minutes of special TUCSICC meeting, 30 June 1978, MRC, MSS.292D/611.41/13. 
4 Minutes of TUCSICC meeting, 10-12 July 1978, MRC, MSS.292D/611.41/13. 
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not interfering in policymaking.  Concerned by the lack of unanimity, Delay offered to 
produce a discussion paper exploring the viability of each proposal.   
  
The document was eventually discussed at a special three-day summit in London in 
late July 1978.  At a meagre six pages, the disconcertingly titled ‘A Policy for Closures’ 
weighed-up the practicalities of five possible policy initiatives: 
 
• resist all closures by any means necessary (except where local workforces 
opted for a redundancy agreement); 
• postpone closures by deliberately prolonging official discussions at national 
level; thus preserving all existing jobs for the maximum possible length of time; 
• debating “in the very greatest detail” each individual closure with industry 
officials; 
• demanding another tripartite investigation comparable to the original Beswick 
Review; 
• and/or hiring an independent consultant to review both BSC’s proposals for 
rationalisation and development.5  
 
The discussion surrounding ‘A Policy for Closures’ reveals ongoing institutional 
discord.  Demands for another state-sanctioned investigation were dismissed due to 
concerns that there was no such political will in Whitehall.  Identifying a lack of 
technological or financial expertise amongst the Steel Committee, one official repeated 
an earlier call for an independent review: 
 
 
5 TUCSICC discussion document: A Policy for Closures, June 1978, MRC, MSS.292D/611.41/13. 
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... there were people available who had greater depth of technical knowledge 
and so forth about steel than any member of the Committee could be expected 
to have, and it seemed only sensible for the Committee to be able to put 
questions to such people.6 
 
Disturbed by the possibility of outside interference, his colleagues steadfastly rejected 
the proposal.  Hector Smith, meanwhile, advocated the concentration of all resources 
on only those works that had any realistic prospect of securing a reprieve: 
 
Mr Smith recalled that he had pressed the Committee repeatedly to seek an 
overall view and not concentrate practically exclusively on one or two works, 
like Shelton, which had taken up a vastly disproportionate amount of the 
Committee’s time, at the expense of other works.  In his view, the Committee 
must decide to secure the long-term future of those works which had a real 
chance of surviving.  This would mean being man enough to accept the 
inevitability of certain closures and then saying this to the members 
concerned.7 
 
Following three days of clashes, a six-tier strategy was finally put on the table: 
 
• respond as early as possible to any closure proposal with relevant comments 
and further questions; 
• schedule preliminary talks with senior industry officials; 
 




• depending on the outcome of said meeting, either formulate a counterproposal 
to closure or prepare for redundancy negotiations at plant-level; 
• present counter proposals to management; 
• if no agreement could be reached, make a formal approach to the Government; 
• once all available options had been exhausted, negotiate closure.8 
 
With little further discussion, the TUCSICC agreed to implement the above plan.  
There would, after all, be no dramatic rethink to the ‘wait and see’ policy, with the new 
strategy representing a compromise between rival organisations that possessed 
conflicting views on how to respond to the Road to Viability.  
 
As the first non-Beswick site on management’s updated closure list, Bilston was a 
strategic piece on a symbolic chess board containing every works outside the Big Five 
and South Yorkshire.  It should have represented a point of departure, but union 
leaders were unable to set aside historic rivalries for the sake of their Black Country 
members.  Sirs had been a keen advocate of the Steel Committee following his 
appointment as Chairman, passionately defending its record to a frustrated rank and 
file: 
 
Arising from the decision to call a Special Executive Council Meeting to discuss 
in depth the role of TUCSICC and to give further consideration to the 
correspondence received from branches and the resolution submitted from the 
National Staff Negotiating Committee, a full discussion ensued on this matter.  
Criticism was expressed at the extension of this Committee’s authority from the 
 
8 TUCSICC discussion document: A Policy for Closures, June 1978, MRC, MSS.292D/611.41/13. 
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original concept of a consultative body, lack of consultation with the lay 
membership and lack of communication and unnecessary delay in dealing with 
proposed changes in existing national agreements.  A view was expressed that 
the Confederation, as the major union in the steel industry, could on its own, 
adequately represent the membership … The General Secretary, replying to 
the points made, re-emphasised the many advantageous agreements reached 
between the BSC/TUCSICC which he pointed out had in the first place been 
approved by the respective Executive Councils of the trade unions concerned 
… He asked for a vote of confidence in the continuation of the Confederation’s 
participation …9 
 
More recently, he had blocked a delegate motion at Scarborough lambasting the Steel 
Committee’s failure to protect the Beswick plants.  However, notwithstanding his 
ongoing support for the umbrella body, Sirs developed a particularly uneasy 
relationship with fellow union officials and the post-Scarborough stand-off was 
dominated by a legal dispute with NUB leader Billy Booth.  Spurning the opportunity 
to set aside their differences, infighting led to the maintenance of a status quo that had 
proven entirely ineffective in the past. 
 
Remodelling the Defence Campaign 
 
As their leaders procrastinated in London, Bilston’s senior shop stewards looked to 
seize the momentum generated at Scarborough by drastically revising their survival 
blueprint.  After closely examining the Road to Viability, they identified a possible 
 
9 Minutes of special ISTC EC meeting, 22 March 1976, MRC, MSS.36/ISTC/4/9. 
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opportunity.  Paragraph 23 of the White Paper stated that decisionmakers would 
concentrate all future capital investment on, “reliable new technology to improve 
product quality and customer service”.10  The enterprising BJUAC leadership, 
therefore, began to investigate alternative production routes, eventually turning their 
attentions to a revolutionary experimental process discovered across the Atlantic.   
 
Known as Q-BOP, it could theoretically be added to Bilston’s existing melting shop 
facility, slashing smelting times and, thereby, production costs.  If installed, the entire 
heavy-end – including the abandoned Blast Furnace Department – could be saved.  
Moreover, as a recent innovation, Q-BOP fitted into policymakers’ new technology 
mantra.  The process was originally brought to the BJUAC’s attention by economist 
Dr. Jonathan Aylen: 
 
The case of Bilston is less clear cut as they have a relatively modern, high 
performance blast furnace.  The best option here is not, perhaps, installation 
of electric arc furnaces to replace their obsolete open-hearth steelmaking, but 
adoption of a recent variant of basic oxygen steelmaking technology using a 
bottom blown vessel [Q-BOP].  These new steelmaking vessels could be fed 
with hot iron from the existing blast furnace.  Providing the new vessels could 
be fitted into the existing open-hearth melting shop, this would offer a relatively 
cheap way of installing new technology in an old plant.  Its adoption in a small-
scale commercial plant would give the British Steel Corporation experience of 
 
10 BSC, The Road to Viability. HMSO Cmnd. 7149, March 1978. 
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a developing technology which, so far, they only been able to test in a pilot 
plant, yet may be adopted in the largest scale plants in the future.11 
 
Having read the University of Salford academic’s proposal, which was printed in a 
letter to The Times, the BJUAC undertook a fact-finding mission of their own.  In July 
1978, the group’s youngest member, Graham Howe, wrote to USW officials in 
Pennsylvania who, in an act of international solidarity, put the Bilston men in touch 
with a pioneering engineer and fraternal brother at USS MaxTech.  After completing a 
remote technological survey, Alan Hutnik confirmed Bilston’s existing set-up could 
indeed be adapted to accommodate the new process.  According to the American, his 
company had recently been commissioned to trial similar technology at an obsolete 
Italian works.12  Seeking to incorporate the process into a new defence plan, the 
BJUAC liaised with both Aylen and engineers at David Ashmore International, the 
owners of Q-BOP’s UK patent.  The former agreed to produce a report exploring the 
practicality and implications of installing the process in the Black Country.  The 
persuasive 16-page paper reasoned there was no technical reason for management 
to object to the concept: 
 
Given its competitive costs, its low output and relatively modern billet mill, the 
Bilston works is suited to producing a wide range of sizes and orders for 
carbon steels in support of another BOS plant elsewhere taking the standard 
sizes and small orders.  But, above all, installation of a bottom blown oxygen 
steelmaking unit at Bilston would provide the BSC with an opportunity to 
 
11 The Times, 17 May 1978. 
12 Letter from A. Hutnik to G. Howe, 13 July 1978, WCA, DW-173/1/4. 
`297 
 
appraise, develop and operate a commercial pilot plant for a new steelmaking 
technology applicable to a wide range of steels including stainless.13  
 
Regarding production costs, it was estimated that Q-BOP would reduce per unit costs 
to those currently being recorded at newer facilities: 
 
… it does seem likely that the Bilston unit would have a conversion cost either 
the same or slightly higher than those of BOS plants elsewhere.  The 
steelmaking costs at Bilston are likely to be between one-third and one-half of 
the conversion costs for the electric arcs currently used for making carbon 
steels.  Considering too the overall costs of steelmaking including raw 
materials, the Bilston works as a whole would show lower overall steelmaking 
costs than electric arc plants if scrap prices were to rise.  Given its low iron 
making costs, the bottom blow oxygen route at Bilston would show an overall 
cost very similar to that enjoyed by established blast furnace/BOS plants 
elsewhere.14 
 
These findings convinced the men to remodel their entire campaign around Q-BOP.  
However, whilst Aylen’s study covered industrial arguments, the BJUAC still needed 
to establish that there was a future market for Bilston steel.  With John Pennington 
disingenuously dismissing their earlier customer survey, they sought independent 
verification from an impartial source.  Dennis Turner persuaded fellow WMCC and 
WMBC officials to sponsor an independent study and, following a hasty procurement 
 
13 J. Aylen, Bottom Blown Oxygen Steelmaking at Bilston, August 1978, WCA, DW-173/1/8, pp. 16-17. 
14 Ibid., p. 16. 
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process, a five-figure contract was awarded to Aston University’s JURUE department, 
headed by Dr. Paul Johnson.   
 
The decision to recruit a team of sympathetic – yet completely impartial – academics 
to help prepare an updated survival plan brought a new level of prestige to the 
campaign.  JURUE, assisted by Aylen, the BJUAC and middle-management, 
produced an interim document challenging management prerogative.  The report 
called for an independent examination of John Pennington’s market share argument: 
 
First, the market share loss figure is regarded by both Bilston and BSC as an 
important item in the closure balance sheet yet widely divergent views are held 
as to its likely size (Pennington – “any loss of tonnage would be marginal if 
properly managed”) – it is therefore important to seek an independent 
viewpoint on this matter; second, a proper examination of this issue should 
enable a good estimate to be made of future demand prospects in the event 
of Bilston not closing down, and hence provide a counterpart to 
technological/costing factors in the full investment appraisal that should be 
carried out before a final decision is reached regarding the future of the 
Works.15 
 
Concluding that there was absolutely no prima facie case to shut Bilston, the report 
called for a delay on all discussions over the future until its authors had delivered a 
final report in March 1979.  Meanwhile, the BJUAC informed the unions, management 
 




and the Government that the local authorities  had commissioned JURUE to undertake 
a full cost benefit analysis of each of the options available; including closure, the JWP’s 
electric arc plan and the BJUAC’s new Q-BOP proposal.   
 
Armed with their revised strategy, the Bilston men looked to publicly refute 
management’s established closure narrative.  Scarborough had previously thrust their 
plight into the national spotlight, providing them with an unprecedented opportunity to 
conduct their own public relations exercise.  Local shop stewards had thereby looked 
to stimulate a wider debate about the future of public sector steel.  Speaking to The 
Guardian, one shop steward extolled the virtues of the works:   
  
We make the biggest ‘rounds (steel bars) in the country.  They were once the 
biggest in Europe.  The biggest in the world even.  We can still make quality 
steel better than anyone else and we can make it at a profit.16 
 
In an interview with The Observer, Turner looked to deconstruct management’s 
overcapacity/overmanning argument: 
 
We could get an order for a five ton ingot and turn it out overnight.  But that’s 
just about four ounces of dolly mixtures in BSC terms … Capacity isn’t the only 
argument.  It’s where that capacity is that also counts – and it’s here in the West 
Midlands – the workshop of the world.  We serve the small men, the small 
 
16 The Guardian, 1 July 1978. 
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forging plants.  We take in each other’s washing.  If we go, that work will fall 
into the hands of the private sector.17 
 
Turner, the public face of the campaign, undoubtedly basked in the media spotlight, 
even persuading the producers of the BBC’s Panorama programme to investigative 
the treatment of the works.  But, with the furore over Scarborough now having settled, 
the BJUAC feared they had lost the opportunity to promote their updated plan at 
national level.  Armed with a new press release, ‘The Bilston Dimension’ or ‘Our 
Answer to BSC’, action committee supporters participated in what was later dubbed 
‘The Fleet Street Occupation’.  Organising wildcat sit-down protests in the reception 
areas of major news outlets in London, the Bilston men targeted influential industrial 
correspondents with their sophisticated document: 
 
And I said to my colleagues, really we’ve got to do more to get our message 
across, we’ve got this case, it’s a wonderful case … So we set out, 250 of us, 
in about five charabancs, you know, five coaches, from here to Fleet Street … 
and we took over, just briefly, every one of the offices of the newspapers, and 
we just went in and just filled the foyer with workers … I mean, you imagine 250 
people, you know, in a reception area, it’s very powerful stuff.18 
 
Persuasively written, the paper began with a message to the press: 
 
 
17 The Observer, 2 July 1978. 
18 Documenting the Workshop of the World, 2007, WCA, LS/LB6/2, p. 18. 
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During these past few weeks, much attention has been focused on the British 
Steel industry with obvious justification.  My Colleagues and I are persuaded to 
write to you since a great amount of your Newspaper Coverage was in fact 
surrounding the Bilston Steel Plant, here in the West Midlands, concerning the 
principled stand taken by the ISTC regarding the unprincipled way BSC 
proposed dealing with the Bilston current/future situation.19   
 
The authors also drew readers’ attention to the reasons for Bilston’s superior financial 
performance and commercial viability: 
 
The greatest significance of these figures [Bilston’s profitability] with which we 
hope you would agree is that in extremes of Market Demand profitability can 
be sustained by the speed and flexibility of the small, integrated plant, where 
adjustment and adaptation can be more practically and manageably applied.20 
 
The Bilston Dimension subsequently highlighted the market share argument: 
  
There have been many reasons for this and a significant one is, that almost 
all plant closures have led to some loss of orders.  If Bilston Works is closed 
down this would undoubtedly happen again.  The amount of market share 
BSC would lose in such circumstances is open to debate but the Commercial 
personnel closest to customers [sic] Buyers are convinced that it would be a 
significant percentage of Bilston’s current order load.  We feel that BSC cannot 
 




afford to continue to take actions which erode it’s [sic] market share any 
further.  The Working Party report on Bilston, very clearly demonstrated that 
relatively modest investment at Bilston with one Electric Arc furnace or Q BOP 
would enable the market share to be maintained at a very healthy profit to the 
Corporation.  Losing this would add to the profitability of private sector 
producers, not only in this country but also abroad – can we afford yet further 
increases in steel imports?21 
 
It also readdressed the overcapacity issue, informing the press of the immorality of 
management’s policy of requisitioning their hard-earned orders: 
 
The overcapacity developed elsewhere is through no fault of Bilston and is 
relevant to the past outlook in respect to those other works and their projected 
order loads.  In pressing for the continuance of Bilston, we are not asking that 
orders be taken from other works, we are only saying that we should have the 
right to retain orders we have traditionally had and be allowed to continue to 
increase them.22 
 
Believing there was a general election on the horizon, the BJUAC shrewdly appealed 
to the British taxpayer.  Using data presented by JURUE’s interim study, they 




23 It was calculated closure would reduce the Corporation’s losses by less than 0.5 per cent.  See Ibid. 
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The Bilston Dimension concluded with a heartfelt plea, describing the human impact 
of closure and, moreover, the immorality of state sanctioned unemployment: 
 
We must of course, always be wary of purely financial considerations, in the 
full analysis a profit is only ‘positive’ in this human world if it is used to improve 
human satisfaction.  If that profit has been created by increasing human 
misery through redundancies and closures then the final result in terms of 
human satisfaction will undoubtedly be a negation of all that our society 
regards as purposeful and civilised progress.24 
 
The effect of the media campaign was clear, with the BJUAC – and Turner in particular 
– cultivating a much closer relationship with some of Fleet Street’s more sympathetic 
journalists.  The Financial Times, The Observer and The Irish Times each ran 
favourable stories on the fight for steelmaking, whilst also scrutinising the behaviour 
of management.  The Guardian’s Peter Hildrew eventually made a personal visit to 
Bilston, prompting an article that highlighted the hopes and fears of the local 
community.  The piece also outlined the benefits of significant capital investment, 
whilst underscoring the ongoing popularity of Bilston steel.25  Hildrew, whose feature 
included Turner’s favourite William Morris quote, clearly admired the charismatic 
steelman, describing him as an “impressive figure”.26  Two other journalists who 
developed a close friendship with the BJUAC Chairman were Paul Routledge and 
 
24 Ibid. 
25 The Guardian, 6 December 1978. 
26 Ibid.  
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Geoffrey Goodman, with the latter crediting him for convincing his Fleet Street team 
of the moral justice of his crusade.27   
 
The media exposure briefly captured the public’s imagination, with the action 
committee receiving messages of support from across the UK.  Beyond the public 
sphere, the new survival plan also earned the backing of industry experts, with the 
editor of The Engineer publishing a favourable multi-page spread on the potential of 
Q-BOP steelmaking in the Black Country.28  Nonetheless, if Bilston’s steelmen were 
to triumph, they still needed assistance from Congress House.  Richard Hyman, in his 
Industrial Relations: A Marxist Approach, has identified the importance of securing the 
support of national trade union elites: 
 
In a major dispute, success may depend on support from outside the plant in 
terms of financial aid, respect for picket lines, or blacking.  (External aid is 
particularly crucial in conflicts over large-scale redundancy or closure, when the 
workplace organisation alone is in an unusually weak position).  Effective 
mobilisation of outside support normally requires some organisation through 
unofficial channels; but it is easier to achieve when a stoppage has official union 
support.29 
        
 
27 Letter from G. Goodman to D. Turner, 1 May 1979, WCA, DW-173/1/10. 
28 The Engineer, 28 September 1978. 
29 Hyman, Industrial Relations, p. 168. 
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Within the trade union movement, the plan received the backing of Robert Muir, leader 
of SIMA.  His most senior Bilston member, Frank Chaney, reiterated middle-
management’s support for the new proposal in a statement to the press: 
 
We are completely in sympathy with the action committee’s right to stop British 
Steel closing the works.  We have our livelihood [sic] to think of and we have 
a common cause with the shop floor workers.  We must make a stand 
together.30 
 
At an extra-ordinary branch meeting, Bilston’s approximately 75 SIMA members 
thereby passed a controversial resolution attacking policymakers: 
 
We ask National Council and the General Secretary to endeavour to make 
BSC justify this policy and hope that all relevant parties will bear in mind that 
whilst high management ‘flounder’ to their decisions, plants like Bilston Works 
are being inhibited for giving a good quality and flexible, repeat flexible, service 
to many ‘small order’ customers and at the same time are putting the livelihood 
of many of the corporations [sic] employees at risk.31 
 
Muir himself backed his Bilston members’ stance with an open letter to Sir Charles 
Villiers.  Threatening to call his entire membership out on strike, he launched into an 
unprecedented attack on Grosvenor Place, “It is not the habit of mangers to indulge in 
any kind of public criticism of BSC unless and until its loyalty and credibility has given 
 
30 The Express and Star, 5 July 1978. 
31 Letter from F. Chaney to R. Muir, 21 July 1978, MRC, 755/4/4/5. 
`306 
 
way to a judgement that the high command was no longer in control”.32  At a 
subsequent conference in Watford, his National Executive pledged to resist closure at 
all costs.  Although a formal endorsement from SIMA was a positive step, the middle-
management union was blacklisted by the TUC.  The new survival blueprint still 
required the formal backing of the Steel Committee.  This, the Bilston men discovered, 
would prove a much more difficult task than first envisioned. 
 
The Delay Paper 
 
Notwithstanding the failure of the TUCSICC to establish a new national defence 
strategy, Bill Sirs and the ISTC were much more active in the wake of Scarborough.  
In August 1978, a delegation from Swinton House at last visited the Black Country.  
Impressed by the work of Aylen and JURUE, they agreed to throw their full weight 
behind Q-BOP.   
 
At an ensuing press conference, Sirs told journalists that he saw the battle for Bilston 
as a trial of strength, warning management to “tread carefully”.33  A day later, 
addressing his union’s reconvened ADC, he defiantly proclaimed the plant 
represented a “dividing line”; promising his efforts on behalf of Bilston would, “set the 
pattern for all future action”.34  In a break in procedure, he ended his speech by calling 
on BSC to modify its approach to development by investing in mini-works.  Then, in a 
pledge that brought a sense of relief to the BJUAC leaders, the industry’s most 
 
32 The Birmingham Post, 5 July 1978. 




powerful General Secretary promised to force Grosvenor Place and Whitehall into 
abandoning their step-by-step approach to rationalisation.  
 
The BJUAC would benefit from the personal backing of some of the Confederation’s 
most senior officials.  Bill Irvine, head of the union’s Scottish chapter, offered the full 
“support and solidarity” of his members, advising the Bilston men to maintain open 
communications with Swinton House: 
 
Another danger is not to tell your EC members in the division what is going on, 
the communication in Scotland in this respect were poor, and we were unable 
to push the case for non-closure of Glengarnock at EC level, because, as EC 
members we were left in the dark as to the genuine wishes of the workforce.  
Please do not allow this to happen in No.4 division, so that your E.C. members 
can give you the assistance you seriously require and deserve.35 
 
Reflecting on closures in Scotland, Irvine provided a cautionary tale: 
 
In Scotland we have recently gone through the traumatic experience of the 
closure (partial) of Glengarnock Works, an event, given the initial attitude and 
determination of the workforce, that I thought could never happen.  But happen 
it did, due solely to the severance pay incentives offered by the BSC.  Indeed, 
at some point last week, it looked like even the 250 jobs to remain the remaining 
mill, would not be manned, so great was the rush to get out of the industry.  If 
 
35 Letter from B. Irvine to G. Fazey, 21 December 1978, WCA, DW-173/1/2. 
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you can persuade your members that this is not the answer and that they are 
selling jobs, which are not theirs to sell, then you will have success.36 
 
There was, nevertheless, still the small matter of convincing the remaining steel unions 
of the merits of Q-BOP.  Acting on Sirs’ advice, the BJUAC decided to lobby a special 
Steel Committee meeting at Congress in September 1978.  One of the most 
memorable events of the entire conference was a speech made by Round Oak 
steelworker and BJUAC supporter Jack Bates: 
 
No one can put a price on the human misery, the deprivation, the break-up of 
family and community life which the closure will create.  Since 1973, Bilston has 
made a profit every year of between £3 million and £7 million.  Last October, 
the BSC put the Blast Furnace into ‘Mothballs’ after spending ¾ million £’s on 
reline.  This action effectively wiped out Bilston’s profits in order to temporarily 
improve the Corporation’s cash flow position.  Now BSC argue that Bilston is 
unprofitable and must be closed.  These are the economics of a madhouse ... 
Mr President, on behalf of Bilston’s steel workers – their families – their future 
– their community I would request that the Steel Committee in their future 
discussions on Bilston with the British Steel Corporation and Secretary of State 
for Industry press for the retention of steelmaking at Bilston … If an impartial 
inquiry [the JURUE report] finds that Bilston is a viable concern and the BSC 
continue to insist on closure for short-term financial considerations, then the 
steel workers of Bilston – indeed the steel workers throughout Britain – will 





Bilston in operation, otherwise there will be no steel industry left to talk about at 
future congresses.37 
 
For the remainder of the conference, a Bilston deputation that included a group of 
female office workers dubbed ‘The Brighton Belles’, stalked TUCSICC officials as they 
made their way around the Brighton Centre.  On the final day, when arriving for an 
extraordinary meeting, steel union leaders were greeted by a boisterous welcome 
committee.   
 
Permitted to enter, a small delegation presented the Q-BOP proposal, with BJUAC 
leaders specifically targeting NUB officials Hector Smith and Billy Booth.  Before 
departing, the Bilston men handed over a written list of demands, the most significant 
of which called for the, “full support of the TUC Steel Committee the retention of the 
Bilston plant”.38  Left to their own devices, the TUCSICC discussed the relative merits 
of Q-BOP.  One official raised doubts over its practicality, highlighting the failure of 
similar processes at private sector facilities elsewhere.  Another voiced specific 
concerns over the expertise of the BJUAC’s academic allies.  The unpredictable Smith, 
who had previously revealed a willingness to sacrifice Bilston as a means of protecting 
members employed at the Big Five, nevertheless, softened his position.  Clearly 
impressed by the action committee presentation and JURUE’s interim report, he now 
called on his fellow General Secretaries to defend the works: 
 
 
37 J. Bate, Speech to TUC Congress, undated, ITSOE, BCA1/5. 
38 Questions to be submitted to the TUCSICC, 7 September 1978, WCA, DW-173/1/4. 
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Mr Smith said that the Committee had to decide very firmly whether they were 
prepared to make a stand on Bilston which, in principle, he believed should be 
kept open, unless either BSC made out a case that was in fact unanswerable 
and provided the pressures on the workers did not become intolerable.39   
 
With the production unions on board, the remaining Steel Committee officials were left 
with no option but to withdraw their earlier opposition.  Following the meeting, a 
spokesperson emphasised the strategic importance of retaining Bilston, “What 
happens thereafter in the industry depends on what happens at Bilston ... the future 
of the industry is at stake”.40 
 
In accordance with Congress House’s post-Scarborough strategy, Sirs asked Dennis 
Delay to produce a detailed working paper to discuss with BSC officials via the JPC.  
Over the coming weeks, the relationship between Congress House and the Bilston 
men reached its zenith, with Delay making regular trips to the West Midlands to 
discuss a dual strategy.  The men also benefitted from the assistance of Hector Smith 
and the NUB.  The action committee were becoming concerned by the effect the GWW 
was having on the mindset of the plant’s blast furnacemen.  Following David Hunter’s 
transfer, a significant number of his former workmen had resigned.  The loss of these 
skilled and experienced workers was a major blow, particularly with hot metal 
production now being a vital component of the Q-BOP plan.  When concerns were 
 
39 Minutes of TUCSICC meeting, 7 September 1978, MRC, MSS.292D/611.41/13.  Unlike the JWP’s 
electric arc proposal, the new Q-BOP scheme called for the relighting of Elisabeth and, therefore, the 
retention of the plant’s 120 NUB members. 
40 The Guardian, 8 September 1978. 
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raised by his Bilston members, Smith renegotiated a wage deal whereby they would 
be paid 100 per cent standard earnings for the remainder of the plant’s lifespan.   
 
The steel union leaders also began to advocate the Bilston case nationally.  At the 
October 1978 Labour Party conference, they submitted a composite motion calling on 
the NEC and PLP to back a proposed moratorium on all planned closures.41  Alluding 
to the Elisabeth decision, the resolution demanded the Government veto any decisions 
directly resulting from mismanagement.  Union officials also forced through an 
emergency debate on the industry.  In what proved to be an extremely controversial 
speech, the ISTC’s Assistant General Secretary took aim at the Government for 
reneging on their 1973 manifesto pledge.  Current policy, he charged, would lead to 
the creation of steel ghost towns.42 
 
Away from the conference hall, the TUCSICC Secretary busied himself preparing the 
so-called ‘Delay Paper’; a report that, by combining the findings and recommendations 
of the JWP, JURUE and Bilston Dimension documents, established the best possible 
case for retention.  Expanding on previous commercial arguments, it revealed 
additional empirical evidence that established how the plant’s close personal relations 
with UK steel users had resulted from decades of excellent customer service.43  This 
included the results of a detailed Aston University-sponsored survey demonstrating 
how BSC would lose a significant proportion of its Black Country orders with the 
closure of Bilston.  Underscoring this independently verified claim were personal 
 
41 The overambitious resolution also demanded back pay for all out of work former BSC employees 
released after the Road to Viability. 
42 Man and Metal, December 1978. 
43 TUCSICC, The Delay Paper, September 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/4. 
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testimonies from local steel users raising concerns over the quality of steel sourced 
elsewhere.  The Delay Paper went onto criticise Mount officials for the manner in which 
they had mismanaged the special steels sector over the past decade.  Contrasting 
Sheffield Division’s financial record to that of Bilston’s, it drew attention to the 
discriminatory commercial policies implemented since reorganisation.   
 
The document continued by scrutinising management’s established overcapacity 
argument.  Casting doubts on Grosvenor Place’s ability to accurately forecast future 
demand, it established how the issue was far less pronounced in the world carbon 
steels market.  Delay also charged that any improvement in capacity utilisation 
resulting from Bilston’s closure would be negligible, due to the limited productive 
capability of the facility.  The paper concluded by demanding no local action should be 
taken by management until JURUE had delivered its forthcoming study into the 
feasibility of new steelmaking equipment. 
 
The Corporation Strikes Back 
 
Following their humbling at Scarborough, senior industry officials initially adopted a 
soft-pedal approach towards Bilston; instead focusing their energies on securing the 
closure of Glengarnock, the final Beswick plant in Scotland.  However, BSC soon 
returned to the Black Country.  In September 1978, with weekly losses hitting an 
astonishing £15m, Sir Charles Villiers bemoaned the financial impact the enforced 
retention of the likes of Bilston was having on public coffers.44  After informing the 
national press that the works had already recorded a £1.3m deficit in the current 
 
44 Projected losses for that year were set at an eye watering £680m. 
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financial year, he revealed that he would do everything in his power to eliminate such 
losses.  The Grosvenor Place press machine also leaked figures claiming the annual 
cost of keeping older, redundant facilities in operation equated to roughly £10,000 per 
employee.45  Then, seeking to undermine the BJUAC’s recently-revealed Q-BOP plan, 
he told the BBC’s ‘This Week’ programme that both his organisation and the 
Government saw no future for the facility in any capacity whatsoever.46  The interview 
elicited an angry riposte from the unions:  
 
Nationwide publicity has been given to the closure situation by the BSC which 
now hangs like the sword of Damocles over the heads of the Bilston workforce.  
Despite the action taken following the National Delegate Conference, the BSC 
Chairman made it quite clear in a TV broadcast … that Bilston was still a target 
area for closures, irrespective of the working parties alternative proposals and 
the social consequences, closure would mean for the area.  This is a 
declaration of intent before either case has been heard by the Steel Committee, 
and must in fact, generate a thought as to the state of industrial relations which 
now exists between the workforce and the BSC.  It is a bitter pill to swallow 
when the Chairman of a nationalised industry can categorically state, 
regardless of social consequences, closures must proceed and quickly, and 
then go on to say that if the present strategy is unsuccessful by 1980 he would 
not be in the driving seat anyway, as his contract would ended.  Life, however, 
has to go on in the communities and the disruption created in the lifestyle of our 
 
45 At the same time, Grosvenor Place refused to address press rumours that they were seeking to sack 
140,000 workers.  See The Sunday Telegraph, 24 September 1978. 
46 Concerned by negative press, Villiers also blocked the BBC’s Panorama team from filming at Bilston, 
thereby prompting producers to cancel the show at the eleventh hour.     
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membership cannot be assessed in the cash compensation terms.  The sugar 
coat on the cyanide pill makes little difference to the ultimate result.47 
 
Away from the cameras, during a chance meeting at a Divisional conference on joint 
consultation, an impudent Villiers looked to coerce his Bilston employees into 
surrendering their livelihoods.  The astonishing exchange was reported to the Works 
Council by action committee leader John Booth: 
 
I shall remember his words for many years.  He told us we were a beautiful 
workforce – a marvellous set of chaps – but we should go back to our members 
and cushion the blow.  We should negotiate, start a new life, get new jobs, and 
invest our money in little cottages in the country.48  
 
This particular episode reveals how, even after Scarborough, senior BSC officials were 
still looking to bypass formal consultation arrangements.  Meanwhile, back in Bilston, 
divisional management undermined performance even further.  As lower grade pig 
iron poured into the melting shop, local shop stewards discovered that 10,000 tonnes 
of cold plate originally produced by ‘Big Lizzie’ was sitting idly in a South Yorkshire 
stockyard.  John Pennington, who refused to release the material, was accused of 
malice by an incandescent Dennis Turner: 
 
This, I think, you would agree, contrasts strongly with the BSC Sheffield 
Agreement for ‘Moth-balling’ the Blast Furnace, which was that the BSC could 
 
47 Minutes of ISTC EC meeting, 16-18 August 1978, MRC, MSS.36/ISTC/4/10.  
48 The Steel News: Bilston and Wolverhampton Edition, 31 August 1978.  
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not find any outlet for our surplus iron-make during the recession.  It further, 
clearly demonstrates that there can no longer be any legitimate reason for BSC 
refusing to re-light the Bilston Blast Furnace immediately, unless of course their 
motivation is, and has been, throughout, to cost [sic] Bilston in the worst 
possible light to achieve their spiteful objective.49 
 
Bilston’s steelmen were also forced to depend on low-grade oil which, alongside the 
imported cold metal, heavily reduced the operational lifespan of each OH furnace.  
There was also a renewed attack on earnings.  Craft workers, including the BJUAC’s 
Frank Robinson, were threatened with the GWW.  Promotions were banned, with 
senior production workers handed additional duties without remuneration.  
Management also refused to admit any new apprentices, leading to the partial closure 
of Bilston’s prized training centre.50 
 
Having prepared the ground for a renewed assault, Grosvenor Place opened talks with 
the TUCSICC via the much maligned JPC.  The first meeting ended on a surprisingly 
positive note, with senior industry officials agreeing to discuss the Q-BOP plan with 
Aylen in person.  The November 1978 talks, however, proved to be a particularly tense 
affair, with disinterested management deliberately adopting a contumacious manner.51  
By erroneously claiming that his organisation already possessed a full working 
knowledge of the “well-established” process, one senior BSC official dismissed the 
 
49 Letter from D. Turner to unknown, 3 November 1978, WCA, DW-173/1/4. 
50 The works also continued to suffer from BSC’s discriminatory personnel policy, as the last cohort of 
trainees were cherry-picked by Sheffield Division.  Janet Sadler, a Bilston girl who had recently received 
a BA in metallurgy, was head-hunted by Rotherham works. 
51 In a letter to Dennis Turner summarising the meeting, Aylen described John Pennington as an 
“awkward adversary”.  See Letter from J. Aylen to D. Turner, 19 November 1978, WCA, DW-173/1/8. 
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need to pilot the technology in the Black Country.52  A composed Aylen, nonetheless, 
contended that his counterparts had little more than a basic theoretical knowledge of 
the method, highlighting the practicality of developing a broader operating experience 
at a fully-integrated OH works.  Ignoring Aylen’s standpoint, management bemoaned 
overall cost projections, which were estimated to be a staggering £17.2m.  The 
BJUAC’s ally, however, later baulked at this figure: 
 
As I suggested on the phone, the real dispute between us is mainly with regard 
to the economics of the scheme.  I suspect their scheme is unduly lavish 
knowing the BSC.  They were very cagey indeed about revealing any details of 
their proposals.  As a next step, I think we ought to insist that they reveal more 
of their scheme and we ought to consider very seriously whether it is worth 
calling in an outside consultant to compile an alternative scheme.53 
 
It came as little surprise when, only days later, the two sides of the JPC failed to come 
to a consensus over Q-BOP.  The experiment was yet another example of managerial 
subterfuge: like the earlier JWP exercise, a red herring devised to give the impression 
of full and meaningful consultation.  As was the case with double-end firing and electric 
arc steelmaking, however, BSC only ever gave a cursory glance at their employees’ 
counterproposals, having absolutely no intention of altering the basis of their 
development strategy.  With talks in London stalling, the action committee and their 
supporters became incredibly frustrated.  A flyer produced with the express permission 
of local shop stewards revealed a clear dissatisfaction with the JPC, describing it as 
 
52 Meeting to discuss Q-BOP steelmaking at Bilston, 8 November 1978, WCA, DW-173/1/8. 
53 Letter from J. Aylen to D. Turner, 19 November 1978, WCA, DW-173/1/8. 
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a, “tool of BSC to push through more plant closures, to weaken still further Trade Union 
and shop-floor organisation and demoralise resistance to bosses [sic] plans”.54 
 
These frustrations came to a head during the ‘Day of Action’, an event the BJUAC 
organised alongside the WB&DTUC.55  The mass rally attracted 3,500 protestors and 
was an altogether different affair to previous events such as the March on London or 
the Fleet Street Occupation.  Some attendees antagonised police officers, as radical 
left-wing groups handed-out flyers encouraging workers to engage in violent direct 
action.  The SCLV, for example, called on protestors to strike in support of Bilston: 
 
These vital elements of workers control will not be conceded lightly.  They can 
only be won by mass direct action, by the solidarity action of other local workers 
like that offered by the Wolverhampton FBU and by engineering workers ... but 
only if it is combined with strike action by other shop stewards in support of an 
occupation of the Bilston plant.56 
 
In doing so, they encouraged the formation of “worker defence squads” to prevent 
attacks from state agents: 
 
Politically as long as the bosses have at their disposal the police and the army, 
the special strike busting squads like the SPG and the SAS every militant 
 
54 SCLV pamphlet, 11 September 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/3, p. 1. 
55 The organising committee also included representatives from the FBU, the AUEW, the SCLV, the 
SWP, the CPGB and the IWP.  Wolverhampton’s firemen were known for their militancy and had 
recently participated in prolonged strike action. 
56 SCLV pamphlet, 11 September 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/3, p. 1. 
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struggle will be at risk.  Pickets must be developed into workers defence squads 
capable of resisting the vicious attacks of the police – of the kind seen at 
Grunwick last year.57   
 
The event featured a symbolic strike and culminated with a speech from Turner placing 
Bilston in the context of the wider de-industrialisation of the UK: 
 
I believe we are going to win the battle for Bilston and at the same time win a 
battle for every one of us.  If BSC breaks the spirit of the Bilston men, thousands 
of jobs will go as though they never existed.58 
 
In the post-steel period, the Day of Action would have a major impact on Turner’s 
future career as a political activist and Parliamentarian, but for now it provided little 
more than a temporary respite for beleaguered steelworkers.  Days later, the BJUAC 
received word from Congress House.  With the JPC experiment having failed, 
Grosvenor Place had placed the short-term future of Bilston on the agenda of their 





With management forced into a temporary withdrawal following their humbling at 
Scarborough, TUCSICC officials were handed what would prove to be one final 
 
57 Ibid. 
58 The Express and Star, 12 September 1978. 
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opportunity to coordinate a collective, inter-organisational national defence strategy 
on behalf of surviving older works.  As the first non-Beswick site on the Corporation’s 
growing closure list, Bilston should have taken on a symbolic status for the unions, 
representing a dividing line between past cooperation and future resistance.  
Institutional disharmony, however, kept the Steel Committee in a state of fragmented 
impotence.  With little consensus over what any revamped strategy should entail, they 
merely maintained a firefighting approach that had proven itself to be wholly ineffective 
in the past. 
 
With their leaders in London vacillating, local steelmen once again sought to seize the 
initiative for themselves.  Having remodelled their entire campaign on a revolutionary 
steelmaking technique, they enlisted a team of prestigious academics and industry 
experts to prepare yet another survival blueprint.  Armed with new, impartial evidence, 
the Bilston men participated in direct action, occupying Fleet Street in an efficacious 
attempt to forge a closer relationship with sympathetic industrial correspondents.  This 
sophisticated manipulation of the press provided the action committee with a national 
stage from which they publicly exposed the intellectual weaknesses of management’s 
established overcapacity/overmanning narrative. 
 
Despite receiving the backing of a variety of key actors, including the Executives of 
SIMA, the ISTC and other industry insiders, the BJUAC struggled to secure the formal 
endorsement of the remaining TUCSICC affiliated unions.  In what was a frustrating 
and time-consuming process, the expert lobbyists were forced to petition leaders at 
Brighton, eventually receiving the support of Congress House.  Over the coming 
weeks, the relationship between Steel Committee leaders and the action committee 
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reached a high-water mark, with their Executives advocating the Bilston case a 
national level. 
 
Armed with the Delay Paper, the TUCSICC opened talks with management via the 
JPC.  The Corporation, nonetheless, were determined to undermine the campaign, 
continuing to rundown the plant whilst directing another entirely pointless consultation 
experiment.  Like the JWP, the JPC was devised to give the impression of full and 
meaningful consultation in order to placate the TUCSICC and the Government.  This 
cynical act of subterfuge worked, with Whitehall and the unions too easily acceding to 
Grosvenor Place’s incomprehensible dismissal of the Q-BOP plan. 
 
Rank and file steelworkers’ growing frustrations with the JPC exercise, management 
behaviour, their Government and the impotence of union leaders spilled over at the 
Day of Action, a protest that was marred by threats of violence towards state agents.  
Indeed, the next chapter investigates what proved to be a turbulent final phase in the 
battle for iron and steelmaking, with the plant’s traditionally moderate shop stewards 





Chapter 7: Hot Words, Cold Actions 
 
This chapter provides a comprehensive account of the final stage of the battle for iron 
and steelmaking.  It begins by chronicling Grosvenor Place’s response to continued 
shop-floor resistance following the rejection of the men’s most recent counterproposal.  
Having failed to secure a negotiated closure by conventional means, management 
sought to destroy local solidarity by using the prospect of a golden handshake to divide 
Bilston’s beleaguered workforce into two warring camps.   
 
The nature and success of this insidious plot is examined.  As are the strategies 
employed by an increasingly desperate BJUAC leadership team seeking to thwart 
these illicit overtures.  It is revealed how, by reluctantly undertaking radical militant 
action, this customarily moderate breed of shop steward secured a temporary stay of 
execution.  With the TUCSICC withdrawing its support following the failure of Q-BOP, 
the BJUAC turned to Bill Sirs who, after a frustrating period of indolence, belatedly 
threw his hat in the ring.  The suitability of his abortive Bilston defence strategy is 
critiqued, as is a Whitehall-backed management decision to reject the action 
committee’s final counterproposal, the JURUE report.  The chapter concludes by 
demonstrating how the BJUAC eventually lost authority amongst some sections of the 
shop-floor, prompting the campaign to disintegrate from within. 
 
The Plant Takeover 
 
Upon entering Grosvenor Place for the December 1978 showdown talks, the BJUAC 
and their union leaders were met by a BSC negotiating team in an uncompromising 
mood.  Announcing a projected £151m half-year loss, Robert Scholey revealed the 
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BSC board had formally ratified the JPC’s decision to reject Q-BOP steelmaking.1  A 
querulous Chief Executive, bemoaning the fact that consultation had lasted for over a 
year, suggested the time had now come for the men to consider a negotiated closure.  
Black Bob strategically reminded his counterparts that a generous compensation 
package awaited any Bilston members willing to immediately relinquish their 
livelihoods.2  Raising the stakes even further, he produced a prospective unilateral 
February 1979 order for the dampening down of two of the melting shop’s three 
remaining OH furnaces.  Referring to the September 1977 two-part, plantwide 
resolution, Dennis Turner responded by confirming the action committee didn’t 
possess a mandate to negotiate closure on the workforce’s behalf; though he agreed 
to take the advanced redundancy offer back to colleagues, as per established 
consultancy arrangements.  Following an intervention from ISTC-affiliated TUCSICC 
officials, Scholey grudgingly agreed to adjourn national talks until he had received a 
copy of the final JURUE report.   
 
Arriving back in the West Midlands, the BJUAC called on a mass meeting to, “fight for 
every last bit of slag”.3  A defiant Turner convinced attendees to raise their hands in 
support of a plantwide resolution rejecting Scholey’s offer, as well as his order to 
reduce steelmaking operations.  Copies were immediately forwarded to Eric Varley, 
Grosvenor Place and Congress House. 
 
 
1 By the end of the financial year BSC had lost £309m.  See BSC, Annual Report and Accounts 1978/9 
(London, 1979), p. 7. 
2 The BJUAC were also warned that they risked receiving a diminished redundancy package unless a 
deal was agreed in a timely fashion. 
3 The Steel News: Bilston and Wolverhampton Edition, 14 December 1978. 
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The Corporation, frustrated by the result of the mass meeting, responded by seeking 
to strong-arm vulnerable sections of the workforce into a surrender.  Adopting a range 
of tactics, the primary objective was to undermine prevailing solidarity with talk of 
record-breaking redundancy cheques.  The first indication of management engaging 
in what local shop stewards described as “skulduggery” came in the form of a written 
notice alerting workers to the financial windfall currently being enjoyed by Shelton 
workers.4  The Corporation’s finely tuned propaganda machine then clicked into 
another gear, using the plant’s internal newswire to spread the very same message.  
When angry workers unplugged telephone lines, management raised the stakes even 
further: 
 
British Steel had got a recording [system] in the Training Centre ... They’d 
[management] set up a scrambling propaganda machine to tell workers all the 
time what they were likely to expect in the way of redundancy payment, 
encouraging them to throw the towel in, it was real Goebbels propaganda; it 
was, really.  And it was churned out through the Tannoy system twenty-four 
hours a day, this propaganda.  I knew that people felt very passionately about 
this, and how it was seeking to destroy our will, creating uncertainty and 
generally debilitating our campaign.5   
 
These tactics signalled a new stage in BSC’s bid to secure an expedited closure, 
representing an altogether more insidious attempt to split the workforce.  Graham 
Fazey, however, revealed this had the opposite impact: 
 
4 Letter from P. Watts to W. Sirs, 15 December 1978, MRC, MSS.36/2000/282. 




Also enclosed, herewith, a copy of the Telephone News Service Broadcast on 
the plant Friday last which we can only interpret as firstly to mislead the 
workforce on what actually did take place at the Steel Committee meeting with 
BSC on Wednesday, and secondly to offer a cheap bribe for our jobs, which 
presumably BSC thought that by throwing a few handfuls of corn, Bilston would 
come tumbling into their pigeon loft!  If this was their hope you may inform them 
that this devious ploy has been extremely counter-productive and has totally 
consolidated the workforce’s resolve to resolutely oppose closure.6 
 
In fact, the final sentence of Fazey’s dispatch masked widespread concerns over how 
the Corporation’s sinister actions were indeed impacting the mindset of some of the 
men.  Immediate and decisive action was required.  Unable to obstruct the internal 
spread of information, Turner used the press to draw attention to the immorality of 
management’s recent conduct.  Speaking to The Financial Times, he complained 
about their “devious” behaviour, whilst sending a message of defiance to Grosvenor 
Place, “We are still in negotiation.  If the Corporation thinks we will sell our souls for 
chicken feed, they have another thing coming”.7  
 
Predictably, Turner’s protest fell on deaf ears.  At a subsequent Works Council 
meeting it was revealed The Mount had ordered the reduction of steelmaking as per 
Scholey’s December 1978 communique.  John Booth responded by launching an 
unprecedented attack on Works Manager Stan Bull for doing Grosvenor Place’s 
 
6 Letter from G. Fazey to W. Sirs, undated, ITSOE, BCA1/5. 
7 The Financial Times, 12 December 1978. 
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bidding.8  Bull, nevertheless, ordered the premature withdrawal of one OH furnace, 
claiming it had become unstable.  However, when inspecting the melting shop for 
themselves, workers discovered the vessel was simply suffering from a minor 
technical issue.  Ignoring fervent protests, management forged ahead with the order.   
 
These cynical actions prompted the BJUAC to adopt a much more militant position 
than at any other point in the campaign.  This began with Turner threatening to 
withhold a lucrative order destined for China.9  When BSC ignored the warning, senior 
shop stewards met to ascertain what radical action could be undertaken to maintain 
steelmaking operations until the arrival of JURUE report.  It was agreed that, with the 
wider workforce’s permission, they would repair and relight the furnace in question.  
Consent was sought via another mass meeting.  At the gathering steelmen were 
greeted by the unusual sight of Turner donning a safety helmet and fire-proof overalls.  
After intentionally firing-up his audience with talk of “industrial sabotage”, a show of 
hands gave the BJUAC a slight mandate to enter the melting shop.  The BJUAC 
Chairman then led the huddled mass to Bilston town-centre, where market day 
shoppers cheered as he declared:  
 
 
8 Booth’s protest sparked a mass walkout, thereby bringing an end to the Bilston Works Council, an 
institution first established by S&L decades prior.  Within days all plant-level joint consultation 
mechanisms were abandoned as the relationship between local management and Bilston’s trade 
unionists broke down completely.  See Minutes of Bilston Works Council meeting, 17 January 1979, 
ITSOE, BCA1/2. 
9 The order was of considerable commercial and strategic value to BSC as it was part of a multi-million-
pound contract negotiated with Chinese Communist Government.  When making the threat, the BJUAC 
Chairman knew Bilston’s mill operatives were the only steelmen in the UK capable of producing semi-
finished steel products to that specification.   
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We are not going to be led like sheep to a pen.  We will fight with every ounce 
of strength we have to maintain the works at full production.  British Steel will 
not cheat us out of our right to work.10   
 
Returning from the impromptu rally, Turner was met by Bull and two unfamiliar faces: 
 
... but then the next thing was, straightaway there was a demand for me to 
attend the General Manager’s office, which was right in the heart of the plant, 
near to where we were, and so I went and there were two factory inspectors 
that had come to tell me that we had no right to be there and we were breaching 
all of the Factory Acts in terms of health and safety, and whatever.11 
 
Much to their surprise, the enterprising steelworker had already arranged for insurance 
cover for his repair team.  Management now played their final card, presenting Turner 
with a formal order: 
 
A number of employees at Bilston are repairing or intending to repair this 
furnace and it should be understood quite clearly that this is contrary to the 
Corporation’s instructions.  Consequently, you are warned that any employee 
who is involved with the repair or later re-commissioning or any other activity 
on the furnace is acting in breach of his contract of employment and renders 
himself liable to immediate loss of pay and, if such involvement continues, to 
summary dismissal for gross misconduct without further warning.  The effect of 
 
10 The Express and Star, 31 January 1979. 
11 Documenting the Workshop of the World, 2007, WCA, LS/LB6/2, pp. 14-15. 
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such termination would be that amongst other things you would not be entitled 
to any benefits relating to redundancy or additional severance pay.12 
 
BSC, however, had again underestimated the strength of the BJUAC’s determination.  
There would be no climbdown.  A repair team immediately went ahead and fixed the 
furnace.  Meanwhile, in what was undoubtedly an incredibly cathartic act, some of the 
campaign’s most ardent supporters forced their way into the Training Centre and 
dismantled the notorious PA system.  With management’s authority completely 
undermined, the action committee leadership exploited the situation even further.  
Over the next 24-hours they oversaw a partial plant takeover, shutting down internal 
communications. 
 
Although an incredible amount of anger was generated by BSC’s recent actions, these 
acts of disobedience were entirely conscience-stricken.  Upon assuming control of 
production, shop stewards encouraged fellow workers to perform regular duties.  
Decades later, when quizzed about these remarkable events, Turner adopted a 
conspicuously apologetic tone, “So effectively it was a 24 hour curfew, worker takeover 
of the plant, but it wasn’t done in a sense of hostility or a feeling of us [challenging] 
British Steel.  It was purely in order to bring that furnace on”.13   
 
This extraordinary act of rebellion, nonetheless, achieved its immediate objective, with 
management seeking an interim compromise agreement.  An uncharacteristically 
conciliatory Scholey formally agreed to maintain current production and manning 
 
12 Letter from BSC to Bilston employees, undated, MRC, MSS.365/BSC/56. 
13 Documenting the Workshop of the World, 2007, WCA, LS/LB6/2, pp. 15-16. 
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levels until he had received the JURUE report.  The plant takeover and work-in 
certainly captured the imagination of trade union leaders, with Jack Gavin proclaiming: 
 
It would be remiss of me if I were not to mention probably one of the finest 
demonstrations of solidarity and defiance that the Steel Industry had seen in 
this Country when the workforce at Bilston rammed the open-hearth furnace to 
keep the Plant producing.  It is with some degree of pride that I saw this 
happen.14 
 
But no amount of approbation would save the works.  Having earned some breathing 
space, anxious shop stewards once again turned to Swinton House. 
 
“I Move Bill, Will You Second?” 
 
In what would be the final stage of the steelmaking campaign, Bilston’s frustrated shop 
stewards finally lost patience with what they perceived to be the ambivalence of their 
national union leaders.  Following the plant takeover, there was an awareness that the 
success of recent acts of militancy were only palliative.  It was, therefore, imperative 
that union bosses took full advantage of what was a temporary local victory.   
 
The NUB EC’s response to the December 1978 Grosvenor Place meeting had been 
to informally withdraw their support for the campaign for new steelmaking, with Hector 
Smith eventually announcing, “There is no doubt that we had set our hat at a Q-BOP 
development at Bilston.  BSC has said this is not to be, so we must now face the 
 
14 Man and Metal, May 1979. 
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facts”.15  With the majority of the TUCSICC organisations following suit, an anxious 
BJUAC looked to their most powerful trade union ally, Bill Sirs: 
 
You will of course realise that the BSC having made their position quite clear in 
relation to Bilston, the Bilston Joint Branches are of course extremely anxious 
to know what the current national ISTC policy is ... I would wish to reiterate as 
strongly as is in my power to do so, that we expect ISTC to totally resist bringing 
Bilston on to a two-furnace operation, and this request, of course, carries with 
it the 100% backing of ISTC membership at Bilston.16 
 
The above correspondence was penned by Graham Fazey, who had by this stage 
assumed the duties of Vice-Chairman.17  Unlike the benign Reg Turley, the no-
nonsense convenor was more cynical of his trade union hierarchy, developing a 
particularly fractious relationship with Sirs.  The two had first come to blows three 
months earlier, when Swinton House declined to support the Day of Action’s symbolic 
regional stoppage: 
 
The General Secretary read correspondence from the Springvale Joint 
Committee requesting the Executive Council’s support for a one-day stoppage 
of work which had been called for by the Wolverhampton Trades Council in 
respect of the threatened closure of Bilston Works.  The General Secretary had 
 
15 The Steel News: Bilston and Wolverhampton Edition, 29 March 1979. 
16 Letter from G. Fazey to W. Sirs, undated, ITSOE, BCA1/5.  The BJUAC were specifically looking for 
a recommitment to the provision to formulate contingency plans protecting members at all non-Beswick 
plants, not just the Big Five. 
17 With the rigours of eighteen months of ceaseless campaigning were by now taking their toll on the 
action committee leadership, with Reg Turley having taken a backseat. 
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replied that our arguments for maintaining the viability of Bilston and the steel 
industry would be seriously weakened by embarking on this course of action.  
After consideration it was decided that the request be rejected, and the General 
Secretary’s reply be endorsed.18  
 
Then, frustrated by Fazey’s refusal to abandon industrial action, Sirs described his 
behaviour as “totally unconstitutional”.19  Snubbing the charges, the BJUAC leader 
inflamed the situation further by convincing hundreds of Confederation members 
employed at privately-owned Midland steel mills to temporarily withdraw their labour 
in solidarity.   
 
The two’s relationship was also soured by the BJUAC’s close ties with the WB&DTUC; 
an organisation that had also quarrelled with the General Secretary.  In the build-up to 
the Day of Action, a Trades Council delegation had ambushed a shocked Sirs outside 
Congress House.  In what was an incredibly tense encounter, the Black Country men 
dared to accuse him of failing to protect his Bilston members.  Incensed by the 
exchange, Sirs ordered Dennis Delay to intervene: 
 
In discussion, reference was made to the possibility of extreme political groups 
involving themselves in the Bilston situation and it was suggested that the 
Secretary should warn the Bilston Committee of the unwisdom [sic] of this.20 
 
 
18 Minutes of ISTC EC meeting, 16-18 August 1978, MRC, MSS.36/ISTC/4/10. 
19 Letter from J. Gavin to G. Fazey, 11 September 1978, WCA, DW-173/1/2. 
20 Minutes of TUCSICC meeting, 10 August 1978, MRC, MSS.292D/611.41/14. 
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The Bilston men, nevertheless, ignored the advice, with several militant groups 
participating in the September 1978 protest.  Much to the consternation of the 
ideologically conservative Sirs, one particular flyer criticised his union for the role it 
had played in facilitating BSC’s closure programme: 
 
The lesson to be drawn from this is that BSC want to use the ease with which 
the Beswick closures were pushed through with the support of the ISTC leaders 
... in order to cut back on running costs all round.  Bilston workers are being 
forced to pay with their livelihoods for an aspect of the world wide capitalist 
crisis ... the way forward from here is not so clear ... workers must not place 
any trust in union bureaucrats ... only the workers themselves are capable of 
stopping the closure [of Bilston works].21 
 
The hypersensitive General Secretary focused his ire on Fazey.  The two renewed 
their earlier contretemps when a pettifogging Sirs ignored a request for an update on 
the JPC process.  He instead made a completely scurrilous complaint over Fazey’s 
incorrect use of an official Confederation letterhead.22  Then, on the eve of the crunch 
December 1978 tripartite talks, Sirs involved himself in yet another pointless quarrel 
when his member refused to withdraw a seemingly innocuous local resolution: 
 
It would appear that if our members are not prepared to accept our advice, 
notwithstanding all the assistance given to them at Bilston, that the Corporation 
 
21 SCLV pamphlet, 11 September 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/3. 
22 Letter from W. Sirs to G. Fazey, 20 November 1978, MRC, MSS.36/2000/282.  
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will be aware of the fact that we have no discipline over the branch and will 
rebut any proposals that we may make from national level.23  
 
Hostilities would continue in the days after the Grosvenor Place stalemate.  When 
Swinton House ignored a request to reveal its current position vis-à-vis the June 1978 
emergency ADC resolution, Fazey conscripted ISTC-affiliated convenors to bombard 
Sirs with a flurry of correspondence: 
 
May I as the Secretary of the above Branch solicit your continued support for 
the fight to save the Bilston Iron and Steel Works.  Following branch meetings 
of the above Branch, I can assure you that my members fully support the fight 
and whilst thanking you for your stand, I have been authorised to write to you 
and to make it clear that we were grateful for the emergency resolution passed 
at the Conference in June 1978 and our determination to fight on has not been 
impaired by anything that has happened since.  Indeed the happenings of the 
last few days which are downright devious have only reinforced our 
determination to stand and fight.  Having served ISTC as a Branch Secretary 
over a number of years, my concern is that this is a fight not only for Bilston but 
for other ISTC members at other plants who could be next on the list for closure 
if BSC was allowed to get its way.24 
 
Informing him that his “attitude” had been a frequent topic of conversation amongst his 
branch members, one local convenor sought to goad Sirs into action: 
 
23 Letter from W. Sirs to G. Fazey, 5 December 1978, MRC, MSS.36/2000/282. 




At a recent Branch meeting, the Branch discussed the attitude being adopted 
by yourself and the Executive Committee concerning the ‘Bilston Situation'. 
Whilst you have pledged verbal support for the ‘Bilston Fight for Survival’, you 
do not seem to be taking any positive steps to ensure that the Bilston plant 
stays open.  It is obvious that BSC are determined to close Bilston.  We are just 
as determined to keep Bilston open, but this situation creates morale problems, 
especially as BSC has the best ‘Dirty Tricks Brigade’ in the business.  The best 
way to improve morale is to show the members that their Union is just as 
determined as they are.  So come on Bill!  Stop playing it by the book and open 
up the ‘dirty tricks’ cupboard!  Give your members the positive support that they 
deserve.  This is the resolution passed by the Branch on 6th December, 1978:- 
“To Bill Sirs and the Executive Committee, this Branch urges ISTC to take 
positive action to support the Bilston Fight for Survival, in keeping with the 
resolution passed at the Conference in June 1978”.  I move Bill – Will you 
second?25 
 
Astonishingly, a simple request for a personal hearing with the EC would prompt the 
following response from union headquarters: 
 
Your third point is one with which I cannot agree at all, and I am most surprised 
that you should be asking for a meeting with the Executive Council.  I do not 
know who has suggested this to you, but this is entirely inconsistent with past 
policy, that the Executive Council should be called to meet every group of 
 
25 Letter from J. Bailey to W. Sirs, 12 January 1979, ITSOE, BCA1/5.  
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workers who have a dispute pending.  If I was to accede that request, I would 
be having an Executive Council every day of the year.26 
 
Worse was to come.  Fazey was subsequently informed that, due to the ISTC ADC 
having zero policymaking powers, the June 1978 Scarborough resolution was non-
binding and had since been censored by Swinton House.  Instead, Sirs revealed he 
would merely continue to implement current policy concerning plant closures.  This did 
little to reassure Fazey, who complained such ambiguity was causing, “not just a little 
consternation” amongst Bilston’s ISTC members.27   
 
Concerned by the potential impact of yet another distracting spat with the capricious 
Sirs, Dennis Turner took over letter-writing duties.  The BJUAC Chairman who, unlike 
Fazey, still enjoyed a warm relationship with his EC, adopted a more diplomatic tone 
when seeking clarification over Swinton House’s contingency plans: 
 
Whilst not appearing to be ignorant, and I hope you accept not facetious, I am 
sincerely querist of what our current policy is in relation to closures.  It is a fact 
that practically the whole of our workforce are anticipating and dependent upon 
a very precise and clear policy on the part of our Confederation as we move 
into this most crucial period of our struggle … The Bilston workforce are greatly 
mindful and appreciative of the mighty blow that was struck for Bilston by 
 
26 Letter from W. Sirs to G. Fazey, 20 December 1978, ITSOE, BCA1/5. 
27 Letter from G. Fazey to W. Sirs, 9 January 1979, ITSOE, BCA1/5. 
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yourself and ISTC, last June, the heartfelt cry that now comes from Bilston is 
‘let us now in organised labour strike the mightiest blow and finish the job’.28 
 
Although Turner’s intervention appears to have mollified his tempestuous General 
Secretary, Swinton House’s reply raised more questions than answers.  Peculiarly, it 
referred specifically to the now completely outdated EC resolution passed in the wake 
of Elisabeth’s mothballing eighteen months prior.  Then, in a move that caused further 
anxiety, Sirs’ Deputy catalogued some of the supposedly successful actions his union 
had undertaken on Bilston’s behalf, before proclaiming, “So I think you will agree that 
we are doing everything possible to assist in maintaining employment at Bilston”.  The 
letter ended with a pessimistic view of the plant’s future: 
 
However there must come a time when either our efforts will be rewarded or 
otherwise.  If that position arrives, then the Executive Council and Steel 
Committee, because there are other unions involved, along with the workforce 
at Bilston will have to decide in their own interests what more can be done under 
the current circumstances.29 
 
The action committee, however, were not ready to capitulate.  When Sirs ignored a 
plea to visit the works in advance of a SISI dinner in Wolverhampton, senior 
Confederation shop stewards ambushed their General Secretary as he arrived at the 
black-tie event.  Although the encounter appeared to be cordial, Bilston’s steelmen 
were left underwhelmed by what was proffered: 
 
28 Letter from D. Turner to W. Sirs, 9 January 1979, ITSOE, BCA1/5. 




The whole situation was completely unnecessary.  I mean, why the hell were 
subs paying [ISTC] members forced to stand in a cold car park just to get an 
audience with their General Secretary?  At times it felt like we were engaged in 
two different battles.  The first was against the Corporation and … the second 
was to force the steel union leaders to fight on our behalf.  Sirs?  … he was 
fiddling around as Rome burned.30 
 
Following the plant takeover, a group of steelworkers travelled to Swinton House, 
where they presented a letter signed by local shop stewards: 
 
It is absolutely paramount that our EC not only pledge their full backing for 
Bilston at this meeting, but more importantly based on the aforementioned 
resolution, determine the appropriate decision in order to give practical effect 
to their decision.  This we underline is absolutely eseential [sic]!  The Bilston 
workforce, therefore, humbly petition our Executive Council in the best tradition 
of ISTC to give their unfettered backing to a loyal and conscientious 
Membership on the Bilston Plant and in so doing win a substantial victory for 
the case Bilston has in its favour.31 
 
Adding their voices were long-time supporters Jack Gavin, Bill Irvine and Alan Farley, 
who compelled their fellow Executive members to formulate a new national defence 
strategy on Bilston’s behalf: 
 
30 Oral testimony from J. Boulton, recorded 16 March 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 




For far too long now the workforce at Bilston have carried on the fight for 
survival seemingly without much national support. ... In conclusion, you are in 
receipt of a letter of support from all branches at Bilston Works pledging their 
support to carry on the fight to keep the works open.  Let us as the largest Union 
within the steel industry not let them down.32 
 
Meanwhile, the action committee looked to place further pressure on Swinton House 
via The Steel News:  
 
The message from the workforce is that the matter is now firmly in the hands of 
Bill Sirs, general secretary of ISTC and chairman of the TUC steel committee.  
Feelings at the meeting displayed evidence of the general frustration of the 
workforce to be given a clear lead at national level … they are expecting that to 
evolve within the next fortnight.33   
 
The Sirs Plan 
 
The lobbying of Swinton House initially appeared to have paid off.  Under concerted 
pressure, Bill Sirs unexpectedly announced a defence plan consisting of: 
 
• a public declaration of Swinton House’s unequivocal support for the retention 
and development of Bilston via an open letter to the press; 
 
32 Letter from A. Farley to ISTC EC, 15 January 1979, WCA, DW-173/1/2. 
33 The Steel News: Bilston and Wolverhampton Edition, 1 March 1979. 
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• approaching the EEC for the capital (in the form of either a grant or a loan) 
required to install Q-BOP steelmaking facilities at the plant; 
• and/or supporting calls on the Government to arrange a public inquiry into 
Bilston and the remaining non-Beswick sites.34  
 
He wasted no time in delivering the first element of this strategy, with an open letter to 
Bob Scholey appearing in the national press and Man and Metal.  Adopting a 
conspicuously confrontational tone, Sirs accused management of conducting a 
campaign of disinformation: 
 
... we have read the ominous signs that have been drifting to us through the 
medium of the press, by what must be carefully planned leaks, and I cannot 
see my Executive accepting the Bilston strategy knowing full well from the press 
reports that your step-by-step process in the White Paper is one similar to the 
domino theory in which one works after another will ultimately fall.35 
 
He also appeared to publicly involve himself in development policymaking by 
highlighting the potential benefits of Q-BOP.  In a move that brought a momentary 
sense of joy at Bilston, the letter ended with a clear ultimatum: 
 
You are also aware that the Bilston Works represents to this Union a parting of 
the ways between the Beswick plants and the other existing plants within the 
 
34 The public inquiry element of the plan appears to have been jointly conceived by Confederation 
bureaucrats and the BJUAC leadership, though it would be Sirs who was the most vocal advocate of 
the tactic. 
35 Man and Metal, January/February 1979. 
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Corporation ... I therefore urge that if this industry is to continue to receive the 
wholehearted co-operation that has been given in the past that we must ensure, 
both the Corporation and the unions, that no action is taken which would break 
forever the trust and sincerity that still exists.36 
 
Sirs immediately moved onto the second stage of his Bilston strategy; calling on EEC 
Commissioner for Industry, Étienne Davignon, to provide both political and financial 
support for the Q-BOP scheme.37  Fellow Europhile Dennis Turner joined his leader 
on a special mission to Brussels, holding preliminary talks with the powerful Belgian 
industrialist and his team of advisors.38  Returning to the UK, Sirs transitioned to the 
final stage of the plan, releasing a press statement demanding state intervention: 
 
It would [a 12-month closure notice] also prejudge the reply being received from 
a request made by the Union to the Government for a public inquiry to be held 
on the future of Bilston, with full examination of the facts at which all parties 
would be able to give evidence and at which the Iron and Steel Trades 
Confederation would indicate its willingness to accept the recommendations of 
such an inquiry.  We further recommend that the inquiry is composed of three 
 
36 Ibid. 
37 Sirs specifically asked the Belgian business magnate for financial assistance in the form of either a 
grant or a loan.  In an attempt to embarrass the Corporation and the UK Government, he went public 
with the bailout plan. 
38 Preliminary talks were encouraging, with an ISTC official telling the press, “[We have] been given 
some ammunition by Viscount Davignon.  I cannot say whether this is in the form of cash or another 
form of help ... Let’s say the meeting was not unproductive.  I understand the EEC has given us the full 




nominated representatives from the trade unions, three from the employers and 
one completely independent chairman.39 
 
Responding to the sudden flurry of activity at executive level, the action committee 
leadership adopted an outwardly optimistic stance.  Even the obstinate Fazey found 
the time to thank his General Secretary.  Any such contentment, however, would 
quickly dissipate.  In a dismissive retort to Sirs’ open letter, a belligerent Scholey again 
sort to coax the ISTC EC into abandoning Bilston with their reputation still intact; 
offering compensation packages equivalent to those secured at the Beswick sites.  As 
an added incentive, he disclosed an informal offer to retain the mills as a standalone 
facility: 
 
I hope that the Steel Committee will agree at its next meeting to discuss with 
the Corporation the retention of a 5-shift mill and we are, of course, prepared 
to negotiate appropriate ex gratia payments with you along the lines of the 
agreement we made during the last year.40 
 
Meanwhile, management looked to sow further division by placing Scholey’s proposal 
on departmental noticeboards.41  Then, when Count Davignon suddenly withdrew his 
 
39 Man and Metal, March 1979. 
40 Letter from R. Scholey to W. Sirs, 30 January 1979, ITSOE, BCA1/6. 
41 The mills-only proposal had already caused outrage amongst a BJUAC leadership who described it 
as a, “conspicuous conscience solving operation”, whilst reminding colleagues that any such offer didn’t 
do, “justice to the substantial case Bilston has in its favour, or to the two thousand jobs approximately, 




support without explanation, Sirs accused Grosvenor Place of sabotaging his appeal 
to the EEC: 
 
Most surprised and disappointed that after our discussion you have now 
changed your mind in relation to the proposed meeting regarding Bilston.  We 
are led to conclude that this results from intervention by British Steel 
Corporation and British Government.42 
 
The unexpected news placed pressure on the impact of the JURUE report on 
Government and management thinking.  Published in March 1979, it represented a 
deliberate ploy to add weight to calls for a state-sponsored probe, with key sections 
focusing on the potential wider socio-economic effects of closure: 
 
This proposal [closure], if implemented, would have a number of adverse 
repercussions on the West Midlands Region and especially on the 
Wolverhampton and Bilston area.  These adverse repercussions, primarily in 
the form of income and job losses, are particularly unwelcome at this point in 
time since the West Midlands Region has suffered a marked relative decline in 
recent years and this decline is exemplified by the particularly difficult conditions 




42 Telegram from W. Sirs to E. Davignon, 19 March 1979, WCA, DW-173/1/2. 
43 JURUE, The Future of Bilston Steelworks: An Appraisal, March 1979, ITSOE, BCA1/4, p. 1. 
`342 
 
According to Dr. Paul Johnson’s team, the human cost would be insurmountable, with 
the direct loss of 2,500 positions at Bilston as well as a further 300 within its external 
supply chain.44  To draw attention to the seriousness of the situation, these job losses 
were placed in the context of the regional employment market.  In February 1979, 
Wolverhampton had a jobless rate of 6.1 per cent, which would inflate to 7.4 per cent.45  
Looking ahead, it was estimated 70 per cent of Bilston’s steelmen would be unable to 
secure immediate employment; a figure that would remain at 30 per cent until March 
1985.46  
 
The report also demonstrated how the debate surrounding Bilston had been driven by 
one single criterion: how closure would improve BSC’s short-term cash-flow position.  
Although it was calculated that management would indeed secure a net cash-flow 
saving of £45.9m, this figure would be offset by a re-adaption bill of £35m, which would 
fall on the Government and not the Corporation.47  By demonstrating how bungling 
officials were wantonly transferring the burden of a contestable closure onto the British 
taxpayer, JURUE sought to put public pressure on Whitehall to intervene.  The 
document concluded by calling on policymakers to retain Bilston as a flexible electric 
arc mini-works as per the JWP proposals.  
 
 
44 Ibid., p. 4. 
45 By way of comparison, the authors provided the corresponding figure in Yorkshire which, at the time, 
stood at 5.3 per cent.  See Ibid., p. 51. 
46 Ibid., p. 60. 
47 Crucially, this figure didn’t include remedial costs required to revitalise the steelworks site and create 
alternative employment for redundant steelmen.  A conservative estimate stood at around £20m, which 
by far outweighed the cost of installing new steelmaking equipment at Bilston.  See Ibid., pp. 61-72.  
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Its completion prompted the renewed lobbying of Eric Varley and his cabinet 
colleagues.  The Whitehall campaign was coordinated by Bob Edwards who used the 
press to demonstrate that there was still a clear and unanswerable case for the 
retention of the state-owned facility:  
 
It produces the cheapest and highest quality iron in any of the steelworks within 
the structure of the BSC … Closure of the plant would double unemployment in 
the Wolverhampton area, which is already plagued by closures of many of its 
important traditional factories.48   
 
A letter, penned by Colin Phips and signed by several West Midlands MPs, was sent 
to Labour Party officials alongside an abridged version of the JURUE report: 
 
I wish very strongly, to support the request by the Bilston Steelworks Committee 
for a public inquiry into the closing of the Bilston Works.  I am particularly 
concerned that the overall economic and social impact of the closures upon the 
Black Country has fully been taken into account in arriving at a decision to close 
the Works … I not at all happy that British Steel fully appreciates the extent of 
the damage that will be done to the Black Country if steelmaking is closed down 
entirely.  The Black Country has been a traditional steelmaking one for nearly 
two centuries and there are enormous inbuilt skills which are not readily applied 
to other jobs, even were such jobs available.  The social impact in a closely-
 
48 The Express and Star, 21 February 1979. 
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knit area like the Black Country will be particularly dramatic, particularly as it 
follows upon closures in other industries during recent months.49  
 
The BJUAC’s political allies were particularly concerned by JURUE’s warning over the 
effectiveness of the Government’s regional economic policy:  
 
I am appalled that there does not seem to have been any parallel programme 
for the introduction of new jobs in the Black Country and this is not helped by 
the Government’s current regional policy.  I believe that an inquiry of the kind 
which the [action] committee seeks would do much to bring in the real size of 
the problem out and would greatly help in coming to a proper decision about 
the industrial future of the Black Country.  I would be grateful, therefore, if you 
would be prepared to initiate such an inquiry as soon as possible.50 
 
Adding their voices to calls for a state-sponsored investigation were the wives of 
Bilston’s steelmen, whose protest letter targeted sympathetic Ministers: 
 
I write on behalf of a group of wives who are very concerned about the overall 
situation affecting employment in this area, and who are likely to be hardest hit, 
together with our children, if this closure, and others which are in the pipe-line 
takes place.  As you are recognised as a fighter for women’s rights, and we 
believe that this fight at Bilston is just as much a cause which we as women 
should be involved in, equally as the men who work at the plant since we have 
 




to be bothered about job opportunities for our children, and those not yet born, 
we hope that we might enlist your support in our campaign.51  
 
In an attempt to force through a Parliamentary debate on Bilston, Edwards produced 
a Commons order paper.  Meanwhile, Prime Minister James Callaghan was petitioned 
by local Councillors when opening Wolverhampton’s new Civic Centre.52  
 
By seeking to take decision-making powers out of the Corporation’s hands, it was 
hoped that sympathetic members of the Government would end their strict non-
interventionist policy.  Yet political mediation was not forthcoming.  One by one, senior 
Government officials deferred responsibility, before Gerald Kaufman confirmed there 
would be no such enquiry: 
 
I fully appreciate the great concern that exists in Bilston about BSC’s proposal 
to end steelmaking at Bilston, but do not think that any useful purpose would 
be served by an independent inquiry.  The British Steel Corporation faces very 
grave problems: low demand and serious overcapacity have forced down prices 
and caused the Corporation to suffer enormous financial losses.  These issues 
were considered in the Government’s White Paper published in March 1978, 
‘BSC: The Road to Viability’ (Cmnd. 7149), which was prepared following close 
 
51 Letter from P. Turner to R. Short, undated, WCA, DW-173/1/5. 
52 Officials cornered Callaghan before the local ribbon-cutting ceremony, with one asserting his 
Government would be, “pulling the plug out of the bath” by shutting Bilston.  Alan Clay, a local teacher, 
complained about the impact closure would have on the prospects of school leavers, “never have we 
had so much difficulty getting pupils in the fifth years into jobs”.  The Prime Minister’s response was, 
however, disappointing.  Ignoring calls for a state investigation, he instead sought to silence protestors 
with talk of generous redundancy cheques.  See The Express and Star, 21 February 1979. 
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consultation with the Corporation and the TUC Steel Committee.  We concluded 
that action had to be taken to bring capacity more into line with demand.  It is 
the Corporation’s responsibility to decide which plants should close ... the 
Government’s view remains that this is the best way forward in the 
circumstances.53 
 
The final defence plan proved to be completely ineffective and, as a belated and 
haphazard policy initiative, was emblematic of the ISTC’s fire-fighting approach to 
defending individual sites.  Sirs’ open letter to BSC was effectively a reworking of the 
spurned Delay Paper, itself a rehash of the Aylen, Bilston Dimension and interim 
JURUE documents.  The EEC approach was doomed from conception, with Brussels 
already backing BSC’s post-Road to Viability closure programme.  Davignon himself 
had only recently attached his name to a plan to massively reduce the Community’s 
overall capacity in line with current demand and, therefore, had very little interest in 
releasing significant capital funds to retain Bilston.   
 
The call for a public inquiry was also implausible.  The March 1978 White Paper had 
the effect of permanently altering the political landscape, with Stephen Young 
identifying an “increasingly ruthless determination” amongst Government officials to 
execute BSC’s closure plan.54  There were other warning signs.  In October 1978, 
during the Labour Party conference, NEC member and future Chairman, Alan Hadden, 
endorsed the Corporation’s overcapacity/overmanning argument, whilst Eric Varley 
refused to meet with a delegation from Bilston.  Days later, when responding to their 
 
53 Letter from G. Kaufman to C. Phipps, 6 March 1979, WCA, DW-173/1/5. 
54 Young, National Steel Strategy, p. 406. 
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Q-BOP proposal, onetime ally Les Huckfield merely trotted out the position adopted 
by his Minister: 
 
As I am sure you will appreciate it is for BSC, and not for the Government, to 
make investment proposals, exercising its commercial judgement to assess 
which projects will best meet the requirements of the market ... I hope you agree 
that we should leave the matter in their hands, although we are, of course, 
keeping in very close touch with the situation.55 
 
Following the October 1978 Blackpool summit, the BJUAC were so concerned by the 
PLP and NEC’s stance that Turner had taken the unprecedented step of appealing 
directly to the Conservatives.  An informal approach was made via Charles Irving, who 
had developed an unlikely friendship with the action committee Chairman when 
unsuccessfully contesting the Parliamentary seat of Bilston eight years prior.  The MP 
for Cheltenham arranged for Turner to meet Norman Lamont, shadow Industry 
Minister.  A rising star in a reinvigorated opposition party, the MP for Kingston-upon-
Thames had close links to BISPA and Sir Charles Villiers – and had previously 
displayed an interest in the potential of a Q-BOP mini-works.  Aware of this, Turner 
suggested this could form the cornerstone of any future Tory Government 
development strategy.  However, after consulting industry officials, the future 
Chancellor adopted a similar position to that of his Labour Party counterparts: 
 
As regards the prospect of Bilston becoming a pilot plant for the Q-BOP 
process, I have suggested this to the Corporation and I understand that they 
 
55 Letter from L. Huckfield to D. Turner, 9 October 1978, WCA, DW-173/1/5. 
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have looked at it in some detail.  I am bound to say, however, their initial 
reaction is that it is not all that satisfactory … Naturally I have indicated to the 
Corporation all the points that you made to me during our meeting, but there do 
seem to be very considerable obstacles to finding a viable future for Bilston … 
I trust the Corporation will continue to consult with unions about any practicable 
alternatives to closure.  However, in the end the future of any plant must be one 
for the management of the Corporation, rather than for Ministers or Shadow 
Ministers.56 
 
As an avowed working-class socialist, Turner’s willingness to temporarily cast aside 
his political beliefs reveals not only his pragmatism, but the lack of faith he had in 
senior Whitehall figures:   
 
… Government Ministers were watching very carefully; they weren’t intervening 
but they were watching to see just how we were treated by British Steel, 
although I think generally they would have wished to have encouraged a quiet 
closure of the plant.57 
 
They were, of course, right to be anxious.  In December 1978, only days before 
management threw out the Q-BOP proposal, cabinet members met to discuss the 
short-term prospects of the industry.  It was at this very point that the Government 
decided to sanction the closure of the remaining ‘high-cost’ plants.  The meeting was 
later summarised by attendee Tony Benn: 
 
56 Letter from N. Lamont to D. Turner, 18 September 1978, WCA, DW-173/1/5. 




EY Committee began at 10.10 with Gerard Kaufman … said there was 
substantial overcapacity in the steel industry and the situation would deteriorate 
further with the coming on stream of the new integrated steel plants at 
Ravenscraig and Redcar.58 
 
Varley was, nonetheless, ordered to continue speaking to doomed workers and their 
unions, despite their fates having already been sealed.  Sirs and the BJUAC, 
henceforth, forlornly requested the support of a Government that no longer possessed 
the political will to intervene.  Days after the Q-BOP proposal was dismissed, the 
General Secretary led TUCSICC officials into a hearing with the Minister.  Although 
Varley accepted management’s treatment of Bilston was “incomprehensible”, he stuck 
to the principles of the Road to Viability by categorically rejecting calls to personally 
intercede whilst formal consultations were still taking place.59   
 
With the Sirs plan faltering, his Executive acknowledged their own deficiencies by 
agreeing that, at some point in the future, they would need to re-examine, “the whole 
position of future closures and make decisions on their future policy”.60  This would 
eventually come twelve months later but, for now, Bilston’s fate rested entirely on 




58 T. Benn, The Benn Diaries: New Single Volume Edition (London, 1995), p. 458. 
59 The Birmingham Post, 26 January 1978. 
60 Minutes of special ISTC EC meeting, 25 January 1979, MRC, MSS.36/ISTC/4/10. 
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Dismissing the JURUE Report 
 
In an attempt to rally his troops for one final push, Dennis Turner publicly praised Eric 
Varley’s decision to reject calls for a state inquiry, suggesting it signalled BSC were 
considering the recommendations of JURUE.61  The alacrity of the habitually optimistic 
shop steward, however, masked a painful truth: he and his fellow steelmen had been 
abandoned by their Government.  The plant’s fate now rested in the hands of hostile 
industry officials.  The outcome was inevitable. 
 
The action committee travelled to Grosvenor Place for talks only days after the release 
of the Aston University study.  Bolstered by the news from Whitehall, a self-assured 
Bob Scholey adopted a markedly rigid stance.  Despite admitting that some of the 
commercial judgements made by the JURUE team were entirely accurate, he 
categorically rejected calls for investment.  When explaining the decision, his 
negotiating team pointed to Government policy: 
 
The Government’s White Paper ‘British Steel Corporation – The Road to 
Viability (Command 7149) made it clear that there is no case at present for new 
starts on steelmaking (para. 12).  It also emphasized [sic] that to achieve 
financial viability it is necessary for capacity to move more into line with 
demand.  The Government thus supports the Corporation’s view that there 
should be no new investment in steelmaking capacity at Bilston ... Despite the 
problems of social adjustment which will occur, the Government has laid on the 
management of the Corporation the prime duty of putting the Corporation back 
 
61 The Express and Star, 14 March 1979. 
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on the road towards financial viability.  The price of failing to do this would be 
industrial and social costs in the UK which would dwarf anything contemplated 
at the present time.62 
 
Meanwhile, a report prepared by John Pennington scoffed at concerns over the socio-
economic impact of closure: 
 
The forecast of job losses and their impact on local unemployment rates as 
portrayed in the Report is unduly pessimistic, particularly if account is taken of 
the possibility of a five shift mill option, the continuation of other activities on 
site and the strong likelihood that a substantial number of employees will seek 
early retirement ... Most of BSC’s major operations are in areas of above 
average unemployment.  Closures have already had to occur in exceptionally 
high unemployment areas and have involved social costs.  Regarding the 
replacement of lost jobs, the Wolverhampton area has suffered substantial 
redundancies in the last few years and has shown considerable resilience in 
absorbing job losses which demonstrated that the process of adjustment is 
likely to be faster than the Report indicates.  BSC (Industry) will have a 
considerable role to play in this connection.  Bearing these points in mind, the 
forecast of social costs in the Report could be reduced significantly.63 
 
 





Responding to a personal plea from Bill Sirs, Scholey discussed the impact retaining 
Bilston would have on the future prospects of the Big Five.  Outlining what he referred 
to as the “systems effect”, the Chief Executive contended that any cash-flow savings 
resulting from closure would deliver, “more security for those jobs that remained within 
the industry”.64  This line of argument, which was tied to the overcapacity/overmanning 
narrative, had previously been trotted out by management to justify the rundown of 
Bilston.  When announcing the ‘Big Lizzie’ decision, for example, management refused 
to discuss the plant’s profitable record in isolation: 
 
Mr Murray stated that he felt there was no point in just talking about the results 
of the past year at Bilston and Wolverhampton, but that it was necessary to look 
at the total scene to understand just how serious the situation was.  He referred 
to the nation’s deep trade recession which started early in 1975 and which was 
thought would improve last year but to the contrary slipped back very markedly 
and the same situation existed in the rest of Europe … It had put into complete 
disarray forecasting and the methods by which they are put into practice.65   
 
The systems effect was consequently adopted by Pennington when rejecting the 
findings of the JWP report and, more recently, in Scholey’s riposte to Sirs’ open letter: 
 
From the contents of your letter it is my view that you have not taken ‘on board’ 
the ‘systems effect’ – i.e. the effect of investment in new and lower cost 
steelmaking capacity upon some of the older and less efficient works.  As I have 
 
64 Ibid. 
65 Minutes of Bilston Works Annual Progress Review meeting, 11 May 1977, WCA, DW-173/1/1. 
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often described to you and your colleagues, the issue the Corporation has to 
consider is not whether Bilston on its own has been profitable in the past, but 
whether the profitability of the Corporation as whole should be improved by 
around £12.5m per annum if iron and steelmaking at Bilston were closed and 
steel, which can be produced more cheaply elsewhere, used to feed the mill.  
As Mr Pennington’s letter of 30th May, 1978 pointed out, investment which has 
taken place in other works, in both the public and private sector, has pre-
empted the justification for any new steelmaking at Bilston.  I can fully 
understand the reluctance of the local workforce to appreciate the overall 
picture, but I do feel that it is necessary for national union leaders to understand 
that, whilst supporting new investment in one direction, they should also 
recognise the consequential effects elsewhere.66   
 
Moreover, the unions had, for a long time, accepted the premise of the systems effect 
argument.  At the December 1977 meeting between the BJUAC and the Steel 
Committee, for example, a top official adopted a worryingly similar stance to 
management: 
 
The Chairman said that having listened to the case put forward by the Bilston 
workers if looked at in isolation was good.  However, as the deputation would 
appreciate any consideration by the Committee had to be based on the overall 
situation of the BSC i.e. a plus at one plant mean a corresponding minus at 
another.67 
 
66 Letter from R. Scholey to W. Sirs, 30 January 1979, ITSOE, BCA1/6. 




That month, during a crisis meeting with BSC, Scholey suggested that unless  Bilston’s 
orderbook was rerouted, more modern plants were in danger of becoming a “dead 
loss”.68  The minutes of the talks reveal the impact this had on union thinking, with 
Hector Smith declaring, “If high cost plants were causing Scunthorpe to be pulled down 
he would talk about [shutting] Shelton, Bilston or whatever”.69  Indeed, the entire 
premise of the TUCSICC’s longstanding policy of sacrificing workers and plants in 
order to protect the Big Five can be interpreted as union acquiescence to the systems 
effect and, in turn, management prerogative.  Writing in Militant Managers?, SIMA 
official Greg Bamber would later confirm how this impacted trade union thinking over 
Bilston:   
 
In separate talks, both with the Steel Committee and SIMA, BSC insisted that 
it had too much capacity for making special steels and that to survive, BSC had 
to concentrate production in the Sheffield area … BSC asked the various union 
negotiators: ‘If Bilston were reprieved, then which works in Sheffield would have 
to be closed instead?’  No union could agree to saving one works at the 
expense of another.  Moreover, no-one could deny that Bilston’s plant was 
antiquated, because BSC had not invested there (BSC had invested heavily in 
Sheffield and had been diverting orders there in preference to Bilston).70  
 
 
68 Minutes of special meeting between the TUCSICC and BSC, 12 December 1978, MRC, 
MSS.292D/611.41/12. 
69 Minutes of special meeting between the TUCSICC and BSC, 12 January 1978, MRC, 
MSS.292D/611.41/12. 
70 Bamber, Militant Managers?, p. 119. 
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Upon hearing industry officials dismiss their report, one member of the JURUE team 
flippantly remarked that not even the Big Five were safe under the current regime.  In 
a calculated response that stunned the room into silence, Scholey agreed, 
pronouncing that unless Bilston was shut immediately, the future of the entire public 
steel industry was at risk.  Sensing vulnerability on the ISTC side of the union table, 
Black Bob looked to deliver a coup de grace by reiterating his earlier offer to safeguard 
Bilston’s mills in exchange for an immediate closure deal covering the heavy-end.  A 
wary Turner, concerned how his leaders might respond to the proposal, interrupted 
proceedings by questioning the practicality and sincerity of the proposal: 
 
Mr Turner said that he felt that the mill-only scheme would be more costly to 
the Corporation than the proposed new investment at Bilston.  The mill only 
option would incur extra costs for importing ingots to Bilston and would lose the 
present customer flexibility.  For these reasons Mr Turner felt that the mill only 
option was a palliative and offered no long-term future.71 
 
Then, in what was the first sign of a possible submission, he asked for cast-iron 
guarantees that any such facility would be ringfenced until March 1982, regardless of 
future trading conditions.  When senior industry officials scoffed at his 
counterproposal, a typically composed Turner finally lost his patience, sardonically 
offering to carry Bilston works and its orderbook to South Yorkshire himself.  In a 
response that highlights the strained relationship that had developed between 
Grosvenor Place and the BJUAC, a pugnacious Scholey called his employee’s bluff: 
 





Mr Scholey said that he was disappointed that Mr. Turner felt that the retention 
of the mill at Bilston was not a good idea and asked whether Mr. Turner was 
recommending that the Corporation should not go ahead with such a 
scheme?72 
 
With no agreement in sight, an impatient BSC chief terminated the meeting by handing 
a twelve-month closure notice to the unions.  The mistreatment of the JURUE report, 
like the JWP and Q-BOP proposals beforehand, demonstrate how management 
weren’t in any way receptive to alternative development schemes produced by 
threatened workers.  BSC’s dismissive attitude was outlined in a rebuttal paper which, 
at just three pages, underscored the lack of consideration planners had afforded the 
study.73  Another insight can be drawn from a meeting between Scholey and Turner 
following the plant takeover: 
 
... obviously we went to meet ‘black Bob Scholey’ and, [armed with] the report 
from Aston University, [which] was a very powerful report and it was very 
supportive – and I was challenging him to tell me about that report, what was it 
he could say [would] he challenge [the report], in terms of what it was arguing?  
And he never offered me one argument; not one.  The only thing he said in 
response to all of that was ‘the trouble with you Dennis Turner is that you think 
 
72 Ibid. 




you know everything’.  Well that wasn’t a very good response, was it, to such a 
[major] issue.74 
 
The Writing on the Wall 
 
Following the meeting, the TUCSICC reconvened with the BJUAC.  The Bilston men, 
having exhausted all other options, played their final hand by demanding a national 
stoppage.  It was revealed, however, that the Steel Committee didn’t possess the 
constitutional authority to sanction any such action.  Abandoned by Congress House, 
each action committee member would now focus on convincing their own respective 
Executives to strike. 
 
With SIMA’s Robert Muir and the NUB’s Hector Smith having tacitly withdrawn their 
support for the campaign, the only other General Secretary capable of completely 
halting the industry was Bill Sirs.  The ISTC boss, angered by management’s treatment 
of the JURUE report, immediately fired a warning shot at Grosvenor Place: 
 
Further to our meeting today I must inform you that a dispute now exists 
between this organisation and the British Steel Corporation in relation to Bilston.  
[I] would request therefore that pending resolvement [sic] of the problem that 




74 Documenting the Workshop of the World, 2007, WCA, LS/LB6/2, p. 16.  
75 Telegram from W. Sirs to R. Scholey, 16 March 1979, WCA, DW-173/1/2. 
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Momentarily, a major showdown appeared on the horizon, with a concerned Dennis 
Delay informing the TUC General Council that, owing to the confusion, a “bad decision 
may arise”.76  The Steel Committee Secretary’s fears, however, were never realised.  
The next day, at an emergency meeting of their Executive, the BJUAC’s ISTC-affiliates 
presented their case for industrial action.  In a speech that would prove incredibly 
prophetic, the deputation argued that Swinton House must finally make a stand; not 
only on behalf of Bilston but for the sake of the entire public sector steel industry.  Yet 
there was little appetite in the room.77  Confederation officials, many of whom had 
previously supported strike action at Scarborough, questioned the level of support they 
would receive in their respective divisions.78  Despite agreeing to defer any final 
decision until the following month, Sirs would subsequently tone down his earlier 
rhetoric, “I would always hesitate to embark on strike action.  I am against strikes 
generally and if they can be avoided, they should be.  Quite often there are other 
ways”.79 
 
The ISTC’s hesitancy was infectious, with the NCCC, the TGWU and the GMWU each 
ignoring the BJUAC’s strike plea.  Indeed, the rival steel unions had traditionally held 
completely divergent attitudes towards adopting radical industrial action, particularly 
on behalf of individual works.  In June 1978, when discussing ways in which to respond 
 
76 TUC inter-departmental correspondence, D. Delay to L. Murray, 16 March 1979, MRC, 
MSS.292D/611.432/43. 
77 Minutes of special ISTC EC meeting, 16 March 1979, MRC, MSS.36/ISTC/4/10. 
78 Despite their judgement, workers at both Corby and Shotton implored their EC to strike on Bilston’s 
behalf. 
79 The Guardian, 17 March 1979.  It was decided that any final decision should be deferred whilst each 
EC member took the opportunity to reflect on their position, yet it was clear very few of the 21-man body 
would agree to industrial action. 
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to the Corporation’s treatment of Shelton, officials from the craft and general unions 
proposed a national stoppage, but this was met with opposition from their counterparts 
within the industrial unions.  Since his appointment four years earlier, Sirs had 
developed a habit of threatening strike action, only to then backtrack.  In the case of 
Scarborough, Martin Upham revealed his boss wasn’t necessarily motivated by the 
actual closure order at Bilston but more the manner in which it was being 
communicated.80  During his August 1978 visit to the Black Country, Sirs refused to 
formally recommit to the threat, claiming he didn’t possess the required authority.  A 
month later, at Congress, he warned that a serious confrontation was looming over 
the plant.  Unbeknownst to the Bilston men, he and his fellow TUCSICC officials had 
already privately agreed to only defend the works through “normal channels”.81  More 
recently, there was the open letter to Scholey, which warned of a “parting of ways”, 
and the telegram sent in response to BSC’s rejection of the JURUE report.82   
 
Notwithstanding his public demeanour, Sirs was ideologically opposed to militant strike 
action, writing in his autobiography, “any fool can strike”.83  When previously asked by 
the WB&DTUC for assistance in arranging a symbolic Black Country-wide general 
strike on the Day of Action, he flatly rejected their request.  Even the 1980 national 
steel strike would be ordered with a great deal of hesitancy: 
 
 
80 Upham disclosed, “The subtle point that failure to give warning and not closure itself was the occasion 
of the strike call was lost on many”.  See Upham, Retrospect and Prospects, p. 10. 
81 More ominously, the TUCSICC decided they would reassess their position if the Government still 
refused to intervene after consulting the JURUE report.  See Minutes of TUCSICC meeting, 7 
September 1978, MRC, MSS.292D/611.41/13. 
82 Swinton House ignored repeated calls from Graham Fazey to substantiate Sirs’ comments. 
83 Sirs, Hard Labour, p. 4. 
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BSC was given approximately three weeks’ notice of the strike and, while some 
might criticize this delay, we were, and are, a union of high principles and 
wanted to allow the industry, the Corporation and the government breathing 
space to reflect and then resolve the situation.84 
 
Meanwhile, with news of Bilston’s inevitable demise starting to spread, the BJUAC’s 
network of stakeholders withdrew their support.  Black Country Labour MPs ignored 
desperate pleas from workers, whilst local officials and the press began openly talking 
of defeat.85   
 
Crestfallen, Turner and Fazey returned to the West Midlands, where they were met by 
a divided shop-floor.  Cracks had first appeared following the rejection of the Q-BOP 
proposal, after which a permanent sense of fatalism appears to have taken hold of a 
growing number of melting shop workers.  Days later, ISTC Springvale No.1 – led by 
BJUAC affiliate Jack Jones – penned a resolution determining a “dispirit of indecision” 
had caused uncertainty amongst its 500 members:86 
 
 
84 Ibid., p. 90. 
85 The men were rocked by a cartoon printed in The Sandwell Evening Mail unfairly criticising local NUB 
members for profiting from idleness.  An angry lodge official defended the actions of his colleagues, 
“Some of the lads are incredibly upset.  They felt they were being treated unkindly for something which 
was not their fault in the first place.  They are a good set of blokes, and over the years have put in a 
great deal of hard work and loyalty to the steel industry”.  See The Steel News: Bilston and 
Wolverhampton Edition, 16 November 1978. 
86 Jones had been unenthused by the Q-BOP project, raising concerns over the practicality of Aylen’s 




[The] branch wishes to ask you if on [sic] the meeting with the BSC on the 6th 
Dec if a decision can be made about there [sic] future, the members expressed 
at the meeting that they were unable to plan for the future of there [sic] lifes 
[sic], they were furious over a report in the local paper of Wolverhampton trades 
council to delay the final decision (I enclose the cutting) so the Springvale 1 
branch are asking for a decision if possible on [sic] your meeting on Dec 6th.87 
 
Melting Shop Manager Bryn Jones noted the presence of an irrevocable malaise 
amongst his men:88 
 
People are just trying to get away with things when they know the items are not 
up to standard.  In today’s market a half-pint service wins no new business and 
loses old customers.  And on current figures it seems that about a third of our 
customers are not getting a full pint from us.89 
 
When a safety drive floundered, Bilston’s disillusioned steelmen invited further 
criticism:  
 
The major part of the effort generated in this campaign has been management 
inspired.  There has been a disappointing lack of response from trade union 
shop-floor representatives, which points to a total failure of communication … 
In some cases it was only accepted in the areas of direct concern, i.e. traffic 
 
87 Letter from J. Jones to W. Sirs, 24 November 1978, MRC, MSS.36/2000/258. 
88 The dispute was particularly difficult for Jones to bare.  The Bilston native had always enjoyed a close 
relationship with melting shop workers who had previously raised money for his terminally ill son. 
89 The Steel News: Bilston and Wolverhampton Edition, 2 November 1978. 
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and transport departments.  At Bilston Works there was local management 
commitment.  In fact, the limerick competition was won by the manager of the 
chemical laboratory.  The general situation at Bilston, however, meant there 
was not a great deal of co-operation from industrial grades.90 
 
After penning their letter to Sirs, the leaders of ISTC Springvale No.1 became 
completely estranged from the BJUAC and the campaign itself.  Indeed, branch 
leaders appeared reluctant to participate in the plant takeover, with one convenor later 
declaring:  
 
I am not certain in my own mind that the action group way is the best at this 
moment in time.  The majority of the melting shop personnel feel that the fight 
to retain Bilston steelmaking is lost, and the issue now before us is one 
concerning the best possible closure terms.  Personally speaking, I think we 
would do as well negotiating now as later ... The difficult question, which each 
worker must answer for himself is: ‘Do we get more or less by fighting on’?  
Each individual must consider this very seriously.91 
 
A confrontation was inevitable.  Following an extraordinary melting shop branch 
meeting, campaign supporters involved themselves in a heated exchange with 
Springvale No.1 officials.  The unsavoury affair was recounted in formal statement 
published in the works newspaper: 
 
 
90 The Steel News: Bilston and Wolverhampton Edition, 16 November 1978. 
91 The Steel News: Bilston and Wolverhampton Edition, 1 March 1979. 
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At a quite stormy meeting, and after much difficulty, the branch was satisfied … 
that a resolution should be sent to Mr Sirs demanding his presence at the 
Bilston plant to tell the workforce where we are going ...  When the official 
business of the branch had been concluded men from the finishing end of the 
plant – at their own request – had discussions with the branch.  After what was 
once again heated and lengthy discussion, it was quite apparent that the 
feelings of those men ran parallel to those of the branch.92 
 
Dissension wasn’t restricted to production workers alone, with tensions between pro-
BJUAC production workers and staffers also escalating.  The likes of Reg Turley and 
David Hamilton, as leaders of the Joint Staff Branches Committee, had been able to 
placate all previous discord, but disgruntled supervisory staff would now act with 
impunity.  At the aforesaid February 1979 mass meeting, Turner was forced to plea 
with workers to fight on until the release of the JURUE report.  Some staffers 
responded by demanding a written ballot to gauge popular opinion.  When Turner 
blocked the request, several staged a symbolic walk out.  Frank Wall, leader of the 
ISTC Springvale Supervisory Branch and a longstanding critic of Turner, immediately 
sought to exploit the changing atmosphere around the plant.  The accomplished 
wordsmith thereby penned an open letter accusing his counterpart of coercion: 
 
It both saddens and annoys me that so many people are afraid to freely express 
themselves, for fear of reprisals ... impassioned – even frenzied – accusations 





bear, and so stifle this fundamentally democratic process.  What a nauseating 
spectacle this made! ...93 
 
Previously, the outspoken shop steward had been viewed as little more than a rabble-
rouser by manual grade convenors, but he would now become the principal architect 
of popular dissent.  Excerpts of his letter featured in The Steel News and a local 
newspaper article exposed the views of those men the action committee had come to 
brand ‘cut and runners’ or ‘head turners’: 
 
The closure makes me really sad, and I have fought it for two years, but I think 
we are at the end of the road.  The Jobs here at Bilston are finished.  We have 
tried to keep them [sic] open but it isn’t worth fighting anymore.  I am reaching 
the finishing line myself and I think we should accept the money and go.94 
 
Until this stage, both the success and legitimacy of the action committee had centred 
on presenting the edifice of a united shop-floor to the outside world.  The cork, 
however, was now firmly out of the bottle.  Aware of the potential impact these reports 
would have on the attitudes of trade union leaders and policymakers, they desperately 
scrambled into action.  Graham Fazey sent a message reminding shop stewards of 
how the September 1977 two-part resolution locked all branches into the campaign 
until the bitter end.  Turner, meanwhile, quelled talk of voluntary redundancy by 
disingenuously claiming management were seeking to offer heavily reduced financial 
packages.   
 
93 The Steel News: Bilston and Wolverhampton Edition, 11 April 1979. 




These and other blocking tactics had once tempered any pockets of potential 
discordance but, with the workforce dividing into two camps, they were completely 
futile.  Dissenters quickly turned on action committee leaders, with Graham Howe 
recalling:  
 
Cut and runners, we used to call them [laughs].  I would say they were definitely 
the minority, but we did have our cars scratched and tyres let down, and things 
like that.  We had a bit of that.  It was obviously some people who wanted to 
get away.  I mean not everybody wanted to stay.  The money was a big lure.95 
 
As the campaign’s figurehead, Turner became a target of abuse, with ‘Dennis is a 
bastard’ scrawled on canteen walls by disgruntled workers.  Decades later, a 
contemplative Turner reflected on this changing mood: 
 
... what we called the ‘cut and runners’, the ones that didn’t want to fight for their 
job, they felt that there was a pot of gold waiting for them and all they’d got to 
do was just give up the fight and just receive a pot of gold.  Well, we all knew 
that was never going to be the case; that the only way they were ever going to 
be properly compensated for the loss of their job was if they were seen to be 
fighting conscientiously, all the way through to retain the jobs … There was 
even physical fighting over people saying: ‘We want to get out of here; we want 
the money’.  We said: ‘That’s not what we set the campaign up for’.96 
 
95 Oral testimony from G. Howe recorded 25 January 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 




With the BJUAC’s legitimacy in question, attempts at encouraging solidaristic action 
were superseded by branch autonomy.  When Hector Smith travelled to the Black 
Country to speak to his members, he discovered a much-changed collective attitude.  
A recent report revealed their worsening mental health, with the boost generated by 
his earlier intervention over pay proving only temporary.  Following a frank discussion, 
Smith announced to the press that he had been asked by local blast furnacemen to 
negotiate an early closure deal.   
 
The NUB lodge’s decision opened the flood gates.  Within hours of the influential 
General Secretary’s departure, all staff and middle-management branches had also 
capitulated.  They were inevitably joined by the plant’s 500 melting shop workers who 
passed the following resolution: 
 
That this branch now feels that after a long sustained fight to keep steelmaking 
at Bilston it will not be possible to hold the members after the 12th [April], we 
therefore ask you and the Executive Council to accept our feelings that  ... 
negotiations should be entered into at once with a view to getting the best 
settlement you can.97 
 
Upon receiving word of these local events, Bill Sirs made the following 
recommendation to his EC: 
 
 
97 Letter from J. Jones to W. Sirs, 30 March 1979, MRC, MSS.36/2000/260. 
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The General Secretary felt that everything had been done through the 
procedures available for the retention of steelmaking at Bilston.  Our members 
at Bilston were now seeking from the Executive Council a final decision and it 
was felt that if nothing more could be done, then we should seek the best 
possible deal for a Severance Payments Agreement.  After full consideration 
the Executive Council expressed their appreciation of the fight put up by the 
General Secretary …98 
 
Before going through the formality of ratifying the decision with the TUCSICC, he made 
a personal visit to the Black Country to speak to senior shop stewards.  One witness 
reflects on what was discussed: 
 
We were told that there was nowhere left to turn.  He [Sirs] explained that he 
had tried absolutely everything in his power … placed his reputation on the line, 
but it wasn’t to be.  He promised to secure us the best possible compensation 
deal, which he presented as some sort of victory.  Talk of record-breaking 
redundancy cheques and the retention of the mills placated the bulk of the men 
…99 
 
Having been criticised by commentators and some of their more disgruntled members, 
the EC released a statement defending its actions: 
 
 
98 Minutes of special ISTC EC meeting, 11 April 1979, MRC, MSS.36/ISTC/4/10. 
99 Oral testimony from anonymous recorded 15 October 2014, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
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In return this Executive Council has shown its strongest support, particularly 
since last June, for our Bilston members.  The General Secretary has made 
representations and presented arguments both to the British Steel Corporation 
and the Government, and ultimately to the European Community … and whilst 
it does appear on this occasion a case of planning going haywire, we are faced 
with a problem that our arguments for the installation of Q-BOP or electric arc 
furnaces is not acceptable to both the British Steel Corporation and the 
Government, which leaves us with old type open hearth furnaces operating 
without hot metal ... As an Executive Council we have therefore been obliged 
to give full consideration to the possibility of taking further steps to keep open 
the open hearths at Bilston.  We are aware, however, of the constant pressures 
upon the General Secretary to bring this matter to a conclusion, and we have 
now received a report from the General Secretary, whom has stated quite 
clearly that he has used every available argument and resource to keep Bilston 
open as an iron and steel producing plant, and we have come reluctantly to the 
conclusion that it would be in the interests of all concerned to take away the 
frustration and confusion by asking the General Secretary to involve himself in 
negotiations that would result in maintaining the mills at a level of operation 
satisfactory to this organisation, and negotiating severance terms with the 
Corporation for our members that will give them a long-term cushioning effect 
against further unemployment.  This decision has been taken after long and 
difficult decisions in which ultimately all our members were agreed as to what 
should be the final course of action.100 
 
 
100 Minutes of special ISTC EC meeting, 11 April 1979, MRC, MSS.36/ISTC/4/10. 
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The next morning TUCSICC officials agreed to negotiate an immediate closure deal, 
with management scheduling redundancy talks in May 1979.  The battle for iron and 
steelmaking was over.   
 
Determined to preserve their reputations as tough negotiators, the steel unions sought 
to secure the best possible deal for their frustrated members.  Ahead of talks, 
Congress House announced it would be seeking “special consideration” for employees 
who, they charged, were being made “sacrificial lambs”.101  It was eventually agreed 
that 1,750 heavy-end workers would receive an ex-gratia sum of 70 weeks’ pay.  
Overall, the deal was worth a record-breaking £11.6m, with some long-serving 
employees receiving £22,000.102  Turning to the surviving mills, the BJUAC 
demanded: 
 
• a 15-shift configuration employing approximately 600 production workers; 
• a firm commitment that BSC would invest in existing plant and machinery; 
• a guarantee that the mills-only operation would be retained for at least a 
decade. 
 
However, management were only prepared to support a five-shift operation employing 
approximately 400 steelmen, whilst no cast-iron assurances were given over the 
facility’s long-term future.  This, as will be outlined in the next chapter, made the facility 
extremely vulnerable to future rationalisation, particularly with the election of a hostile 
Conservative Government on the immediate horizon. 
 
101 Minutes of meeting between the TUCSICC and BSC, 12 April 1979, MRC, MSS.292D/611.41/15. 






Having rejected the men’s latest survival bid, management raised the stakes: 
threatening to unilaterally reduce steelmaking operations whilst attempting to entice 
workers with record-breaking redundancy cheques.  BSC had, however, again 
misjudged the strength of resistance.  Unperturbed, senior industry officials adopted a 
range of insidious tactics designed to undermine prevailing shop-floor solidarity by 
splitting the workforce into two warring camps.  These cynical acts merely impelled 
desperate shop stewards to adopt a more militant stance than at any stage in the 
campaign.  The plant takeover, a final act of defiance that was entirely conscious 
stricken, forced management into pursuing a temporarily deferment agreement.  
Under concerted pressure, Bill Sirs was obliged to act.   
 
Yet the General Secretary’s February 1979 plan was typical of his leadership: a 
slapdash strategy that constituted little more than a sop designed to appease 
aggrieved members.  Meanwhile, encouraged by their Government’s non-
interventionist stance, Grosvenor Place stymied the convincing JURUE report.  With 
the ideologically restrained steel unions inevitably refusing to respond to frantic calls 
for radical industrial action, the campaign fell apart.  Abandoned by both their unions 
and their Government, the BJUAC leadership became the target of disgruntled 
workers seeking head-turning redundancy cheques.  In the past, local shop stewards 
had been able to successfully placate any signs of discord, but they were now helpless 




Internal divisions were inevitable, with accusations of coercion and intimidation unfairly 
levelled at Dennis Turner and his supporters.  These personal attacks would have 
deeply affected a BJUAC Chairman who prided himself on his ability to unite co-
workers around the abstract values of fraternal solidarity, kinship and community.  This 
represented an unedifying end to a hard-fought and incredibly draining decade-long 
grassroots campaign.  Ultimately, the actions of management, assisted by apathetic 
Government and union officials, deeply affected Bilston’s battle-weary rank and file. 
 
With the permanent cessation of iron and steelmaking secured in May 1979, Bilston’s 
remaining steelmen were forced to endure a worsened political and economic climate.  
The next chapter explores the millmen’s experiences at the hands of a hostile 
Conservative Government and a ruthless new BSC Chairman.  Although they would 
ultimately succumb to another round of rationalisation, the chapter demonstrates how 
their leaders proceeded to dominate the town’s social and political landscapes for over 





Chapter 8: Post-steel Bilston 
 
This chapter begins by investigating union responses to workplace restructuring under 
the Margaret Thatcher Conservative Government elected in 1979.  Highlighting the 
combined effect plant closures, the January 1980 national steel strike and the policies 
of a new management team had on TUCSICC thinking, it measures the effectiveness 
of a pan-organisation national campaign undertaken on behalf of the Big Five.  In doing 
so, the chapter demonstrates how union officials finally contested management 
prerogative by publicly refuting the basis of BSC’s decade-long development and 
rationalisation programme. 
 
This flurry of activity came too late for Bilston’s surviving millmen, whose experiences 
are briefly documented.  With the remainder of the works closing in July 1981, the 
chapter investigates the social and economic landscapes of post-industrial Bilston, as 
well as the experiences of redundant ex-steelworkers struggling with life outside the 
plant.  A central focus here is the activities of Dennis Turner and his former BJUAC 
colleagues who, after reforming as a welfare cooperative on abandoned works 
property, looked to attend the needs of a community suffering from the social isolation 
and economic deprivation caused by long-term unemployment.  The chapter 
concludes by revealing how the co-operators continued to participate in community 
and political activism, culminating in Dennis Turner’s election to Parliament in June 






A New Threat 
 
Within days of the permanent closure of Bilston’s heavy-end, the UK had a new 
Government.  An early act of the Conservatives was to place strict cash limits on the 
state steel industry in a completely illogical attempt to strong-arm management into 
breaking even.1  Predictably, this prompted Grosvenor Place to target extensive labour 
economies by way of unprecedented mass redundancies and plant closures.  In the 
first meeting between the TUCSICC and senior industry officials following the May 
1979 election, Bob Scholey revealed the industry faced the prospect of insolvency 
unless drastic bilateral action was taken.  The Corporation’s chief henchmen then 
warned that a major confrontation would occur if the unions attempted to block any 
future de-manning initiatives.  Dennis Delay’s personal comments on the June 1979 
talks reveal a new sense of urgency in management thinking following the election:  
 
At a meeting of the (so called) Joint Planning Committee on Monday, June 11, 
the BSC side made plain that they were determined to take drastic and swift 
action to get the Corporation out of its present predicament.  Their attitude 
pretty clearly had been shaped in the discussions which they have been 
having with the Government.  These appear to have made them, on the one 
hand, desperate, because of the financial strait-jacket the Government has 
 
1 In opposition the Conservatives had adopted a hostile attitude towards the public sector steel industry, 
with Margaret Thatcher’s Parliamentary Undersecretary Ian Gow introducing a Private Members’ Bill 
demanding re-privatisation.  The party’s April 1979 election manifesto had then vowed to set BSC a 
“clearer financial discipline in which to work”.  See Conservative Party, 1979 Conservative Party 
General Election Manifesto (London, 1979).  For a detailed study of the overall impact of so-called 
‘Thatchernomics’ on traditional British industries, see A. Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong 
State: The Politics of Thatcherism, 2nd ed. (London, 1994). 
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now forced on them; and, on the other hand, confident that the Government 
will not intervene if the Committee appeal to the Minister to make the 
Corporation go easy.2 
 
Days later, new DTI boss, Sir Keith Joseph, confirmed annual cash limits had indeed 
been capped, meaning all operational losses were expected to be covered by internal 
cost savings.  Responding for the opposition, James Callaghan warned the steel 
unions: 
 
Sir Keith Joseph has a pistol at your heads.  Some of you who know the steel 
industry well tell me that it will simply not be possible to operate beyond March 
1980 without some further financial loss being incurred.  I am told that the only 
way to meet Sir Keith Joseph’s target may be to close a major modern works.3 
 
The former Prime Minister’s prediction would ultimately prove prophetic.  In the 
meantime, under insurmountable pressure from their Whitehall paymasters, 
management set their sights on shutting all remaining facilities outside the Big Five 
and South Yorkshire.   
 
Following the expedited closure of Corby and Shotton, planners submitted the ‘Radical 
Review’ paper, setting out BSC’s short-term plans.  But with Joseph said to be 
underwhelmed by their limited scale, Scholey returned with the more ambitious 
 
2 TUC inter-departmental correspondence, D. Delay to L. Murray, 19 June 1978, MRC, 
MSS.292D/611.432/43. 
3 Man and Metal, September 1979. 
`375 
 
‘Business Proposal’.  This revised restructuring proposal envisaged cutting annual 
manned capacity from 21.5m tonnes to 15m by August 1980: 
 
• 12,000 at multiple sites deriving from future productivity agreements; 
• 10,000 at Corby and Shotton; 
• 10,000 at Llanwern and Port Talbot; 
• 4,000 at Consett (full closures); 
• 2,800 at Scunthorpe; 
• 2,500 at various finishing sites (full closures).4 
 
The plan was met with widespread dismay, with the EEC Commissioner for 
Employment accusing management of overreacting to the current crisis, whilst at the 
same time condemning the Government for its indifference to the plight of UK 
steelworkers.5  A much more unlikely critic came in the form of Monty ‘Finish ‘em’ 
Finniston: 
 
Where is this recession?  Last year the world produced around 800m tonnes of 
steel the largest amount in the history of mankind.  The Japanese produce 120 
million tonnes a year.  Are they cutting back capacity to 80 million tonnes?  They 
export 40 million tonnes against our total planned production of 15 million 
 
4 The list included those mills, such as Bilston, which had previously survived the closure of ancillary 
iron and steelmaking facilities. 
5 As an alternative, the EEC suggested a work-sharing programme and a ban on all overtime.  It also 
contrasted the British steelworkers’ experiences their European colleagues.  A year earlier, steel unions 
in France signed a deal agreeing to restructure their industry on the condition that there would be no 
compulsory redundancies, whilst their Government introduced policies designed to limit the social 
effects of retrenchment. 
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tonnes.  That is marketing.  We can make steel as well as anyone else, but we 
have lost our sense of trading.6 
 
The most vocal opponent was Bill Sirs, whose rhetoric following the loss of Bilston had 
become markedly radical in tone.7  The ISTC leader directed his fury towards the 
Tories who, he promised, would be, “left in no doubt about our wrath and indignation”.8  
Responding to the rationalisation proposals, he declared his union was preparing for 
an unprecedented phase of resistance.   
 
This coincided with a round of national pay talks that prompted the first national 
stoppage in over half a century.  The events surrounding the historic 13-week dispute 
are ably covered elsewhere, meaning only a very brief summary of its causes is 
required.9  Evidence points to the crucial role the Government played in initiating the 
strike.  Originally, BSC was preparing an opening offer of 10.5 per cent but political 
pressure forced them to adopt what Julia Hartley et al. has labelled an “empty pockets 
approach”.10  The ISTC were thereby offered a deliberately provocative basic 2 per 
 
6 The ISTC Banner, July 1980. 
7  In August 1979, Sirs told Man and Metal: “It would be unwise to commit ourselves too early to industrial 
action against them [the Government], though there is widespread expectation that their ideas and 
actions may stir enough anger to bring it about ... What the flashpoint may be is open to speculation.  It 
may be the steel industry, where congress has agreed overwhelmingly to put its full strength behind the 
unions in the coming fight.  It may be over Sir Keith Joseph’s plans for pruning nationalised industry.  It 
may be over the onslaught on living standards by means of local authorities imposing cuts at the 
government’s request”.  See Man and Metal, September 1979. 
8 The Guardian, 12 December 1979. 
9 Cottrell, The Giant, pp. 123-134; Hartley et al., Steel Strike; S. Meredeen, Managing Industrial Conflict: 
Seven Major Disputes (Oxford, 1988), pp. 169-205; Sirs, Hard Labour, pp. 88-113; and Upham, 
Tempered, pp. 138-156. 
10 Hartley et al., Steel Strike, p. 22. 
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cent, with an additional 10 per cent tied to the aforementioned de-manning proposals.  
The deal was rejected out of hand and, with no deal in sight, Sirs ordered his members 
to withdraw their labour in January 1980.   
 
Although, on the surface at least, the dispute was prompted by the measly pay offer, 
it must also be placed in the context of past and prospective plans to disembowel the 
industry.11  Whilst reflecting on what triggered Sirs’ decision, The British Steelmaker 
opined that it was a, “Gilbertian quarrel between a loss-making nationalised 
corporation and a union losing members through technological change and threatened 
with further contraction because of market conditions”.12  Empirical evidence confirms 
this assertion.  One of the first leaflets produced by Swinton House, titled ‘Why we are 
striking’, proclaimed: 
 
Not content with making the lowest offer of the pay round, BSC now plans to 
destroy 53,000 jobs, adding famous steelmaking towns like Consett and 
Llanwern to the same scrap heap as Hartlepool, Bilston, Glengarnock, East 
Moors and Shotton.  Twenty-six thousand jobs have already gone since the 
start of 1978.  One steel worker in three will be sacked.13 
 
11 Richard Pryke has highlighted the central role rationalisation played in causing the strike, “The 
Corporation made the mistake of starting with a provocatively tiny offer and many steelworkers were 
obviously boiling over with anger at the way in which the Corporation had been managed and the job 
losses that had just been announced”.  See Pryke, Public Enterprise, p. 208.   
12 The British Steelmaker, February 1980. 
13 Man and Metal, January/February 1980.  Labour historian Hamish Fraser has also identified how the 
closure of Bilston was a contributing factor to the national strike, contending, “Closures in Hartlepool, 
Lanarkshire and South Wales were bought off quite quietly, with good redundancy payments, but the 
abrupt closure of the Shilton [sic] and Bilston works and the threat to Corby – all newer places – led to 




Meanwhile, Martin Upham reveals the impact the recent round of closure proposals 
had on Swinton House’s thinking: 
 
Tabling these proposals at time when pay talks were moving towards a strike 
is now nearly universally recognised as a unique public sector industrial 
relations blunder.  The ISTC was left with no alternative but to break with its 
tradition of restraint.14 
 
The stoppage saw the industrial, general and craft unions stand shoulder to shoulder 
for 92 days, after which time a Court of Inquiry instructed a 15.5 per cent hike.  
Notwithstanding union claims of  victory, a significant proportion of the sum was wholly 
dependent on those local productivity deals stipulated by BSC’s Business Proposal.15  
The agreement, therefore, opened the door to further retrenchment, with Grosvenor 
Place immediately looking to impose their will on employees.  Speaking in the 
aftermath of the stoppage, a boastful Sir Charles Villiers declared that its failure had 
helped purge many illusions from the unions, proclaiming a new sense of reality had 
taken hold of the shop-floor.16  ‘Mr Pastry’, nevertheless, would not bear witness to the 
post-strike industrial relations climate.  In June 1980, the Government replaced him 
 
14 Upham, Retrospect and Prospects, p. 12 
15 In a survey of hundreds of South Yorkshire steelworkers, Julia Hartley et al. discovered that a 
significant proportion of respondents was unhappy with the settlement.  Moreover, the vast majority 
viewed it as a defeat, which they blamed on the ISTC leadership.  Following the return to work, the 
same steelmen called for the sacking of Bill Sirs.  See Hartley et al., Steel Strike, p. 151. 
16 When asked about BSC’s post-strike plans, a defiant Bob Scholey declared, “If we can get the cost 
cuts we want from de-manning and better working practices we may make gains…”.  See The British 
Steelmaker, April 1980. 
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with Ian MacGregor, a Scottish-American businessman known for his confrontational 
approach to management.  The recruitment of ‘Mac the Knife’ was a clear signal of 
intent from Whitehall.  He was handed what Alisdair Blair has described a “relatively 
free hand” in eradicating the £545m loss posted by his predecessor in March 1980.17  
MacGregor announced his arrival with a stark message to employees and their unions: 
 
... employment costs will have to be controlled with utmost rigour ... Against 
this background, BSC is also carrying out a further review of capacity to relate 
it more accurately to the perceived demand for steel and the opportunities 
ahead of the Corporation.  The present review will involve an examination of 
further retrenchment, stock reduction and economies in capital expenditure.18  
 
The TUCSICC were consequently presented with a proposal for the advanced closure 
of Consett, whilst press rumours suggested the new BSC Chairman was coveting at 
least one of the Big Five.  The battle for the public sector steel industry was about to 
enter an unparalleled new phase. 
 
Saving the Big Five 
 
The threat was enough to rouse the steel unions from their decade-long slumber.  Bill 
Sirs, buoyed by the strike, at last looked to take the fight to management.19  In July 
1980 he announced:  
 
17 Blair, The British Iron and Steel Industry, p. 579. 
18 The British Steelmaker, August 1980. 




We are mounting an intensive publicity campaign because it is essential that 
our proposals are adopted …  For too long the so-called experts at Grosvenor 
Place, BSC’s lush London headquarters, have been running the industry to ruin.  
The real experts are on the shop floor, in the mills, the offices and the 
laboratories.  We know what has gone wrong, and we know what needs to be 
done to put things right.20 
 
The first phase involved the recruitment of a new research team who sought to 
discredit management by demonstrating how their policy of continuous retrenchment 
was both unnecessary and damaging to the nation’s long-term prosperity.  A 
reinvigorated Confederation Executive thereby displayed a newfound sophistication in 
communicating with the wider public.  The inhouse journal, Man and Metal, was 
replaced with The ISTC Banner, a colour broadsheet that adopted a much more 
confrontational editorial policy than its sterile predecessor.21  Overall editorial control 
was handed to Keith Hill, a disgruntled former Corporation press officer who had 
crossed over to Swinton House.  Under his supervision, The Banner successfully 
challenged those demand forecasts and cost assumptions used by management to 
justify proposed closures.  When rejecting longstanding claims that Grosvenor Place’s 
perilous financial situation had resulted from unreasonable labour costs, Hill and his 
 
20 The ISTC Banner, July 1980. 
21 The ISTC Banner had first replaced Man and Metal during the strike, when fourteen pamphlet sized 
versions each debunked many of the myths previously adopted by BSC when justifying rationalisation.  
These included ‘Let us nail the lie’, ‘What overcapacity?’, ‘Workers not to blame for high steel prices’ 
and ‘How BSC wasted millions!’.  For a review of the impact of the ISTC Banner during the strike, see 
C. McGuire, ‘’Going for the Jugular’: The Steelworkers’ Banner and the 1980 National Steelworkers’ 
Strike in Britain’, HSIR 38 (2017), pp. 97-128.  
`381 
 
research team highlighted the effect central Government fiscal policies and 
mismanagement had had on cash-flow.  Reflecting on post-strike attitudes, Martin 
Upham wrote:      
 
The strike blew away some of the cobwebs which had obscured debates on 
steel policy.  The Research Department was set free to challenge the 
assumptions underlying the management case for retrenchment, and seized its 
opportunity with devastating effect.  For a number of years, the parameters of 
the argument had been defined by BSC; now the chance had come to explode 
the case for retrenchment and the provocative ‘0 per cent’ pay offer.22 
 
The period also saw the ISTC involve itself in policymaking by publishing an alternative 
plan – a ‘New Deal for Steel’.  The impressive 180-page paperback contended that 
many of BSC’s prospective rationalisation schemes could be abandoned if 
management: 
 
• slashed prices by 10 per cent; 
• secured alternative economies (to labour) by making specific operational and 
financial improvements; 
• took more interest in smaller tonnage orders; 
• and/or invested in mini-works and electric arc steelmaking technology.23 
 
 
22 Upham, Tempered, p. 144. 
23 ISTC, New Deal for Steel (London, 1980). 
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The final two recommendations came as a source of frustration in the Black Country 
as they had underpinned both the JWP and JURUE reports.  Then, in a move that 
caused further consternation, Sirs enthusiastically supported individual defence 
campaigns.  He threw himself into the so-called ‘Consett Crusade’, making several 
visits to the North East plant whilst leading a boisterous march on Westminster with 
firebrand MP Dennis Skinner.24  Elsewhere, he arranged a fringe meeting at the 
October 1980 Labour Party conference, rallying the wider labour movement behind 
Llanwern.  Later, during a visit to North Wales, Sirs’ leadership was described as an 
“inspiration” by grateful shop stewards and campaign leaders.25   
 
Unperturbed by the sudden flurry of union activity, the closure stampede continued 
under MacGregor.  After shutting Consett and several mills facilities, he looked to 
stamp his authority on the unions.26  In October 1980, ‘Mac the Knife’ revealed the so-
called ‘MacGregor Plan’, a corporate strategy that proposed a reduced overall capacity 
of 14.4m t/p/a and the dismissal of 25,000 workers.  Ignoring a New Deal for Steel, 
MacGregor undermined Swinton House’s authority by organising a ballot gauging 
workers’ views of his plan.  Securing a mandate from 78 per cent of voters, he made 
14,000 men redundant over the next fifteen months.  These measures, however, did 
little to improve the industry’s finances, with weekly losses soaring to £7.2m in 
September 1982.  A re-consideration of medium-term demand forecasts that month 
 
24 He also ordered his new research team to assist the Consett WAC, University of Durham academics, 
local Government and the County Durham Trades Council in producing a counterproposal to 
management’s closure plan.   
25 The ISTC Banner, October 1980. 
26 The Warrington mills was closed in August 1980 after a mystery fire that some workers blamed on 
management.  Shop-floor resistance at Consett ended only days later. 
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prompted plans to cut manned capacity to a lowly 8m t/p/a.  When pressed, Bob 
Scholey disclosed that the Big Five were indeed under threat.   
 
The ISTC’s immediate response was one of despair, with Sirs expressing frustration 
over management’s contempt for consultation procedures: 
 
In the past few weeks we have had a succession of redundancy and closure 
announcements.  There seems to be no end to the disembowelling of the 
industry.  There is no consultation whatsoever with British Steel on these 
issues.  We are presented with a fait accompli on every occasion and this 
arrogant behaviour has to stop.27 
 
In the aftermath of the strike, a rejuvenated ISTC boss had looked to confront 
management, only for a new BSC Chairman to covet those plants previously sanctified 
by Congress House.  MacGregor’s ongoing assault would, nonetheless, provoke an 
extraordinary collective response from the steel unions.  The 1980 dispute had 
positively impacted inter-organisational relations, prompting the Steel Committee to 
provisionally relinquish longstanding rivalries.  At the height of the stoppage, they 
collectivised under the banner of the TUC Coordinating Committee; meeting daily to 
synchronise overall joint strategy.28  Then, in September 1980, the NUB and 
Confederation Executives discussed a possible merger in view of, “the contraction of 
membership of both unions as a result of the steel crisis and the close cooperation 
 
27 The ISTC Banner, August 1982. 
28 Sirs later revealed that the two union hierarchies became “firm friends and trusted colleagues” during 
the stoppage.  See Sirs, Hard Labour, p. 93. 
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between the two organisations during and since the period of the national strike”.29  
Although the prospective amalgamation was abandoned, the two unions continued to 
enjoy a markedly more positive relationship in the post-strike era.  Meanwhile, Sirs 
also requested the assistance of the wider labour movement, leading to the 
reinstatement of the so-called ‘The Triple Alliance’: 
 
We are serving notice to BSC senior executives.  The Steel strike is over, but 
the Banner is carrying on.  Our main interest now is to pressurise BSC and 
this government, against their will, to maintain a viable steel industry that can 
meet the country’s needs.  That aim has already been placed in jeopardy by 
past closures.  We now look to the whole trade union movement to stand firm 
with us and save steel.30 
 
By October 1982, inter-union solidarity had improved to such an extent that the Steel 
Committee unions looked to take solidaristic action to safeguard the Big Five.  
Agreeing to coordinate a joint national defence campaign, a delegate conference was 
called in Sheffield, at which Sirs proclaimed: 
 
We do not want to harm the industry, and this stoppage will do minimal 
damage, but the action has to be taken to show BSC and the Government that 
we mean business.  Unless we act now – united and determined – future 
generations will never forgive us.31 
 
29 Minutes of ISTC EC meeting, 16 September 1980, MRC, MSS.36/ISTC/4/10. 
30 Man and Metal, March/April/May 1980. 




In another clear departure from the past, the Steel Committee involved lay members 
in policy formation.  Acting on the recommendations of delegates, the umbrella body 
devised an innovative four-point plan: 
 
• coordinate an all-out one-day strike;  
• order all worker-directors to resign; 
• demand a moratorium on all redundancy talks; 
• conduct a wide-reaching PR campaign targeting sympathetic Government 
Ministers and the voting public.   
 
The strategy represented a complete sea-change in thinking.  The steel unions were 
at last ready to march to the beat of the same drum.  Likewise, they adopted a more 
erudite approach to campaigning.  Rather than focusing on pointlessly lobbying 
uninterested and dogmatic senior industry or DTI officials, Congress House looked to 
influence the general public, with Sirs conceding, “We can take all the physical action 
we need, but at the end of the day we have to capture the support of the public”.32  
The battle for hearts and minds began with a full-page article in The Guardian, whilst 
steel union leaders conducted a plethora of TV, radio and newspaper interviews.  They 
also toured threatened communities, establishing a huge cross-coalition of local 
supporters.33  Elsewhere, the TUCSICC enlisted the support of the leaders of BISPA, 
the CBI and various national interfaith groups.   
 
32 Ibid. 
33 This included private steel companies, constituency MPs, civic leaders, Trades Councils, Chambers 




Another component was the targeting of sympathetic provincial Tory officials.  
Attendees of the October 1982 Conservative Party conference, for example, were 
handed flyers by unemployed school leavers bussed in from threatened steel 
communities.  The exhaustive ten-week protest culminated in a special ‘Steel Appeal 
Day’ featuring a mass meeting at Westminster Hall.  Approximately 500 guests heard 
speeches from leading Tories such as Teddy Taylor and Michael Brown.34  Following 
the ratification of a resolution calling on Parliament to intervene, demonstrators 
marched on Whitehall. 
 
The pressure campaign, described by the BBC as, “the most relentless and skilful 
trade union campaign ever” undertaken, proved an unparalleled success.35  
Concerned by the threat to Ravenscraig, Minister for Scotland George Younger 
threatened to resign, whilst his Welsh counterpart, Nicholas Edwards, denounced his 
own Government for their treatment of Llanwern and Port Talbot workers.36  Under 
considerable pressure from key members of their own party, the cabinet instructed 
MacGregor to retain the Big Five until 1986.  In another unexpected victory, the 
Government limited steel imports whilst extending BSC’s cash limits.  When 
announcing the reversal, Whitehall specifically mentioned the impact a “tremendously 
skilled and effective” protest had had on Government thinking.37  For Sirs, the manner 
of the victory brought a great deal of personal satisfaction: 
 
34 The ISTC Banner, December 1982. 
35 Ibid. 
36 The Conservative MP for Brigg, Michael Brown, also announced he would vote against his 
Government if any compulsory redundancies were forced on workers at Scunthorpe. 




For nearly three months the steel unions have been campaigning for the 
survival of the big five integrated steel plants, for further cash aid for BSC and 
for import controls.  We have used political persuasion rather than industrial 
action.  This unique campaign – bringing together people of all political parties 
and none – has now borne some fruit.  I am pleased that the campaign has 
brought home to the Government the needs of the steel industry and the 
importance of the industry to the nation ... We are pleased the big five are to 
continue – they are the heritage of the British people and will be the lynchpin 
of Britain’s industrial recovery.  The raising of the cash limits for 1982-83 and 
for 1983-84 is sensible and just.  It is a triumph for common sense.  The cash 
limits were absolutely cut back by the present Government two years ago, and 
it is apparent that a new realism has crept into Government thinking.38 
 
The deferment of the MacGregor Plan represented a unique episode in the decade-
long fight for jobs.  But what prompted the TUCSICC to cast aside historic rivalries and 
coordinate an effective pan-organisation national defence strategy?  Why now and not 
in the defence of viable non-Beswick plants such as Bilston or Consett?   
 
Firstly, wider political events compelled union leaders to act.  The election of an 
ideologically hostile Government, the aforementioned closure proposals and the 
resultant steel strike, functioned as a binding agent that prompted an extraordinary 
response.  Secondly, the size of the threat was a contributing factor, with a prospective 





Previous chapters have revealed how steel union leaders were willing to tolerate the 
rationalisation of older facilities so long as investment in the Big Five was assured.  
Under Dai Davies’ and Sirs’ direction, both the ISTC and the TUCSICC had protected 
the interests of members at smaller, old-fashioned works in a largely perfunctory 
manner.  It should, therefore, come as no surprise that the threat to these sacred cows 
prompted an altogether different response.  
 
The December 1982 celebrations, however, were short-lived, with a familiar pattern of 
large financial losses, mass redundancies and compulsory closures re-emerging.  
Backed by the Government, management gutted the Big Five, whilst cynically forcing 
through the closure of private sector sites.39  Further retrenchment failed to enhance 
overall performance, with the industry’s fortunes not improving until later in the 
decade.40  This turnaround had come at an incredible human cost, with manning levels 
plummeting to 50,000 by March 1987.  The return to profitability eventually prompted 
the Conservatives to de-nationalise what remained of public sector steel, with the trade 
unions offering almost no opposition.41   
 
One vocal critic of privatisation was Dennis Turner who, at the June 1987 general 
election, had replaced his former mentor Bob Edwards as MP for Wolverhampton 
South East.  The final sections of this chapter explore the former steelman’s journey 
into national politics, as well his time in Westminster which, it is demonstrated, was 
 
39 The Conservatives aggressively bought-out rival steel producers and processers only to shut them 
immediately. 
40 Grosvenor Place finally registered its first pre-tax profit in over a decade in March 1987. 
41 For a commentary on the ISTC’s failure to oppose re-privatisation, see Upham, Passages, p. 89. 
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heavily influenced by his experiences as BJUAC Chair.  But first the short-lived 
campaign to save Bilston’s mills is briefly surveyed. 
 
A Campaign too Far 
 
The action committee’s response to the permanent cessation of iron and steelmaking 
was one of anger, some of which was levelled at steel union leaders.  Graham Howe, 
reflects on the role played by Bill Sirs during the final phase of the campaign: 
 
I don’t think he did a lot for our cause.  I think, as I say, I was a bit naïve 
at the time, but he knew the writing was on the wall … He was privy to a 
lot more than we were … they give you superficial backing and say the 
right things … paying lip service.  He had to be seen to be doing 
something … I think it was a done deal, I think they knew but they went 
through the motions.42 
 
Back in April 1979, a resentful Graham Fazey complained to the press, “We have been 
let down, not only by our trade unions but the Government too.  BSC has demonstrated 
that it doesn’t want the workforce.  If the strong are not prepared to look after the weak 
there is very little the weak can do”.43  Unlike Fazey, Dennis Turner adopted an 
outwardly diplomatic stance, penning a heartfelt message to his EC:  
 
 
42 Oral testimony from G. Howe recorded 25 January 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
43 The Guardian, 14 April 1979.  With the termination of steelmaking confirmed, both Fazey and David 
Hamilton resigned from the Springvale ISTC Joint Branches Committee in protest.   
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… we are very mindful of the positive and helpful contribution that you 
personally … have made to our campaign, we are taking this opportunity, 
whatever the outcome may be to express on behalf of the workforce our humble 
and sincere appreciation for your help and support.  The workforce confirms 
that the case which has been advanced for Bilston is as strong and substantial 
as the first day that our campaign began, indeed whatever the outcome, we 
know that we have won the argument!  Even though the case might ultimately 
be lost.44 
 
The two Turner brothers and Ted Wall, ISTC stalwarts to the end, subsequently 
presented their EC with a special plaque honouring its role in the campaign.  The 
respect was mutual.  In a detailed public statement, Swinton House praised the 
Confederation-affiliated members of the BJUAC: 
 
It is with great appreciation that we have noticed the tremendous fight for 
survival that is being pursued by our members at Bilston.  We are aware that to 
hold together a workforce against the insidious tactics of holding out large cash 
payments had been a tremendous feat of persuasion by our officials.45 
 
Turner henceforth developed an even closer working relationship with Swinton House, 
with his Executive inviting him to speak at the Confederation’s June 1979 ADC.  In a 
keynote speech that was said to have impressed guest of honour, Prince Charles, the 
Councillor spoke of the growing problems of joblessness, social isolation and poverty 
 
44 Letter from D. Turner to miscellaneous, 28 March 1978, WCA, DW-173/1/4. 
45 Minutes of special ISTC EC meeting, 11 April 1979, MRC, MSS.36/ISTC/4/10. 
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in his hometown.  Only six months later he was handpicked by his Executive to Chair 
the West Midlands Strike Organising Committee.  Turner’s role in organising the 
stoppage was later recognised by headquarters: 
 
The national strike has stretched everyone’s organising ability and ingenuity 
almost to the limit, but the most pleasing feature has been the way everyone 
has risen to the occasion ... Because of the comparatively small works by BSC 
standards in our division the number of pickets available was obviously much 
smaller.  This entailed requesting other divisions to provide a large number of 
pickets.  This brought in its wake problems of accommodation but were 
overcome as a result of offers received from other unions and Labour 
organisations and we are thankful for these tangible demonstrations of 
support.46 
 
The election of the Conservative Government had by now politicised Turner even 
further.  At the aforementioned ADC, he called on steelworkers to “fire a warning shot” 
at Margaret Thatcher.47  Then, during the 92-day strike, he was involved in a fiery 
exchange with the man he had christened Sir ‘Thief’ Joseph.  Meanwhile, Bert Turner, 
who alongside his former BJUAC colleagues joined his brother’s Organising 




46 Minutes of special ISTC EC meeting, 18-25 February 1980, MRC, MSS.36/ISTC/4/10. 
47 Man and Metal, July/August 1979. 
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The return to work did not signal the end of campaigning, with the Corporation 
immediately ordering a review into the future of the mills.  Although management 
originally promised the unions they would, “establish a soundly based rolling business 
with maximum flexibility in the longer-term”, The Mount had since ruled out 
investment.48  The facility was in fact rendered unviable by unworkable costs resulting 
from the closure of the heavy-end.  Each ingot had to be delivered from South 
Yorkshire by road, before being re-heated on site.  Costs rose by £7.50 per tonne, 
meaning that, even if working at full capacity, the facility was doomed to record a 
guaranteed annual loss of £1.6m.49  With demand forecasts predicting an average 
working capacity of only 53 per cent, this deficit was expected to reach £3.9m per 
annum.  The review, therefore, explored three options: 
 
• the retention of the finishing end and mills in their current format; 
• the cessation of hot rolling but the preservation of the finishing line only; 
• or full and permanent closure.   
 
The investigation served as little more than a bureaucratic expediency, rather than an 
independent appraisal of ways in which the facility might be preserved.  Before the 
review had been submitted, its author wrote a confidential memo revealing his sole 
objective was to, “establish fairly clearly in the minds of the union and works 
representatives that management do not see a viable future for the Bilston Mill”.50  The 
report, published in June 1980, concluded: 
 
48 Minutes of special meeting between BSC and SIMA, 23 April 1979, 755/4/4/4. 
49 BSC, Bilston Review, June 1980, MRC, MSS.365/BSC/56. 




The forecast loss of £3.9m in 1980/81 equates to £9,250 per person working 
at Bilston.  At this level there can be no financial or moral justifications for 
keeping the plant open unless the future trade forecasts indicate massive 
improvements in the next 12 months and all the signs are completely opposite 
to this.51 
 
Closure was ratified by Grosvenor Place the next month and Bilston’s millmen served 
with a one-year rundown notice.  Receiving the news, those BJUAC leaders still 
employed at the works released a press statement: 
 
There is no question that assurances were given nine months ago that 
production would go on for three years.  The whole episode leaves questions 
about the corporation’s forward planning and general policy.  As far as we are 
concerned the announcement has heralded yet another round in a long fight 
to save our jobs.52 
 
Turner’s experience of the strike, during which he personally coordinated flying pickets 
manned by militant steelworkers bussed in from South Yorkshire, had a clear impact 
on strategy.  Concerned at the prospect of management starving the mills of orders, a 
reprised BJUAC devised a three-pronged initiative:  
 
• independently source new orders from private companies; 
 
51 BSC, Bilston Review, June 1980, MRC, MSS.365/BSC/56. 
52 The Guardian, 22 July 1980. 
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• adopt a strict ‘work-to-rule’ policy; 
• and call on colleagues in South Yorkshire to disregard any orders to stop 
delivering steel ingots to the Black Country plant. 
 
Although these tactics at least ensured the plant survived in the short-term, 
management brazenly transferred newly acquired orders during the summer 
shutdown.53  Following the return to work, a mass meeting expressed a desire to 
negotiate a closure agreement.  Despite protests from the BJUAC, word was sent to 
Congress House and a deal struck whereby the mills would shut in July 1981, though 
many took immediate redundancy.54  Notwithstanding the action committee’s 
determination to block closure by any means, the workforce could only muster what 
was described by one trade unionist as a “token level of resistance”.55   
 
Explaining the manner of the capitulation, it is clear Bilston’s surviving steelmen 
possessed neither the physical nor mental fortitude required for yet another campaign.  
Over the past eighteen months, they had experienced the devastating loss of the 
heavy-end, a debilitating thirteen-week strike and, more recently, a new, more hostile 
regime.  With the strike costing the average public sector steelman an estimated 
£1,000 in lost wages, financial matters ultimately came into play: 
 
 
53 This included custom the BJUAC had secured after reforming.   
54 Minutes of TUCSICC meeting, 14 August 1980, MRC, MSS.292D/611.41/17. 
55 Minutes of ISTC EC meeting, 19-21 November 1980, MRC, MSS.36/ISTC/4/10. 
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But we were out for 13 weeks.  Very hard times for a lot of people … I mean, if 
you’ve got a family and you were the only breadwinner the union money didn’t 
do a lot.  So it was a pretty hard time.56 
 
When we was on strike, and it was I believe the longest steel strike this country 
has ever had, Linda had just had Zoey, she was six weeks old, and we’d just 
moved.  They [colleagues] had a whip round on the picket lines and we had 
nearly £200 … [but] things were tight.  It was so unexpected … It was a 
desperate time, because we had no money.  If it hadn’t been for Rob’s mom 
and dad and my mom and dad buying our groceries, I don’t know how we would 
have survived.57 
 
… we knew we’d lost it.  Even though Dennis wouldn’t admit that, he’d still fight 
to save one job if I know Dennis, because that’s the way he was.58 
 
At Bilston, this issue was compounded by management’s commitment to starve the 
mills, leaving returning workers contemplating the prospect of receiving heavily 
reduced earnings under the GWW.  BSC, therefore, deliberately targeted what they 
had identified as “moderate and reasonable” sections of the shop-floor.59   
 
By the time the BJUAC had launched their campaign, a sizeable group of disillusioned 
millmen had already expressed a desire to leave.  They were only persuaded to fight 
 
56 Documenting the Workshop of the World, 2007, WCA, LS/LB6/2, p. 35. 
57 Oral testimony from R. Allen and L. Allen, recorded 15 October 2014, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
58 Oral testimony from P. Winmill recorded 16 March 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
59 BSC, Bilston Review, June 1980, MRC, MSS.365/BSC/56. 
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on after a full-time ISTC official erroneously warned that Government budget cuts 
would prompt management to offer heavily reduced redundancy terms: 
 
I indicated to the members that there was now a changed situation, and also a 
changed Government, which could subsequently mean that such settlements 
would be far more difficult than they had previously been, and that perhaps the 
results would not be as favourable as previously had been the case.60 
 
Regardless of any such subterfuge, the men only agreed to contest the closure 
decision if satisfactory payments could not be secured.  With this mindset, it was 




The Road to Viability handed the responsibility of preparing all post steel regeneration 
schemes to BSC Industry.  In the case of Bilston, industry officials had seemingly failed 
to produce any such plan.  With little sign of progress, WMBC’s Economic 
Development Committee, chaired by Dennis Turner, was forced to register a formal 
complaint with Whitehall.  This prompted BSC Industry chief Peter Hardwick to 
sponsor a £50,000 geological survey of the site.  At a March 1980 press conference, 
he revealed a proposal to develop the land for a cluster of factories, warehouses, 
commercial and residential properties aimed at attracting 2,700 new jobs to the town.61  
However, at a subsequent Q&A session, Hardwick revealed that neither the 
 
60 Letter from R. Bishop to W. Sirs, 30 June 1980, MRC, MSS.36/2000/260. 
61 The Express and Star, 4 March 1980. 
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Government nor BSC were willing to provide the estimated £4.2m required to deliver 
the project.62   
 
Civic leaders were left with little choice but to explore avenues for securing private 
investment, with Turner and some of his fellow Bilston Labour Party Councillors 
mounting an application for Enterprise Zone status.  If approved, the scheme may 
have facilitated at least a partial rebirth of Bilston by permitting the relaxation of 
planning regulations and providing both tax concessions and rate reductions to 
potential investors.  To generate support for the initiative, a joint public consultation 
and business conference was organised inside Bilston Town Hall.  After a round of 
political lobbying, the Government rejected the application in favour of neighbouring 
Dudley, a town that had also recently lost its steelworks at Round Oak.  Ever the 
pragmatist, Turner responded by working alongside Economic Development 
Committee officials to shake-up the authority’s rates system, prompting the sale of the 
first pockets of land to developers in July 1980.   
 
Then, following years of inactivity caused by a worsening recession, Bilston received 
a boost when Tarmac Group, a company originally co-founded by Alfred Hickman, 
purchased huge tracts of the 190-acre site to erect a business park and affordable 
social housing.  An enthusiastic Turner described the potential impact regeneration 
could have had on the wider community: 
 
62 BSC Industry, which didn’t even have an office in the Midlands, admitted their limited resources would 
be concentrated on communities in Shotton, Port Talbot and Llanwern.  Nevertheless, even in areas of 
high importance, the Corporation subsidiary failed to provide significant employment opportunities, 
leading one political scientist to describe its national post-steel regeneration policy as a “strategy of 




The psychological value of such a development with its attendant boost to the 
local economy in jobs and goods and service would be tremendous uplift in the 
community’s morale.  New housing and new businesses would be far, far more 
benefit for Bilston ... than years of dereliction.63 
 
However, Bilston would once again fall victim to the whims of a public sector industry.  
Having reviewed the BSC Industry’s geological survey, coal industry officials 
expressed an interest in excavating an estimated £14m of coal sitting beneath the 
abandoned land.  Council leaders, nevertheless, rejected the NCB’s overtures, raising 
concerns over the impact the project would have on their plans to regenerate the site, 
“It is time we said that we will not be messed about by another nationalised industry 
grubbing up a few measly tons of coal at the expense of the people”.64  Ignoring the 
protests, the NCB appealed to the Government to ringfence the land.  With customary 
zeal, Turner organised a community campaign that forced Environment Secretary, 
Nicolas Ridley, to order a public inquiry: 
 
Bilston wants open-cast mining like a gunshot in the head.  If a vote was taken 
among local families it would come out at 99.9 per cent against … Given a 
choice, the people of Bilston would prefer the steel works back rather [than] 
open-casting or new housing development.  They were prepared to put up 
with the environmental problems caused by the works because of the jobs 
provided and the £25m-a-year injection into the local economy … Open 
 
63 The Express and Star, 18 September 1985. 
64 The Express and Star, 20 September 1984. 
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casting would bring problems of dust, noise and traffic congestion, but the 
people of the area would get nothing out of it apart from a few short-term jobs.  
What we want now is a new hope and we believe that housing development-
led investment will bring back jobs.65 
 
Following a protracted public investigation, during which Turner took centre stage, the 
Government permitted the NCB to press ahead with their plans, postponing the 
regeneration of Bilston for several years.66   
 
The town’s steelmen, meanwhile, struggled with life outside the plant.  The principal 
feeling was one of heartache, with Bilston’s resident poet writing a threnody capturing 
the sombre mood that had taken hold:  
 
The factory gates are closing, 
Machines are quiet and still 
No roaring of the furnaces  
No rolling of the mill. 
The men fought hard to keep it open 
But all odds were against their will 
It was a world-wide recession 
And this was a bitter pill...67 
 
65 The Express and Star, 17 May 1986. 
66 In June 1991, twelve years after the cessation of steelmaking, Tarmac was given permission to 
develop the derelict site.  As well as building one million feet of warehousing, the £100m project provided 
25 acres of land for housing, a leisure centre and secondary school, making it the largest development 
scheme in Birmingham-Black Country conurbation. 




The trauma was not limited to ex-workers, with one local resident conveying her anger 
to the editor of The Express and Star: 
 
I wonder what lesson the young people of Bilston and surrounding areas are 
learning these days?  Is it that you should be hard-working, fair to your employer 
and fellow workers, loyal and conscientious while receiving in return a good 
wage and the same fairness and loyalty from your employer?  Of course not!  
Those are the ideals which made their fathers redundant, even though they had 
never been on strike and the work was making a profit.68 
 
Local business leaders, responding to the JURUE report, were concerned over the 
future of the market town, with local butcher Ann Hodges warning, “Bilston will die 
because of this”.69  Such prophecies didn’t immediately come to fruition, as former 
steelworkers’ spending power was initially enhanced by record-breaking redundancy 
cheques.  Assessing the local employment scene, BSC statistics suggests that, of the 
1,740 steelmen axed in April 1979, only 366 remained jobless twelve months later.70   
 
This data, however, was skewed by the 400 or so men enrolled in temporary retraining 
courses, and a similar number employed on short-time hours.  By September 1980, 
6,500 Wulfrunians were working a three-day week under the Government’s Temporary 
 
68 The Express and Star, 20 April 1979. 
69 The Express and Star, 19 April 1979. 
70 BSC, Bilston Review, June 1980, MRC, MSS.365/BSC/56. 
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Short-Time Compensation Scheme.  Tom Larkin, a local Councillor and close friend 
of the Turner brothers, described the situation on the ground: 
 
It isn’t only the unemployment figures we ought to be concerned about, it is 
also the numbers that are on short time.  People on short time lose out both 
ways as they lose benefits and get only part wages.  Nobody talks about the 
hidden figures above the two million and families that are struggling to make 
ends meet.71 
 
One such worker was Cecil Baines.  Despite originally securing full-time employment 
as a steel stockholder, he was soon placed on reduced hours before falling victim to 
his new employer’s ‘first-in, first-out’ policy.  Experiencing two redundancies in the 
space of twelve painful months, the skilled metalworker struggled with life away from 
steel: 
 
I felt very depressed – I’d started to learn a new job and had begun to hope 
for a job to see me through to retirement.  Now there are even more men 
looking for even fewer jobs ... Whereas I should be heading for my twilight 
years free from money worries, the worries are there.  It’s going to be a 
struggle to keep going.72 
 
Baines’ ex-colleagues in the mills, some of whom entered the jobs market in 
September 1980, faced an even bleaker situation.  With many of these men over 55 
 
71 Wolverhampton Community Press, October 1980. 
72 Wolverhampton Community Press, November 1980. 
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years-old, they quickly discovered that both their age and industry-specific skills acted 
as a barrier to finding meaningful work.  Three months after leaving the industry, John 
Parnum complained: 
 
If I had been given £15,000 redundancy money, I would give it all back 
tomorrow if I could keep my job … I’m 58 and I always tell people my age 
straight away when I apply for a job.  They are not interested, and you can 
understand that – I even applied for a janitor’s job and couldn’t get that.73  
 
One young steelman remembers being concerned about the plight of his senior ex-
colleagues: 
 
For some of the guys it was the end of their future … there was people who 
wouldn’t get jobs because they were probably too old.  You know, there were 
guys who were 64 …  they couldn’t get another job again, it was impossible.  
For one, they were too frail and, two, they were too old.74 
 
The rundown of the mills coincided with another crippling recession.   
 
Now we’re starting to get concerned about where we were going to get jobs.  
You could hear rumblings that John Thompson’s was having problems as well, 
Sankeys was struggling, Rubery Owens was gone.  So, a lot of the big 
companies were starting to go through the same wall! … you could see, you 
 
73 The Birmingham Post, 18 December 1980. 
74 Oral testimony from P. Winmill recorded 16 March 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
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could see that the industry was going to go.  I remember waking up two or three 
times in the night, sweating and thinking, ‘Christ, I’ve lost my job’! … I felt really 
unhappy about it.  I felt as if they were ripping the life out of the industry, our 
area, especially Bilston and Wolverhampton.  A lot of the companies were 
beginning to struggle big style and you’re starting to wonder, ‘where am I going 
to get a job’?  You’ve got families, mortgages, all the things most people worry 
about and it was becoming a bigger part of your life, almost by the day.  It got 
to the point where you could see on the horizon there was a big precipice and 
you’re going over it.  So, it was obviously worrying everyone.75 
 
In August 1980, Patent Shaft steelworks in neighbouring Wednesbury released a 
further 1,500 steelmen into the jobs market.  A month later, the local unemployment 
rate grew to an astonishing 17.7 per cent as several of Wolverhampton’s largest 
employers rationalised operations.76  With the former workshop of the world becoming 
an employment blackspot, one Job Centre official voiced his concerns to the press: 
 
It’s frightening.  In November 1977 we had 1,080 unemployed and now the 
total is 2,689.  We have 28 vacancies and none of them are in the 
manufacturing industry ... It is worse than anywhere else in the region apart 
from Shropshire, where work has always been hard to find.  Unless we get 
 
75 Ibid. 
76 The Bilston Group, a community organisation led by Reg Turley, estimated that between 1976 and 




some new industry into Bilston, the prospects are extremely bleak.  It’s a dying 
town.77 
 
In October 1980 Bilston experienced another setback when Elisabeth was dismantled 
by the Corporation.  Hundreds of ex-steelmen flocked to Millfields Road to witness the 
final moments of their beloved Lizzie.  The decision to demolish the ‘Grand Old Lady’ 
precipitated yet another wave of despair, with one grief-stricken resident lamenting the 
loss of two centuries of ironmaking tradition: 
 
Sunday, October 5, was surely a day which marked the end of Bilston – the 
day on which the grand and stately Elisabeth finally submitted to the so-called 
march of progress, and sank gracefully to the ground.  As residents of Millfields 
Road we often had course [sic] to complain of the dirt, noise and smoke which 
came from British Steel and other heavy industry in the vicinity – but in 
hindsight all that was preferable to the unnatural silence which now prevails.  
For the noise and bustle were synonymous with full employment and 
prosperity – and of generations of families who were proud of their skills and 
loyalty to the companies they worked for.  Companies such as British Steel, 
John Thompsons, Sankeys – names which are now rapidly becoming merely 
part of the history of Bilston.  What price now that loyalty and skill, Mrs 
Thatcher and Mr Callaghan?  Will Bilston, like the Phoenix, ever rise from the 
ashes and become again that thriving, bustling industrial market town we knew 
 
77 The Birmingham Post, 18 December 1980. 
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and loved?  Rest in peace Elisabeth.  We shall miss you and that you stood 
for.78 
 
The demolition of Elisabeth proved a tremendous psychological blow for Bilston’s ex-
steelmen.  Roger Deans, working as a boundary patrol officer on that fateful day, 
remembers seeing the blast furnace laying in a smouldering heap: 
 
It was an amazing sight, but it was a sight that nobody wanted to see, ever.  It 
had been there all my life … and it was the skyline – whenever you came down 
the New Road, there was Elisabeth, and it was an awful day.  When I say awful 
– it was a pleasant enough day, but it was awful to see that go down, and you 
think, how can you get attached to a damn great [thing] like that.  But people 
did, and it was extremely sad … And I walked up with a chap and we walked 
round the corner of the shell plant, and that was the first time we saw the 
furnace lying down, and he said to me, this is the end of Bilston as we know it, 
and it was.  And he was virtually in tears, I couldn’t believe it …79 
 
For some, the disappearance of Lizzie represented the loss of Bilston’s identity and, 
moreover, its sense of place: 
 
It killed it.  When they shut Stewart and Lloyds, it killed the heart of Bilston.  
Because Bilston was a steeltown.80 
 
78 The Express and Star, 9 October 1980. 
79 Documenting the Workshop of the World, 2007, WCA, LS/LB6/2, pp. 43-44. 




Well, Bilston, as a town has a lot of history and it was always known as a 
working man’s town … very much steeped in industry … everywhere you 
looked, all these jobs were going … You could actually see that people were 
concerned about what it would do to the town, and you could hear people 
saying, ‘It will kill Bilston, it will kill it’.  And it did, but it took a while.  It didn’t 
happen right away, because obviously people had lots of money, so they were 
spending it for the first 6 to 12 months.  But the next year after that you saw it 
go right to the dogs and, to be truthful, I remember saying this to the wife … 
‘Don’t the people look down’.  You know, their shoulders were down, and the 
people looked as though they were lost, and the whole place looked like it.81 
 
Reg Turley was concerned about the impact this was having on the mental health of 
his ex-colleagues:  
 
BRITISH STEEL rightly or wrongly decided to cease operation – Iron making 
– Steel making and Rolling at its Bilston Works in May 1979, the affect [sic] of 
this decision had a catastrophic effect on the people of Bilston and its near 
neighbours.  After the elapse of 18 months these effects are just beginning to 
assert themselves, there is a deep sense of injustice or ‘why should it happen 
to us’.  It is no use ‘faceless people’ in authority saying ‘you must move to 
where jobs are’ or ‘you must change to new conditions and take on different 
trades’.  Men and children of the Bilston area have inherent in them the feeling 
that working in heavy industries is their natural ‘bent’ and a great deal of 
 
81 Oral testimony from P. Winmill recorded 16 March 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
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satisfaction is thus engendered.  Take this driving force away and life becomes 
meaningless.  Whole families are now feeling desperate and the future seems 
futile.  Who knows the anger, the utter feeling of hopelessness, the bitterness 
of men who worked in a worthwhile trade contributing to the national wealth 
who are now unemployed, no prospects for jobs commensurate with their 
skills and ability.  Who indeed, knows what affect this is having on themselves 
and their families.  What disruption is caused in family life when that should 
be the one stable factor in an ever-changing world.82 
 
A valuable insight into the impact unemployment had had on domestic life was 
provided by another ex-steelman: 
 
I’m starting to get short tempered with the wife and kids.  It takes me up to an 
hour to fetch a newspaper.  I just have to get out of the house.  When I was at 
work I would come home and have a meal and talk about the day at work, and 
my wife would talk about her day – now out [sic] conversations are over in five 
minutes and I get short tempered.  My savings have gone now and I’m having 
to live off state benefits.  I’m worried about the future.83 
 
A quiet pride, linked to being part of a highly skilled, strategically vital public sector 
primary industry, was substituted with the indignity of idleness.  The wife of one 
unemployed steelman remembers the embarrassment of joining the dole queue for 
the first time: 
 





I must admit that claiming benefits was probably one of the most degrading 
things I’ve ever had to do because they asked me so many personal questions 
and they treated my husband like he was worthless ... They [BSC] destroyed 
a community.  It just destroyed everything, and I don’t think they realised how 
much it would affect people.  It left a mark.84 
 
An emotional Graham Howe, meanwhile, reflects on how closure impacted him both 
psychologically and physically: 
 
At the end of the day, when we lost, actually, it’s the closest I’ve been to a 
nervous breakdown.  I ended up with shingles.  I’d put that much into it, you 
know, the small group of us – we went everywhere together … It did me … A 
couple of my members, T&G members, one lad committed suicide not long after 
it shut … You know, people had worked there all their lives, their dads had 
worked there.85 
 
Some were ashamed of the stigma of long-term unemployment: 
 
… it was very [emotional] because the [majority of workers] felt passionately 
about [the strength of our case], then, when all that had been lost, and of 
course we saw the aftermath of that; there was a lot of tragedy, really, a [great 
deal] of sadness, because some people never got a job after that, in their lives.  
 
84 Oral testimony from L. Allen, recorded 12 August 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
85 Oral testimony from G. Howe recorded 25 January 2015, ITSOE, BCA1/0. 
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Some people just couldn’t come to terms with losing their jobs, they used to 
go off.  I remember one chap, he used to start out every day, at the same time, 
on his bike, food in his bag, and just ride around because he didn’t want his 
neighbours to know that he’d lost his job.  There were all kinds of cases at the 
time.  But then we said, well, [these human reactions were bound to occur], 
the steel works had closed, everything had gone, 1980.86 
 
As a civic leader, Turner witnessed the human tragedy unfolding before him first-hand.  
Following closure, the Councillor sought to create a forum from which he could tend 
to the needs of unemployed workers and their families.  In March 1981, Turner and 
some of his former BJUAC colleagues were handed an opportunity to secure a familiar 
facility.  With the regeneration of the ex-works site postponed, BSC Industry was 
looking for a new custodian of the now abandoned social centre or club.  After forming 
a workers’ welfare co-operative, the Bilston men re-established the building as a public 
entity, drop-in centre and social club, thus beginning a new chapter in their Chairman’s 
community and political activism.87   
  
 
86 Documenting the Workshop of the World, 2007, WCA, LS/LB6/2, p. 20. 
87 The decision to reform as a co-operative, and not a private limited company, was inspired by a desire 
to establish the new organisation as an entirely altruistic concern with a responsibility to the entire 
community.  It was driven by new SWWC Chairman Dennis Turner who, like his mentor, was a 
passionate advocate of the cooperative movement.  It is telling that he would later stand as a Labour 
and Co-operative Party candidate at general elections.  Once in office, the MP sought to advance the 
movement even further, chairing the Parliamentary Co-operative Group and making key contributions 
to the Party’s annual conferences. 
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As well as filling the cultural void left by the winding up of the plant’s many recreational 
or sporting societies, the centre provided a space from which Turner could nurture 
what he was now enthusiastically labelling “community socialism”: 88 
 
For our own, and our children’s, future we must now begin the campaign for a 
different order of society, where the maintenance of full employment and its 
due rewards cannot fail us!  Where production is planned for need, not greed! 
Where community life is about caring for each other, particularly for those less 
fortunate then ourselves!  The choice is yours – mean, selfish Conservatism, 
or caring, community Socialism! I care, I believe you do too.89 
 
An open-door policy saw the club function as a sanctuary for Bilstonians suffering from 
the social isolation triggered by mass, long-term unemployment and the Conservative 
Government’s ongoing austerity programme.  Addressing the needs of jobless workers 
and their dependents, Turner and his fellow co-operators joined various community 
groups, charities and the local authorities in administering vital frontline social 
services. 
 
Through their community work, the Bilston men became increasingly concerned by 
the growing issue of youth unemployment, which had been compounded by the 
 
88 The welfare society had met the cultural and recreational needs of steelworkers and the wider 
community for nearly half a century.  Under the SWWC, the site’s two bowling greens, cricket field, 
football pitch and tennis courts were open to members, with the centre housing approximately 50 clubs 
or societies.  Events such as afternoon tea dances, bingo and big band nights proved particularly 
popular.  All local unemployed workers and their families could access the facilities for no charge. 
89 D. Turner, Travel our Way, 7 May 1981, WCA, DX/203/10. 
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termination of several local apprenticeship schemes.90  In 1982 they worked alongside 
MSC and WMBC to establish the NSTS in the former works training centre.  An original 
intake of young adults enrolled on one-year YOP courses in clerical work, retail, 
horticulture, catering, fashion and construction.91  The project proved an unrivalled 
success, winning several prestigious awards before being granted Approved Training 
Organisation status by the MSC.  At the heart of the NSTC model was a flexible 
admissions policy that removed any potential barriers to entry.92   
 
Turner’s experiences as a co-operator and training provider inspired him to become a 
vocal advocate for the self-advancement of working-class communities through free, 
open access post-16 education.  As the Chairman of WMBC’s Further Education 
Committee, he looked to expand boroughwide adult vocational training provision.  In 
1983, the Council commissioned Paul Willis, a renowned sociologist, to undertake 
ground-breaking ethnographic research into local unemployment.93  The study, which 
recommended a complete overhaul of existing post-16 training, prompted WMBC to 
revamp Wolverhampton’s entire further education strategy.  This culminated in the 
opening of BCC in September 1984.  Launched with an initial cohort of 5,000 students, 
it provided a range of innovative vocational and academic courses.  With Turner on its 
 
90 George Barnsby calculated between 1978 and 1985 industrial apprenticeship places fell by 70 per 
cent in Wolverhampton.  See Barnsby, A History of, p. 84. 
91 Bilston’s ‘Yoppies’ undertook six months of class-based theory, followed by an extended placement 
in local industry.  By the second academic year the centre had increased its annual intake to 140 
students, over half of which were long-term unemployed.  The training centre was expanded, with an 
urban farm, greenhouse and orchard installed on ex-steelworks land. 
92 The SWWC also worked alongside NACRO to re-train ex-offenders, whilst specifically targeting 
members of the BAME community and those with special learning needs. 
93 P. Willis, The Youth Review: Social Conditions of Young People in Wolverhampton (Aldershot, 1988). 
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Board of Governors, the college offered free tertiary education programmes to all, 
regardless of age, social class, race or religion: 
 
The College was to have its primary objective reaching out into the community 
to provide education and training for those previously denied it.  The word 
Community in the title is no accident but the result of deliberate decision to 
indicate a community focus taken by the Education Committee ...94 
 
Turner personally handpicked radical educational theorist and proud socialist Keith 
Wymer for the role of Principal.  Under the pair’s leadership, the facility grew into one 
of the largest education providers of its kind in the UK, eventually assisting 50,000 
adult learners to realise their potential.95  Reflecting on the achievements of the NSTC 
and BCC, Turner would later celebrate the role adult education plays in assisting 
working-class communities break free from the shackles of poverty: 
 
These youngsters are often born into disadvantaged and dysfunctional 
families, but parents, single mothers, single fathers, carers and grandparents 
are all welcomed and encouraged to integrate into the learning, caring and 
education process, where healthcare, hygiene, debt, financial planning and 
many other important practical issues for the family are discussed.  The 
confidence and well-being which this intervention and interaction engenders 
is having a profoundly beneficial effect on the early lives of hundreds of 
 
94 Bilston Community College, 100 Years on (Wolverhampton, 1996), p. 38. 
95 The Independent, 15 July 2009.  BCC specialised in providing foundation courses, enabling 
Bilstonians and Wulfrunians of all backgrounds to access university-level education.   
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thousands of our young children, whose life chances are daily being 
transformed.  Education, at every stage of development, imbues 
empowerment in the individual, the family and the community, transforming 
lives with knowledge, and opening up opportunities for economic and social 
advancement.  Therein rests the real challenge of combating poverty through 
improving life chances.96 
 
The failure of the mills campaign could have signalled the final disbandment of the 
action committee but, as community leaders, its members became progressively more 
concerned about the fates of the town’s inhabitants.  The work of the SWWC brought 
to light some of the worst excesses of the Conservative Government, further elevating 
a collective political consciousness that had already been piqued by the decade-long 
defence campaign and the ensuing steel strike.   
 
The Politics of Dennis Turner 
 
Following the establishment of the SWWC, Dennis Turner took the opportunity to 
launch his bid for re-election to the WMBC and the WMCC.  The campaign, managed 
by his brother and fellow co-operator, Bert, targeted his political nemeses and was run 
on an anti-austerity ticket: 
 
Since the previous election in 1977, the changes which have taken place for 
us locally and nationally have been both distressing and disastrous.  The 
election of a Tory County Council in 1977, with their miserly, doctrinaire, 
 
96 Parl. Deb. H.L. (5th ser.) (2008) cols. 733-36. 
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obsession for massive bus fare increases, cuts in services, coupled with their 
obvious inability to make any positive impact on the problems of the West 
Midlands economy is their languid legacy to us for their four years of political 
control.  In 1979 we were further ‘assisted’ in terms of jobs – standard of living 
– inflation etc. by the advent of a Conservative Government in Britain under 
Mrs. Thatcher, which has, in my opinion, been a total unmitigated disaster for 
working people (or should I say non-working people) and their families.  It must 
be true that every person reading this must know someone whose 
employment has been adversely affected by the policies of this Tory 
Government!  It is now time that YOUR voice was heard in repudiating what 
Thatcherism and Toryism stands for!97 
 
The experience of unemployment – combined with the brutal realities of Thatcherism 
– appears to have reawakened the activist in Turner.  Over the proceeding weeks, he 
was witnessed heckling the Prime Minister as she visited a Wolverhampton hat shop 
and, whilst protesting NHS cuts outside No.10 Downing Street, he would organise a 
demonstration led by a sick child from his Springvale Ward. 
 
The centre soon became a hive of political activism, with one local CPGB member 
describing it as the “social and political hub” of Bilston and Wolverhampton, where, 
“members of the South East Constituency Labour Party, councillors and hangers on 
would meet over a pint, engage in congenial conversation, and let their hair down”.98  
 
97 D. Turner, Travel our Way, 7 May 1981, WCA, DX/203/10. 
98 Reeves and Chevannes, Real Labour, p. 67. 
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To Turner and his supporters, the club functioned as an advanced political training 
school; a safe haven where activists could exchange ideas and information.   
 
The co-operator thereby placed himself at the forefront of a grassroots ‘right to work’ 
movement dedicated to protesting long-term mass unemployment.  In May 1981 he 
joined former campaign supporters, the WB&DTUC, in coordinating the Black Country 
leg of the People’s March for Jobs.99  After a huge rally in Wolverhampton that featured 
speeches from Tony Benn and Bob Edwards, Turner led a procession of protestors 
back to Bilston.  Joined by hundreds of local workers participating in pre-arranged 
walkouts, the demonstrators followed him to the former melting shop site.  There, they 
were joined by a local bishop, who oversaw a mock funeral service ending with the 
burial of a small coffin containing the final piece of Bilston steel.100   
 
Between 1981 and 1986, as the industrial base of the Black Country retracted even 
further, Turner continued to champion the cause of jobless workers.  In August 1982 
he joined a coalition of West Midlands TUC affiliated groups in organising the People’s 
Campaign for Jobs.101  A three-day protest culminated in a ‘Festival of the 
Unemployed’ in Birmingham; featuring a performance from a people’s theatre that the 
busy local Government official had helped co-found.  He also backed protests against 
public service cuts, whilst lending his substantial organising experience to men 
employed at struggling Black Country firms.   
 
99 The Bilston men had first met the campaign organisers at the September 1978 Day of Action, with 
the Liverpudlians stopping off in Wolverhampton en route to London. 
100 Following a minute’s silence, the group made their way to the club to enjoy a charity event featuring 
music from Liverpool protest group The Spinners.  A fortnight later, the SWWC and their supporters 
joined their comrades on the final leg of their journey to London.  




The co-operators’ public and political profiles soon grew, with Bert Turner elected as 
a Councillor and eventually Mayor of Wolverhampton.  His brother was destined for 
even greater things.  By now a key player in the West Midlands labour movement, in 
June 1987 he replaced Bob Edwards as MP for Wolverhampton South East.  Running 
as a Labour and Co-operative Party candidate on a socialist ticket, Turner secured 
48.9 per cent of the vote, surpassing his mentor’s majority by a significant margin.  He 
announced his arrival on the national political scene with an impassioned maiden 
speech that focused on an issue that had come to dominate his life: 
 
Many of my Black Country men would not comprehend what has been said in 
the speeches over the past few days, I think they would have difficulty in 
identifying some of the things that have been said by the Government about the 
community in which we live in the Black Country today.  Unemployment is 25 
per cent in my constituency.  In Wolverhampton, 25,000 good men and women 
do not have the opportunity to make a useful contribution to society and cannot 
receive the rewards that would arise from that.  When we talk of unemployment, 
we must take into account the indignity that comes with it.  Independence and 
freedom have been mentioned often in the past few days.  The people whom I 
represent no longer have the freedom and independence given by the wage 
packet.  A wage packet is important to them, and their dignity, standards and 
independence are based on that.  So, I must reconcile that freedom and 
independence with the difficulties and impoverishment in which many of our 
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people have been placed by being out of work and finding it difficult to cope in 
present circumstances.102 
 
This powerful address set the tone for the remainder of his time in Westminster.  Over 
the next two decades, Turner became the flagbearer for worker-led anti-closure 
campaigns at struggling industrial firms.103  Meanwhile, retaining his Confederation 
membership, he also spoke out against Conservative Government attacks on his 
beloved trade union movement: 
 
First, it is appropriate that I should declare my membership of the Iron and 
Steel Trades Confederation, from which I receive no sponsorship.  I am proud 
to be associated with that union, as a member, because of the skills and 
talents of its work force in the steel industry.  We know that that industry has 
recently been devastated by the further loss of many jobs ... The trade 
union movement in Britain has actively represented the aspirations of working 
people for longer than the inaptly termed ‘modern’ Conservative party has 
governed.  Trade unionism still remains a central pillar of a democratic society 
such as ours.  Trade unions have been attacked and undermined by this 
reactionary, Conservative Government in the 1980s, who would continue such 




102 118 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1987) cols. 698-99. 
103 These included campaigns at Cannon Industries, Samuel Edges, John Thompsons and Rover 
Longbridge. 
104 204 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1992) col. 246. 
`418 
 
As an opposition backbencher, he influenced Tory policy by forming a cross-party 
Parliamentary Group for Further Education, which he chaired for fifteen years.  Within 
his own party, the popular MP was handed the whips for both Further Education and 
the West Midlands.   
 
Back in Bilston, Turner was tireless in his constituency work, often holding impromptu 
surgeries on market day or in the backroom of the club.  Achieving 56.7 per cent of 
the overall vote in April 1992, this figure increased to 63.7 per cent five years later, 
and a record-breaking 67.4 per cent in June 2001.  His support base included 
hundreds of ex-colleagues, including many from the BAME community: 
 
I got them to sign up en masse for the ISTC.  Years later, when I stood for 
parliament, and I was out canvassing in Ettingshall, they would come to the 
door and say: ‘I know you.  You used to stand on the table in the [works] 
canteen’.105 
 
With the May 1997 election victory secured, Turner anticipated an invite from Prime 
Minister Tony Blair to join his New Labour Government.  However, like so many of the 
party’s traditional working-class socialist MPs, he found himself side-lined at the 
expense of ambitious younger Blairites.  With his whips unceremoniously withdrawn, 
he was handed the minor role of Parliamentary Secretary to new Minister for 
International Development and fellow West Midlander Clare Short.  Disregarding any 
personal disappointment, Turner threw himself into his job with customary enthusiasm, 
 
105 Reeves and Chevannes, Real Labour, p. 37. 
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formulating his department’s core policy objectives of achieving social equality, ending 
poverty and improving education standards in some of the world’s poorest nations.   
 
Behind closed doors, Turner and his Minister became increasingly uncomfortable with 
many of the policies being pursued by their Government; particularly those relating to 
the introduction of university fees and academy schools, which contradicted their 
longstanding political principles.  But, unlike Short, who eventually resigned over the 
invasion of Iraq, Turner wouldn’t abandon his beloved Labour Party.  In refusing to 
vote down his Government, he was merely demonstrating those traits he had 
displayed as a campaign leader and trade unionist.  Reflecting on the role the Labour 
Government played in the plant’s downfall, he was customarily diplomatic, “Ministers 
were asking questions, although I must say that I’d have expected something more 
positive from some of our Ministers – I won’t mention names; I know them very well 
now”.106  Away from Westminster, he faced criticism for ignoring calls to oppose the 
war.  Such party loyalty also led to a public squabble with local left-wing organisations, 
including members of the WB&DTUC.   
 
Turner’s fidelity was eventually rewarded by his party leadership, with Blair making 
him a Lord after he agreed to stepdown at the May 2005 election.  As a working peer, 
he continued to speak out on matters relating to the issues that had driven his career 
as a community leader, political activist, local Government official, trade unionist and 
MP.  In May 2008, for example, Turner reflected on his own experiences of 
unemployment when instigating a debate on poverty: 
 
 
106 Documenting the Workshop of the World, 2007, WCA, LS/LB6/2, pp. 11-12. 
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The mass unemployment of the 1980s remains indelibly etched in my mind.  I 
was one of the 3 million unemployed at the time.  Our Bilston steel works was 
closed with the loss of 2,300 jobs. Factory after factory went out of existence, 
and 40 per cent of the Black Country’s manufacturing base was wiped away.  
Levels of unemployment ran at 30 per cent, and in some streets it was as high 
as 50 per cent. Some 35 per cent of our young people were denied their first 
opportunity of employment since leaving school.  Training places were almost 
non-existent, and the careers service was moribund.  A depressing sense of 
hopelessness and despair pervaded our whole community. Soon poverty 
made its degrading presence felt, and for many human beings, life chances 
were abruptly truncated at a crucial stage in their lives.  Sadly, for others, their 
life chances ebbed away at the moment of their worklessness, never again to 
return.107 
 
The ex-steelworker ended his impassioned address by outlining a personal manifesto 
he suggested would realise his life goal of social and economic equality: 
 
At the top of my agenda for tackling poverty and improving life chances is the 
opportunity for employment.  In our society, the independence and freedom 
that a wage packet or salary cheque bestows can liberate the spirit and 
engender confidence, self-worth and a sense of well-being for the individual 
and his family.  Conversely, unemployment destroys a human being's sense 
of dignity and pride, creates a climate of uncertainty and financial turmoil, and 
generates a poverty of the spirit which denies ambition and aspiration ... The 
 
107 Parl. Deb. H.L. (5th ser.) (2008) col. 733. 
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virtuous link of full employment in the pursuit of tackling poverty and improving 
life chances together with the achievement of increasing national prosperity is 
an economic and social justice model that should bind us all.108 
 
The May 2008 address was followed with a decision by Turner and the surviving 
SWWC members to sell the club and training centre to the Midlands Co-operative 
Society.  At this stage, ill-health and old age had taken their toll, with their Chairman 
suffering a debilitating stroke.  Two years after his death in February 2014, the club 




The threat to the long-term future of public sector steel, triggered by the election of 
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Government, impelled a rejuvenated Confederation 
leadership to openly challenge management prerogative over policymaking via The 
ISTC Banner and a New Deal for Steel.  The subsequent risk to the hallowed Big Five 
prompted the TUCSICC organisations, who had discarded longstanding rivalries 
during the historic national steel strike, to finally take concerted collective action.  The 
extraordinary ‘Steel Appeal’ protest centred on a sophisticated and multifaceted 
lobbying campaign that emphasises the importance Congress House assigned to their 
hallowed bulk, commercial steelworks.  The manner in which the unions defended the 
Big Five may have frustrated Bilston’s former steelmen, yet it was entirely in 







Although the campaign successfully safeguarded the Cathedrals-by-the-sea, it all 
came too late for Bilston’s millmen.  Like their heavy-end colleagues, they succumb to 
a cynical management team armed with the golden handshake.  Defeated, redundant 
steelworkers and their families faced the harsh reality of living in one of the UK’s 
biggest economic blackspots.  They would, nevertheless, receive support from a 
familiar source.  The strike and, moreover, the domestic policies pursued by Thatcher, 
further elevated the former BJUAC leaders’ collective social and political consciences.  
Concerned by the well-being of their fellow Bilstonians, Dennis Turner began a new 
chapter in his community and political activism.  Establishing a workers’ welfare 
cooperative inside the abandoned works social centre, he delivered an array of vital 
frontline services and community projects under the guise of ‘community socialism’; 
eventually assisting with the self-advancement of the jobless through tertiary 
education and vocational training initiatives. 
 
As well as functioning as a sanctuary for those suffering from the social isolation and 
poverty caused by long-term unemployment, the centre provided a forum in which the 
SWWC chair and his supporters could continue their unique brand of political activism.  
Exploiting the various organising and lobbying skills he had developed over the 
previously decade, Turner assisted several regional grassroots anti-closure 
campaigns.  With his public profile magnified, the former steelworker entered the 
national political arena, with his twenty-five years in Westminster clearly defined by his 
time as an activist, defence campaign leader and co-operator. The achievements of 
Dennis and the SWWC throughout the post-steel period, are a fitting legacy to the 





The Battle for Bilston in Retrospect: 
 
This thesis has traced the main political events that contributed to the battle of Bilston, 
documenting how the actions of the state impinged on public sector steel.  The 
industrial strategies of five different administrations and the impact they had on both 
management and rank and file workers at Bilston have been appraised in some detail.   
 
For all its endeavours on the social policy front, Harold Wilson’s Government made 
the fundamental mistake of yielding to BSC’s supposed technical and commercial 
expertise. By failing to cross-examine the overall judgement of management, they 
watched on as Grosvenor Place repeatedly failed to exploit favourable trading 
conditions in the late 1960s.  Wilson also sanctioned the Heritage Plan, which gently 
ushered in the ill-fated relocation of the industry and the systematic marginalisation of 
profitable facilities like Bilston. 
 
Labelled a “sad shambles” by Keith Laybourn, Edward Heath’s industrial strategy 
further undermined the facility’s long-term prospects.1  Firstly, by expediting BSC’s 
fledgling rationalisation programme in March 1971, the Conservatives set a precedent 
of forlornly seeking to improve performance primarily through expediting compulsory 
de-manning initiatives and plant closures.  Secondly, despite conducting a disruptive 
investigation into the industry’s long-term development plans, Heath’s ministry also 
failed to scrutinise the rationale behind management’s erroneous ‘bigger is better’ 
 
1 Laybourn, A History, p. 197. 
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approach; instead distracting itself with concerns over theoretical capacity and cost 
projections.  Thirdly, they replaced the socially conscientious Lord Julian Melchett with 
the architect of Bilston’s downfall Sir Monty ‘Finish ‘em’ Finniston.  Although Heath’s 
time in Government was fleeting, the implications of his industrial strategy were not. 
 
Wilson’s second term in office was a lamentable tale of missed opportunities.  Centring 
on the well-intentioned Beswick Review, its contradictory steel policy signalled a 
political compromise that failed to realise its manifesto pledge to support long-
established steel communities.  The state-sponsored investigation, described by 
Charles Docherty as a “cosmetic exercise”, made absolutely no attempt to address 
the many inherent flaws of the previous administration’s development model.2  The 
Labour Government should have scrutinised the commercial decision to abandon 
overperforming mini-works.  But, by instead focusing exclusively on the social 
implications of their predecessor’s White Paper, they merely handed a temporary stay 
of execution to Bilston – a profitable facility that should have been incorporated into 
the industry’s long-term operating plan.  Following Beswick, advanced plant closures 
returned to the national agenda with the arrival of the steel crisis.  Although Labour 
Ministers assisted threatened workers by instructing the Corporation to abandon its 
April 1975 de-manning proposal, they thereafter obliged the further rundown of Bilston 
by encouraging the unions to negotiate damaging productivity deals. 
 
James Callaghan’s Prime Ministership at first provided a respite for the industry and 
its long-suffering workforce.  An upturn in demand was complimented by several state-
sponsored support mechanisms and the recruitment of an ostensibly more 
 
2 Docherty, Steel and Steelworkers, p. 130. 
`425 
 
commercially minded and conciliatory industry chief.  Bilston’s diligent steelmen were 
rewarded by being absorbed into Grosvenor Place’s updated medium-term operating 
plan for a third time.  This would all change with the re-emergence of the world slump.  
Under intense political and press scrutiny, the crisis ridden Government responded to 
managerial pressure by abandoning its moral obligation to older sites.  Indeed, the 
Road to Viability provided the Labour Party with another opportunity to reassess the 
basis of all future development.  However, by consenting to management’s perfidious 
overcapacity/overmanning argument, the White Paper authorised a cycle of closures 
that would go way beyond Beswick.  This reactive steel policy not only ended any 
prospect of Bilston receiving lifesaving investment, but the introduction of generous 
redundancy packages would eventually undermine local resistance. 
 
Elected only days after iron and steelmaking in the Black Country ended, Margaret 
Thatcher’s Conservative Government had a considerable impact on the political and 
social landscapes of post-industrial Bilston.  Having forced the steel strike and the 
closure of the mills, the Tories’ attack on public services further politicised key 
members of the defunct BJUAC.  Although, as experienced activists, they were 
conceivably always destined to re-engage in civic life, the Government’s determination 
to undermine working-class communities inspired the establishment of the SWWC, 
the NSTS and a new, more intensive round in their political activism.     
 
This study has, therefore, demonstrated how the experiences of industrial workers 
were impacted by the state during a prolonged period of economic and political 
retrenchment.  Each of the Governments reviewed in this thesis placed too great a 
degree of faith in the competence of management, particularly in the field of future 
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planning.  Although they all possessed executive powers, successive Ministers 
consistently endorsed BSC’s ‘bigger is better’ philosophy, in spite of its many obvious 
shortcomings.  In the words of one political scientist, when “the corporation proposes, 
the government disposes”.3  Moreover, as the crisis unfolded, they were too easily 
convinced by Grosvenor Place’s vague overcapacity/overmanning argument, with 
Bilston’s steelmen paying the ultimate price.   
 
The thesis has placed the battle for Bilston in its full industrial context: providing an 
economic, commercial and technical survey of the Corporation, whilst uncovering how 
decisions made at boardroom-level directly impacted the lives of domestic 
steelworkers and workplace cultures.  It has revealed how the closure of a viable state 
enterprise, attended by hardworking and highly-skilled personnel, was encouraged by 
industry officials who had already overseen the loss of 68,000 employees by the time 
they unceremoniously sacked Bilston’s 1,900 remaining heavy-end workers in April 
1979.   
 
The retrenchment of the public sector steel industry was the result of mismanagement 
on a massive scale.  BSC’s approach to long-term planning was both ill-designed and 
poorly superintended.  By concentrating on inflexible mega sites that relied on full 
capacity working, planners wasted an astonishing £3.09bn of taxpayer’s money on 
capital expenditure between July 1967 and April 1979.  A dogged fixation with bulk 
steelmaking facilities left the industry badly exposed to the coming crisis, which was 
further compounded by a series of operational and commercial blunders.  Scrutinising 
the responses of senior industry officials to the constantly shifting economic climate, it 
 
3  Abromeit, British Steel, p. 208. 
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has been demonstrated how they frequently missed out on vital sales revenue, a factor 
that contributed to huge pre-tax losses.  BSC, meanwhile, wantonly sacrificed a works 
that made a profit of £14.4m in the crisis years of 1974 to 1978.  During this same 
period, the industry lost a staggering £682m, with the remainder of the Special Steels 
Division posting a £4.6m deficit.  The Staffordshire knot most certainly propped up the 
Yorkshire rose.         
 
Bilston’s steelmen were forced to contend with senior industry leaders using 
management prerogative to rundown their workplace in three distinct stages.  The first 
involved the systematic marginalisation of the facility from their modernising agenda.  
Overseeing a process of managed decline, they funnelled Bilston’s profits into rival 
lossmaking special steel sites in South Yorkshire, whilst leaving the Black Country 
facility to wither on the vine.  At the same time, an explicitly biased divisional 
management team oversaw a series of discriminatory trading policies that forced the 
facility into terminal decline.  This stage, which saw personnel and orders confiscated 
by the Mount, would culminate in the permanent mothballing of Elisabeth; a move that 
was designed to safeguard unprofitable production units elsewhere.  The elimination 
of Bilston’s ability to produce its own hot metal amounted to industrial sabotage.  Not 
only had management deliberately engineered a lossmaking situation on the ground, 
they also sought to forcibly undermine the anti-closure campaign before formal 
consultation could take place. 
 
The mothballing of the cherished ‘Big Lizzie’ heralded the transition to a second, more 
formal phase in the rundown process.  By exploiting well-meaning consultation 
machinery, senior industry officials deceived Bilston’s moderate and conformist 
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workers into preparing two separate survival blueprints – despite already deciding to 
shut the plant regardless.  Meanwhile, the Corporation looked to place further pressure 
on local workers by deliberately propagating their false overcapacity/overmanning 
narrative.  Emboldened by the support of the state, decision-makers obstinately 
rejected legitimate and well-constructed proposals for lifesaving investment; instead 
seeking a negotiated closure. 
 
Frustrated by the intensity of local resistance, management proceeded to the third and 
final stage.  By moving to unilaterally reduce steelmaking operations, senior industry 
officials sought to create an embryonic closure situation by backdoor means.  When 
these premeditated acts were thwarted at Scarborough and again by the plant 
takeover, management cynically diluted shop-floor solidarity.  Engaging in more 
insidious acts, they used mouth-watering compensation packages to split the 
workforce into two warring camps.  This process would be redeployed fifteen months 
later to force through the closure of mills.  After threatening to substantially reduce 
earnings with the GWW, Grosvenor Place once more used lucrative redundancy 
cheques to target sections of a battle-weary workforce still suffering the financial 
implications of a prolonged industrywide stoppage. 
 
The story of the abandonment of Bilston steelworks extends our knowledge of 
management behaviour and privilege.  BSC’s conduct was unbecoming of a public 
sector organisation that had an explicit legal and moral responsibility for the social 
wellbeing of each of their employees.  It is, therefore, little surprise that a historical 
resentment towards Monty ‘Finish ‘em’, ‘Mr Pastry’, ‘Black Bob’, ‘Captain 
Bumblington’, ‘Mother Hubbard’, ‘Mac the Knife’ and the ‘Sheffield Mafia’ is still 
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exhibited by many ex-steelmen, even today.  Older members of the community, 
meanwhile, choose to refer to the defunct works as ‘Stewart & Lloyd’s’ – but never 
British Steel.   
 
This communal reinterpretation of the past provides an insight into Bilstonians’ 
relationship with their lost industrial heritage.  The experience of public ownership was 
extremely traumatic and, by seemingly erasing the memory of BSC, local inhabitants 
have sought to heal old wounds.  Instead, they have rearranged their collective 
memories around the S&L era: a golden age of steel that was defined by high wages, 
zero unemployment and an altruistic form of paternal ownership.  Local attempts to 
symbolically revive the old socio-economic order points to how communities 
collectively remember – or misremember – a series of defined historical events.  This 
phenomenon, in the words of Donald A. Ritchie, discloses efforts, “to make sense of 
the past and to place their stories into some historical context”.4  Memory is an active, 
fluid process and the ITSOE community project, by redefining public memory and 
inspiring a new collective conscience, has provided an opportunity for Bilstonians of 
all ages to look back at the final years of iron and steelmaking with a sense of 
communal pride.   
 
Another core aim of this thesis was to assess the adequacy of institutional responses 
to rationalisation and, in turn, how trade union policy at national level affected the 
activities of their rank and file.  It has been demonstrated how the reaction to pre-crisis 
closure proposals were utterly ineffectual, thereby establishing a precedent for the 
remainder of the decade.  Union Executives consequently compounded the situation 
 
4 D.A. Ritchie, Doing Oral History, (Oxford, 2015), p. 22. 
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by recognising and conceding to management’s ‘bigger is better’ rationale.  In doing 
so, they adopted a policy of acquiescence, wilfully complying with Grosvenor Place’s 
attendant rationalisation narrative.  Long before the crisis arrived at the industry’s door, 
the steel unions should have produced an alternative hybrid development strategy, 
urging policymakers to invest in all commercially viable units, regardless of size or 
location.  Instead, these ideologically conservative institutions meekly complied, 
adopting the same pro-establishment, pro-management outlook they had exhibited 
since their formation by the Government half a century prior.   
 
Although some form of retrenchment was patently necessary, the unions’ stance 
merely encouraged and then facilitated the unnecessary abandonment of profitable 
installations such as Bilston.  In a bid to appease anxious members, officials adopted 
a futile ‘alternative employment’ position.  This strategy of deferment, however, was 
exposed by an economic crisis which saw the collapse of mechanisms established to 
attract fresh industries to steel ghost towns. 
 
Overall trade union policy was initially masterminded by Dai Davies.  An archaic and 
obtuse figure, he displayed very little compassion for those members facing uncertain 
futures.  His refusal to endorse the NAC, support individual local defence campaigns 
or champion Bilston’s potentially lifesaving double-ended firing proposal caused great 
consternation in the Black Country, with conventionally moderate shop stewards 
calling for his head.  Although Davies retired on the eve of the crisis, his policy of 
acquiescence would outlive him.  The appointment of his former Deputy, Bill Sirs, 
suggested a new, more robust phase in the struggle against structural rationalisation.  
He seemingly brought a newfound resilience to union headquarters, confronting 
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management prerogative in the press and temporarily thwarting unilateral moves to 
expedite previously deferred closure dates.  The new man also sought to unite the 
TUCSICC, an institution that had previously suffered from prolonged and damaging 
bouts of infighting.   
 
Frustratingly, this all proved to be a false dawn.  Ignoring the rhetoric, Sirs prolonged 
those defective strategies implemented under his predecessor by committing to the 
April 1973 national resolution.  Moreover, despite advocating a closer working 
relationship with WACs, he categorically refused to support any one particular defence 
campaign over the other – regardless of merit.  Bereft of ideas, he accepted 
management prerogative by signing a productivity deal which legitimised BSC’s inbuilt 
overmanning myth.  This willingness to submit to managerial control conforms with 
Richard Hyman’s edict in his classic study of British trade unions: 
 
Yet if the union official sees orderly industrial relations as essential for stable 
bargaining relationships with employers and ultimately for union security, his 
viewpoint in many respects parallels that of management … Job control, as it 
primarily concerns the ‘union-as-an-organisation’ (and hence the official as the 
main guardian of organisational interests) is therefore concerned more with 
stabilising the detail of the relationship between labour and capital than with 
conducting a struggle against the domination of capital.  Such control may thus 
involve the suppression of irregular and disruptive activities by the rank and file 
which challenge managerial control.5 
 
 
5 Hyman, Industrial Relations, p. 91. 
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With management cutting a hasty but temporary retreat in the wake of Scarborough, 
the steel unions were presented with another opportunity to discard their firefighting 
approach.  At this stage they still could have pooled their resources to construct an 
alternative development plan that retained viable non-Beswick plants such as Bilston 
and Consett.  Yet the TUCSICC remained in a state of fractured impotence.  The case 
of the steel unions illustrates what Robert Taylor has identified as the very real 
“dangers of fragmentation”: 
 
Our protracted economic crisis has highlighted many defects in British trade 
unions.  The dangers of fragmentation are real.  There is an often unappealing 
sectional self-interest about the motives of union leaders as well as their 
members.  Few think beyond the parameters of their own union … the chaos 
of multi-unionism means the British trade union ‘movement’ is ill-prepared to 
modernise.  The very inter-union divisions undermine union effectiveness.6 
 
Following the desertion of the Steel Committee, it was left to the Confederation to 
safeguard Bilston.  Sirs’ final intervention was emblematic of his first five years in 
office: a haphazard and feeble plan that functioned as a sop to anxious members.  Like 
his predecessor, the General Secretary was a product of his institutional environment.  
Under his leadership, the ISTC continued to adopt a pro-establishment position; 
willingly sacrificing tens of thousands of members on the altar of technological 
advancement.  He was, like Davies, only interested in protecting members at the Big 
Five – as evidenced by the urgency in which he scrambled to organise the Steel 
Appeal protest. 
 




The thesis has provided a critical appraisal of institutional behaviour both before and 
during the crisis.  By scrutinising the response of trade union hierarchies to 
rationalisation, it reveals how the actions of ideologically conservative, pro-
management organisations harmed the prospects of rank and file members at plant-
level. 
 
This study has also critically examined how ordinary workers adjust, organise and 
resist to both the decline of their industry and their unions.  A key objective was to 
determine and appraise the strategic framework adopted by an informal rank and file 
protest group formed at Bilston.   
 
Tactically fluid and strikingly pragmatic, the BJUAC masterminded three distinct 
strategic phases during their decade-long campaign of defence.  The first witnessed 
shop stewards achieve success by focusing on their works’ impressive financial 
record.  Frustrated by the ambivalence demonstrated by union headquarters, they 
enlisted an influential political lobby to do their bidding.  Spearheaded by patron Bob 
Edwards, the Bilston men convinced sympathetic policymakers to absorb their plant 
into the industry’s medium-term operating plans in both May 1973 and January 1975.  
Although the arrival of the crisis threatened to undermine their case for retention, 
Bilston’s diligent steelmen responded by adapting long-established workplace 
practices.  These efforts, which preserved their proud financial record, persuaded 
management to again absorb the Black Country facility into their updated five-year 
plan.  However, with the industry badly mismanaged – and the crisis set to return – 




The mothballing of Elisabeth prompted a tactical transition.  Forced into a lossmaking 
situation, the BJUAC argued on commercial and industrial lines.  Looking to take 
advantage of existing consultative arrangements, they presented an incredibly 
sophisticated homegrown plan which called for new steelmaking facilities to exploit the 
lucrative Midlands carbon steels market.  After a vastly altered political climate led to 
the rejection of the first bid, the BJUAC broadened their already considerable external 
support base by cultivating a closer working relationship with the steel unions.  They 
also recruited a team of industry experts and prestigious academic institutions to 
prepare a revolutionary new counterproposal.  The dynamic action committee and 
their supporters simultaneously participated in extra-workplace direct actions; 
organising several high-profile public demonstrations and a national PR exercise that 
exposed the intellectual weaknesses of management’s rationalisation programme.  
The rejection of the Q-BOP proposal, nevertheless, forced the Bilston men to transition 
to the third and final strategic phase: forlornly pursuing a public inquiry into the social 
implications of closure.  By this stage, however, defeat was inevitable. 
 
It is imperative we now briefly address criticisms levelled at the action committee 
leadership for its chosen strategic approach, as well as some of its more controversial 
actions.  Firstly, the BJUAC’s overreliance on political elites has been queried by some 
local commentators.  There is no denying that, between February 1972 and March 
1978, shop stewards depended heavily on a regional lobby who, despite extending 
the plant’s lifespan, failed to secure major investment.  This was certainly the case 
during the Beswick Review, when there was a much more favourable economic and 
political climate and Bob Edwards had the ear of the Labour peer, Tony Benn and 
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other key Whitehall officials.  The steel crisis, followed by the publication of the Road 
to Viability four years later, thereby exposed the vulnerability of this strategy.  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that, without the assistance of Black Country MPs 
and local authority figures, it is unlikely the works would have been absorbed into 
BSC’s medium-term operating plans in either April 1973 or January 1975.    
 
There have also been retrospective attacks made against the BJUAC – and Dennis 
Turner in particular – for exploiting the campaign for their own professional and 
personal gain.  The battle for Bilston works did represent something of a debutante’s 
ball for the ambitious young Turner, providing him with an opportunity to network with 
influential labour movement leaders, and a platform from which to contest three 
separate general elections.   Nevertheless, he was, with or without the campaign, 
always destined to enter the national political arena, having been schooled by his 
mentor for over two decades.  Moreover, Turner’s enduring popularity amongst 
constituents wasn’t defined exclusively by his work as BJUAC Chair, but also his 
longstanding role as a devoted activist, community leader, local Government official 
and co-operator. 
 
The decision to tie the campaign’s fate with steel union officials – and Bill Sirs – has 
been placed under the microscope by former colleagues.  Although this tactical 
manoeuvre did little to prevent the plant’s downfall, the pragmatic Bilston men had 
very few options following the rejection of the JWP report.  Unlike colleagues at larger 
facilities, they neither possessed the numbers nor the organising capacity to isolate 
themselves from union headquarters.  Instead, an idealistic BJUAC leadership 
believed they could drive national policy from within.  As this thesis has uncovered: 
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they were mistaken.  In the case of Turner, his close working relationship with Sirs, 
particularly in the wake of defeat, naturally irked some of his more indignant 
colleagues.  However, as an ISTC stalwart who possessed an unshakeable 
institutional fidelity, the action committee Chairman’s true allegiances were with his 
trade union and not necessarily its leader.  As an MP, Turner continued to lobby on 
behalf of the Confederation long after Sirs’ retirement, proudly retaining his union 
membership card in the process.  In Labour History and Labour Movement in Britain, 
Sidney Pollard identified how some rank and file workers demonstrate an 
extraordinary degree of commitment to their trade union: 
 
There was something here clearly beyond immediate self-interest: there 
seemed to be devotion to the ideal, such as is perhaps found in national 
patriotism – but that emerged only as a result of the massive propaganda of the 
modern state which pervades the whole society from school age onwards.  The 
unions did not dispose of comparable powers to influence minds or enforce 
conformity, yet they seemed to be similarly able to evoke string loyalties.  
Leaders devoting their lives to the trade union cause showed even greater 
idealism.  Sometimes the cause was that of their narrow trade; but commonly 
there was also a sense of solidarity with working people as a whole.7 
    
In the case of Turner, such conduct is entirely consistent with his own personal 




7 S. Pollard, Labour History and the Labour Movement in Britain (Aldershot, 1999), pp. xi-xii.  
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The final issue to address is the more serious charge of autocracy.  There was, of 
course, the notorious September 1977 resolution, which Turner himself later conceded 
could be perceived as being misleading.  Further evidence also points to how, during 
the final anarchic stage of the campaign, the BJUAC leadership cajoled vulnerable co-
workers with duplicitous claims of reduced redundancy payments.  Moreover, some 
decisions, including the controversial plant takeover, were carried out after calls for a 
secret written ballot had been rejected.  Then, with the workforce dividing into two 
separate factions, overzealous action committee supporters involved themselves in 
unsavoury altercations with colleagues they had disparagingly branded ‘head turners’ 
and ‘cut and runners’.  Yet, for the most part of the decade-long defence, the BJUAC 
acted with transparency and, crucially, with a legitimate mandate.   
 
A key element of this thesis has been to ascertain the degree of shop-floor support at 
various stages of the campaign.  During the first two strategic phases, the action 
committee leadership was enthusiastically backed by the vast majority of a workforce 
driven by a sense of moral outrage.  Accordingly, they successfully tempered any early 
signs of dissension by establishing open lines of communication with rank and file 
workers.  The BJUAC were also cognisant of the importance of securing the backing 
of formal shop-floor institutions, with individual and joint union branches, as well as the 
Works Council, regularly reaffirming their support.  Although the two-part resolution 
admittedly proved to be an area of contention at the very end, workers had voted it 
through on numerous occasions via mass meetings or at branch-level.  
Notwithstanding any such controversy, the motion proved a vital tool: an antidote to 




Anyone familiar with Dennis Turner would be aware that coercion or intimidation were 
not traits he had displayed across his career.  Political scientist Dennis Kavanagh once 
described his lobbying style as, “‘If it’s not too much trouble, do you think you could 
possibly …?’  With an avuncular manner, shaking hands and draping an arm around 
the shoulder of MPs, he was effective”.8  A superb orator who possessed incredible 
powers of personal communication, he was able to woo even the greatest sceptics to 
one of his many causes.  Forthright in his views, but diplomatic in tone, he was a 
unifying figure who repeatedly brought together the shop-floor despite the divisive 
actions of management.  Herein lies the true success of his leadership. 
 
Today, the works, the BJUAC and the SWWC may have all gone but their legacy 
continues.  Politically, Bilston remains a Labour Party stronghold, contrasting with the 
shift towards the populist right that has occurred in de-industrialised communities 
elsewhere.  Current MP for Wolverhampton South East, Pat McFadden, as a disciple 
of New Labour and a non-native, initially struggled to win over working-class 
Bilstonians.  However, after receiving an endorsement from the Turner brothers, Tony 
Blair’s Parliamentary Undersecretary went onto cement his place within the community 
– despite now having a reduced overall majority.  McFadden reflects on how Dennis, 
by personally advocating his election bid, helped him build rapport with voters. 
 
Rarely could a politician have been so familiar with his constituency.  His 
encyclopaedic knowledge came from a lifetime of living there, an uncanny 
memory for names and faces, his work as a Betterware salesman, his 
campaign for the steel works, and the long years he spent as a councillor and 
 
8 The Guardian, 27 February 2014. 
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MP.  A walk down Bilston High Street with Dennis took a long time, as a 
constant stream of people came up to say hello, tell him their news, and pass 
the time of day.9  
 
With the Springvale now gone, Bilston Labour Club has become the town’s solitary 
political hub.  The political culture of steel nonetheless remains, with former plant 
employees still sitting on its board of Governors and many of the current crop of civic 
leaders influenced by those ‘men of steel’ who came before them.  This is certainly the 
case in Bilston East, the former of ward of the Turner brothers.  Councillor Stephen 
Simkins, inspired by their unique brand of ‘community socialism’ when growing up, 
became Bert’s young apprentice on the Council.  Meanwhile, by helping to raise the 
local BAME community’s political consciousness, the Turners provided a platform from 
which second and third generation migrants could participate in local Government. 
Rupinderjit Kaur, Councillor for the Spring Vale ward, has continued the work of her 
predecessors by facilitating training schemes for young unemployed adults.   
 
The CLP’s enduring influence in the area can be explained by Gregor Gall’s concept 
of community-based collectivism.  His work on the Scottish labour movement contends 
that, if the political identity of a town and its inhabitants is deep-rooted enough, it will 
survive the adverse socio-economic impacts of de-industrialisation.10  Clark’s 
aforementioned study into the Lee Jeans campaign, meanwhile, has also 
demonstrated how the long-established regional traditions of popular protest and rank 
 
9 Reeves and Chevannes, Real Labour, p. 87. 
10 G. Gall, Trade Unionism and Industrial Relations in Scotland since UCS, Scottish Labour History, 238 
(2003), pp. 51-74. 
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and file trade unionism can be maintained in the post-industrial period.11  This is most 
certainly the case in Bilston, where the political legacy of Sam Hague, John Baker, 
Benjamin Bilboe, Bob Edwards and the Turner brothers endures. 
 
The work of the SWWC also lives on in those social and cultural institutions they either 
helped to establish or worked tirelessly to safeguard.  When agreeing to sell the club 
to the Co-operative Group, the co-operators ensured all adjoining recreational facilities 
remained as public entities.  Meanwhile, Bilston Community Centre, Bradley Senior 
Citizen's Centre, the Good Shepherd Resource Shelter, the Haven Refuge, the Bert 
Williams Leisure Centre, Bilston Town Hall,  the Gazebo and Wolverhampton Grand 
Theatres all remain in one capacity or another, whilst an annual ‘Dennis Turner 
Opportunity Fund’ provides financial support to disadvantaged students.  In Real 
Labour, Frank Reeves and Mel Chevannes reflect on the longstanding impact of 
Turner’s community work: 
 
The new phoenix-like Bilston is, in reality, the lifetime work of one man, 
transfixed by the revelation that the key to his neighbourhood’s future economic 
prosperity lay in being fiercely proud of one’s working-class roots and industrial 
heritage, and in retaining and valuing one’s hard-won local identity.  Unlike Mrs 
Thatcher, Dennis believed in and treasured ‘community’.  Bilston, to him, was 
far more than the set of buildings, streets and alleyways described above.  It 
was a vibrant pulsating community, whose love of life was displayed on a daily 
basis in the comfort and affection of its homesteads, the neighbourly greeting 
and gossip on its street, the bonhomie of its clubs, pubs, and day centres, the 
 
11 Clark, And the next thing, pp. 119-120. 
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banter of its market traders, and the wry humour and solidarity of its workplaces.  
Dennis venerated the vigour and vitality of his Bilston community and drew his 
strength and sense of purpose from its long-established roots.12 
 
One of the SWWC’s final gifts to Bilston was helping to secure funding for a sculpture 
park that celebrates the town’s industrial heritage.  The first piece, named Witness, 
features excerpts from an oral history interview conducted with one participant prior to 
his death: 
 
But we’re still here, and Bilston has still got that pride that was so dented.  We 
knew they wouldn’t take that away from us, because we are people of steel.  
You know, it’s our history, and we’re resilient, and we had to be resilient … 
they’re [Bilstonians] lovely people, and they’re in the main happy people, for all 
we had those bouts of unhappiness, and there was such unhappiness caused 
by the closure of this plant; but we’re still here to tell the tale.13 
 
In the Shadow of Elisabeth and Workers’ Mobilisation Literature: 
 
Both historical and contemporary researchers have tended to narrowly focus their 
scholarly gaze on the new forms of radical shop-floor protest that emerged throughout 




12 Ibid., p. 136. 
13 Documenting the Workshop of the World, 2007, WCA, LS/LB6/2, pp. 22-23. 
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Like our study, Charles Woolfson and John Foster’s comprehensive and empirically 
weighted account of the UCS sit-in places a rank and file anti-closure campaign in the 
contexts of the changing political and socio-economic environs of post-war Britain.  In 
doing so, the rank and filists offer an instructive appraisal of the impact successive 
Governments’ industrial and fiscal policies had on shop-floor experiences.  Moreover, 
The Politics of the UCS Work-In also identifies how the commercial failings of company 
bosses negatively impacted the prospects of local workers.  Similarly, From Workplace 
Occupation to Mass Imprisonment, Stephen Mustchin’s piece on a four-month 
workers’ occupation of Cammell Laird’s Birkenhead facility, provides an account of 
how long-term structural issues, malinvestment and defunding left domestic 
shipbuilding in a “parlous state”.14  In another piece examining an anti-closure protest 
at a struggling engine plant in Manchester, the author determines the manner in which 
management deliberately undermined commercial performance in order to force 
through mass compulsory redundancies.  Conflict, Mobilisation, and 
Deindustrialisation subsequently illustrates how, by emulating the earlier actions of 
senior BSC officials at Bilston, “controlling, authoritarian” company bosses 
“circumvented union structures” before overseeing a “campaign of intimidation” on the 
factory floor.15  Indeed, management prerogative is a reoccurring theme in studies of 
de-industrialisation and worker mobilisation. 
 
Another commonality with these investigations and this thesis is the heightened 
political awareness of those individuals spearheading the respective protests.  
Mustchin, for example, establishes how, after being marginalised by apathetic trade 
 
14 Mustchin, From Workplace Occupation, p. 39. 
15 Mustchin, Conflict, Mobilisation, and De-Industrialisation, p. 151 and p. 160. 
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union bureaucrats at national level, “politicised” Gardner employees tied themselves 
with regional SWP and CPGB officials.16  Likewise, shop stewards at Cammell Laird 
were politicised by their plant takeover and subsequent imprisonment.  As was the 
case with Dennis Turner, campaign leaders sought to enter mainstream politics, with 
shipbuilder Lol Duffy competing in the 1987 general election on a socialist ticket.  
 
However, notwithstanding these thematic consistencies, it must be stressed that the 
experiences presented in these studies contrast sharply from those of Bilston’s 
steelmen.  The most obvious difference is the political and industrial relations 
landscapes these workplace protests took place in – which, in turn, impacted tactical 
considerations.  The 1971/72 UCS sit-in, for example, occurred as a response to 
Edward Heath’s early laissez faire industrial and economic strategies, with Woolfson 
and Foster noting how organisers, exploiting widespread resentment caused by the 
1971 Industrial Relations Act, were able to place enough political pressure on the Tory 
Government to bailout their struggling company.  Nevertheless, most studies on late 
twentieth century rank and file anti-closure protests look at events that took place in 
the 1980s; usually as a response to multinational firms seeking to cut labour costs by 
shipping production abroad.   
 
This, in turn, greatly impacted the nature of the struggles, which evolved to become 
broad-based ‘right to work’ demonstrations against “Government policy, job losses and 
de-industrialisation”, rather than merely localised, plant-level protests.17  In the case 
of those occurring in Scotland, leaders adopted what scholars have described as a 
 
16 Ibid., p. 152. 
17 Ibid., p. 157.   
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“national orientation”, defining struggles as “all Scotland” demonstrations.18  At 
Caterpillar’s Uddingston facility, for example, Woolfson and Foster have established 
how this phenomenon manifested itself in a unique form of “tartan solidarity”, with 
leaders targeting their American owners with the campaign slogan: ‘How Can Yanks 
Kill Us Off?’.19  By tapping into growing calls for economic and political nationalism, 
local assembly workers were able to build an “alliance of forces” in their fight for jobs; 
establishing a much wider – and influential – support network than the one assembled 
by the BJUAC.20  Assistance initially came from the apex of the institutional labour 
movement, with local leaders benefitting from the backing of the highest levels of the 
Scottish TUC.  Those campaigns taking place elsewhere in the UK would also profit 
from closer relations with regional and national union elites, many of whom suddenly 
demonstrated a sense of urgency that was absent from the fight for jobs in steel only 
a decade earlier. 
 
Meanwhile, organisers could now draw on the solidarity of a British shop-floor 
movement that had finally been roused by the prospect of unprecedented job losses, 
as well as simultaneous attacks on workers’ rights under the guise of the Tory 
Government’s draconian 1980 and 1982 Employment Acts.  In the case of the Garner 
dispute, Mustchin outlines the strength of rank and file support: 
 
Visits to Gardner by activists from elsewhere included steelworkers who gave 
advice based on experiences of the 1980 steel strike; a delegation from Govan 
 
18 Foster and Woolfson, Track Record, p. 23 and p. 111. 
19 Ibid., p. 84 and p. 94. 
20 Ibid., p. 24.  
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shipyards including Jimmy Reid and Sam Gilmour, visited in solidarity and to 
pass on collections from their respective workplaces … Workers from a wide 
range of engineering, steel, shipbuilding, mining, and public-sector workplaces 
in Sheffield, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Huddersfield, Liverpool, Birmingham, Leeds, 
Newcastle, south Wales, and London pledged solidarity and financial support.21  
 
As wide-reaching protests, these 1980s campaigns successfully also tapped into a 
diverse and popular support base far removed from the traditional labour movement.  
In Track Record, Woolfson and Foster examine how employees were assisted by the 
owners of Rangers and Celtic football clubs, their fans, community groups and even 
activist musician Bob Geldolf.  Such patronage enabled organisers to achieve a far 
greater degree of exposure and subsequently, “touched a mighty chord of public 
sympathy”.22  Likewise, Andy Clark, in his study of the 1981 anti-closure sit-in at the 
VF Corporation’s Lee Jeans factory in Greenock, outlined the way women workers 
became “cause celebres” who achieved a huge amount of exposure.23  A year earlier, 
protesting engineers at the Gardner plant, establishing a ‘publicity committee’, were 
able to conduct a successful propaganda war involving the distribution of biweekly 
newsletters and approximately 150,000 leaflets across the North West.24  When 
reviewing the popularity of these campaigns, it is clear the sharp rise in unemployment 
rates, which often exceeded 3 million in the early 1980s, prompted a degree of public 
support not witnessed in the previous decade, when Bilston’s steelmen were fighting 
for their livelihoods.  
 
21 Mustchin, Conflict, Mobilisation, and De-Industrialisation, pp. 160-161.  
22 Foster and Woolfson, Track Record, p. 51. 
23 Clark, And the next thing, p. 124.  




With later campaigns successfully capturing the imagination of ordinary working-class 
voters, elected officials were impelled to intervene.  In the case of the Cammell Laird 
occupation, strike leaders enjoyed an intimate working relationship with Militant-linked 
civic leaders who, in an act of solidarity, organised a 24-hour sympathy strike that 
involved thousands of public sector employees.  At Lee Jeans, employees were able 
to procure the lobbying expertise of Tony Benn, George Galloway and Michael Foot.  
Similarly, it has been established that Caterpillar employees, garnering, “support from 
all sectors of the political spectrum in Scotland”, developed a powerful cross-party 
lobby.25  
 
Having established an extensive and multifaceted support base, under threat workers 
were able to coordinate a much more proactive campaign than the one undertaken by 
Bilston’s steelmen.  The strength of emotional, political and financial backing facilitated 
the adoption of much more confrontational overall strategic frameworks which centred 
on the use of strikes, working-to-rule, sit-ins and other forms of plant occupation.  Yet 
it must be remembered, these radical forms of industrial action were never feasible 
within the public sector steel industry, as they would have pre-empted the closure of 
facilities by Government backed industry officials who not only controlled supply lines, 
but also monopolised the domestic market.  Even if this wasn’t the case, this thesis 
has demonstrated that there was little appetite for such forms of workplace protest 
amongst steel union bureaucrats. 
 
 
25 Foster and Woolfson, Track Record, p. 48. 
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This is not to suggest that the tactics implemented by WACs elsewhere within BSC 
mirrored those of the BJUAC.  Reconsidering the limited post-war labour 
historiography of steelworker mobilisation, the work of David Stewart demonstrates 
that, in the mid-1980s, another Government-backed plan to close Ravenscraig was 
successfully thwarted by the so-called ‘Scottish lobby’.  Representing the, “final symbol 
of Scottish industrial virility”, the author reveals that the fight for jobs was led by the 
Standing Committee for the Defence of the Scottish Steel Industry, a broad-based, 
cross-party interest group who fought a largely political campaign that argued for the 
retention of the lossmaking facility on social lines.26  In doing so, Stewart highlights the 
role of Scottish Conservative Party officials, as well as STUC leaders who, as the 
“lynchpin” of the struggle, functioned as an, “organisational hub, coordinating the 
Scottish consensus with considerable skill and tact”.27 Yet, by focusing exclusively on 
the institutional aspects of the fight for steelmaking, the political historian’s narrow, 
top-down study completely mutes the voices of local workers. 
 
Whilst Allen Maunders’ first-hand account of the fight at Corby works is, on the other 
hand, an impressive study of rank and filism in steel, it also reveals a significantly 
different experience to that of Bilston.  A Process of Struggle also determines how this 
purpose built mono-town’s socio-cultural setting directly impacted the strategic 
direction of the campaign, with participants steeped in a tradition of popular protest 
that had been imported from Scotland’s industrial heartlands.28  With the fortunes of 
 
26 Stewart, Fighting for Survival, p. 49. 
27 Ibid., p. 56. 
28 With the opening of a fully-integrated greenfield iron, steel and tube works by S&L in 1934, thousands 
of unemployed Clyde Valley steelworkers flocked to the sleepy rural Northamptonshire town.  Referred 
to as ‘Little Scotland’, approximately one-third of Corby’s population were Scottish born by the time the 
industry was nationalised in the late 1960s.  This seismic demographic shift manifested itself in a unique 
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the works explicitly linked to the life of the town, it was decided that, “since the 
threatened closure would affect the wider community, then they should be drawn into 
the struggle, (and that the campaign) … was too important to be restricted to the 
works”.29  The result was a local battle that was “primarily one of activists” who, in 
contrast to the BJUAC, pushed a, “special pleading, social consequences line of 
argument; the community case” for almost the entirety of the campaign.30  Moreover, 
community leaders, initially unshackled by the institutional labour movement, 
independently plotted a sophisticated ‘Save Steel, Save Corby’ PR exercise that 
featured an array of imaginative workplace and extra-workplace direct actions.31 
 
Another key variance to the battle for Bilston was the apathy of a workforce whose 
internal fragmentation persistently undermined the propaganda war being coordinated 
away from the shop-floor.  Described by Maunders as a “struggle within a struggle”, 
the fight for tube and steelmaking was repeatedly overshadowed by fraternal and 
 
collective cultural identity, with the town hosting an annual Highland Gathering that attracts thousands 
of local inhabitants. 
29 Maunders, A Process of Struggle, p. 20. 
30 Ibid., p. x and p. 32. 
31 Under the supervision of ROSAC’s publicity subdivision, a team of local artist-activists coordinated a 
wide range of vibrant community schemes.  Led by award-winning painter, Bryan Blumer, they designed 
a range of unique promotion materials such as lapel badges, car stickers and t-shirts.  Meanwhile, a 
group known as the ‘phantom painters’ broke into the works and graffitied ‘Save our Steel’ on the 
facility’s huge, landmark gas holders, whilst a cohort of writers published a regular newsletter titled ‘The 
Steelfight News’.  Seeking to draw national media and wider public attention to their struggle, campaign 
leaders organised several publicity stunts including the staged kidnapping of comedian Dora Bryan, the 
release of a protest album by musician and Northamptonshire native Mick Carver, the launch of a pirate 
radio station called ‘Atlantis’, and a six-day ‘hunger march’ to Grosvenor Place.  The PR campaign was 




political schisms between all grades of worker.32  Adopting a much more 
confrontational approach than their Black Country colleagues, the Corby action 
committee (ROSAC) also involved themselves in high-profile clashes with local and 
national Government figures, senior BSC officials and, inevitably, national union 
leaders.  This culminated in ROSAC supporters, many of whom were women activists, 
accusing Hector Smith of indulging in an, “arm around the shoulder male chauvinistic 
act”.33  Meanwhile, ISTC-affiliated shop stewards, exhibiting and institutional infidelity 
that contrasted with their fraternal brothers within the BJUAC, openly mocked their 
General Secretary for being a “queer fella”.34  
 
Indeed, with the bulk of the campaign centring on “community participation”, the 
assistance of union headquarters was not called upon until it reached its apex in 
September 1979, when Bob Scholey threatened to unilaterally post a 12-month 
rundown letter at the lossmaking facility.35  Despite deep reservations, this prompted 
ROSAC leaders to become more union oriented, “moving steadily and more firmly into 
formal engagement with BSC management through the trade unions and, in particular, 
the TUC Steel Committee”.36  It is only at this final stage that A Process of Struggle, 
and the activities of Corby’s protesting steelworkers, begin to mirror those outlined in 
this thesis.  With the Northamptonshire plant’s fate now firmly in the hands of apathetic 
and disorganised national steel union officials, a familiar pattern emerged: 
 
 
32 Ibid., p. 22. 
33 Ibid., p. 136. 
34 Ibid., p. 199. 
35 Ibid., p. 21. 
36 Ibid., p. 149. 
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1. Assisted by a team of academics recruited by ROSAC, Dennis Delay produced 
a paper summarising calls for the retention of the Northampton facility for 
commercial reasons; 
2. With the paper rejected by obdurate industry officials and a formal closure 
notice posted, desperate workers sought to coordinate an eleventh-hour 
furnace reline and plant takeover; 
3. Responding to local pressure, Sirs forlornly lobbied the EEC, before publicly 
declaring “we are in dispute” with Grosvenor House over Corby; 
4. Despite this public proclamation, the TUCSICC Chair and his colleagues 
refused to answer desperate calls for a national stoppage. 
 
The result of this process left ROSAC horribly exposed and Corby’s beleaguered 
workforce were eventually lured by the prospect of a golden handshake: 
 
There remained two major and continuing concerns … the lure of redundancy 
payments and the poor state of repair in some threatened areas of the plant.  
Both were seen as weakening support at local level and potentially fatal in any 
attempt to keep the workforce even nominally behind the fight once the formal 
closure date was announced.37 
 





37 Ibid., p. 210. 
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The Significance of In the Shadow of Elisabeth: 
 
This thesis represents a vital contribution to the historiography of rank and file trade 
unionism and workers’ mobilisation.  Locality is key.  Frustratingly, Black Country 
workers remain marginalised by academia: erroneously viewed as a passive and 
disorganised mass.  Historians have continued to cast their scholarly gaze towards 
regions whose inhabitants are deemed to possess a proclivity for radical collective 
action.  The post-war labour historiography continues to be dominated by studies of 
workers who are deemed to possess a more heightened working-class 
consciousness: the Welsh coalminer, the Liverpudlian docker and the Upper Clyde 
shipbuilder, to name but a few.   
 
The submission of this thesis coincides with the three-decade anniversary of local 
historian John Benson expressing his frustration at the paucity of work on this 
disregarded region.  Yet his call to arms had very little impact, with a frustratingly 
limited body of work still governed by a small cohort of literary icons idly overstating 
the submissiveness of their subjects.  That is until now.  By providing a voice to the 
hitherto overlooked post-war Black Country steelworker, In the Shadow of Elisabeth 
has offered the reader a detailed insight into the complexities of industrial change and, 
more importantly, processes of working-class organisation in the erstwhile workshop 
of the world.   
 
Contrasting with earlier top-down studies of steel, this survey has handed full political 
agency to ordinary men who engaged in extraordinary, solidaristic collective direct 
action in a spirited fight for the right to work.  Previously forgotten, the battle for Bilston 
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represents a crucial chapter in the history of the domestic labour movement.  
Signifying the longest and most extensive industrial and political grassroots campaign 
witnessed in steel – and, indeed, the West Midlands – the real impetus came from the 
shop-floor and not the corridors of power at the centre.  A story of recession and 
retrenchment, it features exceptional acts of resistance undertaken by rank and file 
workers facing intolerable injustices. 
 
There are a number of lessons that can be learnt from the events that took place in 
Bilston throughout the 1970s; the principal one being that the ongoing fight for workers’ 
rights must be grassroots in nature.  The courage and determination of Bilston’s rank 
and file reminds us that, if ordinary labouring men don’t collectivise to resist mass 
unemployment, then all powerful elites will reign supreme.  Abandoned by the very 
institutions that were tasked with protecting them, local steelmen bravely navigated a 
hostile industrial and political terrain, deploying a full range of skills during a 
sophisticated and multifaceted decade-long campaign of resistance.  The action 
committee and their supporters could have done little else to safeguard the industrial 
culture and heritage of their beloved community.   
 
Disregarding the inevitable outcome, this study demonstrates that with unity comes 
strength: only together can we control our own destinies – a lesson that is as pertinent 
today as it was all those years ago.  In the Shadow of Elisabeth, therefore, stands as 
a permanent tribute to the people of Bilston – their working lives, their industriousness, 
their perseverance, their audacity and, above all, their spirit; all of which couldn’t be 
extinguished even after the closure of their works.  They were – and continue to be – 




This thesis has utilised an interdisciplinary methodology that has benefitted from a rich 
and varied primary source base.  Accessing pre-existing – yet largely unexplored – 
documentary material locked away in formal archive settings permitted a 
comprehensive survey of institutional activity at the centre.  The WCA and MRC 
collections not only widen our understanding of the behaviour of the state, capital and 
management, but also the activities of the institutional labour movement vis-à-vis 
ordinary members.  Any concerns over the top-down perspective furnished by these 
officially sanctioned organisational collections were assuaged by the aforementioned 
frontline community project.  ITSOE’s archive collection, established following a 
sustained process of stakeholder engagement, allowed the reconstruction of rank and 
file activity at Bilston during the anti-closure campaign.  Of significance were a large 
volume of documents produced by local trade unionists – personal correspondence, 
diaries and minute books – which helped determine the overall strategic framework 
adopted by local shop stewards throughout their decade-long fight for jobs.  Whereas 
this informal collection at least provided an antidote to the one-dimensional nature of 
traditional depositories, they still only represented a partial account of what is an 
incredibly complex narrative. 
 
Seeking to fill this discernible empirical void, the author delved into the ITSOE oral 
history collection.  By revealing what everyday life was like on Bilston’s shop-floor 
during a period of retrenchment, the personal testimonies extend our knowledge of the 
impact de-industrialisation has on ordinary workers.  Moreover, by helping to gauge 
the mindset of local steelmen at various stages of the campaign, these reminiscences 
deepen our understanding of workers mobilisation against plant closures and mass 
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redundancy.  When combined with the documentary source material accessed in both 
formal and informal collections, they have enabled the adoption of a methodical and 
empirically rich analysis of both institutional and rank and file conduct. 
 
Despite prompting an intimate and microscopic account of the battle for Bilston works, 
In the Shadow of Elisabeth’s methodological underpinnings are not without flaws.  It 
must be stressed that, even after an extensive and multidimensional process of 
community outreach by the author, the interview sample was restricted to the sole 
surviving member of the BJUAC and their staunch supporters.  The activist orientation 
of interviewees explicitly defines the narrative of the thesis, leaving a discernible 
thematic gap.  This was not for any lack of desire.  The handful of traceable ex-
steelmen who had become dissenting figures during the campaign were less inclined 
to offer their personal testimonies, with at least one displaying unease over the 
ramifications of criticising campaign leaders and Dennis Turner in particular.  Many 
migrant and women employees, meanwhile, failed to answer the interview call, 
perhaps feeling their recollections were of little merit.  In this sense, some voices 
remain muted and questions unanswered. 
 
Those topics that have, therefore, fallen beyond the scope of this broad-church thesis 
warrant further scholarly attention.  As has been repeatedly asserted, the BJUAC 
enjoyed widespread support until the final stage of the battle for steelmaking, when a 
sizeable contingent of the wider workforce became disillusioned with the direction of 
the stuttering campaign.  The voices of these so-called ‘cut and runners’ and their 
leaders, the ‘head turners’, have been largely excluded from our narrative.  Any future 
study into the battle of Bilston should seek to accurately establish what specifically 
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motivated these dissenting figures.  How did they interact with the BJUAC and their 
diehard supporters, and in what forms did they demonstrate their opposition to the 
direction of the campaign?  Likewise, how were they viewed by the wider community, 
both in the immediate aftermath of closure and in the long-term?  
 
Another topic worthy of extensive enquiry is the role played by marginalised 
participants.  Once again, this thesis has only momentarily discussed the activities of 
Bilston’s female employees.  Any future study should, therefore, seek to establish what 
prompted them to actively participate in the anti-closure struggle and how, in their 
view, they were regarded by their male counterparts.  Moreover, the personal 
experiences of the wives of Bilston’s steelmen, both during and after the battle to save 
the plant’s heavy-end, warrants further investigation.  How did they participate?  In 
what way did they support the financial impact of the GWW or the three-month steel 
strike? How did redundancy and long-term employment impact domestic life and the 
family unit? 
 
An additional minority group deserving of their own detailed study is Bilston’s BAME 
workforce, a sizeable cohort that included some of the BJUAC’s most enthusiastic and 
passionate supporters.  Why did these men, many of whom arrived from the Indian 
subcontinent in the 1950s and 1960s, participate in the struggle with such 
enthusiasm?  Did their experiences of the independence struggle back home impact 
their decision to participate in collective, direct extra-workplace action? What impact, 
if any, did the anti-closure campaign have on race relations both inside and outside 
the confines of the plant?  Post-industrial activities could also be documented, with 
any future studies seeking to measure the impact closure had on political 
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consciousnesses and social mobility amongst migrant ex-steelworkers.  Any such 
work should be community-centred and involve the collection of oral histories. 
 
Indeed, the long-term experiences of the Black Country’s redundant steelmen are 
currently being recorded by fellow University of Wolverhampton researcher Paul 
Barnsley, himself the son of a former plant employee.  His timely oral history exploring 
the impact de-industrialisation had on the lives of past and present generations of 
Black Country residents will complete the narrative of the battle for Bilston iron and 
steelworks, an epoch-making event that continues to impact the town to this day. 
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A. Archival Material 
 
1. ITSOE Collection 
 
Interviews, BCA1/0: 
Allen, L., Oral testimony recorded by ITSOE, 12 August 2015 
Allen, L., and R. Allen., Oral Testimony recorded by ITSOE, 15 October 2014 
Anonymous, Oral Testimony recorded by ITSOE, 15 October 2014 
Anonymous, Oral testimony recorded by ITSOE, 15 April 2015 
Birch, M., Oral Testimony recorded by ITSOE, 15 October 2014 
Boulton, J., Oral Testimony recorded by ITSOE, 15 October 2014 
Boulton, J., Oral Testimony recorded by ITSOE, 16 March 2015 
Hickey, A., Oral testimony recorded by ITSOE, 15 October 2014 
Howe, G., Oral testimony recorded by ITSOE, 25 January 2015 
Simpkiss, C., Oral testimony recorded by ITSOE, 8 March 2015 
Vincent, J., Oral Testimony recorded by ITSOE, 15 October 2014 
Winmill, P., Oral testimony recorded by ITSOE, 16 March 2015 
 
Local and national Government files and correspondence, BCA1/1: 
Letter from N. Ridley to R. Edwards, 10 March 1972 
Letter from R. Short to D. Hunter, 27 March 1972 
Letter from J. Melchett to R. Edwards, 26 April 1972 
Letter from J. Gilbert to J. Melchett, 14 June 1972 
 
Minutes of Works Council, JWP and BJUAC meetings, BCA1/2: 
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Statement made by J. Pennington, 8 November 1977 
Preliminary JWP meeting, 24 November 1977 
First meeting of the Technical Sub-Committee of the JWP, 2 December 1977 
Minutes of Bilston Works Council meeting, 18 January 1978 
First meeting of the Personnel Sub-Committee of the JWP, 20 February 1978 
Minutes of an Extraordinary Meeting of the Bilston Works Council, 28 April 1978 
Minutes of Bilston Works Council meeting, 17 January 1979 
BJUAC statement to Bilston Works Council, undated 
 
Publicity, pamphlets, flyers, BCA1/3: 
BJUAC Remit, 6 January 1978 
Workers’ Unity pamphlet, 20 July 1978 
SCLV pamphlet, 11 September 1978 
Frank Wall Paper, undated  
 
Official reports and studies, BCA1/4: 
The Social and Economic Impact of the Closure of British Steel - Bilston works, 
February 1978 
JWP, The Future of Bilston Works, 31 March 1978 
TUCSICC, The Delay Paper, September 1978 
JURUE, The Future of Bilston Steelworks, March 1979 
BJUAC, The Bilston Dimension, undated 
 
Local and national union files and correspondence, BCA1/5: 
Letter from A. Tudor to R. Harrison, 1 February 1978 
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Proceedings from ISTC No.4 Division Conference of Branch Officers, 15 April 1978 
Letter from J. Gavin to D. Turner, 21 June 1978 
Letter from C. Baines to W. Sirs, 14 December 1978 
Letter from D. Turner to W. Sirs, 9 January 1979 
Letter from G. Fazey to W. Sirs, 9 January 1979 
Letter from J. Bailey to W. Sirs, 12 January 1979 
Letter from Swinton House to G. Fazey, 16 January 1979 
Letter from P. Johnson to D. Turner, 18 March 1979 
Letter from G. Fazey to W. Sirs, undated 
Letter from A. Tudor to R. Harrison, undated 
Letter from D. Turner to W. Sirs, undated 
J. Bate, Speech to TUC Congress, undated  
 
BSC files and correspondence, BCA1/6: 
Letter from D. Hunter to M. Finniston, 20 June 1972 
British Steel Corporation and Trade Union Congress Steel and Iron Consultative 
Committee, Reductions in Employment Costs and Improvement in Labour 
Productivity, 23 January 1976 
Minutes of Bilston Works Annual Progress Review meeting, 11 May 1977 
Letter from D. Houghton to unknown, 28 April 1978 
Letter from R. Griffiths to J. Booth, 29 June 1978 
Letter from R. Scholey to W. Sirs, 30 January 1979 
 
 




British Steel Corporation (BSC) and predecessor bodies, 1896 – 1981, files 
concerning closure of works, MSS.365/BSC/56: 
BSC, Bilston review, June 1980  
Letter from BSC to Bilston employees, undated. 
 
ISTC, BISAKTA and predecessors, operations and research, branch correspondence, 
M to W, 1979 – 1984, MSS.36/2000/260: 
Letter from R. Bishop to W. Sirs, 30 June 1980 
Letter from E. Wall to W. Sirs, 12 November 1980 
 
ISTC, BISAKTA and predecessors, operations and research, branch correspondence, 
Ravenscraig 10 to Workington T&S, 1971 – 1978, MSS.36/2000/258: 
Letter from D. Hamilton to D. Davies, 3 May 1973 
Letter from D. Hamilton to D. Davies, 8 May 1973 
Letter from J. Jones to W. Sirs, 24 November 1978 
 
ISTC, BISAKTA and predecessors, operations and research, correspondence 
concerning joint committees of branches, 1960s – 1970s, MSS.36/2000/282: 
Letter from R. Turley to D. Davies, 23 February 1972 
Letter from D. Davies to R. Turley, 25 February 1972 
Letter from G. Saul to P. Watts, 7 March 1972 
Letter from A. Taylor to D. Davies, 17 March 1972 
Letter from J. Clarke to W. Sirs, 21 April 1978 
Letter from G. Fazey to W. Sirs, 23 November 1978 
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Letter from W. Sirs to G. Fazey, 5 December 1978 
Letter from P. Watts to W. Sirs, 15 December 1978 
 
ISTC, BISAKTA and predecessors, communications and publicity, circulars to 
divisional officers, 1938 – 1983, MSS.36/2000/211: 
Letter from J. Gavin to W. Sirs, 27 January 1978 
Letter from J. Gavin to W. Sirs, 3 February 1978 
Letter from D. Turner to W. Sirs, 11 June 1978 
Letter from W. Sirs to D. Turner, 14 June 1978 
 
ISTC, BISAKTA and predecessors, operations and research, divisional 
correspondence and related records: division correspondence: division 4 (West 
Midlands), 1939-1991, MSS.36/2000/225: 
Letter from J. Gavin to W. Sirs, 27 January 1978 
Letter from J. Gavin to W. Sirs, 3 February 1978 
Letter from D. Turner to W. Sirs, 11 June 1978 
Letter from W. Sirs to D. Turner, 14 June 1978 
 
ISTC, BISAKTA and predecessors, communications and publicity, quarterly and 
annual reports, 1960 – 1965, MSS.36/ISTC/4/7 
 
ISTC, BISAKTA and predecessors, communications and publicity, quarterly and 




ISTC, BISAKTA and predecessors, communications and publicity, quarterly and 
annual reports, 1972 – 1976, MSS.36/ISTC/4/9: 
Minutes of ISTC E.C. meeting, 15 November 1972 
Minutes of special ISTC E.C. meeting, 22 March 1976 
 
ISTC, BISAKTA and predecessors, communications and publicity, quarterly and 
annual reports, 1977 – 1981, MSS.36/ISTC/4/10: 
Minutes of ISTC E.C. meeting, 17-19 August 1977 
Minutes of ISTC E.C. meeting, 16-18 November 1977 
Minutes of ISTC E.C. meeting, 16-18 August 1978 
Minutes of special ISTC E.C. meeting, 25 January 1979 
Minutes of special ISTC E.C. meeting, 16 March 1979 
Minutes of special ISTC E.C. meeting, 11 April 1979 
Minutes of special ISTC E.C. meeting, 18-25 February 1980 
Minutes of ISTC E.C. meeting, 20-22 August 1980 
Minutes of ISTC E.C. meeting, 16 September 1980 
Minutes of ISTC EC meeting, 19-21 November 1980 
 
SIMA, consultations: BSC development and closure programmes, proposed cessation 
of iron and steelmaking at BSC Bilston works 1978 – 1979, 755/4/4/4 and 755/4/4/5: 
Letter from D. Murray to D. Turner, 29 September 1977 
Transcript of telephone conversation between D. Hunter and G. Bamber, 9 December 
1977 
Minutes of meeting between the Bilston JWP and Sheffield Division Steelworks Group 
Planning Committee, 14 April 1978 
`464 
 
Memo from J. Pennington to R. Scholey, 27 April 1978 
Letter from J. Pennington to D. Delay, 30 May 1978 
Letter from D. Turner to miscellaneous, 4 July 1978 
Letter from F. Chaney to R. Muir, 21 July 1978 
Minutes of special meeting between BSC and SIMA, 23 April 1979 
Letter from D. Turner to D. Murray, undated 
 
TUC, Industries: Steel Committee signed minutes, 13 October 1972 – 6 August 1973, 
MSS.292D/611.41/6 
 
TUC, Industries: Steel Committee signed minutes, 10 September 1973 – 5 August 
1974, MSS.292D/611.41/7 
 
TUC, Industries: Steel Committee signed minutes, 7 October 1974 – 3 February 1975, 
MSS.292D/611.41/8 
 
TUC, Industries: Steel Committee signed minutes, 3 March 1975 – 4 August 1975, 
MSS.292D/611.41/9 
 
TUC, Industries: Steel Committee signed minutes, 6 October 1975 – 12 August 1976, 
MSS.292D/611.41/10 
 
TUC, Industries: Steel Committee signed minutes, 14 October 1976 – 8 September 
1977, MSS.292D/611.41/11: 




TUC, Industries: Steel Committee signed minutes, 13 October 1977 – 2 February 
1978, MSS.292D/611.41/12: 
Minutes of special meeting between the TUCSICC and BSC, 12 January 1978 
Minutes of meeting between the TUCSICC and BSC, 11 May 1978  
Minutes of special meeting between the TUCSICC and BSC, 12 December 1978 
 
TUC, Industries: Steel Committee signed minutes, 7 March 1978 – 7 September 1978, 
MSS.292D/611.41/13: 
TUCSICC discussion document: Future BSC Investment Strategy and Works 
Closures, 7 March 1978 
Minutes of TUCSICC meeting, 13 April 1978 
Minutes of TUCSICC meeting, 11 May 1978 
TUCSICC discussion document: A Policy for Closures, June 1978 
Minutes of meeting between the TUCSICC and BSC, 7 June 1978 
Minutes of special TUCSICC meeting, 30 June 1978 
Minutes of meeting between the TUCSICC and BSC, 30 June 1978 
Minutes of TUCSICC meeting, 10-12 July 1978 
Minutes of TUCSICC meeting, 7 September 1978 
 
TUC, Industries: Steel Committee signed minutes, 12 October 1978 – 8 March 1979, 
MSS.292D/611.41/14: 




TUC, Industries: Steel Committee signed minutes, 12 April 1979 – 4 September 1979, 
MSS.292D/611.41/15: 
Minutes of special meeting between the TUCSICC and BSC, 16 March 1979 
Minutes of meeting between the TUCSICC and BSC, 12 April 1979 
Minutes of meeting between the TUCSICC and BSC, 12 July 1979 
BSC, Comments on the JURUE Report: The Future of Bilston Works, undated 
 
TUC, Industries: Steel Committee signed minutes, 11 October 1979 – 14 February 
1980, MSS.292D/611.41/16 
 
TUC, Industries: Steel Committee signed minutes, 13 March 1980 – 4 September 
1980, MSS.292D/611.41/17: 
Minutes of TUCSICC meeting, 14 August 1980 
 
TUC, Industries: Steel Committee signed minutes, 9 October 1980 – 10 September 
1981, MSS.292D/611.41/18 
 
TUC, Industries: steel, closures, 16 March 1979 – 17 October 1979, 
MSS.292D/611.432/43: 
TUC inter-departmental correspondence, D. Delay to L. Murray, 16 March 1979 
TUC inter-departmental correspondence, D. Delay to L. Murray, 19 June 1978 
 
3. Wolverhampton City Archives 
 
Records of Alfred Hickman Ltd., 1897 – 1920, DB-31/1: 
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Correspondence, 1875 – 1920, DB-31/1/1 
Financial and accounting records, 1881 – 1931, DB-31/1/3 
Production records, 1907 – 1932, DB-31/1/4 
Employment records, 1915 – 1928, DB-31/1/6 
 
Records of Stewarts and Lloyds Ltd., 1912 – c.1990s, DB-31/2: 
Administrative records, 1947 – 1978, DB-31/2/1 
Financial and accounting records, 1929 – 1972, DB-31/2/4 
Employment records, 1912 – c.1990s, DB-31/2/5 
Production and sales records, 1942 – 1947, DB-31/2/6 
Technical records, 1922 – 1962, DB-31/2/7 
 
Records of British Steel Corporation, 1967 – 1980, DB-31/3: 
Administrative records, 1971 – c.1979, DB-31/3/1 
Correspondence, 1973 – 1975, DB-31/3/2 
Financial and accounting records, 1963 – 1978, DB-31/3/3 
Employment records, 1966 – 1971, DB-31/3/4 
Technical records, 1970 – 1978, DB-31/3/5 
Promotional material, 1974 – 1979, DB-31/3/7 
 
The closure of British Steel at Bilston, 1972 – 1979, DW-173/1: 
 
British Steel, 1977 – 1979, DW-173/1/1: 
Minutes of Bilston Works Council meeting, 13 February 1975 
Statement by C. Villiers to Bilston Works Council, 26 November 1976 
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Letter from S. Bull to Bilston works management committee, 5 July 1977 
Statement made by S. Bull to Bilston Works Council, 25 August 1977 
Letter from J. Pennington to D. Turner, 31 October 1977 
Minutes of Primary Mills Joint Consultative Council meeting, 1 February 1979 
Memorandum of agreement, 1 May 1979 
 
The Iron and Steel Trades Confederation, 1975 – 1979, DW-173/1/2: 
Letter from E. Wilson to G. Fazey, 18 December 1977 
Letter from J. Gavin to G. Fazey, 11 September 1978 
Letter from A. Farley to ISTC E.C., 15 January 1979 
Telegram from W. Sirs to R. Scholey, 16 March 1979 
Telegram from W. Sirs to E. Davignon, 19 March 1979 
Letter from B. Irvine to G. Fazey, undated 
 
Trade Unions, 1979 – 1979, DW-173/1/3:  
SIMA statement to Sheffield Division, 1 December 1977 
Letter from H. Penny to D. Turner, 3 February 1978 
Letter from W. Little to D. Turner, 23 May 1978 
Letter from S. Clarke to L. Murray, 26 May 1978 
Letter from R. Edwards to J. Miles, 5 June 1978 
Letter from W. Sirs to G. Fazey, 20 November 1978 
Letter from J. Miles to R. Edwards, undated 
 
Works Action Committee, 1977 – 1979, DW-173/1/4: 
Letter from R. Turley to S. Bull, 27 September 1977 
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Letter from D. Turner to miscellaneous, 28 March 1978 
Letter from A. Hutnik to G. Howe, 13 July 1978 
Letter from G. Fazey to all branch secretaries, 7 September 1978 
Questions to be submitted to the TUCSICC, 7 September 1978 
Letter from D. Turner to unknown, 3 November 1978 
Letter from G. Fazey to W. Sirs, 20 February 1979 
Resolutions, undated 
 
MPs and Parliament, 1978 – 1979, DW-173/1/5: 
Letter from R. Edwards to R. Turley, 5 April 1973 
Letter from D. Turner to R. Edwards, 15 May 1973 
Letter from R. Edwards to R. Turley, 23 May 1973 
Letter from D. Turner to J. Callaghan, 21 September 1977 
Letter from R. Edwards to E. Varley, 11 November 1977 
Letter from L. Huckfield to C. Phipps, 15 February 1978 
Letter from G. Kaufman to A. Benn, 23 May 1978 
Letter from N. Lamont to D. Turner, 18 September 1978 
Letter from L. Huckfield to D. Turner, 9 October 1978 
Letter from W. Sirs to G. Fazey, 20 December 1978 
Letter from C. Phipps to E. Varley, 13 February 1979 
Letter from G. Kaufman to C. Phipps, 6 March 1979 
Letter from P. Turner to R. Short, undated 
Letter from G. Andrews to E. Varley, undated 
 
Local Councils, 1978 – 1979, DW-173/1/6: 
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Letter from R. Boffy to J. Callaghan, 14 November 1977 
 
University of Salford and University of Aston, 1977 – 1979, DW-173/1/8:  
JURUE, A Proposal for an Independent Appraisal of the Situation, July 1978 
J. Aylen, Bottom Blown Oxygen Steelmaking at Bilston, August 1978  
Meeting to discuss Q-BOP steelmaking at Bilston, 8 November 1978 
Letter from J. Aylen to D. Turner, 19 November 1978 
 
Production figures, profits and loss and other statistics, 1972 – 1979, DW-173/1/9 
 
Correspondence and papers of Dennis Turner, 1972 – 1979, DW-173/1/10: 
Letter from G. Goodman to D. Turner, 1 May 1979 
D. Turner, Report on Annual Conference of the Labour Party, undated 
 
Publications concerning the closure of British Steel at Bilston, 1966 – 1978, DW-173/2: 
British Steel Corporation Confidential Reports, DW-173/2/1 
 
The New Springvale Club, 1982 – 2007, DW-173/3: 
Rules of The New Springvale Club, DW-173/3/1 
Papers of Dennis Turner concerning Club activities, 1983 – 1984, DW-173/3/3 
 
Education, 1984 – 1990, DW-173/4: 
Manpower Services Commission and the YTS scheme, 1986 – 1987, DW-173/4/3 




Family documents, 1945 – 1974, DW-173/5: 
Turner family documents (1945 – 1974), DW-173/5/1 
 
Wolverhampton Art Gallery Local History Collection, DX-894/9/3/2: 
A Brief History of Bilston Iron and Steelworks 
 
Ephemera, DX-634/134: 
“Little Alfie” election handbill 
 
Local and parliamentary election addresses (1955-1983), DX/203/10: 
D. Turner, Travel our Way, 7 May 1981 
 
Documenting the Workshop of the World, Bilston oral histories, LS/LB/2: 
Turner, D., Oral testimony recorded by Helen Sykes, 15 June 2007 
 
LS: No Title Substitute, LS/LB8p: 
Rev. C. Lee, A Sermon to Ironmasters, Merchants and Others on the Sins of the Iron 
Trade 
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